Politics and Governance

On April 14-16, 2012, the EastWest Institute, in partnership with the Women’s Parliamentary Caucus (WPC) of the National Assembly of Pakistan, arranged for the first official delegation of Pakistani women parliamentarians to visit Afghanistan. This ground-breaking visit is described in the publication Women, Peace and Security, released today in anticipation of the institute's annual awards dinner honoring two of the parliamentarians who took part in this dialogue. On September 27th, EWI will present its distinguished leadership award to Dr. Fehmida Mirza, the first woman speaker of the National Assembly of Pakistan, and Ms. Shinkai Karokhail, a renowned women’s rights activist and member of the Afghan Parliament.

Over the course of their visit, the parliamentarians discussed issues related to reconciliation with the Taliban and regional economic cooperation with Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; Masoom Stanikzai, Advisor to the President on Internal Security and Head of the Secretariat for Afghanistan's High Peace Council; Zalmai Rassoul, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan; Haji Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, the Speaker of the Lower House; and members of the Wolesi Jirga Commission on Women’s Affairs, Civil Society and Human Rights.

In the meeting with President Karzai, the Afghan leader declared: “This initiative is of immense importance to both countries and a great sign of a better future.” He called for more contacts between women parliamentarians in both countries, saying that such visits are “instrumental in strengthening of trust-building between the two nations.”

Click here to read more coverage of the Kabul visit.

EWI’s Brad L. Brasseur argues that full mutual recognition of the Durand Line would allow both countries to more effectively police their borders, and would facilitate much-needed economic development in the border regions. The validity of the Durand Line is already supported by international law and practice, he writes, but only mutual recognition will allow the two countries to cooperate and move forward in peace.

Arguing that the international community has an interest in a stable and secure Afghanistan–Pakistan border, Brasseur adds that outside investors can incentivize a resolution to the long-standing border issue by promising investment on the condition that border control and local security conditions improve.

“Participants  agreed that the relationship between the United States, Pakistan and Afghanistan will determine the success of reconciliation.  The recent increase in tensions between Afghanistan, the U.S. and Pakistan gives reason for concern,” said Guenter Overfeld, EWI Vice President and Director of Regional Security.

Discussions with the insurgency require that Kabul and the international community make more efforts to work towards a successful transition not only in the military field, but also through strengthening good governance and economic development. A political settlement is particularly urgent, according to participants, given that NATO intends to hand over responsibility for Afghanistan’s security to the government in Kabul by 2014.

To speed up reconciliation, participants repeated their earlier call for an “address,” or standing political office, for the Taliban. With an office, it would be easier to streamline fragmented negotiations efforts and ensure the safety of negotiators.

Participants also discussed how to build intergovernmental trust, recommending the establishment of a Pakistani body committed to working with the Afghan High Peace Jirga and a format for talks between the United States, Pakistan and Afghanistan that is more effective than the current trialogue meetings.

“It is difficult to imagine that a final settlement can be achieved without greater clarity on the future of the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan,” the report points out.
Still, participants emphasized that “reconciliation must be Afghan led and Afghan owned.” They called on Afghan authorities to deliver better public services, improve governance and emphasize that there will be no return to the Taliban policies of the 1990s.

“Ironically, some of the older Taliban leaders, who are committed to a largely nationalist agenda, may be less militant on these issues than the ‘neo-Taliban,’ the younger generation of Taliban leaders,” participants observed. “It may be easier to strike a deal with the Taliban now, while the old leadership is still in place, than with their successors.

The report also stresses that reconciliation must not jeopardize the Afghan constitution and human rights. “Any return to the Taliban policies of the 1990s, including their attempts to banish female education, would be a recipe for disaster,” it states.

Click here to download the first and second reports from the Abu Dhabi Process

The report is based on concrete recommendations made by more than 70 leading lawmakers from Afghanistan, Pakistan and other Muslim countries, as well as representatives from Europe and the U.S., convened by EWI and the Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention at an international conference hosted by the European Parliament on December 7, 2010.

Meeting participants called for President Hamid Karzai’s government and the Taliban leadership to commit to unconditional talks in a trusted environment, ideally in a ceasefire zone with a mediator from a neutral country. Participants also recommended making talks more inclusive, saying that the engagement of tribal leaders along the border is “vital to the success of reconciliation.”

To improve the Afghanistan and Pakistan relationship, meeting participants suggested a “mechanism for a regular and genuine information exchange and cooperation,” such as an Afghanistan-Pakistan Jirga process.

Participants also recommended that to decrease the trust deficit between Pakistan and Afghanistan, both countries should address the role of India in Afghanistan in a frank and transparent manner.

The meeting was also a step towards building person-to-person trust between Pakistani and Afghan leaders, according to Ambassador Overfeld: “To the participants’ credit, palpable tensions gradually gave way to a constructive spirit -- a real determination to bring sustainable development and peace to the region.”

Bringing together Afghan and Pakistani politicians, diplomats, scholars and former military officials, the meetings seek to build confidence, ensure stability, and enhance regional development.

“There is no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan.  A dialogue leading to political settlement should therefore begin soon,” the report concludes.

Among the report's key recommendations: the use of open dialogue to solve the conflict in Afghanistan, rather than the use of military force; the active pursuit of delisting selected Taliban leaders; the continuation of the Abu Dhabi Process to help build trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan and create strategies towards a political settlement.

The report points out the need to address the bilateral trust deficit at three levels: senior government, the wider bureaucracy and civil society: “Both Afghanistan and Pakistan may wish to consider the appointment of a respected personality from each country to a senior position solely dedicated to the bilateral relationship.”

"The quality of the Afghan-Pakistani relationship is a decisive factor for political reconciliation in Afghanistan and stability and development in the region," added Guenter Overfeld, EWI Vice President and Director of Regional Security. "A fundamental lack of trust has persisted and has prevented substantive cooperation and collaboration."

Executive Summary

While President Karzai promises economic opportunities for the Taliban, Afghanistan remains heavily dependent on foreign aid and has few sources of income generation for the government or the people. There is certainly potential for advances in these areas in Afghanistan, in agriculture or mining for example, but it will take time to develop them and make them sustainable. In the short term, no significant improvements are expected in the labor market. Achieving some progress and stability in Afghanistan, however, is time-critical. Dwindling support for international engagement in the country highlights this urgency.

In light of this situation, the international community should focus on developing Afghanistan’s migrant labor capacity in a targeted and systematic way in order to increase the prospects for income generation in the form of remittances. The development of semi-skilled and skilled vocational sectors in line with forecast requirements of employment markets, targeting the GCC member states, could provide a near-term solution to Afghanistan’s limited economic prospects.

• The potential of remittances to enhance economic development in poor developing nations is highlighted by the many successful examples of remittance flows to Asian countries, whose workers are based in member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In that context, the volume of remittances sent home is, for many developing countries, the largest source by far of external capital. In many cases migrant labor contributes considerably to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of recipient countries.
• Despite the financial crisis and subsequent economic problems, economic growth prospects in GCC countries and the need for migrant labor appears to be strong over the coming decade due to large scale infrastructure projects in Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. in particular.
• The increasing jobless rate among nationals of GCC member countries in coming years is not likely to negatively affect migration flows from the Asian countries as the greatest need remains blue collar unskilled and low-skilled labor. Nationals of GCC countries generally target junior and senior white collar jobs.
• Currently, the numbers of Afghan migrant laborers in GCC countries are relatively small. Afghan migrant labor has so far (often illegally) targeted the neighboring countries of Iran and Pakistan. Due to their own demographic situation and economic difficulties, both countries, however, will not be able to continue to accommodate significant numbers of Afghan migrant laborers. They are, on the contrary, in the process of returning Afghan nationals back to Afghanistan and implementing significant refugee return programs.
• A coordinated approach by GCC countries in line with expected labor requirements would considerably enhance the stability of Afghanistan via remittances. Historically, GCC member states have shown a strong commitment to supporting Afghanistan. With the expected economic growth in GCC countries, there is the further potential for a considerable strengthening of bilateral relations and an increase in the numbers of Afghan migrant laborers to GCC countries. Such a move would quickly result in external income for Afghanistan and contribute to its economic development.
• The large numbers of Pakistani migrant laborers in GCC countries and the role their remittances play in the Pakistani economy may lead to friction with Afghanistan if Afghan laborers in GCC countries are perceived as a competition harmful to Pakistan’s economy. A possibility to avoid such situation would be a cooperative approach based on a quota system that allows Afghanistan to profit from the increase in labor demand expected over the next years in a predictable and agreed-upon way.
• Many international donors have given their support to the Kabul government, actively promoting vocational education and training in the context of their development programs. The next logical step is to strengthen these programs in line with needs of migrant labor markets to qualify unskilled Afghan labor force for employment opportunities.
• Cooperation between GCC countries and the international community’s training programs in Afghanistan would help deliver migrant labor programs in a targeted and economically viable manner.

Executive Summary

The Euro-Atlantic security scene is characterized by a loss of mutual confidence, renewed tensions, and serious disagreements regarding not only practices but principles. Those trends, if not corrected, will produce negative strategic consequences for the security of Europe. New opportunities have emerged today for rethinking the security situation in the Euro-Atlantic region, for strengthening confidence, changing mutual relations, and, if need be, institutions. A basis for this can be found in the hopes for improved U.S.-Russian relations expressed by U.S. President Barack Obama, in the initiative by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on reforming the European security architecture, as well as in the process of elaboration of the new NATO strategic concept.

The EastWest Institute, responding to requests by American and Russian officials, assembled an Experts Group to discuss conceptual and practical recommendations that could facilitate a much needed “grand debate” over security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region. This report is the result of that process. As part of this process, the EastWest Institute will convene two seminars, one in Brussels in cooperation with the Egmont Institute, and one in Moscow, organized with the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), in order to provide an opportunity for external stakeholders to respond to the conclusions presented in our report and to lend additional insights. Because of differences of views among the group on a number of issues, the report is not a consensus document, but rather a presentation of possible courses of action designed to stimulate this debate.

All members of the group did agree that despite such differences of opinion, states of the Euro-Atlantic region should embrace a common strategic vision of security issues. It should be based, inter alia, on the following principles:

• recognition of the pluralism of decision-making centers in the security sphere and the need for them to cooperate;
• preparedness to negotiate from a position of respect for the declared security interests of all states;
• the right of each state to determine its own security arrangements;
• striving to convert conflicts in the Euro-Atlantic security sphere into win-win situations;
• a commitment to confidence-building, especially to policies that would facilitate collective action for preventing, containing, or reversing unfolding crises.

The report presents three possible paths (scenarios) towards strengthening security on a cooperative basis in the Euro-Atlantic region. These paths represent the three main strands of opinion among the experts and can be summarized as follows:

Remedial Repair: institutional status quo; emphasis on removing mutual misperceptions and strengthening transparency and confi dence; identifying and pursuing common interests in the Euro-Atlantic zone;

Partial Reconstruction: identifying additional and creative political, legal, and military arrangements, possibly including overlapping security guarantees, that address potential security concerns of states in Central and Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region; pursuing common interests beyond the Euro-Atlantic zone;

Fundamental Transformation: reforming the overall architecture of Euro-Atlantic security by signing and bringing into force a European Security Treaty (EST); placing common security challenges as a higher priority than differences in the Euro-Atlantic zone.

For each path, there is a set of concrete proposals for further consideration to advance the agreed overall vision. These proposals are not necessarily mutually exclusive, nor do they necessarily represent the view of the group as whole. Some of the more challenging proposals include:

1. Russia, the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the United Nations (UN) should urgently negotiate coordinated measures to prevent another military crisis in or around Georgia.
2. Finding some “quick fix” measures that might promote mutual confidence (such as a political commitment to joint ballistic missile launch monitoring or to extend the geographical scope of the Cooperative Airspace Initiative).
3. NATO members and Russia should fully implement the Rome declaration of 2002 with its logic of joint decision-making on security matters of mutual concern. They need to make the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) a more productive forum by the time of the next NATO summit. All NRC participants should commit themselves to the principle that they will not block the functioning of its dialogue mechanisms during a crisis.
4. As an earnest display of shared commitment to indivisible security, leaders of the OSCE, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EU, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) should convene a summit on Afghanistan/Pakistan to agree on a common set of policies to combat arms smuggling, drug trafficking, recruitment of militants and violent extremism, and to assist in addressing the socio-economic problems of the two countries.
5. The United States and Russia should accelerate bilateral consultations for solving problems related to implementation of the adapted CFE treaty. The format of the consultation should be extended to other interested countries.
6. NATO, the EU, and Russia can together or in parallel provide mutual and overlapping security guarantees to countries that seek those guarantees (Georgia and Ukraine may be among them).
7. The leaders of Europe should convene a Group of Eminent Persons, composed of high ranking politicians, former diplomats, and military officials, to make recommendations on how to translate the new hopeful signs in United States-Russia relations to the Euro-Atlantic security scene, and to assess the Russian proposal for an EST and other similar initiatives.

In the coming months, before the next OSCE Ministerial Council (December 2009) and the next NATO summit, political leaders must aim for a roadmap to a strengthened security regime in the Euro-Atlantic region. Equal and indivisible security of all states should be translated from an attractive slogan into hard reality. Strategic reassurances at the rhetorical level without action and reform at the operational level are not just hollow. They may in the light of the last decade prove dangerous.

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