Russia

"Is China ready to abandon North Korea? BBC. Apr 9.

"Friend or frenemy? For China, key issue is how US really views it,” Christian Science Monitor. April 11.

“What Kerry Should Tell China,” by Shen Dingli. Foreign Policy. April 11.

"In Seoul Kerry Warns North Korea Against Missile Test," The New York Times, April 12.

"Why the Iranian Nuclear Standoff Won't End Anytime Soon," The Atlantic, April 11.

"Defense News, April 10

Follow EWI on Twitter @EWInstitute for continuing news updates.

Compiled by Michael McShane, Athina Doutis, Alex Schulman and Haolin Liu.

Can you outline the basic tenets of the Arms Trade Treaty and discuss what it aims to accomplish?

Prior to the arms trade treaty, there was no real global set of rules governing the trade, export or transport of conventional weapons. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) sets up standards for the cross-border transfer of eight categories of weapons; tanks, combat vehicles, all the way down to small and light weapons. It seeks to curb the irresponsible and illegal trade of weapons and prevent their sale into illicit markets.

Prior to authorizing any sale of weapons, the exporter has to assess whether the transfer is going to be used to facilitate or commit genocide, crimes against humanity, or other international humanitarian laws. If there is a known risk, they are prohibited from making that sale or transfer. Countries will then be held accountable through annual reporting requirements on arms transfers.

What are some objections to the treaty? Can you summarize the treaty’s main limitations?

The three countries that objected to the treaty are North Korea, Iran and Syria. I should say that the objections that these three countries held were echoed by a number of other countries. North Korea didn’t like the idea that exporters would be judging the humanitarian rights record of the importing countries. Iran, for their part, said that, “they didn’t approve of the transfer of conventional arms to foreign occupiers,” which is a thinly veiled reference to Israel. Syria objected because they didn’t like the fact that transfers or exports to armed groups or non-state actors (e.g. rebels in Syria) were not covered.

The treaty is also criticized for its relatively narrow scope; it doesn’t cover gifts and loans, which is a significant loophole. Furthermore, there’s no enforcement mechanism – that’s left to states to resolve.

Though the United States, the world's biggest arms exporter, voted yes on Tuesday, what are the chances of the U.S. ratifying the treaty? There’s stiff resistance from the National Rifle Association and conservatives in the Senate, where it needs a two-thirds majority to win ratification.

The focus of this treaty is entirely on the international trade and transfer of conventional weapons. The preamble of the ATT explicitly acknowledges that states retain their sovereignty and their authority to regulate the internal transfer and internal domestic possession of conventional weapons. It no way infringes upon private ownership. In fact, the American Bar Association was commissioned to do an analysis of the ATT and they found that the treaty is entirely consistent with the Second Amendment.

In the short term, there will definitely be opposition to the treaty in the U.S. The New York Times reports that over 50 senators are against it. So I don’t think this is going to happen anytime soon. But in the long term, the position of the NRA and other treaty opponents will likely be undermined. The current gun safety debate in the U.S., triggered by the Newtown massacre, weakens their position. And considering the fact that the only three countries that currently oppose the treaty are Iran, Syria and the North Korea, the NRA’s alignment with that trio certainly does not put them in a good light.

Why have Russia and China, two leading sellers of conventional weapons, abstained from voting? What does this mean for export control?

In short, China was opposed to the fact that the treaty was approved in a setting that did not allow every state veto power. It was previously negotiated at the UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, but consensus was blocked by opposition from Iran, North Korea and Syria. The ATT was then moved to the UN General Assembly, which requires only a simple majority to adopt a treaty. Wary of establishing a precedent, China argued that this move weakened the treaty.

Russia, for its part, felt that a number of the definitions, such as the term “genocide,” were not sufficiently clarified. Should these definitions be more appropriately defined, I believe it would be more acceptable to the Russians.

Russia is the second largest exporter of conventional weapons and China the fifth largest. The fact that these two countries did not approve the treaty outright obviously does not bode well for its implementation.

Anna MacDonald, the head of arms control for Oxfam International, has said, “This treaty won’t solve the problems of Syria overnight…but it will help to prevent future Syrias.” How might this treaty affect the current situation in Syria, if it were to be ratified today, and how might it prevent armed violence in the future?

Even by the most optimistic estimates, we are still one to two years away from this treaty’s ratification and entry into force. If it did enter into force today, it would make Russian sales of weapons to Syria much more difficult. Eventually, post-ratification, this will develop into an international norm. This is what happened with nuclear weapons, biological weapons and chemical weapons. It takes years, but eventually, it will develop into a norm, and this will raise political costs for countries that contravene the norm.

Another thing that the treaty will do is publicly name violators, ostracizing these countries within the international community. In terms of preventing future Syrias, the treaty will fill gaps that currently exist in the global arms trade. Only about 50 countries currently have related laws on the books, so once this treaty is approved with broad support from the international community, it will serve to diminish the now flourishing illicit market for these weapons.

What challenges will stand in the way of effective enforcement of this treaty?

It remains to be seen if countries are willing to subordinate their economic interests to fulfill their obligations under this treaty, so it’s entirely likely that countries will enact laws on the books without enforcing them. We saw this with China’s national export control system in the 90s and well into 2000s; they had laws on the books but they lacked the will or the capacity to enforce many of them. As a result, Chinese missile and nuclear weapons technology found its way into illicit markets.

It’s going to take some significant work on the part of the international community to push countries to actively enforce this treaty and fill these gaps. The ATT is a good start, but it’s a framework for international export control systems; more work needs to be done to build a robust regime that prevents these guns and weapons from falling into the wrong hands.

EastWest Direct is an ongoing series of interviews with EWI experts tied to breaking news stories.

What do you feel is the motivation for this recent ratcheting up of the rhetoric and threats by the North Korean leadership?

In this situation, we have a young leader who feels he has to prove himself—in particular, to his generals. Kim Jong-un wants to solidify his claim to authority after his father’s death. He also has to prove himself internationally and I think he is being advised that this is the way to do it. You can look at similar actions that have occurred earlier – the 2006 and 2009 nuclear bomb tests, for example. They’ve also shut down Kaesong City before, as they did earlier this week. These things were done in the past to demonstrate the nation’s sovereignty; they also seem to think that this bolsters the country’s reputation in the world. I think the difference this time is that everything is happening much quicker. The pace is greater in terms of the amount of rhetoric and the threats to South Korea, the region and even to the embassies in Pyongyang.

Are these actions being taken seriously by the international community?

If you look at reports out of Pyongyang, the embassies have not fled, so it appears that foreign government officials have become immune to the rhetoric. On the other hand, I know the United States takes it very seriously. It’s one of those situations where the probability of an attack is pretty low, but the risk of large scale casualties and damage is dramatic. So you need to take actions appropriately, factoring in the tremendous risk if you get it wrong.

Based on your experiences in South Korea working with the U.S. military, can you offer an estimate of North Korea’s offensive capacity?

Their initial capacity is rather large: there are estimates of up to 7,000 artillery tubes that can reach Seoul, which could produce millions of casualties during an initial assault. On the other hand, the counterattack from the combined forces command would be devastating to North Korea. I believe that they know that. The only thing that they could do is to inflict a huge amount of casualties in Seoul and then the combined South Korean and U.S. forces would attack rather quickly and it would be pretty ugly for North Korea.

So that’s your assessment of the worst-case scenario?

The worst case scenario would be an an artillery and ground attack on Seoul. There would be immediate casualties in South Korea followed by a decisive coalition counter attack. Withan armyof over 600,000 soldiers, South Korea would provide the primary ground troops. The air and naval forces associated with that attack would be strongly supported by the United States.

Setting aside government propaganda, how do you think the average North Korean citizen views the current situation?

North Korea is a country that has been isolated for well over 50 years to an incredible degree. In 1953, the average North Korean and average South Korean were very much alike, even physically. Today the average North Korean is about three inches shorter and 40 pounds lighter than the average South Korean. There has been a policy of starvation for three generations. I think North Koreans support the government because that’s the only thing they know. If average North Koreans had a greater understanding of the outside world and could see the dramatically higher standard of living that South Koreans enjoy, I think they would be opposed to their government’s actions. But, of course, that’s why they’re kept isolated.

Given China’s role as North Korea’s only ally, do you think that it will work to lessen tensions? There were some recent comments from President Xi warning North Korea indirectly not to stir up trouble.

China stands to lose a huge amount, as does the entire region, if the situation spins out of control. The enormous economic progress we’ve seen would be jeopardized. Like President Xi, Russia’s President Putin and German Chancellor Merkel cautioned the North Koreans to avoid provocations. I think that, if needed, both Russia and China would take stronger actions to try to stop Pyongyang from doing something foolhardy.

EastWest Direct is an ongoing series of interviews with EWI experts tied to breaking news stories.

Media commentary in India on the fifth BRICS Summit, held in South Africa on March 27th, has not been particularly positive. Attention has been drawn to the artificial character of this grouping originally thought up by Goldman Sachs, the conflicting interests of its constituents, the disparate nature of their political systems, the doubtful advantages to India of membership, and, now fears of Chinese domination of this ensemble because of its overwhelming economic and financial weight.

If the logic of this criticism were to be accepted, it will apply partially to the United Nations, the IMF and the World Bank too, where differences in the political systems, power equations and interests of countries are even more marked, with the influence of one country—the United States—being the most decisive. The G-20 also cannot be exempt from such criticism too. Yet India is a member of all these international organizations or groupings, without self-questioning.

NATURE

The perceived anti-West orientation of BRICS is troubling for some. True, the Russians pushed for its creation in order to forge a partnership between major non-western countries to promote multipolarity. Members like India—and this would apply to Brazil and South Africa as well—believe in a reform of the West-dominated international system in which their voice is not sufficiently heard. Groupings like BRICS can act as platforms for calls for change, without the three countries in question slipping into any futile anti-westernism.

We should not overuse the democracy argument to question our cohabitation with China and Russia in BRICS. If we are supposedly in bad company, then it is worth recalling that US financial and economic links with China, or those of major European democracies, are incomparably greater than ours. We should also be careful not to buy into the highly tendentious western criticism of Russian democracy for geopolitical reasons.

We are against policies of regime change, interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries, politicization of human rights issues and doctrines of humanitarian intervention etc. India-Russia annual summit declarations show congruence of thinking on the principles that should govern international relations. With Brazil and South Africa too we have such consonance. The BRICS platform enables all of us to project our opposition to western efforts to create new, destabilizing norms.

In BRICS only India and China have sharp bilateral differences. Should we be in a grouping that provides space to China to expands its influence internationally, eventually at our expense? Russia too should have similar concerns theoretically, but it is working closely with China politically, economically and, once again, militarily, as the decision to sell its 24 SU-35 aircraft, the very same that lost out in competition for the supply of 126 aircraft to us, shows. This is discomforting for us as it devalues the relative importance of India-Russia relations to China’s advantage.

Despite this negative feature of BRICS for us, there are clear strategic advantages of membership. BRICS is an instrument of pressure for change in the international system. The eThekwani Declaration calls for new models and approaches as regards global governance. It notes the negative spillover effects of the monetary policy of the U.S., Europe and Japan which have led to increased volatility of capital flows, currencies and commodity prices, with negative growth effects in developing countries. It calls for prioritizing the G20 development agenda. It expresses concern at the slow pace of IMF reforms and demands that International Financial Institutions should reflect in their structures the growing weight of BRICS and other developing countries. The core principles and the developmental mandate of the Doha Round is stressed, besides asking that the next Director-General of the WTO should be a representative of a developing country. All this reflects India’s thinking and interests.

DECLARATION

The declaration calls for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council, with Russia and China reiterating the importance they attach to the status of Brazil, India and South Africa in international affairs and supporting their aspiration to play a greater role in the UN. This kind of patronizing formulation was not needed by India, which is less than what Russia offers us bilaterally.

The eThekwani declaration is moderate, with no anti-western bias. The paragraph on Syria is balanced; the one on Palestine repeats standard formulations. On Iran, there is a call for a negotiated solution, with concern expressed about threats of military action as well as unilateral sanctions. The paragraph on terrorism accords with India’s position. The one on Afghanistan is unobjectionable. The paragraph on climate change is non-controversial. The importance of peaceful, secure, and open cyberspace through universally accepted norms, standards and practices is emphasized.

STEPS

Because the summit was held in Durban, the focus on Africa in the proceedings—with participation of several African countries in discussions—and the final declaration is prominent.

The decision to set up a New Development Bank with substantial and sufficient initial contribution to finance infrastructure in emerging and developing countries has attracted adverse attention, as if working outside the World Bank or ADB is unacceptable. Differences over the size of funding and fears of Chinese domination have been highlighted. A Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with an initial size of US$100 billion to help BRICS countries forestall short-term liquidity pressures has also been established. These are steps in the right direction.

We should not be dismissive about the declared aim of progressively developing BRICS into a full-fledged mechanism of current and long-term coordination on a wide range of key issues of the world economy and politics. This is part of our sensible policy of playing on all chess boards with prudence, calibration and no ideological bias.

Read this column at The Daily Mail.

"Here's North Korea's official declaration of 'War.'" The Washington Post. March 30.

"Kim Calls Atomic Weapons Top Priority as Korea Tensions Rise," Bloomberg. Apr 1.

"Understand Xi Jinping’s Renaissance, Put it in Historical Context," CSIS. Apr 1.

"UN treaty is first aimed at regulating global arms sales." The New York Times. April 2. 

“Report urges cuts in nukes, greater US-Russia cooperation to end ‘Cold War autopilot’ strategy," The Washington Post, April 3. 

“North Korea Seen Unable to Deliver Nuclear Attack on U.S.,” Bloomberg. April 4.

Follow EWI on Twitter @EWInstitute for continuing news updates.

Compiled by Michael McShane, Athina Doutis, Alex Schulman and Haolin Liu.

Can you give us a brief background on Sino-Russian relations following the dissolution of the Soviet Union?

There was a period of pretty frigid relations between China and the Soviet Union for about three decades that really only thawed with Gorbachev in the mid-to-late 1980s, culminating with his historic visit to Beijing in 1989. I was a student in Beijing during that visit; it was a very interesting thing to see from that angle.

In the 1990s and 2000s, the China-Russia relationship, while thawed relative to the Soviet period, was not a particularly dense one from the standpoint of diplomatic contact or pragmatic collaboration. Russia was dealing with its own enormous upheavals in the 1990s, culminating in the economic crisis in 1998. Meanwhile, China was really gaining momentum as it embarked on its own economic growth strategy. There weren’t particularly serious diplomatic issues or problems in the relationship.

One of the areas that had been a source of some tension and conflict between the Soviet Union and China was over the correct path of Leninism/Marxism. Once the Soviet Union ceased to exist, the ideological differences that had always been a part of the cool relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC dissipated overnight; there was no longer an ideological competition.

The 1990s and early 2000s were periods of a kind of benign neglect. One phrase that I have used to describe this with reference to how China saw Russia – but I think the same could probably be said vis-à-vis how the Russians viewed China –was “a deficit of strategic relevance.” Simply put, neither country was a top-tier priority for the other during this period.

Do you feel that Russia and China are “balancing” against U.S. power and its partners in Asia?

I don’t think there’s a concerted effort on the part of Russia and China to consciously work together to balance the U.S., per se; but the net effect of the positions that both of these countries tend to take for their own national interest puts them on the same side of a lot of issues in the world, particularly issues before the UN.

Both China and Russia are very proud nations. They’re both great nations. It’s very important to the leadership of both countries—if you look back historically in their foreign policy doctrines—to espouse the notion of non-interference in their internal affairs. This notion of protecting sovereignty, protecting territorial integrity and keeping foreigners out of “our business” and out of “our internal affairs” is a very important theme for both countries. That leads them to a convergence of viewpoints on a lot of issues.

That being said, the reason I say that I don’t think it’s a concerted effort is because there still is a lot of mistrust between the two countries. While things are changing, there’s this long legacy of a neglected relationship and, before that, rather deep distrust. To me, this precludes the notion of a true China-Russia partnership that is sort of designed with intentionality to counter the U.S.

Where might Russian and Chinese interests diverge in the coming years?

They share a long land border, but China is fundamentally an East Asian nation surrounded by 14 countries (it has more border countries than any other country in the world), while Russia is both a European and a Eurasian landmass. Russia is in its own category, but it is much more connected geographically and culturally to Europe. It looks at issues like NATO in ways that are different from China because it’s a stakeholder in those issues similar to the way China is a stakeholder vis-à-vis issues like the South China Sea (which doesn’t particularly affect Russia).

As I discussed, there are many issues where, in matters of foreign policy doctrine and foreign policy principle, there are convergences. But there are disagreements. Take the case of Georgia. Russia has recognized two areas of the nation of Georgia that have broken away from Georgia and declared independence. Russia was the first country to recognize the independence of what it regards as states. China disagrees with Russia on this particular issue because it would set a dangerous precedent vis-à-vis potential breakaway provinces in parts of China. Chinese leaders don’t want to be on record supporting this kind of separatist activity; obviously, that would have implications for Taiwan, but also for Tibet, Xinjiang and other parts of China.

What are the geopolitical implications of the past decade’s heightened level of Sino-Russian trade relations?

Even as recently as 2001, China-Russia trade totaled only about $10 billion. Today, looking at the trade figures for 2012, it’s $88 billion. It’s increased almost nine-fold in a period of eleven years, which is a remarkable growth trajectory. There’s a stated goal on the part of the Chinese and Russian leadership to get to the $200 billion two-way trade mark by 2020; that starts to become a very real number in global international trade. To put it in perspective, U.S.-China trade relations amount to about $500 billion.

This signifies a qualitative change in the way the two countries are dealing with each other. It symbolizes a level of engagement and a comfort level that is new. It also represents a very significant trend in terms of global economics. In the case of Russia exporting to China, it’s mostly energy (e.g., oil, natural gas, minerals). In the case of China, it’s electronics and textiles. There is a real growth here that is having a significant impact on both economies.

China has become Russia’s number one export market, surpassing Germany, which is of symbolic significance; I believe this is the first time in Russian history, or at least in modern Russian history, in which its top export market is in Asia, not Europe – that’s a real milestone. Meanwhile, China is looking West to a greater degree. It sees that there is real potential in that direction further to develop its economy and create opportunities for trade and investment.

Does Sino-Russian cooperation in the UN Security Council and growing trade relations reflect a growing shift in the global balance of power?

I think that China and Russia, again, do often tend to see global issues and issues before the U.N. in very similar terms because of rather similar foreign policy doctrines that place an emphasis on multilateralism and the U.N.. They like the U.N. as a forum for dealing with international issues because, as veto-wielding members, they can control the agenda. They have similar views on the notion of interference in internal affairs and the notion of unilateralism. They both have wariness about U.S. motives and strategic intentions. But again, I don’t think that there’s a concerted effort, per se, to counter the United States.

They probably think of themselves as having somewhat similar positions in the world, which is they’re great powers but not yet (or, in Russia’s case, anymore) superpowers. There’s a certain element of what might be called “triangulation” in the relationship, as well. Bear in mind, the U.S.-China opening in 1972 occurred principally on the basis of the idea that the United States and China should come together to counter the Soviet Union – “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” That element, that triangular dynamic, is one of the reasons that U.S.-China relations got out of the starting blocks to begin with.

I think that Chinese leaders are mindful of Russian views and vice versa because there is a sense that the world is changing. While the United States remains the world’s sole superpower, it is not as powerful vis-à-vis all the other countries in the world as it was 10, 20, 30, 40 years ago. This notion of a growing multi-polarity is a key theme in both Chinese and Russian foreign policy; and indeed, it’s a goal of both countries’ foreign policies.

China and Russia want an increasingly significant voice in international relations commensurate with their growing economic clout. The notion of a U.S. that is, if you will, less omnipotent is one that is welcomed by the leaders of both nations. In this sense, and in others, China’s and Russia’s interests converge to a much greater degree than they diverge.

Both countries’ leaders – who will each be in place for the next decade or so – have publicly characterized the China-Russia bilateral relationship as the strongest it’s ever been. It seems probable that we’re in for a major growth spurt in China-Russia ties. And that’s going to have significant implications for the world. This is going to be an interesting relationship to watch over the coming years.

EastWest Direct is an ongoing series of interviews with EWI experts tied to breaking news stories.

"What's Wrong with China's North Korea Policy?," Carnegie Endowment. Mar 26, 2013. 

"In China, Soviet Union's failure drives decisions on reform," The Washington Post. Mar 23, 2013.

"China's Xi tells Africa he seeks relationship of equals," Reuters. Mar 25, 2013. 

"China agencies press territorial claims in Asian waters," The LA Times. March 27, 2013. 

"Elite in China Face Austerity Under Xi's Rule," New York Times. March 27, 2013.

Follow EWI on Twitter @EWInstitute for continuing news updates.

Compiled by Michael McShane, Athina Doutis, Alex Schulman and Haolin Liu.

There is, according to the paper, a “new order in the relationship between Moscow and Beijing, in which China is no longer the junior partner.”

Titled “Russian–Chinese Security Relations: Moscow’s Threat from the East?” the report reviews positive and negative aspects of the relationship. It also considers the role of Western nations in the future of Sino-Russian relations.

The paper, released in the wake of Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Russia (his first as China’s President), maintains that China’s rapid growth has shifted the nature of this bilateral relationship, which has largely been based on energy and arms transactions.

 “When China has reached enough independence from Russia in military technology and has created sufficient alternative ways of gaining energy,” it argues, “Beijing might well ‘dump’ Russia as a ‘strategic’ partner.”

That raises the possibility of a more positive relationship between Moscow and the West. De Haas maintains that recent Sino-Russian political cooperation was mostly due to opposition towards Western policies, not the result of a “genuine desire for country-to-country political cooperation.” Following China’s so-called “dumping,” Russia may find itself resorting to an alignment with Europe and the United States on security issues.

In attendance were 32 Brussels-based academics, NGO officials and diplomats. Representatives from Russia and China voiced objections to the report’s claims of a fracturing relationship, maintained that although Sino-Russian relations consist of different approaches and interests, China and Russia’s roles are complementary, not confrontational.

 “Russian Judge Delays Trial of Dead Lawyer,” New York Times, March 11,2013.

“Two-Thirds of Russians Support Banning Foreign Adoptions – Poll” Interfax – Moscow, March 11, 2013 

“U.S. Demands China Block Cyberattacks and Agree to Rules” The New York Times. Mar 11, 2013. 

“China offers to discuss cyber security with US” Reuters. Mar 12, 2013.

"Guns and Butter: How to Prevent a Nuclear Arms Race in Asia" Albert B. Wolf, World Policy Blog. March 13, 2013

“China’s Xi Jinping charts a new PR course” The Washington Post. March 13, 2013.

“China’s New Leader Takes Full Power in Delicate Balancing Act,” The New York Times. March 14, 2013. 

Follow EWI on Twitter @EWInstitute for continuing news updates.

Compiled by Michael McShane, Athina Doutis, Alex Schulman and Haolin Liu.