Russia

Genscher notes that "We live in a globalized world and need the strength of all [countries] to solve the problems around us." Genscher suggests that Russia's activities in Crimea and Ukraine must be addressed, and that "If one wants to influence the other side, one has to talk to it. And, namely, without preconditions." 

For coverage of the interview published by Sputnik International, click here.

For details on the interview published by Süddeutsche Zeitung (German Edition), click here.

In the article, Chertoff explains that "National self-interest has us rushing headlong to the establishment of sovereign 'borders' and jurisdictional limits across the cyber-globe that will fracture the network into multiple, overlapping, competing parts. And that, in turn, will come at a great cost to personal freedom, economic productivity and social development."

To read this article published by Forbes, click here.

Публикуемый в переводе на русский язык доклад «Афганский наркотрафик: сценарии развития ситуации после 2014 года» продолжает серию публикаций, отражающих анализ и рекомендации российско-американской Рабочей группы по проблеме афганского наркопотока, организованной Институтом Восток-Запад в 2011 году. С прекращением мандата Международных сил содействия безопасности (МССБ) и выводом из Афганистана значительной части иностранного военного контингента страна сталкивается с вызовами переходного периода, существенно повышающими риски военно-политической дестабилизации и роста производства опиатов.

Учитывая значительную степень неопределенности дальнейшего развития событий внутри и вокруг Афганистана, авторы доклада приняли за основу анализа сценарный подход, основанный на комбинации двух базовых факторов, определяющих уровень безопасности в стране и, соответственно, потенциал развития наркоэкономики как способа выживания в кризисных условиях: степень политического единства и уровень внешней поддержки (прежде всего в отношении Афганских сил национальной безопасности). Примечательно, что в рамках каждого из четырех получившихся сценариев, от более-менее оптимистичного до самого негативного, российские и американские эксперты находят возможности для развития сотрудничества России и США в борьбе с наркоугрозой. К сожалению, подготовка и выпуск доклада (оригинал на английском языке увидел свет в феврале 2015 года) совпали с периодом резкого обострения российско-американских отношений, вызванного украинским конфликтом, а также более глубокими расхождениями во взглядах на современный миропорядок между политическими элитами двух стран. Взаимодействие России и США в сфере противодействия афганской наркоугрозе стало одной из жертв этого обострения, оказавшись фактически замороженным в результате введенных Западом антироссийских санкций.

Однако к моменту выхода в свет русского текста доклада появились признаки растущего понимания руководителями обеих стран того факта, что для решения ряда приоритетных международных проблем сотрудничество России, США и их союзников является насущной необходимостью в интересах их обоюдной национальной и глобальной безопасности и должно быть защищено от влияния политических разногласий по другим вопросам. Так, в телефонном разговоре 15 июля 2015 года президенты В.Путин и Б.Обама выразили «взаимный настрой на продолжение совместной работы в интересах устойчивой реализации венских договорённостей [по иранскому ядерному досье], а также по некоторым другим актуальным международным темам, включая противодействие угрозе международного терроризма.» (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49999). Сотрудничество в борьбе с терроризмом и экстремизмом неизбежно создает предпосылки для возвращения к активному взаимодействию России и Запада в противодействии наркоугрозе, в частности в свете все более очевидных попыток ИГИЛ распространить свое влияние на Афганистан и другие страны центрально-азиатского региона. Как отмечалось в первом докладе Рабочей группы «Афганский наркотрафик: совместная оценка угрозы», «связи между наркотрафиком и организованным вооруженным насилием (и транснациональными сетями криминального и террористического толка) служат источником новых типов угроз безопасности на региональном и глобальном уровнях.» (http://www.ewi.info/idea/afghan-narcotrafficking-joint-threat-assessment-russian-edition). Более подробный анализ этой связи, в частности в сфере использования финансовых доходов от мировой торговли афганскими наркотиками, Рабочая группа планирует представить в одном из своих очередных докладов в 2016 году.

India was admitted to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as an observer in 2005. It has taken ten years for India to be admitted as a full member at the SCO summit at Ufa in Russia in July this year. The principal reason for this long delay has been China’s reluctance to accept India’s membership without admitting Pakistan at the same time.

Russia has been supportive of India’s inclusion, but has been advising India to pursue the application process for full membership only in close consultation with it. Russia has had reservations about Pakistan’s eligibility for full membership because of its terrorist affiliations, its support for the Taliban and its role in promoting instability in Afghanistan. It has wanted Pakistan’s policies in this regard to evolve before considering its inclusion.

The Central Asian states have had serious concerns about the growth of religious extremism and terrorism in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region and the spill over of these pernicious forces into their region and destabilising their secular polities as a consequence. For both Russia and the Central Asian states, Pakistan’s membership was encumbered with unacceptable baggage. India’s membership, on the contrary, carried no uncomfortable baggage.

India, as the largest economy in southern Asia, has much more to offer for the economic development of Central Asia than Pakistan. Its entry would have given the Central Asian states more options, while also achieving a better distribution of power within the organisation

For Pakistan, it would have been a humiliating political defeat if India obtained membership before it did. Pakistan believes it has a Central Asian vocation. Geo-politically, it sees itself as the gateway for South Asia to Central Asia. As an extension of this thinking it treats Afghanistan as its strategic backyard. Pakistan would, if it could, exclude India even from Afghanistan, not to talk of Central Asia. India’s admission to the SCO without Pakistan would have dealt it an intolerable blow in terms of its self-image, its policy of denying access to India to Central Asia and its obsession of parity with India.

Chinese clout

China, ever sensitive to Pakistani views, would not have allowed a preferential decision in favour of India. The “iron” ties between Pakistan and China would explain why India could not become a member without Pakistan in the tow.

China has enormous clout within the SCO. Although the Central Asian states were part of the Soviet Union a little more than two decades ago and Russia still retains great influence in a region that remains its strategic backyard, it has had to contend there with the expansion of Chinese power.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia became enfeebled. It is during this period that China has grown in a spectacular way. The receding Russian power and expanding Chinese power has led to the creation of a new balance between the two in Central Asia. It is ironic that an area that was part of the Soviet Union has been brought together on a common platform, not in Russia, not in one of the Central Asian states, but in faraway Shanghai.

China has already established itself solidly in Central Asia. It has harnessed the region’s hydrocarbon resources to fuel its economy. As the world’s largest exporter, it is not surprising that it has captured the markets in these countries. Russia does not have the economic strength to compete with China in this region. China, in fact, is successfully harnessing Russian oil and gas and other raw materials for the needs of its economy.

This has meant that the two countries have had to establish a modus vivendi in Central Asia. They see it in their mutual interest to work cooperatively there. So, if Russia would have wanted India in and China would have wanted Pakistan in at the same time, neither could, or would, have wanted to over-rule each other’s preference. Hence the stalemate over membership all these years.

In any case, Russia would have had no reason to overly push for India’s membership while keeping that of Pakistan in abeyance, because India is not central to the functioning of SCO and the issue is not of such importance as to justify causing a strain in the cooperative Russian and Chinese stewardship of the organisation.

There could have been a reason to bring India and Pakistan into the SCO some years ago when the US was promoting its New Silk Road idea with the objective of drawing the Central Asian states towards South Asia and tying them together in trade and energy partnerships with a view to lessening their dependence on Russia and China. That US strategy could have been thwarted by opening the doors of membership to India and Pakistan, but this was not done.

Making the grade now

There are several reasons why the membership has now been opened to both India and Pakistan.

The relations between Russia and the West have deteriorated sharply, with the imposition of western sanctions on the country and attempts to isolate it internationally. Russia, as a result, has moved eastwards towards China and is pursuing a Eurasian strategy. China, which sees the US “rebalance” towards Asia as a form of containment of China in the east, has begun to move westwards more decisively. It too has new Eurasian ambitions. Both want to consolidate the SCO as a platform on which as many countries of the larger region can come together, as possible.

This serves the Russian purpose of demonstrating that it is not isolated internationally, and that, in fact, more countries are joining a grouping that is dominated by it and China and one that excludes the West.

Some are projecting the SCO as a potential counter to NATO, but that is a gross exaggeration of its purpose and potential. There is a vast difference in the political, economic and military potential between Europe and the Central Asian states.

India would not want to view its membership of SCO as a political riposte to the West. It has legitimate interests in Central Asia independent of the quality of ties between Russia and China and the US.

For China, the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative would get depth by the inclusion of the two South Asian countries. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project, which is an integral part of OBOR, would link Central Asia to the proposed Xinjiang-Gwadar link, giving an outlet to the sea to these landlocked countries. In this scheme the stabilisation of Afghanistan becomes necessary. Hence the Chinese involvement in promoting the reconciliation process between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

India is wary of OBOR and the CPEC, as it sees these projects as means for China both to create market opportunities for the excess capacities it has built in certain sectors of its economy and, more importantly, as a tool for realising its great power ambitions by using the huge financial resources now at its disposal.

China may be hoping that India’s SCO membership may whittle down India’s reservations and draw India into its initiative. The inclusion of Nepal and Sri Lanka as dialogue partner countries is a pointer.

India’s stakes

The expectation that the SCO can play a role in settling differences between India and Pakistan is far-fetched. China cannot be a broker because of its “higher than the Himalayas” and “deeper than the oceans” relationship with Pakistan and its own territorial differences with us, involving J&K too. Russia’s inclination to become a broker – any throwback to Tashkent – will create serious misunderstandings with us.

On the issue of terrorism, Pakistan may come under some pressure in the SCO. Within SAARC, Pakistan can join the shared rhetoric against terrorism without any pressure to clean up its act, as the only victim of its jihadi policies is India. Within the SCO, Russia, China and all the Central Asian states are concerned about terrorism and Pakistani policies and actions will be under scrutiny.

India may not get too much comfort from this, though. China has shown its colours in the UN Security Council on the Lakhvi case and would shield Pakistan on the issue of terrorism against India. Even Russia has been chary of naming Pakistan as a source of terrorism against India.

All in all, India’s membership of the SCO is a positive development. It recognises India as a legitimate stake-holder in Central Asian developments. Pakistan’s policy of obstructing an Indian role in Central Asia has received a set back. India will have a say in drawing up the SCO agenda. It will have a platform on which it deal with the Central Asian states collectively rather than dealing only individually with them. It will have ideas and programmes to offer in niche areas of its strength for promoting the development of Central Asian countries.

If India has failed to solve its problems with Pakistan within SAARC, our common membership of SCO will not help either.

Click here to read the article at The Wire.

Ties between Russia and Japan are slowly picking up steam again after a 16-month chill following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Earlier this month, Shotaro Yachi, Japan’s national security adviser, traveled to Moscow and met with his Russian counterpart to discuss President Vladimir Putin’s plans to visit Japan later this year. And despite ongoing tensions over Ukraine, there are also signs that Japan’s foreign minister, Fumio Kishida, may travel to Russia in the coming months to prepare for a potential Putin visit. Japan-Russia cooperation is also continuing on the security front with bilateral maritime security drills, focused primarily on border security, slated to take place later this month near Russia’s Sakhalin Island.

Since his election in late 2012, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has expended considerable diplomatic energy toward repairing Tokyo’s relationship with Moscow. Abe has met with Putin on numerous occasions, including two official visits to Russia. Indeed, Abe’s policy shift on Russia was so dramatic that his visit to Russia in 2013 marked the first official trip by a Japanese leader in a decade. Nevertheless, Japan still maintains a need to balance its desire to improve ties with Russia with its obligations, as a member of the G-7 and chief regional ally of the United States, to sanction Moscow for its involvement in the continuing fighting in eastern Ukraine. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Tokyo fell in line with its G-7 partners and implemented a limited set of economic sanctions on Moscow.

Now, even with Ukraine unresolved, Abe is looking to reinvigorate his policy embrace of Russia and maintain a nuanced approach to Putin. This push for engagement is premised on three main pillars. First, Abe remains convinced of his need to resolve the longstanding territorial dispute with Russia over the southern Kuril Islands, known as the Northern Territories to Japan. Second, both Tokyo and Moscow share a desire to enhance their energy partnership. And, finally, both sides have a strategic interest in closer relations as a potential balance or hedge against China’s rapid rise in the region.

On the island spat, there appears to be momentum toward a resolution after decades of failed discussions between the two sides. While Abe has prioritized Japan getting the islands back, he has subtly indicated his desire to compromise on Tokyo’s longstanding insistence that all four of the disputed islands be returned to Japan. Indeed, in early 2013, Abe sent former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori to Moscow as a special envoy on territorial issues. Before his trip, Mori floated the idea of a compromise: “splitting” control of the four disputed islands. Abe has officially stepped back from such an idea, maintaining the position that all of the islands be fully returned to Japan. However, Abe knows that such a one-sided resolution would never be backed in Russia. Japan and Russia continue to have backroom discussions on a potential resolution to the islands dispute, which has resulted in the two sides failing to officially sign a peace treaty ending hostilities from World War II. The stage appears set for a grand bargain on the islands during Abe’s tenure; both sides indicate that the conditions have never been better for a breakthrough.

Moreover, in addition to talks on the island row, Abe and Putin have each announced plans for stronger economic cooperation, with a focus on bolstering Japanese investment in Russia’s far east. The two also have agreed to a more enhanced bilateral energy dialogue. Since Japan shut down its nuclear power plants after the 2011 Fukushima disaster, it has looked to Russia for energy imports, most of all liquefied natural gas. Russia quickly became one of Japan’s top energy trading partners, and plans for a gas pipeline, which have been mooted for decades, were reportedly revived last fall. That has carried over to the security front. Last year, Abe pledged Japan’s support for Russia’s counterterrorism concerns while seeking Moscow’s understanding about Japan’s defense and security reforms.

Before Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Tokyo and Moscow had agreed to regular “2+2” dialogues between their respective ministers of defense and foreign affairs. The first such meeting took place in November 2013 in Tokyo and marked a significant improvement in bilateral ties. During that meeting, both sides agreed to increase cooperation in a number of strategic areas as an initial step toward elevating the partnership. But the Ukraine crisis put a temporary moratorium on these high-level exchanges.

There is a broader strategic element to Japan-Russia relations, too. Abe’s sustained engagement with Russia is based on the conviction that improved ties with Moscow will help Japan’s economy and guard against China’s growth and assertiveness. Tokyo sees this as even more of an imperative, considering the shifting geostrategic environment in the region brought by closer ties between Moscow and Beijing. Russia, for its part, also has an interest in improving relations with Japan in order to balance its complex relationship with China and continue its own stated goal of a Russian “pivot to Asia.” 

Abe and Putin will continue to be challenged in their attempts to bolster their relationship due to external pressures created by the Ukraine crisis. But there is a new opening for a grand bargain involving the Kurils, especially as Abe suffers in the polls because of his contentious legislation to expand the role of the military, currently in the Japanese Diet. Abe may look for a diplomatic win with Russia to help soften the blow of the security bills domestically and distract critics from his polarizing security policy. 

Indeed, Abe appears to be pursuing a similar agenda with China, by improving ties with Beijing and looking for a visit there later this fall. The biggest challenge for Japan and Russia in the coming months will be for both sides to retain at least some of the momentum despite Tokyo’s sanctions against Moscow, which aren’t likely to subside anytime soon, unless in concert with its other G-7 partners. Without that larger change, Japan will be forced to maintain a balanced line with Russia going forward, one that is compartmentalized and issue-specific, but could still yield results.

To read the article published by World Politics Review, click here. 

Given your extensive and challenging diplomatic experience, what are you planning to give EastWest Institute in the future? How do you see the work of the think-and-do tank under your guidance?

I’m glad you don’t just call us a think tank because we are different. We don’t have the focus as much on analytical studies and pronouncements as other traditional East American think tanks have. We’re not like Brookings or Carnegie. We try not only to set forward the ideas or judge them but also to listen. One of the key elements of a think-and-do tank is that we’re pronouncing less what we think should happen, but rather we try to understand the context so as to allow others to come together and find solutions. It’s a search for common ground, not just an analysis. We continue to do a lot of networking, widening existing scope of contacts brought together in the past four decades. For my part I want to see that our institutional structure is stronger throughout the world. In the broader sense the old-fashioned East-West track of EastWest Institute is truly becoming East-West, building on ties with China and India. It’s not as it was years ago when the line was drawn only across Europe. Now it’s the question of how do you deal with institutions throughout the world.

Russia and the US are going through an arduous period in bilateral relations which has a profound impact on the international relations system. How do you see the future of the Ukrainian crisis? How long will it take to settle the disputes and end hostilities? What is the profound reason for such deterioration in bilateral relations, up to you?

It is an exceptionally difficult issue. It illustrates the contribution we’d like to make. We are hoping not so much to come in with a magic solution, but to use the trust built both at the highest and local levels to avoid mistakes, to start a better discussion. The focus should be not only on settling the crisis and ending hostilities. Our point will be to say who are the people that need to talk? How can we help them talk? How can they frame the question in a way that’s most constructive?

Speaking about bilateral relations, I would emphasize that in the 21st century it is essential not to limit ourselves to looking at things bilaterally. Let me give a parallel that I’ve studied recently. The United States and Pakistan have a long bilateral relation which I would say was fairly sterile. We kept making the same mistakes over and over again, even when I was ambassador there. And I noticed that the Pakistanis and the Indians have the same problems. They kept having the same discussions over and over again because the structure of their diplomacy was bilateral. The way to manage problematic issues, such as those I have mentioned or even Ukraine, is to realize that there are not only traditional multilateral arrangements and actors. There are other players who can approach these issues differently. They don’t necessarily have to be governmental. They can be from business or from civic organizations. Are there ways to approach these non-traditional questions in bilateral relations often have? Not addressing these issues means limiting our abilities in conflict management.

As the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon put it, EastWest Institute is always challenging the way international relations are traditionally perceived. Now the system is obviously going through a great shift, possibly to be transformed irrevocably. How do you see the new system? What will be in its center?

I don’t expect that we’re going to see one system replacing another system. Some people have talked at many levels about the end of a Westphalian diplomatic system. I don’t think it is the correct way to put it. It’s just that other kinds of diplomacy and other issues grow up around it. Here ties throughout society, business, philanthropy, government matter the most. Of course, we take very seriously high-level state-to-state links. I hope we will be able to move from a traditional perception of diplomacy in relations. What I think Ban Ki-moon is saying that we are not witnessing the demise of one system and another replacing it but rather a profound change.

Right now EWI is working with Chinese expert groups. What are the main tracks of cooperation and dialogue?

We have a high-level political party dialogue. It’s the only party-to-party dialogue that we know of between America and China where the Democratic and the Republican parties speak with the Chinese Communist Party. We have been meeting quite regularly recently discussing issues like anticorruption. We facilitate such cooperation so that these institutions understand each other better. We also have the US-China Sanya initiative which brings together retired flag-level military officers from both countries. Here the participants discuss such topics as Taiwan, cybersecurity, maritime tensions in the South China Sea. That will hopefully prevent misunderstandings at high level. We also meet once a year in Beijing and have discussions on the Asian-Pacific region issues in general. We try to rebuild trust at high levels. That doesn’t mean that we only care about what high-level people think. It is a search for creative solutions, new ideas and third parties in a broader way.

In 2015 EWI celebrates 35 years of its existence. What is the main achievement of the organization? Do you think that think tanks are efficient for the big game politics? Can they give solid and valuable advice for politicians?

The EastWest Institute started out rather modestly as an institution that sought to jump over the Iron Curtain and tried to see whether the changes that were taking place in the 1980-s and 1990-s could be understood, talked about, and what ties could be made. Especially the contribution to the peaceful reunification of Germany was something that EastWest really worked at. I’m proud of EWI’s even-handed reputation at a global level. The things we’re doing now allow us to make a contribution to greater projects (e.g. in the Middle East, in South Asia, and most recently between Russia and the West).

Have the goals changed since the creation? What are the aims for the future?

The goals are the same because we are still bringing together people to talk, to build high-level trust, to address regional issues, to look at some functional issues. However, though the goals are the same, the scope is different. Now we are truly of a worldwide nature. If we’re dealing with a broad variety of countries we’re going to hear a lot more different ways of managing problems. It’s not going to be easy. Even though we’re based in the United States we consider ourselves a global organization. So our effort is to be very independent.

Many people in Russia and the West are very anxious about the ongoing political crisis. I’d like to think that situations like this are precisely when an organization like ours becomes useful where the problems are challenging because they are new. And it’s precisely at that time that coming together allows us to find concrete solutions that people in power can take.

Cybersecurity is one of EWI’s strong points. Now you are on the final track towards another cybersecurity conference in New York. What is the most challenging part of dealing with cybersecurity issues?

When we started working on cybersecurity we were ahead of the curve in the study of these issues, pioneers of sorts. Since that time a lot of experts have emerged and are working on it. Now we have to find added value, where we can contribute and others don’t. Part of it is in setting the agenda. One of the difficulties that one sees when studying cybersecurity is that many institutions and states define the problem differently. Some are focused on physical security, others on financial transactions, others on classical questions about warfare. We are working on finding those areas in which the rules, if there are going to be rules, can be made acceptable to all players, and I mean not just states but also large financial institutions. Finding that common ground is the key to what we do, and this topic desperately needs that. Cybersecurity desperately needs to be defined and institutionalized in ways that people accept, so that there aren’t misunderstandings that lead to real conflict. We are trying to be the people who don’t so much solidify cybersecurity and become the ultimate experts but rather those who are helping define the way a problem can be solved so that others can work with us. The fact we’re working in a lot of different places, in the West and East coasts of the United States, in Europe and Asia, indicates that we are on the right track.

Click here to view the interview on the RIAC website

Click here to watch the video on RT