Russia

On January 10, Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif met with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov in Moscow to discuss the resolution of the Syrian civil war and U.S. President Donald Trump’s threats to suspend the Iran nuclear deal. After their meeting, Zarif praised Russia’s resolute support for the implementation of the Iran nuclear deal, and reiterated both countries’ shared willingness to preserve the territorial integrity of Syria.  

Even though Zarif’s recent meeting with Lavrov aimed to showcase the strength of the Russia-Iran alliance to the international community, the long-term sustainability of the Moscow-Tehran alignment remains unclear. The uncertainty surrounding the survival of the Russia-Iran partnership can be explained by both countries’ conflicting strategic visions for the Middle East regional system.

Russia’s strategic vision is chiefly focused on eliminating sources of instability and preventing U.S.-led military interventions, which from Moscow’s perspective facilitate the creation of failed states. The Russian government justified its September 2015 military intervention in Syria as a necessary measure to restore stability to the country, and to deter Washington from using force to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Russia views its Syria campaign as an integral step towards achieving its broader goal of establishing itself as an indispensable guarantor of collective security in the Middle East.  

Although Iranian policymakers frequently tout Tehran’s role as a stabilizing force in the Middle East, collective security promotion is only a peripheral goal in Iran’s strategic vision. Iranian policymakers are primarily focused on expanding Tehran’s sphere of influence in the Middle East and containing Saudi Arabia’s power projection capacity across the Arab world. These expansionist objectives have caused Iran to cooperate more extensively with belligerent non-state actors than Russia and engage in military activities that undercut the effectiveness of Moscow-backed political settlement initiatives.

These divergent objectives threaten to unravel Russia-Iran cooperation in Syria, as the conflict transitions from the military to diplomatic phase. Even though Russian military officials have praised the effectiveness of Hezbollah troops during pro-Assad military operations, Iran’s use of Syrian territory to create a permanent transit point of weaponry to Hezbollah has alarmed Russian policymakers who seek to preserve strong relations with Israel.

Iran’s unwillingness to suspend military operations in Syria until Assad has completely vanquished opposition forces also deviates from Russia’s more limited objective of ensuring that Assad controls enough territory to negotiate with Syrian opposition factions from a position of strength. Iran’s belief in the feasibility of a military solution in Syria has made it less willing than Russia to diplomatically engage with Syrian opposition or Kurdish factions during diplomatic negotiations, limiting the scope of the Moscow-Tehran partnership.

Prospects for constructive cooperation between Russia and Iran on resolving other regional conflicts, like Yemen and Afghanistan, also appear dim. In Yemen, the already-strained relations between Russia and Iran-aligned Houthi rebels have deteriorated further since the assassination of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh on December 5. These tensions have prompted Moscow to establish stronger lines of communication with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on resolving the crisis.

A similar divergence in objectives restricts the potential for Russia-Iran cooperation in Afghanistan. Russia is seeking to implement an Afghan political settlement, which includes the Taliban, as swiftly as possible. While Iran wants a peace settlement in Afghanistan to be achieved in the long-term, it is unwilling to suspend military action until anti-U.S. forces have gained a position of primacy in western Afghanistan. As Iran continues to provide military assistance to Taliban forces near its borders, Russian policymakers are concerned that Tehran will obstruct the Afghan peace process to advance its own objectives.

Although divergent interests make the Russia-Iran partnership weaker than many analysts have assumed, U.S. policy choices could also profoundly impact the strength of the alliance. As former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul noted in a August 2017 interview, the re-imposition of a stringent U.S. sanctions regime against Iran by abandoning the nuclear deal could cause Tehran to pivot strongly towards Moscow. If the United States decides to militarily retaliate against Assad’s use of chemical weapons, it will likely re-awaken Russia and Iran’s long-standing opposition to U.S. military interventions, further strengthening their partnership in Syria.

Although a marked improvement in Washington’s relationships with Russia or Iran is unlikely to occur in the near-term, U.S. policymakers can influence the trajectory of the Russia-Iran relationship. To capitalize on disagreements between Russia and Iran’s Afghanistan strategies, U.S. diplomats could re-establish diplomatic dialogue with the Taliban, which would provide a genuine basis for U.S.-Russia cooperation in Afghanistan and isolate Iran’s support for a military solution from the international consensus.

U.S. policymakers could also attempt to strengthen dialogue between Geneva and Astana talks participants in Syria. This move would give Russia the status recognition it desires, and weaken the Moscow-Tehran partnership, as Iranian policy makers remain concerned that heightened Russia-US cooperation will cause Moscow to distance itself from Tehran, like it did during the early years of the Obama administration.  

Even though the Russia-Iran alliance appears robust, both countries’ divergent strategic visions could render the partnership unsustainable in the long-term. To weaken the Russia-Iran alignment, U.S. officials should refrain from implementing overly hawkish retaliations to Moscow and Tehran’s destabilizing conduct, and look to expose cracks in the partnership through targeted diplomatic engagement with Russia. If U.S. policymakers implement this strategy, the Moscow-Tehran partnership could weaken considerably once military operations in Syria draw to a close, potentially strengthening Washington’s influence in the Middle East for years to come.   

Samuel Ramani is a DPhil candidate in International Relations at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He is also a regular contributor to the Washington Post, The Diplomat and The National Interest. He can be followed on Twitter at samramani2.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/countries/IR/events/50770/photos/42565

On December 14, Director of EWI Office in the Russian Federation Vladimir Ivanov participated in the XV Scientific Conference of the International Research Consortium of Information Security, held at the Reception House of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and sponsored by Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, a leading Russian foreign affairs diplomatic journal. This annual event was devoted to information security in the context of the development of the digital economy, mechanisms for the implementation of norms, principles and rules for responsible behavior of states in the ICT environment, as well as the impact of information technologies on strategic stability. The event was attended by diplomats, security officials, academics and experts from Russia and abroad.

In his introductory remarks, a co-chair of the meeting Dr. Vladislav Sherstyuk, Director of the Institute for Information Security Issues with the Moscow State University (IISI) favorably assessed the outcomes of a multi-year productive partnership between IISI and EWI particularly emphasizing the value of the Joint U.S.-Russia Critical Terminology Foundations Report in providing guidelines on how to resolve the lingering international controversy on the development of universal norms of responsible behavior in cyberspace. Building on Dr. Sherstyuk’s idea, Ivanov dwelled on cultural and institutional differences between Russia and the United States, arguing that many of the current tensions in bilateral relations, including specifically the cyber domain, are rooted in mutually poor understanding of the political language, culture and national institutions of each other, and could be mitigated through more intense dialogue and more attentive listening to each other. Ivanov also focused on the work EWI had conducted in 2017 with the variety of Russian partners including IISI, the Russian International Affairs Council, the Moscow State Institute for International Relations, the Russian Internet Governance Forum and others.

He also reported on the first initiatives of the newly established Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace launched in February 2017 by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, together with the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) and EWI. It has a strong potential, he said, to support United Nations efforts in the area of setting advanced norms and confidence-building measures in cyberspace, particularly through helping improve coordination between technical experts, policy-makers and private sector leaders globally.

On December 13, the vice director of Russia’s National Defense Command Center, Victor Kalganov, and three prominent Russian Ministry of Defense officials made an official visit to North Korea. Kalganov’s trip to Pyongyang came after United States Secretary of State Rex Tillerson called for renewed DPRK-U.S. diplomacy, and underscored Moscow’s commitment to a peaceful resolution of the North Korea crisis.

Since North Korea fired four ballistic missiles towards Japan on March 6, the Russian government has devoted considerable diplomatic resources to resolving the nuclear standoff. Many analysts have cited Russia’s desire to increase its influence in the Asia-Pacific region and alignment with the North Korean regime as rationales for its expanded diplomatic involvement on the Korean peninsula.

While these factors have shaped Russian policymakers’ perceptions of the DPRK crisis, the best explanation for Kremlin’s active role in resolving the standoff is Russia’s desire to showcase its great power status to both its domestic audience and the international community. To this end, , Russian diplomats have rallied support from European and Asian leaders for a peaceful resolution to the North Korean crisis, and used a mixture of coercive diplomacy and back-channel negotiations to convince the DPRK to come to the bargaining table.

These diplomatic initiatives are principally aimed at preventing a war between the United States and North Korea. Much like how Russia’s successful diplomatic outreach to U.S. allies in Europe and the Middle East on Syria helped soften Washington’s position on Assad’s removal, Kremlin policymakers believe that building an international consensus around the need to avoid war with North Korea will moderate President Donald Trump’s hawkish rhetoric towards Pyongyang. Enticing North Korea to the bargaining table would also assist this aim. If Russia can help successfully prevent a war, Moscow’s status as a conflict arbiter will increase tremendously, expanding Russia’s alliance network and Putin’s prestige at home and abroad.  

An Increased Voice

Russian policymakers believe that revealing the chasm in perspectives between Trump administration’s hawkish rhetoric and the international community’s perceptions will cause the United States to de-escalate and align with the international consensus. To facilitate this effort, Russia is trying to convince U.S. allies to support its preferred solution to the DPRK crisis and pressure Trump to refrain from military action.

Since March, Russia has emerged as a leading international supporter of China’s dual freeze proposal, which calls for a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear weapons development in exchange for the suspension of joint U.S.-South Korea military drills on the DPRK’s borders. Even though the United States has rebuffed the dual freeze proposal, Russia has reached out diplomatically to U.S. allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region to convince them to endorse the plan and pressure Washington to follow suit.   

For example, on August 18, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held a bilateral dialogue with his German counterpart Sigmar Gabriel. Berlin’s subsequent expression of support for the dual freeze proposal gave Moscow’s position on North Korea critical legitimacy within the European Union.  

The Russian government has also attempted to expand support for the dual freeze proposal in the ASEAN bloc. On August 9, Lavrov announced the creation of a permanent Russia-ASEAN mission to bolster security cooperation with Southeast Asia on North Korea and transnational terrorism. Public statements expressing solidarity with the Russian position on North Korea by ASEAN leaders like Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte have also gained widespread coverage in the Russian state media, reaffirming the link between Moscow’s great power status aspirations and diplomatic involvement on the Korean peninsula.

In addition, Russian officials have leveraged improved relations with South Korea to shape Seoul’s perspective on the North Korea crisis. Moscow’s outreach to moderate members of South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s inner circle has produced tangible results, as a group of Moon’s foreign policy advisors expressed tentative support for a dual freeze proposal on September 14.

If the Trump administration responds to Moscow-induced diplomatic pressure from U.S. allies by loosening its preconditions for diplomacy with North Korea and desisting from further military threats against Pyongyang, respect for Putin as a peacemaker will grow considerably. Such an outcome would  help Putin consolidate his nationalist base ahead of the 2018 presidential elections, and bolster the credibility of Russia’s arbitration ventures in other regions.  

Coercion and Co-option

To steer North Korea towards a peaceful course, Russia has combined coercive diplomacy with co-option. To highlight its displeasure with Kim Jong-Un’s brinkmanship, Russia supported the imposition of comprehensive UN sanctions against North Korea on September 12. As Russia has replaced China as North Korea’s most trusted international partner, according to the DPRK’s February 2017 ranking of international allies, Moscow hopes its expressions of displeasure with Pyongyang will resonate with North Korean policymakers.

Even though Russia remains officially committed to implementing the entire UN sanctions regime against North Korea, in practice, Russian policymakers have distinguished between “legitimate” punitive sanctions worthy of full compliance and “counter-productive” sanctions that threaten North Korea’s economic stability.

Russia routinely violates sanctions against the DPRK that it deems to be counter-productive, believing North Korean aggression is more likely if Kim Jong-Un faces internal instability. As such, in November 2017 Russia increased oil exports to North Korea aimed at preventing  volatility and unpredictability associated with a potential collapse of the North Korean economy.

In exchange for this vital material support, Russian diplomats have held bilateral dialogues with North Korean officials aimed at convincing Pyongyang to accept diplomatic negotiations with the United States over its nuclear program. If Russia can convert the goodwill accrued from Putin’s post-2014 rapprochement with North Korea into a diplomatic breakthrough, Moscow will highlight its diplomatic independence from China and great power status in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Russian government’s efforts to steer the United States and North Korea towards a peaceful course has increased its credibility as a diplomatic stakeholder in the region. Arguably, based on its ability to maintain a line of communication with both North Korean officials and pro-engagement members of South Korea, Russia is presenting itself as a useful partner for U.S. policymakers seeking a peaceful resolution to the DPRK nuclear crisis.

As Washington’s current strategy of combining sanctions against North Korea with periodic engagement of China struggles to gain traction, the prospect of Russia as a go-between in the crisis may take on increased relevance.

Samuel Ramani is a DPhil candidate in International Relations at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He is also a journalist who contributes regularly to the Washington Post, The Diplomat and Huffington Post. He can be followed on Twitter at samramani2 and on Facebook at Samuel Ramani.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: "Entering the Kremlin walls." (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by SusieQ158

This year represents the centennial of the communist takeover of Russia, which indelibly marked the transition from Tsarist Empire to the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. was a menace not only to the free world, but also to its own people. Despite its collapse and Russia’s independence over 25 years ago, many in Washington still cannot allow themselves to imagine, let alone manifest, a productive relationship with Russia.

Prior to 1917, Russia was the only major power in the world with which the United States had neither a war, nor serious diplomatic dispute. It even supported and defended America during its formative and most vulnerable years—the American Revolution¹ and Civil War. Thus, President Jefferson declared, “Russia is the most cordially friendly to us of any power on earth” and President Lincoln’s Secretary of State stated, “[Russia] has our friendship, in preference to any other European power.”² Notwithstanding constitutional differences between the Russian monarchy and American democracy, their relationship blossomed.

In our current political climate, each nation blames the other for meddling in domestic and international affairs. Foreign malfeasance cannot be tolerated, but should the United States not seek bona fide deals with Russia for the sake of America’s national interests? Meanwhile, recurring sanctions against Russia have forced it to align with China versus the United States. Continued hostilities only increase the chances of direct confrontations—be they political, economic, cyber or nuclear. Arguably, America has more at stake in these scenarios long-term.

In addressing Washington and Moscow’s destiny, White House spokesperson Sarah Sanders opined, “I think a lot of that depends on Russia.” Yet, Russia has already made proposals to partner with America in business, anti-terrorism, and European security. Despite current turmoil, it is now incumbent on the U.S. to re-establish mutual respect and take Moscow up on its offers. Why? Because, history reveals and pragmatism dictates that constructive cooperation with Russia is in America’s best interests.

As the Russian Federation detoxes from its Soviet occupation, Washington should likewise cleanse itself of the biased disposition it has toward Moscow. The moment has come to shift U.S. foreign policy away from the obsolete Cold War paradigm and re-imagine a businesslike relationship with Russia.

Russia and America after the U.S.S.R

The emergence of Soviet communism in Russia led to a geopolitical and social calamity of immense proportions. This criminal regime, architected by Vladimir Lenin, relinquished moral authority by building its foundation on the bones of over 60 million of its own people whom it exterminated over several decades. During this era, the Soviets erased the bond America and Imperial Russia once shared.

The collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991 offered an unparalleled opportunity for the United States to re-establish a constructive relationship with a newly liberated Russia, which was distancing itself from its Soviet past, restoring traditional values, and seeking partnership with America. Unfortunately, some Beltway insiders stood in the way of this rekindling. But, why?

For its part, Russia has tried to engage the United States. In 2000, his first year in office, President Putin suggested joining NATO to President Clinton. In 2007, Putin offered President Bush a compromise on joint missile defense. After his election in 2008, President Medvedev proposed working together on several key initiatives, and President Obama committed to "resetting, but also broadening" ties. Regrettably, Russia’s propositions were not earnestly welcomed by the establishment.

After 9/11, Putin was the first world leader to call President Bush to offer sympathies. He even “coordinated with central Asian nations to allow U.S. forces… to use military bases of the former Soviet Union” and provided intelligence in support of America’s war in Afghanistan. These actions were unimaginable during the Cold War. Washington should have recognized Moscow’s gestures for what they were—the strongest indication of Russia’s sincere desire to partner with the U.S., engage constructively, and eschew Soviet ideological paradigms.

Russia’s efforts should have catalyzed a reassessment of its renewed potential as a strategic partner. But Washington failed to capitalize on this opportunity. Instead, it continued to treat Russia as the U.S.S.R (justifiably “America’s number one geopolitical foe” in a bygone era). This inability of the entrenched Cold War establishment to differentiate Russia from the Soviet Union plagues our relations to this day.

While Russia inherited certain Soviet attributes, including a seat on the UN Security Council, Soviet-era monuments, and commemorations of the Great Patriotic War for its defeat of Nazi Germany, it draws stark contrast from the communist regime—diplomatically, economically and ideologically. Thus, it is essential to recognize that Russia is not the holistic successor of the U.S.S.R., and being Russian is not the same as being Soviet—these identities embody two entirely different mindsets, values, and traditions.

Contextualizing Current Russo-American Relations

Despite media coverage that paints Russia as “the enemy and aggressor,” sober context helps one understand its actions as reactionary. For instance, regarding Crimea’s annexation, critics of Russia often fail to acknowledge the catalyzing event—a February 2014 coup d'état in Kiev that overthrew Ukraine’s president. This threatened Russia’s access to one of its few warm-water ports and its Black Sea Naval Fleet—established under Catherine the Great in 1783. While these aspects do not necessarily justify annexation, they do contextualize Moscow’s reaction to the political upheaval in Kiev. In covering suspected Russian interference in the 2016 American presidential election, commentators omit documented U.S. meddling in Russia’s internal affairs. Time Magazine memorialized one such intrusion with its July 15, 1996 cover-story featuring a cartoon of Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, waving an American flag—the caption reads: “Yanks to the Rescue: The Secret Story about how American advisers helped Yeltsin win.” Historical context does not defend electoral meddling, but helps one see these events as connected incidents, not isolated episodes.  

In dealing with Russia, certain politicians and pundits have practiced foreign policy by crayon—full of name calling and unproven accusations. Notwithstanding valid disagreements one may have with President Putin, he is an accomplished leader and should be treated accordingly. He guided his country’s turn-around from near ruin in 1999, carried approximately 30 million Russians out of poverty, and increased life expectancy from 65 years to 71.6 in a little over a decade.³ Russia is now a significant economic power and geopolitical force. Thus, the question arises: is America better-off insulting Russia with tired Cold War rhetoric or is a businesslike approach based on mutual interests worth a try?

Why Re-Imagine Russia Policy Now

U.S. sanctions on Russia have not had their intended effect and, instead, damaged America’s long-term economic interests. The 2014 sanctions necessitated Russia’s pivot to Asia away from the West. Research by Macro-Advisory Partners indicates a Russian recovery from prior sanctions—with GDP increasing to 1.4 percent in 2017 and 1.9 percent in 2018, and business confidence reaching pre-sanction levels.⁴ More worrisome for America, estimates now show trade between Russia and China growing to over 200 billion USD in a few years.⁵ By contrast, U.S. trade with Russia was a paltry 20.3 billion USD in 2016.

Since sanctions are self-defeating, perhaps pragmatic cooperation will be more productive. To this end, America cannot revert to Cold War habits. It must rebuild trust with a new cadre of diplomats and policymakers who seek commerce over conflict, and possess Russian cultural fluency. Why can this approach work? Many Americans who visit and work in today’s Russia are pleasantly surprised to find more areas of agreement with its people than typical stereotypes allow.

While the Soviet mentality lingers and will take time to dissipate, the new generation of Russians is very much like us and wants a positive relationship with America. I experienced these sentiments when meeting with President Medvedev, in both Moscow and Silicon Valley in 2010. While visiting San Francisco, he sent his first tweet, hung-out with Steve Jobs, and met entrepreneurs over coffee. This period was arguably the peak of Russian-American relations in the 21st century—full of promise. Unfortunately, old habits got in the way again—NATO incursions and regime change in Libya fractured this brief Russian-American détente and prevented more win-win opportunities.

There is an undeniable truth: Russian-American relations will outlast their current presidents. The U.S. needs to think practically and longer-term—recognizing the potential of a constructive relationship with Russia, a nation that was one of its strongest allies for nearly 150 years.

Even during Soviet times, with polar-opposite ideologies and far more subterfuge on both sides, open channels of communication were maintained through the height of the nuclear threat to elude mutually assured destruction. In the current cyber-age, effective negotiation, rules-of-engagement, and productive diplomacy are arguably even more critical to the preservation of national security.

Today’s Russia is not the Soviet Union. It offers the United States much to gain from a renewed positive relationship. Most young Russians are strikingly different from old Soviets. Thus, as Russia moves away from its Soviet past and embraces its seminal traditions, which are more aligned with classical Western values, perhaps it’s also time for American politicians and media elites to reconsider attitudes, policies and rhetoric entrenched in Cold War doctrine.

We need to find ways to encourage dialog, resolve conflicts, and do business. If not, then the U.S. may succeed in provoking new hostilities, ideologically “losing” the younger generation of Russians, and creating yet another enemy. Just as President Reagan “had the imagination to see beyond the ubiquitous Cold War stereotypes that seemed to be set in stone,” it’s time again to re-imagine the Russian-American relationship before it’s too late.

^{1. Frank A. Golder, "Catherine II. and the American Revolution," The American Historical Review (1915), 92.}

^{2. F. A. Golder, The Russian Fleet and the Civil War, The American Historical Review, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Jul.,1915), 811.}

^{3. Macro-Advisory Ltd., “July 2017 Macro Monthly,” 5.}

^{4. Macro-Advisory Ltd., “July 2017 Macro Monthly,” 1, 17.}

^{5. Macro-Advisory Ltd., “July 2017 Macro Monthly,” 50.}

P.N. Loukianoff is an American entrepreneur/investor with over 20 years experience in Russian-American ventures, and contributing author of Russia and the U.S.S.R: What They Never Tell You. Contributor: Michael Loginoff, an American graduate student at the University of Oxford in Russian & East European Studies.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the authors and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: "Sea ice off western Alaska" (CC BY 2.0) by NASA Goddard Photo and Video

On August 13, 2017, a senior Russian military official announced that Moscow would host comprehensive joint military drills with India from October 19 to 29. This announcement gained widespread international attention, as Moscow’s October drills will coordinate with India’s army, navy and air force in a synchronized fashion for the first time. The timing of Moscow’s decision to expand its military cooperation with India is also intriguing, as the drill announcement occurred just days after Pakistan held negotiations with Russia on the purchase of S-35 war planes.

Russia’s decision to deepen its military cooperation with India and Pakistan simultaneously is a compelling example of Moscow’s balancing strategy in South Asia. Russia’s ability to maintain cordial security partnerships with both India and Pakistan is highly beneficial for its broader geopolitical aspirations.

Moscow’s successful balancing strategy in South Asia highlights Russia’s great power status to the international community, as it demonstrates that Russia can directly compete with the United States and China for influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Russia’s South Asian balancing strategy also ensures that both New Delhi and Islamabad support Moscow’s efforts to prevent instability in Central Asia and Afghanistan.

Moscow’s partnerships with India and Pakistan have been sustained by its efforts to address two key security challenges of mutual concern. The first major security issue that Russia has emphasized in its attempts to cement partnerships with India and Pakistan is that of combatting transnational terrorism.

Even though Indian politicians have routinely highlighted Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism as a major threat to regional stability and Pakistani media outlets have blamed rising Islamic extremism on India’s marginalization of Muslims, Russia has retained favorable relations with both countries by refusing to blame either country for the ongoing threat of terrorism in South Asia.

Instead of emulating the Trump administration’s accusatory approach, Russia has addressed the terrorism threat in South Asia by bilaterally engaging with the Indian and Pakistani governments on areas where they can implement constructive solutions. Russia’s counter-terrorism outreach to India has focused on the enforcement of stricter cross-border controls on the inflows and outflows of Islamic extremists. To convince the Indian government of Moscow’s commitment to cracking down on facilitators of terrorism, Russian President Vladimir Putin supported India’s counter-terrorism raid in Kashmir after the 2016 Uri attacks and openly praised New Delhi’s counter-terrorism policies during his meeting with Modi in June.  

Even though Russia’s support for India’s counter-terrorism policies risks damaging its bilateral relationship with Pakistan, Moscow has eased concerns in Islamabad by highlighting Pakistan’s indispensability as a counter-terrorism partner in Afghanistan. Russian officials have argued that the Trump administration’s hostile rhetoric towards Pakistan risks destabilizing the region, and Moscow has given Pakistan a prominent diplomatic profile in the peace talks it has hosted on the Afghanistan crisis. These actions have reassured Pakistani officials of Russia’s impartiality in South Asia, and have caused Islamabad to support an expansion of Russia’s diplomatic presence in Afghanistan.

The second major security issue that underpins Russia’s South Asia balancing strategy is ameliorating India-Pakistan border tensions, which escalated markedly in 2016. Much like its approach to counter-terrorism, Russia has taken a non-committal approach to the re-escalation of the Kashmir conflict, by refusing to use its position on the United Nations Security Council to condemn either side for the rising hostilities.

While some analysts believe that Russia’s inaction on Kashmir in the UN Security Council constitutes a tacit pro-India stance, as Pakistan had appealed to the UN about casualties inflicted by Indian surgical airstrikes in Kashmir, Russia has highlighted its impartiality in the standoff by advertising itself as a potential mediator in the security crisis.

Russia’s potential to act as a mediator in the Kashmir conflict grew following a fruitful bilateral dialogue between Putin and former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in June. Even though Pakistan has expressed more enthusiasm about a Russian mediation role than India, Moscow’s preference for bilateral dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad, and opposition to judgmental resolutions from multilateral bodies has consolidated its South Asia balancing strategy.  

Even though Russia’s economic and security links with India have greater geopolitical significance than those that bind Moscow to Pakistan, Russia’s use of constructive bilateral engagement on counter-terrorism and offer to mediate border tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad has allowed it to implement a highly effective balancing strategy in South Asia. If Russian diplomatic overtures help ease tensions between India and Pakistan, Kremlin policymakers will be able to expand Moscow’s access to vital new markets for Russian military equipment, highlight Russia’s great power status on the world stage, and demonstrate Russia’s ability to exert tangible influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Samuel Ramani is a DPhil candidate at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He is also a journalist who writes regularly for the Washington Post, The Diplomat and the Huffington Post. He can be followed on Twitter at samramani2 and on Facebook at Samuel Ramani.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Ambassador Cameron Munter, CEO & President of the EastWest Institute, joined a panel discussion on July 24 in Belgrade to talk strategies and challenges facing America, Russia and the Middle East. The discussion, organized by the Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development (CIRSD), also touched on the refugee crisis, Syria as well as volatile U.S-Russia relations.

Joining Munter were Vitaly Naumkin, Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Science, and Vuk Jeremić, President of CIRSD.

Asked about what "went wrong" in Iraq and past U.S. policies in the region, Munter said that America used to see itself back then as the only superpower in a unipolar world. Munter said some really believed in the prospects of bringing democratic governance to the Middle East even if the idea seemed like an almost impossible undertaking.

Munter remarked that although some believe Americans went into Iraq for oil, numerous tenders had been issued following the fall of Saddam Hussein and none of which were won by U.S. companies. “Other conspiracy theories suggest that that our goal was to weaken the influence of Iran, whereas in reality, this influence has only increased,” he added.

For more details about the event, click here.

While in the region, the former U.S. Ambassador to Serbia also made a number of media appearances including TV station N1 and Danas.