Conflict Prevention

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The report is based on concrete recommendations made by more than 70 leading lawmakers from Afghanistan, Pakistan and other Muslim countries, as well as representatives from Europe and the U.S., convened by EWI and the Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention at an international conference hosted by the European Parliament on December 7, 2010.

Introduction

In his inaugural address, U.S. President Barack Obama told the Muslim world they would be judged by what they build, not what they destroy. But even if those who build far outnumber those who destroy, many governments and societies will continue to be confronted by the specter of violent extremism. The challenge they face is how to devise effective strategies to counter the extremists and encourage long-term solutions that go beyond merely containing the problem to addressing its root causes. This is the challenge we posed to a wide variety of participants in the EastWest Institute’s Countering Violent Extremism Initiative.

In 2008, EWI’s Countering Violent Extremism initiative began a concerted effort to engage youth, advocacy groups, religious organizations, and local religious leadership to gauge their understanding of violent extremism and to learn what they believe should be done to counter it. Throughout the course of the year, we received a wealth of information, opinions and advice that extends far beyond this report. Further study is needed, but is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this EWI initiative.

As is all too well known, violent extremism is a longstanding and long-studied phenomenon in human history. There are few things that have not been said already. There is, however, a significant gap between what is being said and what is being done. This paper will show that violent extremism is a symptom of a much larger set of problems where solutions must come from concerted efforts by governments and societies worldwide. In order to set the stage, this report will first briefly review what policy experts have said and then review the feedback from people of faith and young people as to how, from their perspectives, solutions can be achieved.

Each specific case of violent extremism arises from a variety of unique factors. A review of cases would require voluminous study. Instead, we are focusing here on recommendations for governments and civil society that will help them work toward a better and safer world. Arguments from civil society and governments bear certain key similarities — both seek to enhance their own security and their own interests. This paper presents an overview of the “rationale” for violent extremism as presented by extremists and terrorists and civil societies’ reactions to such explanations. It also explores what can be done about violent extremism, given that it cannot be easily defined, cannot only be combated ideologically, and cannot be combated through the use of force alone in any sort of sustainable way.

Extremism in every form is a major concern for the global community. Though the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (also known as LTTE, or more commonly, as the Tamil Tigers) do not share the same religious motivations as the violent extremist groups that tend to garner the most interest today, they merit much greater attention from the international community. Their longevity, success, and tactics – their revival of suicide bombing in particular – render them a formidable foe. The protracted conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE offers several important lessons regarding effective strategies for combating violent extremism. These lessons hold – and indeed are all the more relevant – in the face of the recent military gains of government forces over the LTTE.

In recent years, the Sri Lankan government has pursued a predominantly military strategy against the well-armed Tamil Tigers. This policy has failed to eliminate the violence in the region and is unlikely to yield peace in the future, even in the face of current military successes by the government. The government’s vow to end the civil war, even if achieved sooner rather than later, would only be a temporary victory – one that might diminish the level of violence in the short term but is unlikely to end it permanently. Sheer force, with no regard for the motivations and objectives of the LTTE, will not create the conditions necessary for an enduring and sustainable resolution of the conflict. The roots of this longstanding conflict are in the political and economic marginalization felt by the Tamil minority. A military victory by the government will not address this. Damaging military operations against the LTTE have not yet resulted in the LTTE seeking to change its tactics – the violent approach of the LTTE has wavered little. Without a negotiated settlement, the two sides will continue to pursue strategies that rely on violence, pushing aside the political goals and objectives that could actually, if resolved, bring elusive peace to Sri Lanka.

Continued violence will only serve to strengthen the resolve and sense of victimization of both factions. The longer the violence ensues, the more likely it is that the regional and global Tamil communities will be drawn into the conflict, potentially sparking an international campaign. India’s close proximity to Sri Lanka, along with its 60 million strong Tamil community, puts the regional superpower in a precarious position. Should the extremism expand beyond Sri Lanka’s borders, it will become a matter of global security and the international community will be compelled to act. It would be far better for the international community to become involved now and offer whatever assistance it can to reach a conclusion in this long campaign, than to act when it has no choice and little leverage.

Given the prolonged military campaign against the LTTE, a growing death toll – especially among civilians – and the threat of a larger campaign spreading where there are large Tamil communities, the government of Sri Lanka would be advised to muster the political will to try to fi nd a solution that addresses the political demands of the LTTE within the framework of a sovereign Sri Lankan state. This is not a call for capitulation but a call for negotiation and accommodation by both sides, even as government forces rack up military victories against the Tamil extremists. Insurgent organizations can and do evolve. LTTE participation in the political processes of Sri Lanka could shift the LTTE away from its strategy of violence.

Key recommendations

For resolving the conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE 

• Abandon the predominantly military strategy adopted by both sides following the end of the ceasefire agreement in January 2008 in favor of a strategy that favors political accommodation. 
• Acknowledge the source of grievances on both sides as a starting point for negotiations.

For wider international efforts to counter violent extremism

• Major players – both global and regional – should work with the UN to appoint an internationally respected figure to mediate between the government and the LTTE. 
• Commit to a cooperative strategy that forgoes a military approach and engages insurgent groups. 
• Identify and acknowledge underlying political grievances as a starting point for negotiations. 
• Address human rights violations in military operations against all insurgents.

At the beginning of the EastWest Institute’s 4th Worldwide Security Conference (WSC4), held on February 22-24, 2007 in Brussels, most attendees gave a pessimistic reaction to this straw poll. Two themes were central to the conference. Firstly, that at the core of counter-terrorism is the essential task of not allowing terrorist violence to dictate the nature and function of our society; and secondly, that terrorism is illegitimate and criminal. Terrorism cannot damage our liberties and rights, and it is a crime, not a war. Are we winning the long-term struggle against current terrorist groups and movements? The conference said no. Are the terrorists winning the propaganda war? The conference said yes.

Among the major issues addressed in the book and the presentation were:

• Energy security is a core part of national sovereignty for many states.
• There is a need to depoliticize and to de-securitize energy.
• All actors concerned—whether energy-exporting or energy-importing—are interested in a stable and predictable energy markets and physical continuity of energy flows.
• All parties concerned should work on resolving the overall general sense of insecurity and correct the misperceptions about the real intentions of the major global energy actors.
• Transit and importing countries consider energy as an issue of strategic importance. For example, not only Turkey wants to be a major West Asia’s energy hub, Ankara also sees itself as a rising global energy player. Similar to Turkey, India does not hide its ambitions to become South Asia’s top energy actor.
• Closer cooperation between different international and regional energy regimes is essential. The United Nations can play a more significant role in fostering trust and cooperation in this matter.
• In Europe, the trend towards a common energy policy lies in intense consultations between member states. National governments and not EU institutions should have a decisive influence on the development of EU’s common energy vision.

The Lindh Programme book was able to delve in more depth into some specific threats to the global energy security. Among the most pressing issues are:

• Internal unrest/instability in the energy-producing and the transit countries—especially Iraq and Iran;
• Intra-state tensions on the global scale and the energy-producing and transit regions;
• Terrorist attacks against energy installations, pipelines and maritime energy routes;
• Political and diplomatic mistrust between energy exporters, energy importers, and transit countries;
• Real and perceived scarcity of the hydrocarbon resources;
• Rarity of new large-scale discoveries;
• Territorial disputes;
• Use of energy as a political tool;
• Selection of the transport corridors and conflicts between importers, exporters and transit countries.

To address these very real threats to global energy security, governments, international organizations, the private sector, and civil society should work together to mitigate existing threats and prevent the emergence of new challenges. These actors should use multilateral frameworks, preferably under UN auspices, with a number of binding rules, and take into account the interests of all stakeholders involved. This universal framework should also integrate all positive results achieved by existing global and regional energy institutions such as the Energy Charter Treaty, the International Energy Agency, and the International Energy Forum.

Among the next steps that concerned energy stakeholders should undertake include:

• Diversifying energy systems on the global, national, and regional levels;
• Developing and implementing advanced energy saving and energy efficiency measures;
• Build up of emergency fuel stocks;
• Promotion of R&D activities to spread efficient and environment-friendly technological options;
• Development of traditional and new domestic energy sources;
• Strengthen multilateral energy cooperation;
• Promote an institute of ‘energy diplomats’ on the global and regional levels.

EWI will continue to undertake research and develop recommendations on the pressing issue of global energy security through its work in energy and conflict prevention, including planned work in 2008 on integrating Iran in binding regional frameworks through energy cooperation.

The EastWest Institute established the multiyear “International Task Force on Preventive Diplomacy” as the flagship of its Conflict Prevention Program in May 2007. The Task Force has one core purpose: it will investigate and promote concrete ways of strengthening practical mechanisms to build domestic and international political will to shorten the time between early warning and effective early response to violent conflict. To this end, the Task Force has adopted a set of Guiding Principles as a framework for its activities over the next few years.

Policymakers, journalists, and community leaders have reached an impasse in crafting a common understanding of how to describe the link between religion and violent extremism, both from a factual point of view and in terms of what might be effective in undermining the appeal of extremist movements.

Media Coverage:

• 07-Jul-2008 - Logos Institute Blog: Communication Isn’t About Pushing Messages at Audiences
• 07-Jul-2008 - About.com: Towards Greater Understanding

Executive Summary

The last seven years have seen leading Americans falter in their communications about violent extremists and the communities believed to be fostering them. Policymakers, journalists, and community leaders have reached an impasse in crafting a common understanding of how to describe the link between religion and violent extremism, both from a factual point of view and in terms of what might be effective in undermining the appeal of extremist movements. This paper begins at this impasse. It reviews the choices to be made about language and rhetoric in U.S. public discourse as elements of a necessarily broader communications strategy to counter violent extremism. It takes account of how these choices flow through the global media, especially Arabic outlets. It concludes with a call to go beyond debates about the words themselves and to implement a holistic approach to communication that comprehends both the contemporary media environment and the cultural and political landscape of conflict. Communication cannot be composed merely of canny use of media, nor only of a well-crafted message. In the 21^st century media environment, words shape actions, actions beget words, and both are in perpetual, dynamic relationship.

Both proposals, first called for by the Task Force’s High Level Advisory Board in December 2007, are a result of months of deliberation and international soundings undertaken in cooperation with multiple stakeholders including Task Force members, United Nations personnel, national government representatives, Members of Parliaments, and international civil society organizations.

The proposals for both initiatives answer why it is no longer enough to rely on official decision support machinery to provide timely and well-constructed options for preventive action and explain why national governments, in cooperation with the wider international community, need to be supported by influencers who understand threats and challenges and who are also prepared to collaborate with all stakeholders to provide comprehensive frameworks towards managing violent conflict.