Strategic Trust-Building

Key excerpts from her comments are translated below.

On the revised U.S.-Japan defense guidelines:

“The recent update of the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines is aimed at enabling the U.S. and Japan to respond jointly and more effectively to the security challenges of the 21st century…This certainly affects China, and in recent years the U.S. and Japan have both been paying close attention to China’s maritime actions and its hardening posture in the East and South China Seas; however, I personally believe that this update does not specifically target China…The update is timely and prescient, and is predominantly meant to allow Japan, as the United States’ primary ally in Asia, to take on greater security responsibilities”

On the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB):

“The TPP is very important to both the U.S. and Japan. From the U.S. point of view, the TPP is a key part of its ‘Asia Strategy’ and the strategic focus of its economic policy in Asia. In Japan, Abe has spent a great deal of domestic political capital to push for progress on the TPP. He hopes that joining the TPP would push forward domestic reforms in Japan, particularly in agriculture and the economy.

The AIIB and TPP clearly serve two different functions and cannot be compared directly. The TPP negotiations are moving into their final stages. If an agreement can be reached and implemented within a short period of time, it would have a positive effect on the United States’ reputation, standing and influence in Asia…While the AIIB puts some pressure on the TPP negotiations, the TPP’s main obstacles and sources of pressure come more from U.S. and Japanese domestic politics than from strategic pressures.”

On Abe’s speech in Congress:

“I believe those who wanted Abe to apologize directly [for Japan’s role using ‘comfort women’ during World War II] were disappointed, as he himself did not actually apologize. He also did not directly address the topic of ‘comfort women’…Though Abe expressed remorse and pledged self-reflection [on this issue], there are still people who would want a sincere apology from Abe himself. ”

On the U.S.-Japan alliance’s impact on China-Japan and U.S.-China relations:

“There has always been strategic mistrust in China-Japan and U.S.-China relations. The mistrust between China and Japan is mostly the result of historical issues and the relationship has been afflicted by a sense that the war remains ‘unsettled.’ I think a stronger U.S.-Japan alliance would deepen mistrust between China and Japan, particularly on military issues. Abe himself hopes that Japan can ‘normalize’ as a country and break free from the restrictions set by its pacifist constitution.

I believe Japan and the U.S. must, through public diplomacy, clarify and explain to China and other Asian countries how a closer U.S.-Japan alliance, particularly a closer military alliance, can benefit the entire region.”

To view the interview at NTDtv, click here. (Mandarin)

According to Miller, the relationship between the two powers are contingent on significant contributions from both parties; "significant national security and defense reforms on the Japanese side and a rebalance toward Asia on the United States’ side." Though there are a number of political obstacles on both sides, Miller says that the relationship can "serve as the foundation for a networked alliance approach to peace and security challenges in the Asia-Pacific."

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To read the full article, click here.(Paywall)

Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani’s visit to India will help set the new direction of bilateral ties. 

India was the first country with which Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement, but the dynamics of the relationship has changed with Ghani, a US-educated former World Bank official, assuming power. 

Ghani has visited China, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the US before coming to India. In China he spoke incautiously of Afghanistan’s new external priorities which seem to have relegated India to the outermost circle. 

He has also decided not to pursue the request for defence equipment from India, which would suit us as we are hardly in a position to substantially meet Afghanistan’s critical requirements, but this does jolt the relationship politically. 

He obviously feels that he must engage Pakistan vigorously and obtain its cooperation for pushing the reconciliation process with the Taliban.

In this spirit he has made some unusual gestures, such as meeting the Pakistani army chief at his headquarters in Rawalpindi, besides engaging in coordinated operations with the Pakistan army against the Pakistani Taliban on Afghan soil. 

Reconciliation 

Ghani has also sent six officers for training at the Pakistani military academy to allay Pakistani anger at Afghan officers being trained exclusively in India. 

In return, Pakistan has not yet concretely facilitated the reconciliation process, opening Ghani to domestic criticism for this lack of reciprocity. 

Ghani is also counting on China to influence Pakistan to actively promote the reconciliation process, besides providing economic support to Afghanistan to compensate for the economic consequences of Western troop withdrawal. 

He probably calculates that India’s capacity to economically help is limited because of lack of contiguity and negative Pakistani policies, and that China could be a more productive partner. 

China has expressed its willingness to help in the reconciliation process. Its investment commitments — in the Aynak copper mines for instance — are known. 

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project indicates far-reaching Chinese plans to bring this region into its economic orbit, from which Afghanistan would potentially benefit. 

Ostensibly, Ghani is thinking in hard, practical terms of Afghanistan’s national interest. The Afghan polity is not unanimous on Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan and the Taliban. 

If this is pushed too far without adequate fruits from the exercise appearing quickly, political fissures in Kabul could widen. 

As it is, there is a suspicion that Ghani is seeking to strengthen the Pashtun elements in the polity at the expense of other ethnic groups. It is too early yet to see things clearly as no talks with the Taliban have begun. 

Accommodating the Taliban in the power structure in Afghanistan unconditionally will meet resistance from other ethnic groups, especially the idea of giving them governorships and ministerial appointments outside any electoral process. 

This will be seen as a weakening of the fledgling democratic base of the country. 

Strategy 

Whatever it might want the international community to believe, Pakistan has not given up its strategic ambitions in Afghanistan. It remains opposed to the Indian presence there. 

The West accepts Pakistan’s strategic oversight over Afghanistan, even when it has suffered greatly from its duplicitous policies. 

Pakistan has been the real problem in Afghanistan, providing safe-havens to the Taliban and abetting terrorist attacks there, but all this is being overlooked and Pakistan is now being seen as the key to the solution in Afghanistan. 

With this kind of acceptance of Pakistan’s policy in Afghanistan, why should it change its strategic designs in that country? 

Goodwill 

For India this is a problem, as Pakistan will continue to impede India’s access to Afghanistan as well as Central Asia. 

India will not be able to pursue its normal economic and other interests in this whole region because of the support the West and China give to Pakistani policies in Afghanistan. 

With radical ideologies and terrorism spreading in this region, and Pakistan itself in the throes of terrorism and sectarian conflict, India’s security is under threat. 

India needs to keep a presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia to consolidate its image as a benign partner capable of providing economic benefits and assistance, and maintaining a power balance in the region. 

It does not serve the interest of Western democracies to weaken India’s position in Afghanistan to the advantage of a military-dominated, terrorism- riven, democratically weak and radicalising state like Pakistan. 

Rationally, Kabul would need to maintain close ties with India to balance Pakistan and deter it from overreaching itself in Afghanistan. 

India, which enjoys great goodwill in Afghanistan, would want to nurture it and not lower its profile in Afghanistan deliberately, especially in the economic area, building Afghan capacities and humanitarian exchanges. 

India faces a big challenge, but its role and how it benefits the Afghan nation is understood by our many friends in Afghanistan, amongst whom President Ghani should rightfully figure. 

Click here to read the article at The Daily Mail.

(11:39 - 20:34)

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Miller highlights South Korea's comfort women, the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute and differences in the larger historical narrative as the three key issues which remain unresolved.

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The EastWest Institute has released a new report by a working group of Russian and U.S. experts on how the United States and Russia can jointly combat narcotrafficking out of Afghanistan. The joint U.S.-Russia working group previously has released two reports, Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment in 2013 and Afghan Narcotrafficking: Post-2014 Scenarios in February 2015.

The paper points out that Afghanistan accounts for 80 percent of global opium and 74 percent of illicit opium production worldwide—90 percent of which is trafficked out of the country. Afghan heroin has created an addiction crisis in Russia, whereas for the United States the growing Afghan drug trade is further testimony to the failed decade long U.S.-led state-building exercise in the country.

The current publication comes at a time of increased tensions between the United States and Russia over Ukraine, which is detrimentally affecting joint efforts elsewhere in the world. “(…) [C]ooperation between the United States and Russia may not come easily even when confronting a common threat. Fallout from the Ukraine crisis has damaged the bilateral relationship to an extent that will take years to repair,” the study notes pessimistically.

Prior to the Ukraine crisis, both countries had slowly increased joint operations in the region. For example, back in 2010, Russian and American authorities seized approximately $60 million worth of opium during raids on four drug laboratories near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The EastWest paper elaborates:

"According to official data from the Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation (FSKN), such cooperative operations continued through 2012, yielding a total of seven FSKN-DEA operations in the country. These operations resulted in seizures of 2.5 tons of opiates, 3.5 tons of hashish, 1.5 tons of morphine and 5.5 tons of precursors—along with the destruction of 10 drug laboratories."

However, even prior to the Ukraine crisis things did not always go smoothly between Moscow and Washington. Right around the time when United States state-building efforts intensified in Afghanistan (2008-2009), it became apparent that Moscow favored a more heavy-handed approach—a combination of opium eradication combined with interdiction efforts within Afghanistan and the destruction of laboratories—while Washington wanted to pursue a lighter touch campaign focused on drug interdiction in order not to further aggravate the Afghan population.

With the ongoing deterioration of Russia-West relations, the cooperation could potentially snap to a complete halt, although the U.S.-Russian working group does not seem to think this is likely. They offer a set of recommendations for Afghan, U.S., and Russian policymakers to consider. Here is a selection:

• Encourage Afghanistan to cooperate more actively with Iran to improve interdiction along the Afghan-Iranian border. (…)
• Speak with a common voice in matters of counternarcotics and border security in Central and South Asia and demand that Central Asian officials live up to the obligations of the counternarcotics and border management assistance that they have received. (…)
• Push Afghanistan and Pakistan to finalize the status of their frontier.(…)
• Deepen formal and informal cooperation across the FSKN and DEA field offices in Afghanistan and Central Asia.(…)
• Jointly expand multilateral training of Central Asian and Afghan border police, customs authorities and counternarcotics officers. (…)
• Establish joint positions on counternarcotics and border control at international bodies where these issues are discussed (…) 

According to the EastWest Institute, The State of Afghanistan’s Borders will be followed by three more reports in 2015 and 2016: two that will offer specific policy suggestions on alternative livelihood in Afghanistan and narco-financing and a final report presenting a compendium of all recommendations.

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To read this article at The Diplomat, click here.

Interviewer: World leaders are gathering in China over the next few days as the annual Boao Forum gets under way in the southern island of Hainan. This year’s meeting comes at a critical time for China. Its economy is slowing, but there is growing momentum for a new development bank it’s leading. Even though it’s an idea rooted by President Xi Jinping and its headquarters, as recently announced, will be based in Beijing, but delegates at the forum insist China will not dominate decisions made at the Asian Infrastructure Investment Development Bank, that’s because they say the AIIB will be held responsible for profits and losses by its stakeholders which, in this case, are the member countries. China’s vice finance minister has said that the bank’s shareholding structure is still under negotiation, but there would be a different [inaudible] for Asian members versus non-Asian members. Still, supporters of the AIIB say the bank will not rival that of the World Bank or the IMF. China has set a deadline of March 31st for countries to apply for founding membership to the bank.

And for more, let’s speak to Kok Piin-Fen in New York. She is the director of the China, East Asia and United States Program at the EastWest Institute. The organization is a think tank for international security policy. Piin-Fen, plans for the implementation of the “One Belt and One Road” initiative are expected to be released at the Boao Forum. Tell us how this initiative is expected to increase economic integration between the east and west.

Kok: Thanks for having me on the show. Essentially the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, as I understand it, is China’s signature diplomatic initiative in the region. It seems to link pretty much the whole Eurasian span of continents from East Asia all the way to the west, right up to the doorstep of Europe, so essentially it’s linking up markets from the maritime part of China’s eastern coast all the way to the western part. So, in that sense, it’s a way for China to tap into this vast market and to help ease domestic pressures within its country in terms of overcapacity in some sectors such as concrete and steel that’s needed for infrastructure, and also providing markets for excess capital.

Interviewer: Piin-Fen, the theme since 2014 has been Asia’s new future, but tell us, can Asia work together, I mean, despite differing strategic positions within the continent?

Kok: I believe so, especially in the area of economic and social development…There is a lot of talk about the geopolitics of all these various competing initiatives, whether it’s AIIB or the Trans Pacific Partnership, or TPP, and the Chinese-led RCEP—Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership—but at the end of the day, I think everyone agrees that the goals of these so-called competing initiatives are really to promote the development and prosperity of the region. I think this is a pragmatic reason why you see many Asian countries, including Singapore, joining various so-called competing initiatives at the same time.

Interviewer: Piin-Fen, thanks very much for that. That was Kok Piin-Fen from the EastWest Institute.