South Asia

McConnell particpated in a policy discussion with Indian network CNBC-TV18 on the significance of Obama's visit and the possiblity of further business ties between the two major powers. 

"India should demonstrate its trustworthiness as a great place to do business," McConnell said during the discussion. 

In addition, McConnell was interviewed by Information Security Media's Varun Haran about India-U.S. cooperation on cybersecurity issues. 

"There is a lot of good basis for cooperation," McConnell told Haran, "It just needs to be ramped up more, which will happen after the President's visit." 

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To listen to the complete interview, click here.

Back in the summer of 2013, I embedded with a company of U.S. paratroopers in Eastern Afghanistan. Attached to the company of U.S. soldiers was akandak (battalion) of the Afghan National Army. Back then, I was quite impressed by the professionalism of the Afghan soldiers and wrote a glowing article titled “Afghan Forces Not Worried About US Departure.” Today, with Afghan security forces dying at a rate of around 100 per week (this only used to happen during the “hottest” periods of the annual fighting seasons), I am a less optimistic. Despite that, I still believe that Afghan forces will be able to hold their ground – for at least the next three years.

The major, if scaled down, objective for the newly launched NATO Training Mission “Resolute Support” is to train Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to the point where they will be able to control the country’s population centers and strategically important assets, such as major roads and mountain passes after 2017. The more ambitious goal of pacifying the entire country is now passé. Afghan forces have reached a maturity level where they are able to control about 80 percent of the population and where insurgent forces will not be able to dislocate them from key geographical positions.

Experience has shown that developing forces need three things to succeed: effective local leadership and governance to provide popular support; outside training and partnering that lasts long enough to ensure they are truly effective on a self-sustaining basis, and the resources necessary to keep fighting long enough to win. Each of these three factors need to be supported by institutions staffed with competent technicians, together with adequate structures and organizations. In this regard, the ANSF presents a mixed picture at best.

Money

While progress in local leadership and partnering is steady, resources post-2017 are largely undetermined. The oft-cited annual ANSF budget of $5.1 billion (first introduced at the NATO Chicago Summit in 2012, later increased to $5.1 billion at the NATO Wales Summit in 2014) is not backed by an adequately reviewed cost model and donor support post 2014 – despite pledges – is still largely undefined. What is very much needed is an adequate unclassified post-2104 campaign plan linking ANSF resources to objectives and further linking this plan to the gradual withdrawal of ISAF forces in order to garner the necessary political support in donor countries.

I posit that military progress in the field before 2017 can only be undone by substantially cutting the ANSF budget below $2.7 billion (the current annual operations cost of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Uniformed Police (ANUP)).

Recent Progress

Here are three examples from a tactical, operational and strategic perspective.

The U.S. M224 60 mm mortar might be a tactical “game changer” on the battlefield since it dramatically reduces the need for air power assets and increases the mobile firepower of the ANA. Almost all Afghan National Army (ANA) infantry kandaks (battalions) are now equipped with the weapon and basic mortar training (“mortar academies” set up by NATO advisors) has been somewhat successful in teaching ANA soldiers the necessary combat skills. This weapon has dramatically increased the ability of ANA units to withstand ambushes and pursue insurgent forces withdrawing from the battlefield.

There have been some good initiatives to reduce desertion and attrition rates. Evidence suggests that one of the principal reasons why Afghan soldiers go AWOL is that they do not return from home leave, which they take to share their salary with their families. With the increasing introduction of electronic banking among ANA and ANUP units there has been a sharp reduction in home leave and a concomitant reduction AWOL rates, according to a few senior-level ANSF leaders I spoke with. Yet, there is no publicly available comprehensive declassified dataset for soldiers and policemen going AWOL in 2014 to support this assertion.

Because of sparser resources, ANSF commanders are looking for alternatives to establish a modus operandiwith insurgent forces in strategically less important areas. There has been an increase in tacit agreements (for instance, in Zormat district in Paktia Province where I was embedded for two summers), between ANA, ANUP, and local insurgent commanders, whether Taliban, Haqqani network, or local criminal gangs. These agreements still leave ANSF in control of population centers and major highways. One can observe that in areas where there are tacit agreements in place ANSF are still aggressively patrolling cities and highways, resulting in high casualty rates on both sides.

Challenges

Tactical training at the squad, platoon and company levels is still inconsistent across units. While it is true that the firepower and combat effectiveness of the ANA units has increased dramatically in the past three years, the results are still mixed with some units doing better than others. The inability to retain experienced people past the three-year contract that ANA soldiers sign will be an ongoing challenge.

The ANSF still cannot move freely in the country. There are areas that are a no-go for the ANSF, others where they will only go with U.S. air support, and others where they will go on their own. Major population centers fall into the last category. No-go areas are remote geographical areas located around villages with a strong local criminal presence in addition to foreign insurgent fighters. This will not change in the years to come and may increase the number of safe havens for insurgents, should the U.S. decide to further scale back air support between 2015 and 2017.

Cooperation between ANSF elements is still a problem. The ANA is generally the most effective force, but has critical problems in retaining trained personnel, sustainability, and consistency. Only limited elements of the police – like the ANCOPs – are consistently effective, and corruption and ties to local power brokers remain critical problems. The Afghan Local police (ALP) and other local security forces are vital when it comes to holding territory, but very erratic in quality.

Logistics is still a challenge. The reason is the highly centralized logistics and acquisition system where funds are tightly controlled at the Afghan Ministry of Defense level. Resources only slowly trickle down to corps, brigade and kandak level. Corruption remains widespread. This is especially acutely felt in funds for informants, ammunition, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) equipment. Thus, it is fair to conclude that a lack of administrative competence, especially in the higher ranks among staff officers, as well as over centralized command and funding structures, still hampers military performance.

Of course, the elephant in the room is the political situation in Afghanistan – which could undo battlefield progress in a matter of months or even weeks.

Nonetheless, I am confident that the ANSF will be capable of prevailing on the battlefield against insurgents until 2017. It is important to understand that the insurgency is still very limited in its military capabilities and has been severely weakened by an aggressive coalition air campaign. The long term ANSF funding situation remains critical but is unlikely to change until 2017. ANSF will be able to control all major population centers and transit routes until then.

To read the article at The Diplomat, click here.

The lack of economic opportunities for the populace in Afghanistan is a major impediment to peace and stability. Without an adequate industrial base and/or agriculture infrastructure, guns-for-hire in abundance as a means to finding income is neither conducive for foreign direct investment nor for domestic entrepreneurial initiatives. That a small elite cabal with fixed mindsets returned after the fall of the Taliban to occupy seats of power in Kabul, does not help.

Economic resurgence for land-locked countries requires facilitating trade to and through their territory.  The EastWest Institute (EWI), a New York-based leading US think tank, headed by Ross Perot Junior, initiated the “Abu Dhabi Process” — a cross-border trade dialogue co-funded by Abu Dhabi and Germany — between Afghanistan and the countries on its periphery. Hosted by the EWI, the recent Istanbul conference encouraged businesses in South and Central Asia to themselves take necessary initiatives to unlock trade and kick-start the war-ravaged Afghan economy.

For the short-term, the recommended ways forward included: a) a regional business council comprising influential business leaders from Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Iran, CARs, Turkey and Iran; b) one-window custom clearance systems by Afghanistan and improved border sources at Torghundi, Hairatan, Torkham, Chaman, Wagah and Sher Khan Bandar and other border points to reduce time and cost of crossing; c) a generous visa regime to enable businesses to move around easily (under Saarc for the short-term and the Economic Cooperation Organisation for the long-term); d) regional entrepreneurship exchange programmes to promote trade and investment opportunities.

The mid-term recommendations included: a) a unified transaction mechanism system and a regional banking framework; b) standardising the Afghan tax structure to entice business investment; and c) a free trade zone Fata. The long-term recommendations were: a) a regional infrastructure trust fund, with India, Turkey, China, Russia, Pakistan and Afghanistan as donors to invest in designing, developing and expanding transport means, such as railways; and b) the implementation of CASA-1000, TAPI projects and other regional energy projects (without mention by name of the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline). The threat of US sanctions remain, and while Pakistan has no intention of bucking that, the Iranian portion is in place at the border at two places, 70 kilometres from Gwadar and 250 kilometres to connect into the extensive Pakistani gas pipeline infrastructure, with planned connections into Fata and Swat.

Recent significant and symbolic events confirm that Ashraf Ghani is a game-changer in the context of the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship.  To quote a recent article of mine,“Throwing aside diplomatic norms, the Afghanistan’s President visited GHQ immediately after landing at Islamabad. A foreign Head of State heading straight towards a military HQ on arrival carries a lot more than ceremonial importance, the Afghan President means business because he well understands where the real power concerning national security rests. Ashraf Ghani described his discussions later with the Pakistani PM as ‘a shared vision to serve as the heart of Asia, ensuring economic integration by enhancing connectivity between South and Central Asia through energy, gas and oil pipelines becoming a reality and not remaining a dream. The narrative for the future must include the most neglected of our people to become stakeholders in a prosperous economy in stable and peaceful countries, our faiths are linked because terror knows no boundaries. We have overcome obstacles of 13 years in three days, we will not permit the past to destroy the future’.” How will the Afghan president overcome the ‘hate Pakistan’ mindset of a few Kabul diehards, some of these ingrates even born and educated in Pakistan, who must even now be conspiring to cut him down to size?

That the future would not be held hostage by the past was symbolised by the US repatriating (with Afghan consent) Latif Mehsud along with two other militant commanders from Bagram into Pakistani custody. In another one of my articles, I had said, “The capture of the senior leader of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Hakeemullah Mehsud’s No 2, by US Special Forces represents the ‘smoking gun’ about the Afghan regime’s sustained involvement in terrorism in Pakistan. In the company of the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) agents taking their prized asset to Kabul to meet senior government officials, Latif Mehsud was simultaneously on the American ‘most wanted list’. India’s RAW is using the NDS as a proxy to sustain and support the TTP’s brutal campaign within Pakistan. To its credit, despite Karzai’s fury at the US for his capture (Daily Telegraph, October 13, 2013), this cut no ice with the US, and it signalled that as its enemy, Latif Mehsud would remain in its custody.” The act of handing over this terrorist is a confidence-building measure that will reduce the trust deficit and build on the excellent fast developing working relationship.

Realpolitik is the product of cold, calculated pragmatism based on economics. Afghanistan will make billions of dollars from system-collected royalties from the Central Asian Corridor passing through its geographical location. Without a continuous flow of gas and power, economic resurgence in Pakistan will remain moribund. The EWI’s Abu Dhabi Process emphasises that the entire region stands to gain exponentially from constructive trade and commerce engagement.

Afghanistan has finally found its man of destiny in Ghani. How long before a leader in Pakistan rises above selfishness and greed for the sake of the country? 

Among other discussions, the panel "reiterated the need for progress on the political front, highlighting the political-economic-security nexus amid a backdrop where Afghanistan, and the whole region, can benefit from strategic cooperation rather than competition." The event took place at the United Nations Headquarters.

To read the report, click here. 

Does one need Sherlock Holmes to deduce that the nasty and misleading story aired by a foreign news agency about a “split” in the army originated from a partisan source?

Most politicians can be economical with the truth even at the best times. With Khursheed Shah critiquing in the joint session of parliament the prime minister buckling under pressure from the army and the resultant threat to democracy, Mian sahib crossed the failsafe line that an awakened public is now increasingly not likely to tolerate between truth and falsehood. “Sotto voce” a solemn-faced prime minister categorically denied requesting the army for mediation to defuse the political standoff and assured the house about upholding the joint parliamentary resolution supporting the Constitution in letter and spirit. 

Recall his struggle along with the late Benazir Bhutto: “Governments come and go but principles cannot be sacrificed.” Describing the opposition leader’s speech as reflecting his sentiments he said, “How can one expect a U-turn from me, who endured the hardships of arrest and exile for the cause of democracy?” The prime minister’s recollection of sequence of events was that after he was telephonically informed in Lahore in the presence of Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan about the PTI and PAT leaders’ request to meet General Raheel Sharif, he did not object. “If they want to meet the army chief then they should certainly meet. The army did not ask to play the role of mediator, neither have we requested them to play such a role.” This confirmed that the army had been specifically instructed by the government to step in. The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) flatly contradicted Mian Nawaz Sharif’s statement.

The two dharna (sit-in) leaders vehemently denied requesting the army to broker a settlement, insisting that the prime minister was blatantly telling lies to parliament. Referring to the Director General ISPR, Major General Asim Bajwa’s Twitter update “(The army chief) was asked by the government to play a facilitative role for resolution of the current impasse, in yesterday’s meeting, at (Sharif’s) house” as proof, Maulana Tahirul Qadri said, “The request to resolve this issue as mediator came from the prime minister and incumbent government.” Following the public denouement of Nawaz Sharif’s credibility, a three-member bench of the Supreme Court (SC) admitted a petition seeking the prime minister’s disqualification for telling lies to parliament. Declaring that the ‘who said what’ was between the prime minister and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), the SC bench put the credibility of at least one of them on the line. Prima facie, the facts are pretty open and shut; does one really expect anyone to fall over themselves to deliver justice? 

Nawaz Sharif whispering “Geo, Geo” on primetime television, attempting to prompt the federal interior minister during the joint session of parliament was really uncalled for. That stage whisper seen and heard by millions fully exposed Information Minister Pervez Rasheed’s remark to the media: “Now you know which side we are on,” after the Sharif visit to Hamid Mir’s bedside. Given the innuendos and accusations about scriptwriting from the ‘democrats’ in and out of the house (and disparate television anchors), the military has been forced to repeatedly ‘clarify’ they were “not siding with anyone”. Being reactive instead of being proactive, appeasing detractors on the one hand and on the other taking friends for granted, or even ignoring them altogether, no wonder they end up on the receiving end. Munich, 1938, is a historic precedent that appeasement is always counter-productive. Appeasement should have ceased after the wake-up call rendered by the Hamid Mir affair. Does one need Sherlock Holmes to deduce that the nasty and misleading story aired by a foreign news agency about a “split” in the army originated from a partisan source? 

These sideshows unfortunately detract from the change that the people of Pakistan want (and deserve). Imran Khan must get his priorities right: redemption for the electoral deviations suffered by his party or the struggle to change the destiny of the people? Fixing the electoral system being the primary objective, those planning and executing strategy need boning up on Clausewitz’s first principle of war, the “selection and maintenance of aim”. Demanding a judicial commission for the 2013 elections diverts from the selected aim. Consigned invariably to the dustbin of history, which commission’s report has ever achieved anything in Pakistan? A legal passage to nowhere geared to derail aspirations for a free and fair electoral process, the suggested terms of reference (TORs) were tailor-made for filibuster. Imran is playing into the hands of feudals comprising the majority in parliament. Look at their influence in preventing the local bodies elections. The fountainhead of democracy is local governance; without it democracy is a farce.

Freedom from the evils associated with the present democratic bondage should be the greatest gift for the poverty-stricken and discriminated populace of this country. Feudalism and democracy cannot coexist. Is this the moment where history will record that democracy finally got the better of feudalism in Pakistan? Deviating from the selected aim will render us an unfortunate footnote to history. It will simply pass us by.

Do not hold your breath about getting justice from those responsible to render it or enforce it. Lack of an honest agenda, the arcane laws of evidence and a battery of glib lawyers will likely give legal sanction to ‘our constitutional duty to tell lies on (and off) the floor of the house’. To serve and further the cause of democracy — that should be an ideal follow-up resolution of the joint session of parliament.