Let’s Drop the Anglo-German Historical Analogy Once and For All When Discussing China

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe did it: He compared the relationship between Japan and China to the one of Great Britain and Germany prior to World War One. In particular he referred to the Anglo-German arms race and used the historical analogy to warn of a new arms race in Asia. It appears that it is virtually impossible to discuss the rise of China without sooner or later making a historical analogy to 1914. It is, however, typically used to describe the relationship between the United States and China.

The Anglo-German historical analogy often leads policy makers astray from the actual reality of the rise of China and its military build-up. If we use historical analogies at all we should get them right!

Yuen Foong Khong , author of ‘Analogies at War-Korea, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decision of 1965‘, defines historical analogy as:

“an inference that if two or more events separated in time agree in one respect, then they may also agree in another . . . appeasement in Munich occurred as a result of Western indolence; appeasement in Vietnam is also occurring as a result of Western indolence. Appeasement in Munich resulted in a world war; therefore, appeasement in Vietnam will also result in a world war.” 

Analogy is thus used to predict possible outcomes of certain policy decisions and provide prescriptions. 

Analogies also are used widely for justification or advocacy or to assist in processing difficult information. The problem arises when policy makers select ‘bad’ analogies. As Khong asserts, had the Johnson administration used the French example in Indochina (especially their defeat at Dien Bien Phu) rather than Munich and the Korean War, the fateful decision in 1965 to commit ground troops to Vietnam might have been viewed very differently. 

He also makes a compelling argument that ultimately it was analogy rather than domestic political considerations, bureaucratic politics, or the political military ideology that caused President Johnson and the National Security Council to decide to intervene in Vietnam. Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, offered the plausible rationale at a National Security Council meeting. “I feel there is a greater threat to start World War III if we don’t go in. Can’t we see the similarity to our own indolence at Munich?” Historical analogies are thus powerful tools in the hands of an eloquent advisor. 

Taking a closer look at U.S. policies towards China and applying the historical analogy of the German-British naval race, we might conclude that unchecked, Chinese aggression could destabilize the region and even lead to World War III. The same is true for the China-Japan relations. At least by applying Khong’s framework, this would have to be the logical conclusion; however, even the most hawkish defense analysts would find this statement difficult to accept. 

The general consensus of expert opinion is that despite its increasingly martial tone, neither the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy nor the People’s Liberation Army can in any way challenge the United States globally. Thus, using the German-British naval race of the early 20th century as an analogy to illustrate U.S. policy options toward China is simply inappropriate. 

Perhaps then if we look for proper historical analogies to use in discussing the rise of Chinese naval power, we might choose the rise of the Italian naval power in the inter-war years. As it turned out, the Italian Navy did not really impact the outcome of World War II substantially. However, like the Chinese today, the Italians were engaged in many military innovations throughout the 1930s, faced a similar strategic outlook and were confronted by a technologically superior force. 

The post-World War I Italian Navy, similar to the current Chinese Navy, possessed specific regional aspirations. With the conclusion of the war in 1918, the Italian Navy agreed that it must first dominate the Adriatic Sea and then expand into the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. China has a similar sequential strategy with attempting to control first the Straits of Taiwan and the South China Sea followed by the First Island Chain. Finally, China plans to project power all the way to the Second Island Chain. 

Often echoed in Chinese newspaper editorials, China, like Italy in the 1930s, feels boxed in and claims the right of an emerging power to a strong and powerful navy because the “Chinese nation’s existence, development, and great resurgence all increasingly rely on the sea.” Mussolini in 1926 forcefully asserted that “a nation which does not have free access to the oceans cannot be a great power; Italy must become a great power!” He reiterated this point in 1939 when he argued, “The bars of this prison are Corsica, Tunesia, Malta, and Cyprus . . .The fundamental aim of the Italian foreign policy must be ‘to break free of this prison . . .” The strategic straightjacket for China, as Robert Kaplan put it in his book Moonson, is Taiwan; for Italy in the 1930s it was Malta — both islands often referred to as unsinkable aircraft carriers. The Italian Navy’s prime obsession during the 1930s, especially during the Mediterranean Crisis in 1935, was the conquest of Malta, which greatly troubled Admiral Domenico Cavagnari, the head of the Italian Navy ministry, since he, much more than Mussolini, was aware of the inherent weakness of the Italian Regia Marina. 

Another similarity between Italian strategic thinking in the 1930s and current Chinese strategy is striking. Afraid to face the might of Great Britain — the most powerful naval force of its time — starting in 1936, Italy began to develop an access denial strategy based on light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines to defend the coast and to cooperate with the air force in creating torpedo bombers squadrons, light surface-assault craft, underwater assault techniques and the rapid construction of motor torpedo boats. 

Today, China likewise aims to implement an access denial strategy to offset the powerful U.S. Navy by developing an anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21-D, with the ability to target U.S. carrier groups within 1000 miles of the Chinese coast. They possess over 50 high-speed anti-ship cruise missiles carrying patrol boats, and since the 1990s, China has more than quadrupled its submarine fleet, capable of firing anti-ship cruise missiles. Additionally, the new Lyang II Class Guided Missile destroyer is equipped with a sophisticated phased-array radar system similar to the Western Aegis system. Like the Italian example demonstrates, this is largely a sign of perceived weakness and should not be misinterpreted. 

Closely analyzing French and British Naval policy towards Italy in the 1930s, one also notices how little both navies factored in cultural and psychological aspects (e.g. some naval historians, argue, that due to their experience in the 19th century, the Italians had developed a keen aversion to large sea battles, after a devastating defeat by the Austrian Navy in the Adriatic in 1866, which made any aggressive Italian action in the 1930s less likely) which also today are neglected in alarmist statements on the Chinese Navy. The French for example greatly overestimated Italian naval strengths throughout the 1930s, which substantially influenced their policies. The British more accurately assessed the Italian Navy’s fighting strengths, yet their forces to protect global commerce and the far-reaching British Empire could not withstand the loss of even a single battleship. This is similar to the United States’ fear of losing a single aircraft carrier to Chinese missiles; the psychological impact would be just too shocking to contemplate. 

Using the analogy of Germany prior to World War I is not only alarmist but simply a non-sequitur. Applying the logic of historical analogies to the British-German naval race, the corollary is the following: if the United States does not increase its naval spending, a resurgent Chinese Navy will lead China to pursue a more aggressive, unpredictable global foreign policy with the aim of guaranteeing “China’s place in the sun,” which sooner or later will lead to war. The intra-wars Italian navy was, at least in magnitude, a formidable force, and, although equipped with modern battleships and cruisers, was untested by war, badly trained, and lacking an aggressive offensive doctrine, European political rhetoric to the contrary. 

If, however, we can instill in foreign policy makers an apposite analogy, we can draw a more rational conclusion regarding the Chinese Navy and the Communist elite, which would help both the United States and Japan develop a more prudential naval policy vis-à-vis China. 

High Time to Act Against Information Catastrophe: Time to Strengthen Cyber Security

We need stronger cyber security to protect against massive consumer data breaches

If you are a leader in business or government, or even just a private citizen, there is an emerging phenomenon that you need to know more about. It’s called “information catastrophe.”

This is the event where the marvelous technologies of the cyber age combine with the actions of a person (accidental or malicious) to dump the larger share of your confidential database into the public domain, to criminals or to hostile governments.

It just happened in Korea, as announced this week. The event in question involved the theft and illegal sale of the credit card information of most of the country’s consumer population.

Don’t worry so much about identity theft, though that is happening. You need to be preparing for information catastrophe.

There are important defensive measures, such as reviewing security procedures, vetting your staff or associates better, or establishing strong relations with law enforcement or national intelligence agencies. Those approaches, however, are only band-aid solutions and temporary fixes.

Market pressure + policy failures = low security

The biggest source of the problem is the low-security character of the information systems and networks you are using.

A series of market pressures over half a century as well as regulatory policy failures have somehow convinced most of us to entrust our life savings of information and our inner-most feelings and secrets to data “banks” somewhere in the ether.

Only gradually are people becoming aware that these data banks are highly insecure and more regularly being breached in the bright glare of unwanted publicity.

The data banks comprise software and hardware products in which high vulnerability to attack has been tolerated as a trade-off for lower cost and more convenient accessibility.

When the initial choices for lower cost and lower security were made in many technical sub-fields decades ago, we did not quite foresee the combined effect of those choices.

A paradigm shift in cyber security

Now that we fear NSA can hack anything and anyone, and we know some other, more sinister governments are mining all of our personal information with malicious intent, it is time for us all to trade-up to “highly secure computing.”

In a recent paper released by the East West Institute, called “Resetting the System,” German researcher Sandro Gaycken and I make the case for this paradigm shift in cyber security.

We note that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified highly secure computing as one of the highest priorities for research in this field. U.S. scientists are reserving the right to legally develop NSA-resistant encryption.

And the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), where key elements of Internet technology were developed, is now running new projects in highly secure computing.

We understand that term to mean information technology with security that is unlikely to be breached — except in unusual and rare circumstances (or at high cost and risk to the perpetrator).

Highly security computing is a gigantic investment

This is not some unachievable holy grail. As John Dobson and Brian Randell argued in 1986, while being critical of those who believed it possible to build totally secure systems, “highly secure computing” is a worthwhile goal for scientific research and public policy.

As the DHS’s research plan mentioned above has noted, the more highly secure technologies cannot be bolted on top of the existing ones.

By and large, a move to less vulnerable IT would require a gigantic initial investment by manufacturers and consumers. It could be more expensive to operate and perhaps less convenient and less functional. So consumers—firms and individuals—will not rush to adopt it voluntarily.

The roles of governments and the private sector

Typically, a market failure—where private markets do not provide goods or services needed by customers or do not provide them in adequate quantities at an affordable price—triggers the question of government intervention.

In most market economies, considerable care is taken to craft policies that address the national interest (or public interest) without unduly constraining innovation and competitiveness in the private sector.

But once a government chooses to intervene, the inevitable result—absent a complete course reversal by the private sector—must be some compromise with and by private sector interests. Just how this might play out in particular economies demands detailed study. The policy outcome would inevitably be imperfect.

At the very least, this cyber security dilemma probably demands a price signal of some sort by government and a transition plan with clear benchmarks and standards to provide for phasing out of low security equipment and software.

With or against markets: the EU and China

While this may seem anathema within a U.S. free market environment, the pace of change may be forced on the global market by the European Union or its individual member states with considerable influence.

China is definitely acting against the market, as we have known it. The Snowden leaks about NSA successes against it have led to decisions by the government to accelerate its indigenous cyber security efforts, including new design standards. China is also reviewing its exposure to commercially available products that fall into the low-security and highly vulnerable category.

Today, it seems like we are many years from a consistent effort by any government to adopt highly secure standards for its IT market.

But as the information catastrophes start to affect more and more politicians or significant national economic or security actors, the rush to new products will intensify.

As we move closer to adoption of cloud computing, where confidentiality expectations will be paramount, we can expect that to drive a more rapid move to maximum security in cyber space. The companies that judge this moment well may ride the crest of a new wave of IT wealth.