As part of its Speaker Series, the EastWest Institute’s New York Center invited Robert Person, assistant professor of International Relations and Comparative Politics at the United States Military Academy and expert in post-Soviet politics, to offer an in-depth, historical perspective on the current conflict in Ukraine, on November 5, 2014

Speaking to a filled conference room and a number of dialed-in listeners, Person began by offering some historical perspective on Ukraine, providing insight into the forces fueling the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

 “The challenges are immense,” Person said.  “The odds are against Ukraine and Kiev. Unfortunately, I would predict we are in for a bumpy ride.”

Despite all of these seemingly insurmountable differences, he argued that the best course of action for Kiev is to rule from the center. He stressed the importance of the Ukrainian government to satisfy the needs of both Western and Eastern Ukraine, if it is to avoid a “frozen conflict,” a term popularly applied to post-Soviet conflicts used to describe the end of an active armed conflict without any substantive agreement or peace treaty.

Exploring Russia’s objective to keep Ukraine within its sphere of influence, a precedent established by Muscovy’s (a precursor to modern Russia) domain over the territories that would become Eastern Ukraine and Kiev’s significance in Slavic culture, Person helped elaborate on Moscow’s investment in the future of Crimea and other disputed eastern territories. He also offered explanations of some of the driving factors behind resistance to Putin and Russia, notably, the emergence of Ukrainian nationalism, a notion encouraged by the Vienna-based Habsburg Monarchy who saw a strong national identity in Ukraine as an important bulwark to Russian westward expansion. Ukrainian nationalism, Person explained, is a monumental aspect of both Kiev’s view of Russia as a foreign imposition and a major pillar of Ukrainian resistance to Russian control, exemplified by Ukrainian nationalist resistance to the Soviets during World War II and to Russia today in this conflict.  

After giving important historical perspective, Person then took into account the significance of the myriad of cultural, social and political differences between Kiev and Eastern Ukraine, notably the vastly different educational curriculums (Kiev emphasizing concepts of Ukrainian nationalism and Eastern Ukraine leaning towards Slavic and cultural brotherhood with Russia), the impact of linguistics (Ukrainian or Russian) and the demographic make-up of Eastern territories such as Crimea. These domestic issues, as he explained, are of great importance in understanding the current conflict.

Dr. Person warned that if Kiev doesn’t reassess its strategy, which necessitates both addressing serious domestic economic and political concerns and distancing itself from both the West and Russia, it has little hope of finding a solution for this conflict. In his examination of the conflict in Ukraine, Person sees the many challenges facing Kiev and Ukraine as a prediction of a long and tedious road to peace.

“The second big task for Kiev is governing from the center. This will require someone to walk a very fine line,” Person stressed.

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DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army (DA), Department of Defense (DOD), or the U.S. Government.

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This November, Beijing will be abuzz as China hosts the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting. The APEC Leaders’ Meeting is one of the few marquee events where world leaders in the Asia-Pacific region can meet. This year’s meeting has the potential to host two critical summits. The first summit, between U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping, has been arranged and is a much awaited follow-up to the Xi-Obama visit in Sunnylands, California last summer. The second summit, between Xi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, remains a moving target as Beijing and Tokyo jockey for the necessary conditions and backdrop for a potential meeting.

There are a number of reasons why these two potential meetings should be looked at together. First, with regard to the U.S.-China summit, there remains an underlying discomfort in Washington about properly managing the much bandied-about term “major-power relations” in reference to the U.S.-China relationship.  Daniel Russel, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, has tried to remove any lingering ambiguity on the Obama administration’s understanding of the concept: “The phrase that now adorns coffee mugs and t-shirts all over Washington—‘a new model of relations between major powers’—is a catchphrase that the Chinese are very fond of but that we also endorse. What we mean by a new model is not the notion of some sort of G2 condominium, but rather a conviction that the U.S. as an enduring power and China as a rising and important nation—certainly in the region and on a global scale as well—that these two countries are not condemned to some sort of mechanistic standoff.”

Indeed, the “major-power relations” era has confused some of Washington’s allies in Asia including Japan, which felt that the Obama administration had effectively given a free pass to China. Therefore, Obama’s follow-up meeting with Xi—along with any statement that comes out of that meeting—will have to consider the messaging not only to Beijing, but also to Tokyo, Manila and others. While focussing on cooperation on a range of international economic and security issues, including North Korea, Obama should also stress to Xi that one key element to “major power relations” is the adherence to international norms and laws in the maritime domain.

This meeting really sets the stage for a potential landmark encounter between Abe and Xi in Beijing. The two leaders of Asia’s biggest economies have not met since Abe took office in late 2012. China and Japan have been in a diplomatic standoff since Abe’s predecessor purchased three of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands from a private buyer in September 2012. Despite a tough line on Chinese assertiveness in the East China Sea, the Abe administration has been working hard to arrange a summit with Xi for the past year and appears close to its goal for a meeting at APEC. The nature of any summit remains undetermined but it could range from a simple handshake to an informal meeting. At this point, even a handshake meeting would be welcome and could re-energize back-channel diplomatic efforts already underway.

The basis for a meeting remains uncertain, but there are reports out that Japan has more or less negotiated terms for the summit. While Abe has consistently voiced his desire to meet Xi, he has also publicly denounced the idea that such a meeting should be based on certain preconditions. Meanwhile, China has indicated that Japan needs to “show sincerity” on issues relating to history and territory. Essentially, Beijing is looking for a two-pronged pledge from Japan before re-engaging at the head-of-state level. First, China wants a guarantee—even if not public—that Abe will not visit the controversial Yasukuni shrine again while in office. Second, Beijing is demanding an acknowledgement from Japan that there is an active dispute in the East China Sea. On face-value, both concessions are politically very difficult for Japan but with the proper amount of nuance from Tokyo and compromise from Beijing it might be possible for both sides to agree on a middle path that would allow an informal summit at APEC.

If there is an Abe-Xi meeting, we should not expect anything significant to come directly out of the meeting. Yet, this encounter would be important, due to its symbolism, alongside quietly improving diplomacy at the working level between both countries. Over the past four months, tensions in the East China Sea have been gradually lowering and there has been a recent resumption of maritime crisis management talks between respective authorities in China and Japan. Moreover, there have been a number of visits to Tokyo and Beijing by senior government and former government officials over the past few months in an effort to reinvigorate “shuttle diplomacy” and set the stage for a resumption of sound bilateral ties. A successful Xi-Abe meeting would be the first official sign for more robust diplomatic engagement at the working level.

Jonathan Berkshire Miller is an EWI fellow with the China, East Asia and United States Program

The EastWest Institute’s Brussels Center hosted a roundtable discussion “Managing Conflict in Europe and its Neighborhood: Lessons Learnt and Future Prospects” on September 25, 2014. Selected policy makers, academic experts and NGO-representatives reflected on previous cases of conflict management in Europe, specifically the Balkans, with a focus on the ongoing crisis in Eastern Ukraine.

The first panel, “Ethnic and National Conflict in Europe: the Case of the Western Balkans,”,was chaired by Jonas Jonsson, Head of Division for Western Balkans, European External Action Service. The panelists focused on how ethnic and national tensions have been fueled over the years, what the status quo is today, and which conflict management tools have been used – or have remained unused - in the region and by the European Union.

The power of nationalism was a key aspect of the discussion. Because nationalism and populism continue to have the potential to lead to violent extremism, the need for working up joint approaches to historical accuracy on an educational and youth level was emphasized. While guns are silent and will hopefully remain silent in the western Balkans, there is no genuine peace and reconciliation between ethnic and national groups, which prevents movement beyond the conflict management phase.

The panelists also discussed the role the European Union plays in managing conflict through its Enlargement Policy and the prospect of European Union membership for several Balkan candidate countries.  As one participant put it, “The EU dangles the carrot of membership in front of accession candidates in the Balkans, and if they behave, they can become a member.” The obstacles placed by individual European member states were also mentioned; the absence of a common European position, on issues such as the independence of Kosovo, contributes to a merely managed status quo, without prospects for an ultimate conclusion. The Kosovo issue remains central to tensions in the Balkans, considered by Serbia as an integral part of its territory, and considered by Albanians as part of a the “greater Albania.”  Asking either side to relinquish the claim on Kosovo is synonymous to asking them to give up a part of their identity. Attendees emphasized that a successful integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union is also a matter of credibility; unless the EU can achieve a sustainable peace in the Western Balkans, the EU will hardly be successful in any other processes of stabilization in its neighborhood.

The second panel, “Prospects for Managing and Overcoming the Ukraine Crisis,” was chaired by Georgi Pirinski, Member of the European Parliament, Former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria. The panel addressed three major aspects of the crisis in and around Ukraine and the prospects for eventually managing the conflict: the internal Ukrainian problems, the complex Ukraine-Russia relationship and the strategic dimension relating to Russia’s concerns towards an extension of the European Union and NATO.

The common perception that there are ‘two’ Ukraines divided by different loyalties towards Europe/”the West” and Russia/”the East”, respectively, was challenged. It was noted that only two provinces in Ukraine actually rebelled against Kiev, and it was argued that they could not have done so without significant external support. Different scenarios addressed how the situation with the two regions of Luhansk and Donezk could evolve, including: a federalization model;, a neutralization of Ukraine according to a Finland/Austria model; and a frozen conflict scenario as is the case with Georgia and the breakaway provinces of South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, and with Moldova and Transnistria. While the latter scenario was discussed the most intensively, there were different views on whether Russia bears an interest in a frozen conflict scenario; the lack of clear borders to Donezk and Luhansk as opposed to Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia was also mentioned. .

The role of the European Union was discussed at length, with a specific focus on the European Eastern Partnership initiative. While the Eastern Partnership initiative has provided much needed assistance to Ukraine in many areas, such as trade relations, tariffs, and economic strategy, it has failed to address existing “hard-core” security issues of concern to Ukraine, and was consequently unprepared to deal with the unfolding security situation in the wake of the current crisis. The first step to building a stable state with a functioning economy is to ensure the security and territorial integrity of that state by securing a functioning police force, army, and independent intelligence service. Consequently, it was recommended to introduce a security and defense dimension to the Eastern Partnership framework.

The panel noted that the European Commission, represented by the newly established Support Group for Ukraine, is committed to assist Ukraine in implementing much needed reforms domestically; however, the Support Group will only be effective if the Ukrainian leadership makes a positive choice towards harmonization and integration, and sets up a credible strategy towards that aim instead of using the fighting in the east as an excuse to stall the reform process.

With regards to the Ukraine-Russia dimension, the heated debate illustrated how there is a complete lack of trust and confidence between the involved actors. The Russian strategy, in its western neighborhood and specifically with regards to Ukraine, was subject to different analyses. Russia sees the association agreement between the European Union and Ukraine as a threat to its existing trade relationship with Ukraine; the opposing argument is that Ukraine can have a free trade zone with both Russia and the European Union, as is the case with Serbia, without diminishing the existing Russian-Ukrainian trade relationship.

The session concluded with the prevalent view that, although the crisis in Ukraine is not yet at the conflict management stage, no time should be lost in preparing for reconciliation and trust- building efforts on all possible channels through constant dialogue and contact with all involved parties.

In the concluding session, the conference chairman Ambassador Martin Fleischer, EWI’s Vice President and Director of Regional Security, elaborated a number of conclusions and “lessons learnt”:

1. Building trust is often perceived as a challenge of post-conflict, peace-building; however, trust is also a main pre-condition for managing a conflict. Trust-building must be done through complementary channels. While these obviously include governments, international and regional organizations and civil society, too little use is made of parliamentary channels.
2. Extreme nationalism, fueled by its typically one-sided interpretations of history, remains a challenge for every peace settlement. But there are encouraging examples of joint initiatives by historians and also on an educational level to overcome national-centric and ethnocentric standpoints and work towards long-term reconciliation.
3. National governments continue to bear the major responsibility. They must actively take matters of reconciliation and trust-building into their own hands and not be allowed to rely on civil society and outside actors such as the European Union. 
4. Within the European Union, differing national interests of member states still impede a genuine common foreign and security policy and jeopardize the efficiency of the EU’s strongest instrument for conflict-settlement, i.e. its neighborhood policy and the membership perspective. The case of Cyprus exemplifies failure in this regard.
5. The Eastern Partnership initiative has thus far failed to address the defense and security needs of the Eastern Partnership states. Strengthening the defense and security dimension in the Eastern Partnership initiative would give the European Union added leverage in its goal to support the institutional development of target states.
6. In spite of these shortcomings, the EU must and can play a more result-oriented role in conflict management and conflict prevention.

•  For insurmountable border issues in the Balkans, there is no alternative to step-by-step integration into a unified Europe in which borders lose their importance.
• The case of Ukraine is different, as EU-membership is no immediate perspective, and westernization is probably no cure-all. History teaches us that lasting conflict solutions must respect the interests and at least be honorable and “face-saving” to all major stakeholders