



CONSULTATION ON EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY

25-26 September 2010, Ditchley Park

Policy Highlights

On September 25 and 26, 2010, the EastWest Institute (EWI) co-hosted with the Ditchley Foundation a consultation on Euro-Atlantic Security. See participant list attached. This report, like the meeting, is intended to inform EWI choices about next steps in its Track II work on this subject. The report draws out policy highlights and does not try to reflect either a consensus view of the participants or a summary. Therefore some of the ideas may be contradictory. Such a short report cannot fully capture all richness and detail of the discussion. The two-day Consultation provided fresh opportunities for networking of colleagues from the massive OSCE geography. There are two sections: Reframing and Specific Policy Proposals.

REFRAMING

Strategic Reassurance: There is some wide divergence still on what mutually acceptable “assurance” looks like. As a defensive military alliance, NATO has a responsibility for strategic reassurance of its members. It needs to adopt postures that reassure its members and that do not exacerbate their individual conflicts with neighbors. Given the strategic environment in Europe, innovative and purpose-designed confidence-building measures between NATO members, and neighbors with whom NATO has disputes, may be more important forms of reassurance than military deployments inside NATO territory. Russia too has an obligation for reassurance of its neighbors.

Boldness of Action to Exploit the Moment: Europe does not need a new vision of its security. It needs boldness of action and some political risk taking by leaders to put things in order according to agreed principles of treaties in force. There is wide agreement that the current structures have failed in important ways and may not continue to work even imperfectly. The opportunity presented inside Europe at the end of 2010 and the need presented by the emerging international situation outside Europe demand a new political commitment to timely remedial action.

Security and the Threats are Global – Biggest Problems Are Outside Europe: The importance of this “moment” is not just related to the summit season. The next global round of economic uncertainty is of great concern. Moreover, the top tier international threats and international conflicts are not in Europe. The twin summits [NATO and OSCE] must not confine themselves to organizational issues but “think big” about the specific threats and challenges. Then, states will need to review the instruments available to them collectively to address these. It would be easy if the

environment was really just multipolar, but in fact state power is highly differentiated across a variety of problem areas.

OSCE Border with Afghanistan: The OSCE should take a lead in establishing conflict prevention mechanisms on the OSCE border with Afghanistan. OSCE member states need to remain committed to stabilizing Afghanistan. The European Union (EU) needs to consider a more coherent package for the entire Central Asian region, including Afghanistan.

Turkey and Europe: As the OSCE border state facing a security-challenged region, Turkey's needs and interests demand more attention. The EU indecision on Turkish accession may be undermining broader European interests.

Russia's Military Power Weakening: Russia sees its conventional power in decline. This has negatively impacted domestic trust in European institutions. Russia is at crossroads. The OSCE community has to find creative ways to address the transformations in Russia, including through economic partnership and social policy. The Russian government does appear to be more interested now than in recent years in finding creative ways to bind the country to Europe.

American Expectations May Be Misplaced: The expectations addressed to Europe by the United States may be higher than Europe can deliver. That said, European members of NATO need to give more importance to keeping the United States engaged in NATO and Europe. European Foreign and Defence Ministers need to work harder to keep their American counterparts involved.

Completing the Peace Dividend in Europe: There is a fundamental and unnecessary disconnect between NATO Europe and OSCE Europe. Europe needs to explicitly reconcile its commitments to collective self-defence (NATO and CSTO) on the one hand and ideas of common security on the other ("indivisible security"). NATO and Russia have abandoned all planning for large-scale military combat against each other. It is time for politics to catch up with that and for political leaders to adapt military posture and planning accordingly. We have some components ("fragments") of a European system but not a functioning system. Russia has consistently been asking for a more ambitious set of commitments on hard security issues to be captured in a new set of arrangements. There has to be a much stronger alignment among NATO, the EU and OSCE in security policy.

Shifting Gear for Internal Threat: The most serious threats to European security are internal and security structures need to be reformed to address these internal threats rather than continue to operate as if conventional war emanating in Europe is a primary organizational reference point. Europe is almost totally unprepared for certain internal contingencies. These contingencies dictate quite fundamental changes in field organization of European armed forces. [The contingencies referred to by this participant were not elaborated.] A complementary view to this from a different participant was that the domestic concerns include energy dependence, small arms, demographic shifts, resilience in the face of natural disaster or economic shock, and even poverty. [There was little discussion of how these issues would affect national or multilateral security planning.]

Policy Framework for Future Military Action inside Europe: There could be a useful discussion around principles for use of armed forces inside Europe. Possible parameters could include: information sharing and warning, responsiveness, legitimacy, instruments and mission clarity. There is room for concern that Europe will not have the capability to respond adequately to the next internal conflict that turns into large-scale violence.

Can OSCE Live with NATO as Global Enforcer of a Western Vision? The old vision of “Western” security policy, based on liberal pluralist values and willingness to use force, retains high relevance for the coming decade. But it may be in transition, as citizens in some Western countries begin to challenge it. The idea is certainly confrontational to some non-Western members of OSCE. There has been a gradual erosion in the OSCE zone of the underpinnings of cooperative security (understood as interests, values and vision). What is the basis of a compromise here?

Managing Open Borders and Change: CSCE came into being to bring stability and predictability to inter-state security. Now Europe must adjust its organizations and mechanisms to manage change in non-conventional fields of security policy (cyber war or political manipulation of communal conflict) rather than promote stability through conventional force deployments. Whereas CSCE appeared at one level to entrench post-war borders and thereby underpin the division of Europe, Europe must now manage cross-border activities of increasing intensity and scale in a way that integrates Europe. Managing fast-paced change in economics and society is now a more important value for Europe than trying to ensure continuity in intra-European dimensions of hard security. We need to avoid creating a new NATO/Russia border.

Political Will Needed for Dispute Resolution: The biggest challenge for Europe now is to bring predictability to dispute resolution in order to prevent single points of conflict linking up to produce a new division. (This is often referred to as trust building.) Wherever possible, bringing Russia into European decision-making for security on and around the continent is the best way of providing reassurance to Russia. Reassurance of the United States and the need for Europe to support it in global conflicts is equally important. Reassurance of all NATO members remains vital as well. But none of this reassurance can be at the expense of other states. Collective and mutual reassurance has to be the higher goal. Bad neighbor relations and use of veto power may have to be regarded as negative values. [Editor’s note: There was evidence of continuing disputes between leading countries as to who is to blame for the weakening of various assurances.]

Using All Organizations Coherently: One of the major problems is a lack of coordination of common efforts among diverse regional security organizations (OSCE, NATO, CSTO, SCO, CICA) as well as a certain competitiveness among them. A change process must aim to improve NATO-EU cooperation. The EU now constitutes a major transatlantic and global actor, along with NATO. New partnerships between other regional security organizations such as NATO, the EU and CSTO, will be central to strengthening cooperative security arrangements. The response to the crisis in Kyrgyzstan this year showed a good model of cooperation between these organizations. One of the practices we confront now is that states opposed to meaningful change engage in “forum shopping” between different organizations. The EU needs to be lifted much higher into pan-European and trans-Atlantic security planning.

Georgia as a Test-Case: For many, a litmus test of the prospects for positive change will be a restoration of OSCE credibility in Georgia. If no progress is possible on the military or security front, then massive efforts will need to be made on the economic and social fronts, including through provision of economic and reconstruction assistance. An OSCE monitoring presence of some sort probably needs to be re-established in all areas. OSCE needs to be present and effective in all conflict areas.

Cyprus as a Test Case: Others saw resolution of the Cyprus conflict as a litmus test of a renovated OSCE.

Re-setting Arms Control and Confidence Building: There was little opposition to the view that the CFE Treaty represents a cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic Security and that its suspension is related to political events rather than its inefficacy. There were repeated suggestions that the CFE could and should be restored in some form. Starting a new CFE process with a legally binding document as an end-goal was seen as one of the options. It should be focused much more on transparency and confidence-building measures than on the “bean-counting” of the past. Another option is to abandon the CFE format and instead sign a loose agreement composed of different areas/baskets such as military exchange, transparency and confidence-building. Even though Russia endorses CFE, it may not be compatible with Russian interests in a new set of European security agreements as foreshadowed in the Medvedev’s proposal for a new architecture. Confidence-building measures in the OSCE area need a big “rethink” to include new instruments (a hot line network?) and involvement of new actors, such as business and civil society.

Non-Nuclear Europe? The nuclear element is a big driver of NATO’s current military posture in Europe. What will Europe look like if it is de-nuclearized west of the Urals? Nuclear disarmament in Europe has to be raised higher on the policy agenda.

Political Cultures in Sub-Regional Security: There needs to be greater explicit recognition of quite divergent political cultures across Europe and the North Atlantic, based in part on different approaches to state power and different stages of economic prosperity. OSCE states should not pursue diplomatic strategies that assume the world should be uniform. This was not about human rights or different views of political pluralism. In practical terms, this means that conflict resolution in one part of the OSCE zone (say for Turkey’s political leaders or for the states in the Balkans) will look very different from other sub-regions (say for example, in the old EU 15) and possibly be based on quite different assumptions of domestic power politics. Sub-regional solutions may be better than a one-size-fits-all approach. There is an unresolved tension between impulses to maintain national sovereignty and to pursue more effective multilateralism. In some countries, there is a huge reluctance to pool sovereignty. Collective social psychology can have a powerful and often immovable influence on a state’s foreign policy.

Over and Above the Corfu Process: One of the achievements of the Corfu process is the improvement of the security atmosphere and the agreement to hold an OSCE Summit in Astana on December 1-2, 2010. This Summit is not expected to bring any concrete results such as signing important treaties, but rather mark a departure point for new joint action on a variety of fronts under an agreed action plan. The Corfu Process does not offer a strategic level realignment of the sort we need.

SPECIFIC POLICY PROPOSALS

For the Astana Summit and OSCE

1. Commit to regularizing a regime for monitoring and reporting conventional force deployments in Europe as quickly as possible.

2. Commit to regular joint study/reporting by a sub-committee of states of military operational deployments outside Europe that directly affect OSCE members, especially in the West Asia and South Asian regions, and adjacent ocean areas.
3. Create a standing Track II process modeled on the Council on Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific CSCAP in the Asia Pacific to support efforts inside the OSCE for more effective preventive diplomacy and policy development.
4. Convene an OSCE expert group to identify a working package of interconnected initiatives to address the incipient conflicts in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

For NATO

1. Work towards political declarations that offer interpretations of the Article 5 commitment to mutual defence in dealing with new unconventional threats.
2. Complement NATO reliance on military deterrence with a civil-military approach of preventive diplomacy in NATO declarations.
3. Harmonize NATO strategy with the EU Security Strategy to avoid duplicating capabilities especially in crisis management.

For NATO and Russia

1. Revise the format of the NATO-Russia Council to shift from a 28+1 format (as the G8 was originally conceived as G7 + Russia) to a format of 29 (as the G8 more or less became) in considering the most serious global challenges.
2. Convene a standing, high-level mechanism for NATO-Russia cooperative missile defence. Commission a joint threat assessment of missile capabilities and technical requirements for defensive measures.

For regional security organizations (OSCE, EU, NATO, CSTO, SCO) and member states

1. Set up regular consultations among and between all leading security organizations at a pace and intensity commensurate with need.
2. Improve conflict prevention capabilities of regional organizations, especially OSCE, which has achieved a certain level of success in post-conflict “observing” but little in preventive diplomacy.
3. Promote new initiatives for economic development and conflict resolution in individual inter-state conflicts and monitor their success.
4. Take concrete measures to reflect the trans-Atlantic dimension of European security, for example by binding the United States more closely through an ad hoc multilateral group (US – EU-Russia Summit or a similar forum) in order to sustain American interest in European Security and reassure it.
5. On the model of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, create a continental and trans-Atlantic process to directly engage business representatives from East and West in discussing the economic dimension of pan-European security.

PARTICIPANTS

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