In 2009, tensions between the United States and Russia were worse than they’d been in a decade, despite pledges by both President Medvedev and President Obama to improve the bilateral relationship.
In a Washington Post op-ed, Medvedev blamed much of the rift on the Bush administration’s plans to build a global missile defense system in Central Europe. The White House cited a looming threat from Iran, but the Kremlin suspected that the system was poised to intercept Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles. If implemented, Medvedev wrote, the plan “would inevitably require a response on our part.”
At the EastWest Institute, the question was clear: was Iran close to developing a nuclear weapon, or not? The need for clarity—and for some kind of U.S.-Russian consensus—was urgent. Beginning in March 2008, EWI brought together a U.S. team, led by General (ret.) James L. Jones, Jr., and Russian team led by Ambassador Anatoly Safonov. Over four meetings, the technical experts examined Iran’s missile and nuclear weapons capabilities, finally producing the first U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment—with the indispensable help of David Holloway.
“I thought it would take three weeks,” says Holloway, the Stanford history professor and nuclear weapons expert who led the writing process. “It took five months.”
According to Holloway, the Russians experts were reluctant to include mention of a technical transfer between Russia and Iran, and the Americans tended to think that Iran was closer to developing a nuclear device than the Russians did. Since it was a joint report, everyone needed to agree on every word.
“It led to an enormous amount of email traffic,” Holloway laughs.
The report ultimately concluded that the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear missile program was not imminent, and that planned missile defense system would not be effective. According to The Wall Street Journal, the report played a role in the Obama administration’s decision to scrap the plans and design a system more in line with existing threats—a decision that went a long way toward pushing the reset button on U.S.-Russia relations.
“The results and outcome of that decision, and the way it was framed, was very close to the conclusion of our report,” says Holloway. “Everyone felt good about that.”