Southwest Asia

The EastWest Institute convened “Afghanistan Reconnected,” an Abu Dhabi Process Meeting on Afghanistan’s investment potentials, in New Delhi at the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry’s (FICCI) Federation House, on November 19-20, 2013. The conference addressed key challenges and opportunities for investment in Afghanistan after the 2014 withdrawal of international forces. High-level representatives, including Afghanistan’s Finance Minister Dr. Hazrat Omar Zakhilwal and India’s former Foreign Minister Kanwal Sibal, as well as additional participants from India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, U.A.E., Turkey, the United States, the EU, Central Asia, Iran and China, attended.

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The nuclear deal with Iran has drawn strong criticism as a compromise that exposes fractures in the sanctions coalition against Iran, dismantling hard-won sanctions without having reached the goal of implementing maximum limits on Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Are the concessions to Iran’s nuclear fuel-making program a reasonable step in the right direction, or do they pose a grave danger to the future of non-proliferation in the region?

It is important to remember that the P5+1 (or EU3+3) which negotiated and signed off on this interim deal with Iran includes all five Permanent Members of the Security Council in addition to Germany. These are the same countries that passed the sanctions resolutions. 

The deal itself, which is a renewable six months interim deal, puts limits down on Iran's nuclear program that would make it harder for Tehran to build a weapon and easier for the world to find out if it tried. 

In it, Iran agreed to cap its enrichment level to a maximum of 5 percent, which is well below the 90 percent threshold needed for a warhead. Iran also pledged to "neutralize" its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium—the highest level acknowledged by Tehran—by either diluting its strength or converting it to fuel for its research reactors, which produced isotopes for medical treatments and other civilian uses.

Iran also agreed to halt work on a planned heavy water reactor in Arak, southwest of Tehran. Heavy water is a compound used to cool nuclear reactors, which do not need enriched uranium to operate. Heavy water reactors also produce a greater amount of plutonium as a byproduct, which could be used to make warhead material. Iran does not currently possess the technology to extract the plutonium, and promised in Geneva not to seek it.

The deal also gives inspectors from the UN's nuclear watchdog agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency, faster and broader access to Iran's atomic facilities and obligates Iran to address all UN Security Council concerns, including those around the Parchin military compound outside Tehran. Parchin has been suspected of housing a secret underground facility used for Iran's nuclear program, a claim denied by Iran. UN nuclear inspectors twice visited the site, but seek a third tour.

In return, Iran receives a rollback in some sanctions—a total package estimated by the White House at $7 billion back into the Iranian economy—but the main pressures remain on Iran's oil exports and its blacklist from international banking networks during the first steps of the pact over the next six months.

It also opens up $4.2 billion from oil sales to be transferred in installments over the next six months as various compliance stages are reached. That's still a very small sum in a country that was once one of OPEC's top exporters.

The deal also offers Iran some sanctions easing on gold and other precious metals, as well as Iran's automobile and aviation industries and petrochemical exports. The P5+1 further agreed to hold off any new nuclear-related sanctions for at least six months in exchange for Iranian adherence to the deal.

Above all, the deal removes the immediate threat of unilateral military action and the potentially grave consequences such action would have for the world and the authority of the United Nations. The interim agreement now gives the negotiating states six months working space, and up to a year if renewed, to achieve a comprehensive peaceful settlement. The US is now able to move away from the rhetoric of military confrontation that neither President Obama, the U.S. public nor the world is comfortable with and instead share responsibility with all other permanent members of the UN security council, Germany and the EU, thus strengthening the P5+1 and facilitating action that will need to be taken within the Security Council and the UN system.

What challenges will the U.S. face at the negotiating table six months from now, when participating powers will seek a more permanent agreement on Iran’s nuclear program?

The next six months of negotiations will be very difficult as success would require another vast investment of effort and political capital from both presidents, and would be hostage to developments elsewhere, especially in Syria. There is a threat that the deal could fall apart almost immediately in the face of hardline objections in Washington and Tehran. A congressional vote now for more sanctions would almost certainly derail it. Iranian conservatives would see such an act as American duplicity and it would make it extremely hard to ever seal another agreement. Iranian conservatives would be likely to accelerate Iranian nuclear development, bringing a conflict closer.

The most important challenge is to ensure that the permanent agreement limits the activity of the Iranian nuclear program to plausible civilian uses subject to comprehensive monitoring as required by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. To quote a recent op-ed authored by former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz: “Any final deal must ensure the world's ability to detect a move toward a nuclear breakout, lengthen the world's time to react, and underscore its determination to do so.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has labeled this deal “a historic mistake,” arguing that Iran, like North Korea in 2005, is using diplomacy as a distraction to allow it to make a jump forward in its nuclear program. Do you believe that this is the case, or is Iran making a good-faith effort to reach rapprochement with global powers after a decades-long standoff?

Despite the negative response from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the agreement, the deal is not really a bad one for Israel. For the first time in a decade, Iran will be freezing its progress on its nuclear program, and is even rolling back certain parts of the program that particularly concerned Israel.

Netanyahu has made it his mission to protect Israel from a potential Iranian nuclear attack and for a while, it looked like Israeli military action—with or without U.S. involvement—was simply a matter of time. But, now, most of the world wants to find a diplomatic resolution of the Iranian nuclear problem, compromising with Tehran in order to avoid another war.

For Netanyahu, the devil is not in the details but in the bigger picture, as he believes that the deal fast-forwards American-Iranian relations and may thereby redraw the strategic map of the Middle East. Israel enjoys its status-quo as the Middle Eastern unchallenged military power and any potential challenge is viewed as a threat. 

However, Israel will need to adapt to a changing world where its military power, while still unmatched in the region, won’t be enough to ensure its security. It will need to consider other means of protecting its interests and defusing tensions.

Saudi Arabia, a key U.S. partner in the region, is not alone in its fear that the deal marks a shift in the geopolitics of the Middle East. With the U.S. pivot to Asia, news of secret U.S. talks with Syria and Iran, and speculation that U.S. influence in the Middle East is on the decline, will we begin to see regional realignments in response to the changing political milieu?

Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have been lumped together with Israel as opposed to the deal struck in Geneva. However, the Gulf States have taken a different approach

The Saudi government issued a carefully worded statement that cautiously welcomed the deal adding that it “views the agreement as a primary step toward a comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue provided it leads to a Middle East and Gulf region free of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.”

However, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies are not merely concerned about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. They have a more profound fear that geopolitical trends in the Middle East are aligning against them, threatening both their regional stature and their domestic security. Their basic assumption is that whatever’s good for Iran will, somehow, come at their expense. 

With Iran dominant in Iraq and Lebanon, holding onto its ally in Syria, and now forging a new relationship with Washington, there are few obstacles to its regional dominance. Internally, Gulf monarchies are afraid that this will encourage Shiite populations to oppose their Sunni rulers.

On the other hand, the Geneva agreement reflects an Iranian desire to change their relationship with the rest of the world, and by default with Iran’s Gulf neighbors, making the Middle East safer. Improving relations with regional countries is a central plank of Iran's diplomatic policy under its new president, and both President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif have made overtures towards Iran’s Gulf neighbor. Last week, they welcomed United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed to Tehran and have embarked this week on regional trips that have taken them to Kuwait and Oman. There is indication that a trip to Saudi Arabia could also be on the horizon.

The Obama Administration does think that the U.S. is overcommitted in the Middle East, and seeks to “pivot” at least some American foreign-policy resources and attention to East Asia. Substantial increases in domestic energy production have made the Middle East less important to American energy calculations, though Persian Gulf oil and gas will remain significant for decades to come. That is reason enough for the U.S. to maintain good relations with Gulf monarchies. But the overall trend is toward a diminished role for the Middle East in the global energy market. 

Still, there are many common interests to keep the allies united, including shared worries about Iran’s regional influence and about Al Qaeda and its affiliates, as well as an absence of alternative arrangements that meet their security needs.

EastWest Direct is an ongoing series of interviews with EWI experts tied to breaking news stories.

All seemed to agree that this time around, a red line had indeed been crossed and, therefore, based on solid evidence, some sort of coordinated effort should be made to make it clear to the Syrian government that this violation of internationally accepted norms would not go unpunished.

That unity has been shattered in the last couple of days. First, the Obama administration had to admit its intelligence does not tie Assad himself directly to the attack. It has strengthened calls on the president to first sit down with leading Democrats and Republicans and try to seek Congressional approval for any action. The absence of a “smoking gun” also put off many doubters wary of being manipulated. Finally, UK Prime Minister David Cameron did not manage to convince a skeptical British parliament, where many remembered how 10 years ago they were dragged into the Iraq War based on what later turned out to be false proof, to act.

The result is that in the public debate on Syria, in Turkey and elsewhere, we are back at square one. On one side, we have those who believe the killing of over 100,000 people is reason enough to intervene in Syria and who considered the chemical attacks to serve as an additional argument that might be the straw to break the camel's back. Again firmly opposed to this view is a mixed bunch of principled pacifists, old-fashioned anti-imperialists and a big group that simply does not believe military operations will be effective and could even be counterproductive. For that reason, they want all attention to be focused on the diplomatic initiative that was undertaken by Washington and Moscow some time ago.

Personally, I am convinced that any eventual progress at the negotiating table will only be accomplished after the military balance on the ground has shifted in favor of the rebels. Only then will Assad and his main backers, Russia and Iran, be willing to sit down and talk about a political solution. This is why I have been in favor for some time of supplying the non-jihadi rebels with sufficient arms and why now I support a military attack that will substantially weaken the Assad regime.

Several analysts have warned against the dangers of the limited bombing campaign US President Barack Obama has in mind. Even if the US would be able to stop Syria from using chemical weapons again, the war, in which most Syrians who died were killed by bullets or artillery and air strikes, will continue unabated. Assad will take his revenge on his opponents at home and abroad.

That is why two things need to happen once it has been established beyond doubt that the Syrian government should be held responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Ghouta. One is the destruction of the regime's military infrastructure and “command-and-control” centers, including the airports that are being used by Russian and Iranian military and commercial planes to offload new weapons for Assad. Secondly, we need a new American and European engagement to build up an armed opposition that can push back government forces on the ground but can also act as a reliable partner during negotiations and in the post-Assad era. As The Economist summarized its advice to Obama, “do it well and follow through.”

I fully realize that hitting Assad hard and supporting moderate rebels will not solve all the problems in Syria. It might create an even bigger mess in the short run. But what I fully reject is the conclusion that therefore doing nothing or staying out is the best option. As celebrated New York Times columnist Nicholas D. Kristof pointedly formulated it this week, “for all the risks of hypocrisy and ineffectiveness, it's better to stand up inconsistently to some atrocities than to acquiesce consistently in them all.”

Joost Lagendijk has been Member of the European Parliament from 1999 to 2009. He is now living and working in Turkey as a columnist for the Turkish dailies Zaman and Today's Zaman.

Originally published on todayszaman.com.

“Whether by design or accident, the nuclear deal struck in Geneva this past weekend is about far more than centrifuges, enrichment and breakout times.

Ultimately, the success of the nuclear negotiations will help determine who and what will define Iran for the next few decades.

Will Iran be defined by the confrontational and bombastic approach of its former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the conservatives around him? Or will it be defined by the more open and moderate approach of its current President Hassan Rouhani and his energetic and respected Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif.”

-“Nuclear Deal will Define Future Iran,” Reuters, November 25, 2013.   

“The Obama administration moved quickly to sell the agreement to nervous U.S. allies, particularly Israel, and to persuade lawmakers not to push ahead with new economic sanctions that could prompt Iran to abandon the six-month freeze on its nuclear program set under the accord. In interviews, Secretary of State John F. Kerry defended the deal, saying that the United States and its allies believe that the agreement ensures Iran will either abide by the terms or face the reinstatement of measures that have crippled the country’s economy.”

-“After Iran nuclear deal, tough challenges ahead,” Washington Post, November 24, 2013.

“The White House has to persuade skeptical lawmakers to hold off on imposing new sanctions on Iran during the next six months. That may be a hard sell given the number of lawmakers from both parties who want to increase the sanctions on Iran rather than softening or relieving any of the existing measures. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada, a close White House ally, has said he's prepared to take up a tough new sanctions bill when the Senate comes back into session next month. The bill would almost certainly pass if it was put to a full vote. Secretary of State John Kerry said Obama was prepared to veto new sanctions legislation, but that's a battle the White House would dearly love to avoid.”

-“Deal Reached to Halt Iran's Nuclear Program,” Foreign Policy, November 24, 2013.

“The U.S. readiness to talk with Tehran, after decades of mistrust, has angered some people in Israel, who said it was a form of appeasement. But supporters of the deal say it will encourage Iran to be more open about its true nuclear aims, which it says are peaceful.

Israel's parliamentary opposition leader Isaac Herzog said Netanyahu should minimize confrontation with the Obama administration "and restore the intimate dialogue with the leaders of the big powers."”

 -“Netanyahu sending security aide to U.S. for talks on Iran,” Reuters, November 25, 2013.

“The Iranian foreign minister pointed to Israel’s animosity with Iran and fury of the Israeli leader over the victory of Iran’s diplomacy in Geneva talks, and said, “In these negotiations we want to build the trust of the world in the fact that we are not after nuclear weapons; so why have the enemies been terrified in such a way and why are they crying out?”

-“AEOI Chief: Structure of Iran’s N. Program Unaffected by Geneva Deal,” Fars News Agency, November 25, 2013.

“Gary Sick, a former National Security Council Iran expert who now teaches at Columbia University, said the bilateral U.S.-Iran communication was about ‘laying the groundwork’ for the interim deal concluded in Geneva. ‘The real negotiations, of course, took place with the P5+1’ he said, but the secret U.S.-Iran talks were a way ‘to break the ice a little bit.’ There has been more direct communication between Washington and Tehran in the last few months, he suggested, than in the 34 years since the Iranian revolution.”’

-“Nuclear deal raises prospects (and fears) of broader US-Iran thaw,” Al Jazeera America, November 24, 2013.

“…The interim nuclear agreement signed in Geneva on Sunday by Iran and the six big powers has many of the flaws of Munich and Paris. But it has none of their redeeming or exculpating aspects.

After Geneva there will come a new, chaotic Mideast reality in which the United States will lose leverage over enemies and friends alike.”

-“Stephens: Worse Than Munich,” The Wall Street Journal, November 25, 2013. 

Just as the United States has had to adapt to a world where its power is unmatched but no longer will determinant, Israel have to do the same. With enlightened leadership this adaptation could strengthen the Jewish state, securing the nation through integration in its region rather than domination of it. For now Israel is some way from this mind-set. Its overriding prism is military. It was important that President Obama set down a marker, as he has through this deal, one that may spur new strategic reflection in Israel.

-“Israel's Iran Dilemma, “The New York Times, November 25, 2013. 

“This is a sham from beginning to end. It’s the worst deal since Munich…It’s really hard to watch the president and the secretary of state and not think how they cannot be embarrassed by this deal.”

-“Charles Krauthammer: Worst since Munich,” Politico, November 26, 2013.

Consider the theatrics of the absurd by some political clerics at the killing of the terrorist responsible for slaughtering thousands of innocent Pakistanis. It is sad that the fundamentally moderate Jamaat-e-Islami should label the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan chief Hakeemullah Mehsud a "shaheed!"

To safeguard their fiefdoms, politicians and clerics often turn to appeasement of militants. The army did well by immediately reacting to what could potentially erode the morale of its rank and file. And so did PM Mian Nawaz Sharif. Burying 15 years of self-created bad blood with the army by a maiden visit to the GHQ soon after the JI leader’s outrageous remarks, he rightly called the army’s martyrs as “our benefactors.”

Appeasement should never be an option. The militants have the blood of too many innocents on their hands. A brutal minority cannot be allowed to dictate to the ‘great silent majority’ through the barrel of a gun under any circumstances. The not-so-squeamish should see the ghastly video of this so-called ‘shaheed’ murdering one of the ISI heroes of the Afghan war, Col (ret.) Sultan Amir Tarar, nom de guerre: "Col Imam," in cold blood.

With the civil society breaking down because of blatant injustice and discrimination, insurgency and terrorism have become endemic in South Asia. After two decades of horrendous strife Sri Lanka successfully crushed the Tamil insurgency that had terrorised the island. The RAW-trained Tamil Tigers (LTTE) ultimately turned with a vengeance on the Indian peace-keeping force (IPKF) which had landed (by forcible self-invitation) to relieve them from the besieging Sri Lankan Army. How tragically ironic that in return for the bulletproof jacket he had personally presented LTTE Supremo Prabhakaran with, Rajiv Gandhi got a garland of explosives.

More than a dozen insurgencies are eclipsed by the largest terrorist group in the world operating across a broad swath of territory in India. Collecting government revenues from more than 70 districts operating in 17 Indian states, PM Manmohan Singh calls the Naxalites an existential threat to India. Nepal has seen its share of Maoist terrorism. RAW-crafted incidents aside, Bangladesh faces intermittent terrorism of the jehadi-kind.

After Tora Bora in 2002 the Al-Qaeda hierarchy went to ground in South Waziristan protected by an outer core of Mehsud tribal mercenaries. Their presence on our soil made us the ground zero of terrorism. The army went into Fata in 2003 without the requisite numbers, equipment, training, logistics, etc. Al-Qaeda turned its guns into Pakistan and created the TTP. We have only ourselves to blame for giving this menace the time and the space on our lands to prosper. Far worse, we actively collaborated with others in fighting their proxy wars on (and from) our soil.

The CIA drone strike that took out the TTP chief derailed the "peace talks," the soft-sell mechanism for countering terrorism. This was further complicated by him being replaced by the outright murderer Mullah Fazlullah. That Fazlullah had ‘guest’ status in Afghanistan after being run out of Swat by the army was never a secret. However, the capture by US Special Forces of Deputy Latif Mehsud being escorted by National Directorate of Security (NDS) agents on his way to meet Karzai in Kabul really exposed the Afghan government's double-dealing.

Afghan intelligence (with help and guidance from RAW) has been supporting the TTP’s terrorist activities and helping kill Pakistanis while posing as holier-than-thou and condemning the insurgents fighting the civil war as Pakistan-supported terrorists. Karzai’s loud protests to the U.S. for not releasing his "guest" only underscored the Afghan regime’s perfidy. It was only Latif Mehsud who could give Hakeemullah’s exact whereabouts to the Americans. With a U.S. $5 million bounty on his head, the Americans finally had a shot and they took it. Good for them.

Sophisticated psychological warfare must make the population aware of the dangers posed by terrorists. Unless accompanied by socio-economic measures, it can backfire. Terrorism can be multi-layered; issues in Pakistan include conflict of ideologies, whose brand of Islam is right and how to impose this brand on others.

U.S. intelligence failures leading to 9/11 prompted security becoming tighter, making laws stricter and highly pro-active. Providing against ‘clear and present danger’, the fail-safe line dividing rule of law from criminality can be crossed sometimes. However, one cannot agree that the only way to counter terror is by terror.

Foreign exchange meant for charity must be scrutinised for terrorist funding while processing through scheduled banks, not through FE dealers and "hawalas." Without adequate resources, or even a technological base, third world countries like Pakistan tend to react to terrorist threats rather than pre-empt them. Electronic forensics and technologies must be developed to anticipate possible future threats. NADRA’s electronic identification process has indeed been an unimaginable ‘giant leap forward’ for Pakistan—a success story beyond compare.

The National Counter Terrorism Authority (Nacta) in Pakistan is mandated to “coordinate counter terrorism and counter extremism efforts evaluating the nature and magnitude of the terrorist threat; and to present strategic policy options to the government for consideration/implementation after scientifically studying the phenomenon of extremism and terrorism in historic and professional perspective.”

A well-equipped, well-trained and well-led counterterrorism force (CTF) can isolate and destroy the terrorists’ potential to spread destruction and grief, utilizing any resources for operations, wherever and whenever necessary. Induct only the very best without any political interference or manoeuvring. Beware of the evil nexus between corruption, organised crime and terrorism. Politicians and powerful people on the criminal payroll will always be averse to the CTF becoming effective.

The touchstone of success lies in being fair to all—without fear or favor. If any community is discriminated against because of their lineage or political leanings, the battle will be lost. Urban guerrilla warfare cannot be sustained without the support of the people. Conversely no counter-campaign can succeed without the support of the people.

We have to re-think our electoral process. Our present bankrupt version will never allow democracy to function at the grassroots level. Without participation of all the stakeholders the moral basis of a democratic society is eroded. The vested interests of the PML-N and the PPP in Punjab and Sindh notwithstanding, despite Imran Khan’s passion for real grassroots democracy, even the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf model in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has discrepancies deliberately tilting for feudalism.

An insurgent may be wrong but he believes his cause is just, his motives are unselfish and his actions target combatants. From time to time insurgents do use terrorism as a weapon of war. A terrorist uses a cause to justify his motives; the difference is that he mostly targets non-combatants with maximum prejudice.

The mindset of a terrorist is that of a murderer, callous and brutal. To terrorise the population the new TTP chief Fazlullah had video-taped the beheadings of the unfortunate in public during his reign in Swat. The commitment, will and determination of the ‘great silent majority’ to fight this murderous criminal mindset can only be encouraged by giving them participation with power at the grassroots level.

In practical terms, these twelve recommendations are offered as challenges to individuals. These will be the ones who will need to make the difference when a difference is called for. The senior leaders and subject matter experts of equipment suppliers, network operators and service providers; the leaders and participants of the industry’s fora; researchers; consultants in small firms; government policy makers and staff employees; IT specialists in financial firms; and many others—all are strongly urged to include this report in their dialogue and to do so speedily, as the improvement opportunities described have important benefits to many throughout the world—and the consequences, many downsides.

It is encouraging that at the time of this report dispatch, a number of private sector interests have indicated their willingness to take the next steps suggested for several recommendations. Each of the recommendations should be considered and acted upon with urgency proportional to the vital role that international communications networks and services will play in the future. The critical priority for implementation is clear. Without reliable international communications networks and services, public welfare is endangered, economic stability is at risk, other critical sectors are exposed, and nation-state security is threatened. The implementation of this report’s recommendations will significantly reduce these and other risks. Each of the twelve recommendations is both challenging and achievable. The intent of the ROGUCCI process from the beginning has been to improve the world’s communications. Successful implementation of each recommendation will significantly improve the reliability and robustness of communications services for the citizens around the world. However, each will require skill, resolve and genuine partnership among government entities, stakeholders and the private sector.

This study strongly urges the private sector, governments and other stakeholders to chart and embark on a new course of policy and practice that forcefully advocates highly available, highly reliable, highly robust, highly resilient and highly secure international communications infrastructure.

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