Russia

Ukraine is fighting wars on two fronts. While facing Russian aggression on its soil and separatists in the East, it wrestles with systemic corruption that impedes serious reform. Both constitute threats to its sovereignty, prosperity and its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. “It serves no purpose for Ukraine to fight for its body in Donbas if it loses its soul to corruption,” warned then U.S. Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson during his visit to Ukraine last year.

The conflict in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea have had the positive unintended consequence of supporting nation building, and fostering a strong sense of Ukrainian national identity. On the flip side, weak governance, rampant corruption and a lopsided economy dominated by oligarchs undermine the clear choice of the Ukrainian people to integrate into a Western-European value-based system.

Since the Euromaidan protests in 2014, the reform process underway in Ukraine has been a rocky one. Of course, it is challenging over a short period of time to move on from the disastrous post-independence legacy of a quarter century of self-inflicted bad governance. Moving up a few ranks from the 142nd position in 2014 to the 130th place in 2017 in the ranks of Transparency International indices should be no reason for celebration.

Granted, Ukraine has made progress towards becoming a more functional state. The new electronic public procurement system has won international acclaim. Decentralization is succeeding, and energy sector reform has proven relatively effective, ensuring Ukraine is no longer purchasing natural gas directly from Russia. The new patrol police is more efficient and less corrupt. Also, progress has been made in introducing new legislation and new structures to curb corruption at local levels, but unfortunately these measures have been overshadowed by the less serious struggle against corruption in the higher levels.

As such, observers note the existence of a “dual state” in Ukraine, with the façade of official government institutions being restructured and a secondary oligarchic patronal structure, created in the 1990s, with outsized influence in politics and business—all operating in a fragile political context. The biggest challenge is the underlying architecture of governance, which has not changed much, allowing the existence of the basic preconditions for corruption to flourish.

The current scenario sees a struggle between reformists and post-soviet, corrupt governance leadership practices. Corruption is also being leveraged by Russia as a subversive weapon to bring Ukraine closer into its orbit, weaken resilience in the country, curtail the prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration and damage the image of Ukraine internationally.

At the Core, It’s About the Economy

Ukraine is the second poorest country in Europe, after Moldova, with about 2,500 USD per capita income in current prices in 2017. This is only 7 percent of the EU-28 average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. While the Ukrainian economy returned to growth in 2017, the dire economic situation has led to a drop in living standards, exacerbating disparities and deepening inequality.

At the beginning of the 1990s after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Ukraine and Poland, two neighboring countries, with populations about the same size, had similar incomes. Today, the GDP per capita in Poland is 13,800 USD, five-times that of  Ukraine.

Ukraine’s economic growth model has been an extractive one, mainly dependent  on imports, driven on the exploitation of natural resources and public property, and on the artificial accumulation of financial capital. The large-scale privatization process of the state-owned enterprises has not been effective, favoring market monopolies and fueling widespread corruption. In absence of real structural reforms, the role of innovation in the economy is limited. In contrast, the shadow economy is significant, and sovereign debt is skyrocketing, reaching 75 percent of GDP in 2017 according to IMF data. All these challenges have seriously impaired economic competitiveness.

To foster economic development it is imperative to create a business friendly environment. Judiciary reforms, clear property rights, simplification of procedures and an effective fight against corruption are key. Such reforms are necessary to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), crucial for Ukraine’s sustainable development. Despite its strategic location and a market of 42 million consumers, Ukraine has attracted less than 75 USD per capita of new FDI in 2016.  

The benefits of FDI extend beyond capital, job creation and tax collection, to fostering productivity gains in the form of technological know-how, knowledge and managerial skills, access to foreign markets, increased competition and spillover effects for domestic firms. Unfortunately, Ukraine has a serious lack of absorptive capacities to attract and utilize FDI effectively.

A Compelling Narrative

There has been no lack of political, financial and human engagement on the part of Western countries in Ukraine. This is for good reason, as Europe is not stable without a stable Ukraine.

International donors have been throwing large amounts of money to finance the transformation in Ukraine. In 2014-2016, the U.S. provided more than 1.3 billion USD of foreign aid and three billion USD in loan guarantees to support the Ukrainian economy and defense. Since 2014, the EU has mobilized about 3.8 billion euro in macro-financial assistance through three consecutive programmes of low-interest loans, and more than 260 million euro in technical assistance, representing the highest amount ever made available by the EU to a third partner.

Since Euromaidan, there have been four key drivers for reforms in Ukraine: support from the international community; an active and engaged civil society; a small core of strong reform-minded political leaders (mainly women in the government and the parliament); and the Euro-Atlantic integration process.

Reforms in Ukraine are crucial to transform the country economically and politically, to allow Ukraine to improve its international image and rebrand itself with a new narrative different from the existing security consumer’s narrative.

The success of Ukraine is the success of the West. The internal situation in Ukraine should be a common strategic interest, and the West needs to remain united and have a comprehensive long-term strategy. This will only be realized once Ukraine weeds out corruption allowing it to get its house in order.

Dr. Valbona Zeneli is the director of the Black Sea and Eurasia Program at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.

The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of DoD or its components.

Photo: "Flag" (CC BY 2.0) by Oleksii Leonov

The bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia is at its most dangerous point since the Cuban missile crisis. In some ways it is worse. As a Russian colleague recently observed, the management of Cold War tension was mathematical; today it is emotional. Further cemented by the chemical attack in Syria and by new sanctions, the hard lines both sides have drawn bode poorly for progress in reducing tensions. The immediate task is to keep communication channels open to avoid missteps or miscalculations that could lead to inadvertent or unnecessary escalation of conflict between the two nuclear powers.

Cyber is both an element of and hostage to the larger set of issues affecting U.S.-Russia relations. White House officials have made it clear that they won’t talk to the Russians about cyber until there is some reduction in Russian-based (or directed) hostile activity. However, Russian officials say they are neither aware of nor responsible for any alleged cyberattacks, emphasizing that these would in any case be the work of independent parties.

Read the full commentary.

Photo: "html php java source code" (Public Domain) by markus spiske

At the Moscow Economic Forum, McConnell, who heads EWI’s Global Cooperation in Cyberspace Program, discussed how traditional military conflict is now moving into the online sphere where conflicting parties may distort facts and launch information wars by involving civilians. “On one hand, anyone can now act like a journalist online using new technology without having to promote fact. On the other hand, many people do not have a critical way to sort out information they see online and start living in their own bubble of bias,” said McConnell.

At a discussion organized by the Valdai Club, McConnell was joined by Andrey Krutskikh, the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for International Cooperation on Information Security, to discuss information warfare, security and norms of behavior in cyberspace. As part of his discussion, McConnell noted: “In balancing security and safety with user anonymity on the Internet, I believe there will be increasing recognition that in some Internet spaces, anonymity is useful only to malicious actors.”

At the Russian Internet Governance Forum, participants focused on the technological aspects of “fake news” on the Internet. Here, McConnell argued that media organizations, including international social media platforms, should take more responsibility for fact-checking before disseminating information. 

Below is the video from the Valdai discussion.

Photo: "information" (CC BY-NC 2.0) by stomen

Munter's remarks begin around the 13:20 mark.

Listen here.

Photo: "2008-XI-A Okina" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by Mr. Theklan

A tanker filled with liquefied natural gas (LNG) with “Russian DNA” arrived in Boston in early March. This was already the second shipment of so-called “Russian gas” to the United States: earlier this year the “Gaselys” tanker owned by the French energy company Engie delivered Yamal gas molecules from the Isle of Grain LNG terminal in the UK.

The news was something of a surprise for the media, which has almost exclusively portrayed the US as an exporter – not importer – of LNG.

Why does the U.S. — the world’s largest gas producer and net gas exporter — need to import LNG?

Following the “shale revolution” and the surge in natural gas output, imports of LNG to U.S. terminals were reduced to a bare minimum. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. LNG imports barely reached 2.21 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2017, with most cargos arriving from Trinidad in the Caribbean Basin.

Read the full commentary here.

Photo: "Arctic Discoverer LNG tanker 3068" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by Yukon White Light

Vladimir Putin has won re-election as president of Russia, by a wide margin. According to news reports, he received over 70 percent of the votes cast, with an estimated 60 percent of voters taking part. Despite allegations of irregularities and criticisms that authorities kept legitimate opposition to the incumbent president off the ballot, Putin has achieved what he set out to achieve: a clear mandate for the next six years.

But what is that mandate? And what are we to expect from Russia in the global arena?

Context is important. Putin's last election, in 2012, came on the heels of significant public dissatisfaction (which led to mass protests the Russian president claims were orchestrated by foreign interests). This year's election was in part an attempt to "put to rest ghosts of the past" by preventing displays of public discontent and demonstrating to audiences — domestic and foreign — a sense of order, continuity and strength. The strategy proved successful. 

Putin's campaign also pointed to other signs of stability: In spite of low oil prices, most economic indicators in Russia, including wages, unemployment and gross domestic product growth, are stable. None of the metrics is necessarily exemplary, and Russia's poverty rate is still high, but the Kremlin is portraying its economic management as controlled and effective. Its efforts had a powerful psychological effect on the majority of the electorate. As Russians told me on my most recent visit, it could be a lot worse.

Read the full commentary here.

Photo: "Russia_President_Putin_Korea_Visiting_01" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by KOREA.NET - Official page of the Republic of Korea

In the interview, aired on March 19, Hassan said President Putin perhaps will not try to play new political cards in that region.

He said Putin will keep using the threat of radical Islamist groups and the efforts to destroy them as ways to strengthen Russia's relations with regimes in the Middle East.

"Russia is trying to compete with the U.S. in Iraq through investment in oil fields [in the Kurdish region]. In the coming years, the [geopolitical] equation in the Middle East might not change against the interests of Russia particularly in Syria. The growing Russian influence there right now is less the result of Russian leverage and more due to the lack of clear U.S. strategy and vision, as well as to the fact that the EU is currently consumed with internal problems. But if Russia poses a threat to vital Western interests in Syria, that may lead to an escalation [of the rivalry]."  

Listen to the interview (in Arabic).

Photo: "G20 Leaders’ Summit" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by Herman Van Rompuy