Russia

Europe’s eastern frontier (now in the heartland of Asia) has exploded in the news with almost 200 people killed in communal violence in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan. The country is a member both of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), set up in 2002 on the basis of a 1992 treaty. The Secretary General of CSTO, Nikolai Bordyuzha, a leading Russian military and political figure, has been coordinating the main international military and security response to the Kyrgyz crisis, culminating as of June 14 in provision by CSTO of intelligence, mobility and law enforcement assets to support local authorities.

As NATO prepares its new security concept in coming months, we will begin to hear much more about Osh, the CSTO and Bordyuzha than we might have were it not for these unhappy events. Coolness in the diplomatic relationship between CSTO and NATO until now was at the background of a June 15 article in the International Herald Tribune. In a co-authored op-ed, former US Ambassador to Russia, Jim Collins, called on NATO and the United States to “look beyond old stereotypes” and offer “full cooperation and partnership with both the CSTO and OSCE” in addressing the security problems of Central Asia and Afghanistan. The authors described the CSTO as a “natural regional partner” of NATO and the United States. Collins knew to whom he was speaking. Leading officials in the Obama administration have argued forcefully against any move to closer relations with the CSTO. Many strategic analysts in the United States believe that NATO reasons for “not recognizing the CSTO are self-evident”, as an American academic commentary as recent as June 13 argued.

Russian Ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, had complained on June 9 just days before the violence in Osh erupted, that “we do not understand those who say the CSTO represents only Russia's interests and can therefore have no contact with NATO”. The interesting dilemma is that in NATO parlance, there are grades of partnership, defined largely by where a state sits on the spectrum of full democracy. Many in NATO attach such political significance to the term “partner” that any relationship between NATO and CSTO would be like “sleeping with the enemy”. (Some CSTO members do not meet the standards NATO sets for the highest level of partnership based on degree of protection of basic political rights.) In addition, for many members of NATO, CSTO is seen as Russia-dominated and a proof that Russia has not abandoned Soviet-era imperialist ambitions toward its near abroad.

The report issued by Madeleine Albrights’s “twelve apostles” on the future NATO security concept said rather pointedly that “on the list of NATO partners, Russia is in its own category”, mentioning later that “some governments are more sceptical than others” toward Russia.

The Albright report did however urge the alliance to “forge more formal ties” with regional security organizations including CSTO. This was the second last sentence in a nine-page section on NATO partnerships, even though CSTO is NATO’s approximate counterpart in the far east of Europe.

Political relations between this or that regional organization, even military organizations, can be rather formalistic affairs. So why does it matter whether NATO and CSTO spend much time talking with each other? The answer has three parts: heartland Asia will remain vital to the security of “old Europe”; NATO does not have the political stomach to stay there militarily; and the CSTO is an emerging security actor there. One could conclude that the reasons for stronger NATO-CSTO relations are more self-evident than the arguments against.

The Smolensk tragedy was an event of enormous importance for the Poles, and may also be a key event for the EU as it awaits the results of the Presidential election. How will the deaths affect the result of this vote brought forward by three months, which at one point had looked like a shoo-in for the ruling Civic Platform’s Bronislaw Komorowski?

He is now facing the late Lech Kaczynski’s twin brother Jaroslaw, whose PiS party had looked out of the running until Lech’s death boosted it in the polls. Jaroslaw’s campaign slogan is “Poland is the most important.” Komorowski is far more pro-European, and wants early adoption of the euro single currency.
The accident has brought two fomer sworn enemies closer: Poland and Russia, and one of the stated ambitions of Poland’s EU presidency, in a year’s time, is to improve relations with the east.

“The Poles feel this acutely, the need to stabilise their relationships with the east, particularly with Russia, and to bring Russia into a more regular dialogue with the European community, with NATO,” says the EastWest Institute’s Andrew Nagorski.

Poland has long been considered pro-American above being pro-European. It hosts US missiles, and its EU membership in 2004 came five years after joining the NATO club. But that is not the whole picture says Poland’s representative at the EU

Jan Tombinski;
“The EU is where our future challenges lie. NATO membership was dictated more by our past fears, but both represent our integration into the western world’s institutions.”

Poland’s Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski agrees;

“I think the circumstances have changed. The USA no longer feels threatened by a European defence identity, quite the contrary, they would like to see a more capable europe to share the burden.”

Poland’s European identity is also bound up in its adoption of the Euro. Warsaw had previously said it would like to make the change in 2012, but the economic crisis has pushed that date back.

Jan Tombinski explains why;

“Two years ago we committed to announcing a timetable but today we’d prefer to wait a little while to benefit from a more stable and confident eurozone, and build the best entry conditions we can. I also don’t think that today the eurozone is ready to take us in.”Where Poland stands in Europe depends to a large extent on Sunday’s election, because the Polish presidency can veto legislation, and has power in the realms of defence and foreign affairs.

Copyright © 2010 euronews

The two organizations signed a memorandum of understanding on May 4, 2010, at the first Worldwide Cybersecurity Summit in Dallas. The MOU commits both organizations "to work together to better promote the safety, stability and security of cyberspace."

Under the agreement, the IEEE Communications Society will bring essential technical expertise in hardware, software and networks to the Worldwide Cybersecurity Initiative and help build the technical foundation for international cybersecurity measures. Meanwhile, EWI will bring its reputation as a global policy change agent and help build trust and mobilize resources to develop and implement such measures.

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The city of Sevastopol captures modern Europe’s history in a tantalizing way. The city’s past links the easternmost reaches of the continent to its west in a way no other city does. It also speaks to the future in no uncertain terms. Europe has a date with history in Sevastopol.

The Crimea is the farthest east inside Europe that British soldiers fought and died in large numbers, some 5,000 killed in action and some 20,000 dead from disease in Britain’s “Russia War” of 1854-56.

Sevastopol also reveals with sharp clarity the transitory character of political sovereignty.  In the Crimean War, among the allies against Russia were two “states” that have since passed into history -- the Kingdom of Sardinia and the Duchy of Nassau.

The Crimean region has been a focal point of invasion and changing political sovereignty over the last millennium. Today, while very clearly a part of Ukraine, the city of Sevastopol and its naval base, like the Crimean peninsula as a whole, have been the subject of some political contest with Russia.

The region and this city have a distinct place in Russian history and psychology. Through 1855 and 1856, Tolstoy achieved his early fame with publication of Sevastopol Sketches, written in large part from the front lines of military service as the city was under siege from France, Britain and Turkey. The Soviet era added even more complex layers of memory and politics. The second siege of Sevastopol, during the Great Patriotic War, lasted some nine months and resulted in Soviet military casualties of around 11,000 killed in action.

Sevastopol is today a “Russian” city. According to the Ukrainian National Census of 2001, the ethnic composition of Sevastopol is predominantly Russian, around 72 per cent, with Ukrainians around 22 per cent.

For now, the political disputes around Sevastopol and Crimea have become quieter. In April 2010, Ukraine and Russia agreed terms to extend the lease on the naval base of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol until 2042. Ukraine is now led by a political party that more clearly represents the interests of Ukraine’s Russian communities than the rival parties. The government has officially taken its country’s possible membership of NATO off the table.

But Sevastopol remains a beacon warning us of possible dark days in Europe’s future. Under the new agreement, Russia has taken on the responsibility for supporting infrastructure development in Sevastopol and the rest of Crimea. President Medvedev has already ordered planning work to begin. This is definitely good news for local residents and has to be applauded on that basis.

In the longer term, the political significance of this extra-territorial economic planning reach of Russia into the sensitive political region will be determined by what else happens in relations between Russia, Ukraine and rest of Europe. 

Here the Russian proposal for a new European security treaty takes on added significance. The case of Sevastopol, which most Europeans and American simply don’t understand, is an important part of the psychology behind Russia’s advocacy of a new security architecture. If we want a guarantee of stability in Europe’s east, then we need to understand that psychology better.

But we also need to respond to it. Europe was not prepared to come to terms with the incipient crisis represented by the political tensions between Georgia and Russia before August 2008. Europe needs to learn from that failure. It needs now to take advantage of the pause offered by Presidents Yanukovich and Medvedev in respect of Sevastopol to negotiate a new security architecture that addresses directly and adequately the “eastern question” of its security -- represented so well by the case of Sevastopol and the Black Sea region.

Retired Colonel-General Victor Esin, former Chief of Staff of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, offers an analysis of the latest START agreement and its implications for the Russian strategic forces:

The new START Treaty signed by U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Prague on April 8, 2010 has to be analyzed at two interconnecting and intercorrelated levels.

The essence of the first level is that, after seven years of the new Treaty entering into force, both parties will have a total number of not more than 8,000 deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and nuclear-armed heavy bombers each.

The second level limits the number of strategic carriers and corresponding warheads. After seven years, the limits of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and nuclear armed heavy bombers for each party cannot exceed 700 units and 1,550 nuclear warheads.

The five following aspects are very important:

First, all ICBMs and SLBMs launchers, including those for testing, military personnel training and those at the space launch sites, which are intended for the launch of space launch vehicles, will be taken into account.

Second, under the Treaty, only nuclear armed heavy bombers are subject to the limits and accounting. The number of conventional armed heavy bombers is not covered by the Treaty. But the Treaty has special provisions for the procedure of the conversion of nuclear armed heavy bombers into conventional armed bombers which, according to experts who participated in the Treaty negotiations, does not allow for their re-conversion.

Third, the limits and accounting cover all types of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs irrespective of whether they are tipped with nuclear or conventional warheads.

Fourth, the limit of 1,550 warheads includes all warheads – both nuclear and conventional – on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and nuclear arms for deployed heavy bombers. In addition, a special accounting rule is stipulated for heavy bombers: one bomber counts as one warhead. This may be a defect of the Treaty because the heavy bomber actually can carry from twelve to twenty nuclear-armed cruise missiles and more than twenty nuclear bombs. Nuclear bombs can be carried only by U.S. heavy bombers. Russian heavy bombers are armed only with cruise missiles.

Fifth, each party has the right to define the structure of its nuclear forces on its own and in accordance with “the levels” for the launchers and warheads established by the Treaty. Now Russia has been freed from the burdens established on the structure of its strategic nuclear forces by START I. It is very important for Russia that the new Treaty does not forbid the replacement of single warheads of existing RS-12 ICBMs by MIRVs.

Can Russia maintain parity in strategic nuclear arms with the U.S. under the new Treaty? To answer this question we must assess the current status of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces.

According to the rules (pro forma in many respects) of START I, as of July 1, 2009 (the date of the latest exchange of written notifications between the parties of the Treaty containing updated information on their strategic offensive arms) Russia’s arsenal totaled 809 strategic launchers fitted with 3,987 warheads, and the U.S.’s totaled 1,188 strategic launchers with the associated number of 5,916 warheads. However, de facto, as of March 2010, Russia’s deployed nuclear strategic forces included 560 launchers fitted with approximately 2,500 warheads while the U.S. had about 800 launchers fitted with 2,100 warheads.

What does this mean for the U.S. and Russia?

Russia:

To fulfill the new Treaty obligations, Russia (if it does not want to go below the level of 700 deployed launchers) will need to accomplish two tasks. First, the launchers with the expired operational terms, subject for disposal, should be replaced with new ones. Second, another 140 new launchers should be put on operational posture in order to reach the agreed 700 limit thus filling the currently existing gap between this limit and the actual number of deployed launchers.

United States:

The U.S. has the easier task – only to reduce the excessive quantity of the strategic launchers.

Should Russia overcome these many difficulties to maintain parity with the U.S. in number of launchers as it did in Soviet times? My answer is: No, Russia does not need to match the U.S. launcher for launcher. Russia’s main goal is “to have such strategic nuclear-forces potential, which is able to provide assured nuclear deterrence.” But this task, according to expert calculations, can be successfully accomplished by the unbalanced number of strategic launchers in Russia compared with the U.S. It should be enough for Russia to have 500 deployed strategic launchers and 1,550 warheads that will provide compatible combat capability with the U.S., which will have: 700 deployed launchers and the same number of 1,550 deployed warheads. In reality, warheads destroy targets not launchers .

Undoubtedly, the U.S. will have bigger reloading potential than Russian strategic nuclear forces. But this superiority does not play a decisive role in Russia’s nuclear deterrence potential.

What is an actual threat to Russia is the unlimited build-up of the U.S. global ABM system. That is why Russia made a special statement on the ABM problem during the signing of the new START Treaty in Prague. The statement declared that the Treaty can work and be vigorous only in the absence of qualitative and quantitative build up of the U.S. ABM capabilities. The Russian Federation can withdraw from the Treaty under Article XIV of the Treaty if the threat posed by the U.S. ABM capabilities leads to the devaluation of Russia’s strategic nuclear potential.

Writing for his fortnightly column on livemint.com, Sidhu describes two views on the recent nuclear deal. One, popular in the global South sees a new, more assertive role for successful developing countries, and the other, popular among the developed world, that sees the deal as naïve and unrealistic. The reality, he suggests, is somewhere in between.

"While it is true that both Brazil and Turkey have been more assertive in the international arena on issues well beyond their borders … they have also been cautious in their approach and have sought to work closely with the P5," he writes." The Tehran agreement is not a radical new proposal and resembles the earlier agreement that Iran has discussed with the Vienna group since October 2009."

Sidhu argues that the limited scope of the agreement highlights this deference to the five permanent members of the Security Council. "Had there been an anti-Western sentiment, the contours of the Tehran deal would have looked very different," he suggests. "Brazil might have offered to supply the enriched uranium directly, instead of reiterating that it be supplied by the Vienna group (as was envisaged in the original agreement discussed between Iran and the Vienna group)."

But despite Brazil and Turkey's efforts to accommodate the P5, the P5 has responded with its own draft resolution in the UN Security Council with a new round of sanctions against Iran. Sidhu considers this response disappointing, calling it short-sighted and indicative of "an anti-South attitude." Further, he suggests that the new resolution is unlikely to be effective. Competing demands from the U.S., China and Russia have watered it down, and, because Brazil, Turkey and Lebanon are unlikely to support the resolution, it will not be unanimous. "In this light, a resolution passed by the majority will lack credibility," Sidhu suggests. "The failure to effectively impose these sanctions will only further signal the growing weakness of the P-5 in UNSC."

Sidhu concludes with a call for a united effort. "What is abundantly clear is that to effectively address the crucial issue of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, there will have to be a combined effort of the West and key non-Western powers," he writes. "Neither one can be successful on its own."

Click here to read Sidhu's article on livemint.com

In "Euro-Atlantic: Equal Security for All," an article to be published in the May 2010 issue of Revue Defense Nationale, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov makes a case for a rethink of European security, naming the EastWest Institute among the sources of thought leadership on the issue. The article was reproduced by ISRIA, an online news service specializing in diplomatic and intelligence information.

David Firestein's recent piece in The Moscow Times, Reset in Danger of Being Set Back, received considerable attention from a number of policy media organizations. A sampling of organizations carrying the piece:

News

• Official Russia
• St. Petersburg Times

Think tanks and NGOs

• American Policy Examiner
• China Arms Control and Disarmament Association
• EU-Russia Centre
• Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization

Websites and blogs

• Robert Amsterdam
• La Russophobe
• RealClearWorld
• The News Links
• Blognews24
• Inosmi.ru

Russian daily Rossiyskaya Gazeta profiles longtime EWI supporter Kathryn Davis and her history of generosity for Russia-related programs.

"She headlines so many of these programs that it’s easy to lose count," Andrei Sitove says. "Davis centers, chairs, libraries, museums and courses have been running in many colleges and universities, including Harvard and Princeton, as well as in the New York-based East-West Institute and the Washington, D.C.-based think tank The Heritage Foundation.  Her United World College Scholars Program pays for students from 175 countries to study in 88 leading U.S. universities."

This list provides a mere glimpse into Davis' important global initiatives for peace.