Writing for Trustlaw, a Thompson Reuters Foundation service, reporter Lyric Thompson discussed the EastWest Institute's 2012 Awards Dinner held yesterday at the Four Seasons Restaurant.
"I have followed [EWI award recipient Ms. Shinkai] Karokhail’s work since she was profiled in the PBS Series Women, War and Peace," writes Thompson.
"Although the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan are famously fraught," she continues, "Karokhail is particularly optimistic that it will be possible to improve things by promoting dialogue and understanding between female leaders on both sides, which has already begun."
On April 14-16, 2012, the EastWest Institute, in partnership with the Women’s Parliamentary Caucus (WPC) of the National Assembly of Pakistan, arranged for the first official delegation of Pakistani women parliamentarians to visit Afghanistan.
This visit builds on an ongoing two-year effort of EWI’s Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention to strengthen the role of women in political life, and in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Afghanistan in particular.
Over the course of two days the parliamentarians, led by Shahnaz Wazir Ali, Member of Pakistan's National Assembly and Special Assistant to the Prime Minister, discussed issues related to reconciliation with the Taliban and regional economic cooperation with Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Masoom Stanikzai, Advisor to the President on Internal Security and Head of the Secretariat for Afghanistan's High Peace Council, Zalmai Rassoul, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, Haji Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, the Speaker of the Lower House, and members of the Wolesi Jirga Commission on Women’s Affairs, Civil Society and Human Rights.
Though Afghan women parliamentarians make up nearly a third of seats in parliament, they struggle to make their voices heard in a male-dominated environment. Pakistani women parliamentarians work in a similar cultural, religious, and social context, yet they have made far more political headway. Afghan women parliamentarians have called for more support from their colleagues in the region, and EWI’s Parliamentarians Network has facilitated a series of dialogues to answer that call.
This delegation is the first step in implementing the Islamabad Action Plan, a set of commitments outlined by Afghan and Pakistani women parliamentarians during their previous meeting in Islamabad in June 2011, which was also facilitated by EWI.
In the meeting with President Karzai, the Afghan leader declared: “This initiative is of immense importance to both countries and a great sign of a better future.” He called for more contacts between women parliamentarians in both countries, saying that such visits are “instrumental in strengthening of trust-building between the two nations.”
Women are critical players in the ongoing peace and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, often serving as agents of positive change in the region. “Without women, no progress can be made in society,” Stanikzai added. Participants strongly endorsed the recommendation to ensure greater representation of women in all tracks of diplomacy.
Joint challenges, from extremism and terrorism to economic underdevelopment, should be addressed by joint efforts, according to the participants. The Taliban attacks on Kabul during the parliamentary visit served as a stark reminder of the work that remains to be done. These attacks, the Taliban’s broadest assault on Kabul in more than a decade, fired at the Afghan parliament only hours after the meeting came to a close.
As the international military presence winds down and Afghanistan sets to assume responsibility over its security in 2014, many – including participants in the meetings – fear a return to Taliban rule, and a subsequent retraction of women’s rights. While emphasizing the importance of engaging with those Taliban who are willing to negotiate and constructively discuss a peaceful resolution, Rassoul and Stanikzai both emphasized that the Taliban must accept the 2004 Afghan constitution which recognizes that women and men have equal rights and responsibilities under the law.
Participants suggested that an inclusive forum where Afghan women parliamentarians can develop a common agenda and work jointly, such as a women’s parliamentary caucus, would enable them to maximize their influence. “Only if women work together will they have their voices heard and safeguard their rights,” one participant said.
The Commission on Women’s Affairs, Civil Society and Human Rights, one of eighteen permanent commissions of the Afghan parliament, has made impressive strides – most notably, by its recent successful push for a decree on combating violence against women. But because of the way parliamentary groups are structured, not all women parliamentarians are able to participate in such efforts. To help change that, participants committed to taking steps towards the creation of an inclusive women’s group in the Afghan parliament, an initiative that has the backing of President Karzai. Participants speaking for Pakistan’s WPC pledged their ongoing support to their Afghan colleagues and invited them to Islamabad for an EWI-facilitated follow-up visit later this year.
Can the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) detect illicit nuclear testing with a high degree of confidence? This question was the topic of conversation on March 2, 2012, when the EastWest Institute, in partnership with London-based VERTIC, hosted a seminar on the verification capabilities of the current Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
Moderated by EWI’s Jacqueline Miller and Andreas Persbo, Executive Director of VERTIC, the seminar featured presentations by experts Jenifer Mackby and Edward Ifft on technical advancements that have direct bearing on the CTBT’s robust and multifaceted verification regime.
The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on September 10, 1996. The Treaty has yet to enter into force. 157 countries have ratified the treaty. Another 25 countries have signed but not yet ratified the treaty—including the United States. President Bill Clinton presented the treaty to the Senate for ratification in 1999—and the Senate handed Clinton a stinging defeat when the treaty only received 48 of the 67 votes needed.
Opponents of the treaty cited concerns over the effectiveness of the CTBT’s verification regime—and, they argue, those concerns remain valid today. Proponents of the treaty point to successful real-world tests of the verification regime with North Korea’s nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, as well as the March 2011 tsunami in Japan, where data were provided to help the Japanese government issue early tsunami warnings. CTBT monitoring stations also tracked the release of noble gases and radioactive isotopes from the Fukushima nuclear plant. Proponents of CTBT ratification add that verification regime is ahead of schedule and functioning at a higher level than anticipated.
Jenifer Mackby, an Adjunct Fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, spoke first. Mackby has extensive experience in the area of nuclear disarmament and the CTBT in particular, having served as secretary of both the negotiations of the CTBT at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva as well as the Verification Working Group of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission in Vienna. Dr. Edward Ifft, who spoke after Mackby, is an Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service. He has been involved in negotiating and implementing many of the key arms control agreements over the past 40 years, including both the first and second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the first (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) START.
Mackby found the verification mechanisms of the treaty as more than adequate for detecting illicit nuclear tests, noting that “most experts agree the treaty will prevent countries from developing advanced nuclear weapons or improving existing ones, thus impeding a nuclear arms race, curbing nuclear proliferation, and strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty.” Mackby specifically discussed the three main components of the CTBT—the International Monitoring System, the International Data Center, and the On-Site Inspection System. She also singled out some key features in what she considers to be the most far reaching verification regime of any agreement to date. These features include its state-led implementation strategy, zero-yield test threshold ban, and its ability to detect both above- and below-surface detonations. In addition, Mackby noted that current verification capabilities are much greater than when the CTBT was originally signed in 1996, allowing for a much more flexible, nuanced, and focused method of data analysis—or what she termed “precision-detection techniques.”
Ifft discussed the On-Site Inspection System (OSI) under the CTBT and its capabilities and drawbacks. The OSI is a vital part of the verification regime; in some cases it may be the only way to verify an ambiguous event. The CTBT’s OSI is much more intrusive than any other regime, with inspection teams possessing a wide array of techniques at their disposal. Ifft noted that “when the treaty enters into force, OSI will be a powerful force to use for verification.” Despite these positive developments, Ifft cautioned that certain techniques can be used to try to evade detection, namely de-coupling explosions, hiding tests in chemical explosions, and extremely small yield explosions. Despite these potential pitfalls, Ifft maintained, would-be testers would not have a high-degree of certainty that they could avoid detection—something that could serve as a powerful deterrent.
Both Mackby and Ifft concluded that technical advances have strengthened the detection capabilities of the CTBT’s intrusive verification regime. Although it is not yet in force, the treaty has contributed to halting vertical nuclear proliferation and the CTBTO has successfully detected nuclear explosions and monitored the relatively low-level accidental release of radioactive material at Fukushima. But North Korea’s 2009 nuclear rest highlighted the problem for all states when the CTBT is not in force. Since radionuclides were not detected, an OSI could have provided better insight into the scope of the North Korean test.
Mackby added that a number of countries are looking to the United States to ratify the treaty before they do so—China most prominently. President Obama has insisted that that he intends to present the CTBT to the Senate once again for ratification—without specifying the timing. Given the fact that this is an election year and any such attempt would spark new partisan debates, it’s unlikely to be anytime soon.
Warning that the chances for military action against Iran could be “50-50 for this spring,” Trita Parsi, the president of the National Iranian American Council, discussed his new book A Single Roll of the Dice – Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran at the EastWest Institute on Feb. 27.
Moderated by EWI’s Andrew Nagorski, the conversation provided the audience a window into some of the previously unknown details of the Obama administration’s diplomatic outreach to Iran. With access to over 70 high-ranking officials from the U.S., Iran, Europe, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Brazil—including the top American and Iranian negotiators—Parsi explored the real reasons for the collapse of diplomatic efforts between the United States and Iran.
During his talk, Parsi laid out the series of events that unfolded in the first two years of the Obama presidency, starting with Obama’s offer, 12 minutes into his presidency, of the hand of American friendship to those willing to unclench their fist. However, the legacy of bitter distrust between Iran and the United States, and the skepticism of others that a deal could be negotiated, eroded any initial optimism. As Parsi put it: “Many wished Obama well but few wished him success.”
Parsi pointed out that serious talks were delayed until after the 2009 Iranian presidential election. Then, when the widespread allegations of fraud triggered mass protests, it became increasingly difficult for Washington and Tehran to focus on the nuclear issue on its own terms. For various reasons—including the continued technical progression of Iran’s enrichment capabilities and the hardening of attitudes towards Iran in the West—any deal needed to work right away. As a senior State Department official told Parsi, “Our Iran diplomacy was a gamble on a single roll of the dice.”
That roll of the dice came in the form of what was meant to be a confidence building measure, a nuclear fuel swap where Iran would ship out 1200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium (LEU) in return for fuel rods. The fuel rods were for its Tehran Research Reactor, which produces medical isotopes for Iran’s cancer patients. The West and Iran could not come to terms, but then Brazil and Turkey stepped in to broker a deal they thought would be acceptable to both sides. By then, however, the facts on the ground had changed. Iran had almost doubled its LEU since talks first began, and the U.S. had won international backing for strong sanctions. As Parsi explained, the Obama administration had opted for sanctions instead of a political deal because it believed diplomacy had failed.
Parsi argued that diplomacy was never pursued as far as it should have been, and unreasonably optimistic early expectations may have contributed to the failure of this effort. ”Negotiations such as these succeed not because the proposals are flawless or because both sides play fair, but because the many flaws associated with the talks are overcome by the political will to reach a solution,” he said.
With tensions and harsh rhetoric escalating on both sides amid increasing speculation about a possible Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, Parsi warned that sanctions could backfire. One result could be that Tehran would walk away from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since all of the current information the West knows about Iran’s nuclear program comes from IAEA inspections and reports, he added, this would create an even more dangerous situation where Washington and others would be left guessing about what is really happening on the ground—and, in all likelihood, assuming the worst.
What will Pakistani politics and security look like in 2020? That question was the topic of a Feb. 24 presentation at the EastWest Institute’s New York Center by a team of experts convened by New York University’s Center for Global Affairs.
Led by Prof. Michael F. Oppenheimer, the team presented its Pakistan 2020 report, which explores three possible future scenarios for the country.
The event connected participants in the United States, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Pakistan to weigh in on prospects for Pakistan’s future over the course of the next decade.
Oppenheimer’s colleagues included: Shamila Chaudhary, an analyst for Eurasia Group who served as the director for Pakistan and Afghanistan at the National Security Council from 2010-2011; Pakistan 2020 team lead for the CGA Scenarios Initiative Rorry Daniels; and Regina Joseph, who wrote up one of the scenarios for the report. The Carnegie Corporation-funded project was the result of NYU’s Pakistan Scenarios workshop held on April 29, 2011, which brought together 15 expert participants to develop three “plausible, distinct and consequential scenarios that merit the attention of U.S. foreign policy makers.”
Each scenario for Pakistan in 2020, though hypothetical, was designed to produce policy insights through considering potential futures.
The first hypothetical scenario, “radicalization,” envisions a Pakistan consumed by populist fervor as a result of “perceived military threats, spiraling economic losses and political infighting.” This results in the rise of a democratically elected conservative military officer who pursue a radical Islamic agenda for the country.
The second scenario, “fragmentation,” foresees economic instability as crippling the capacity of the state to govern, leading to a federally and regionally unstable Pakistan rife with insecure nuclear materials.
The third and most optimistic scenario, “reform,” sees a growing middle class fostering a centrist, economically oriented political movement. A political party born out of this movement then serves to displace much of the power currently held by political and military elites.
While the third scenario may be the least likely to occur, Oppenheimer said, “it is sufficiently plausible for the U.S. to try to work toward that scenario, in part because the other two … involve significant risks and damage to American interests and American security.”
Chaudhary argued that balkanization in Pakistan was unlikely. She maintained that Pakistan should instead be expected to “muddle through” current challenges. The first and third scenarios, both of which heavily rely upon the democratic process, would seem to support her view that Pakistan’s military, media, political parties and religious organizations are an example of “democracy at its best and at its worst.”
Najam Abbas, a senior fellow at the EastWest Institute who called in from London, commented that the situation requires a “macro-layer of analysis to probe the implications of Pakistan's 64-year-long [history of] a chaotic polity and shaky economy,” and aspects that “lead us to triggers that perpetuated strong individuals but weaker institutions.”
EWI Board Member Ikram Sehgal, speaking from Pakistan where he is chairman of a private security company, said pervasive corruption in Pakistan’s institutions was “the most important issue to the people of Pakistan” and a major cause of current instability.
German Ambassador Guenter Overfeld, EWI’s Vice President for Regional Security, calling in from Brussels, argued that corruption in Pakistan was in fact “a symptom of poor governance, not a cause.”
Pakistan 2020 is the seventh such report on potential futures for key countries conducted by the GCA Scenarios Initiative. Past reports have covered Iran, Iraq, China, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.
On December 7, 2011, the EastWest Institute (EWI), in partnership with the World Policy Institute (WPI), hosted the second annual Ian Cuthbertson Memorial Lecture. Counterterrorism experts Scott Helfstein and Naureen Fink discussed the positive and negative impacts of democratic transitions on the fight against terrorism.
The lecture, held at EWI's New York Center and moderated by EWI's Andrew Nagorski, was named in honor of the distinguished British diplomat and counterterrorism consultant Ian Cuthbertson, who served in senior roles at both EWI and WPI.
The ongoing turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), which many observers at least initially hailed as moves toward democratization, has raised many questions about the potential consequences for international security. Among these concerns is the effect it will have on counterterrorism operations throughout the region, especially in light of the pre-existing relationships between countries undergoing political upheavals and the Western governments most actively targeting terrorist operations. At a fundamental level, there is a sharp divide between many analysts on the question of the relationship between regime type and the prevalence and effectiveness of terrorism. Some argue that the institutions comprising a liberal democracy weaken the potential for terrorist activity and allow for more effective counterterrorism operations, while others maintain that autocratic regimes are more effective at thwarting and minimizing security threats.
Helfstein, who spoke first, is director of research for the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. An advisor to public and private sector organizations, Helfstein has extensively studied the effects of democratic and autocratic transitions from 1970 to 1990. Naureen Chowdhury Fink, who followed Helfstein, is a senior analyst at the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. Having worked closely with the U.N. Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) on developing their initiatives in South Asia, Fink offered her expertise on Bangladesh as a case study to understand the impact of regime type on counterterrorism.
The Arab Spring raises the question of whether the security relationships established between Western and MENA autocracies are more effective at combating terrorist activity than new democracies, liberal or not, which come with uncertainty. During the discussion, a consensus quickly arose that reality calls for far more nuance than a simple “yes” or “no” answer.
In the wake of the revolutions, functioning security networks have been thrown out the door and have yet to be replaced. Helfstein noted that the United States has “created a foreign policy in the past based on the notion that democracy actually hinders terrorism, but there are good reasons to question that assumption.” He went on to cite a quantitative analysis of the impact of regime type transitions on terrorism that at least partially discredits the notion that democracy inhibits terrorism.
Speaking about his research on regime transition from 1970–1990, Helfstein pointed out that regimes that transitioned from democracies to autocracies had substantially fewer terrorist acts in the two year period following the transition when compared to the two year period preceding the transition. And in fact, nations that became democracies in that period underwent just the opposite experience: a substantial increase in terrorist attacks in the following two years. Regardless of the optimism generated by images of democratic participation in formerly autocratic regimes, it is clear that the future holds serious challenges for these states.
Fink, a specialist in South Asia, offered her extensive experience as an analyst of counterterrorism in Bangladesh as a case study for the topic. “Democracy has created an inhospitable environment for militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh,” she noted, adding that the majority Muslim nation’s democratic institutions have acted as a “pressure valve” for managing discontent. Bengali democracy, which has been in place since 1972, serves to establish expectations of transparency and accountability from public officials who, should they fail to meet these expectations, can be replaced at the ballot box.
That said, Fink noted that the “violent political culture” found in Bangladesh has threatened the stability of fundamental democratic practices such as the peaceful transition of power, even among members of the same political party. A major lesson for the Arab Spring is that the abuse of power within democratic institutions can allow alternate narratives of religious extremism and militancy to become more compelling to the populace.
In light of this discussion, the conventional wisdom holding democratic transition as an absolute good proves to be a questionable one. Helfstein said that transitions are usually “jarring events” that “not only impact the political institutions but they impact the social structure of society.” The societal shock produced by regime change can often lead to unpredictable consequences.
Both speakers emphasized the role of culture and social norms. The outcome of a democratic (or autocratic) transition is significantly linked with ingrained social mores that can prove highly resistant to the influence of imposed institutions. The coming months are sure to shed more light on how the current political transitions in the Arab world are influencing the prospects for effective counterterrorism.
The National Assembly of Pakistan on Tuesday passed a landmark bill on the “Prevention of Anti-Women Practices.” Dr. Donya Aziz, a member of parliament and part of the EastWest Institute’s Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention, spearheaded the effort to pass the historic bill.
The bill criminalizes exploitative and discriminatory practices such as forced marriages and denial of women’s rightful inheritance. People who engage in these practices, which are customary in some parts of Pakistan, are now subject to hefty fines or up to 10 years in prison.
Though Pakistan’s parliament has a greater proportion of women than the U.K. Parliament or the U.S. Congress, Pakistani women parliamentarians must constantly work against gender bias and prove themselves as serious contributors in the legislature.
The Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention congratulates Dr. Aziz, a member of its Executive Council and a leading member of its working group on Women, Peace and Security. It also congratulates the many female lawmakers who work to improve women’s and human rights in Pakistan. We are proud to continue to work together to support women in their active role in public life.
The Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention is an international, non-partisan, standing structure with a membership of almost 180 parliamentarians from 58 countries across the globe. The Network connects members of parliament to mobilise efforts towards the prevention of conflicts turning violent through diplomatic initiatives and effective collective action. The latest report from the Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention’s working group on Women, Peace and Security is available here.
Donya Aziz, Pakistani lawmaker and member of the Executive Council of EWI's Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention, is leading a parliamentary battle to end "anti-women practices" in Pakistan.
The EastWest Institute's 8th annual Worldwide Security Conference (WSC8) took place on October 3-4, 2011. The conference, sponsored by the French G8 Presidency, brought together leading policymakers for two days of networking, debate and exclusive private consultations on a range of new security challenges, from the new political landscape in the Arab world to a growing number of attacks in cyberspace. Here is an overview of WSC8 media coverage.
