Russia

At the other end of the spectrum stands the possibility of a failed Russia whose disintegration would be catastrophic not only for its own people but for the world at large. At the fulcrum stand President Vladimir Putin and the Russian people. Enjoying around 75% popularity in public opinion polls, the President has a unique and historic opportunity to move Russia along the path of democracy, peace and a market economy. EWI, through its Moscow Centre, its regional publications and its new Private Sector Initiative, is deeply engaged in partnering with the forces of change in the Russian Federation.

The massive handouts from the public sector in the past decade are not the answer. The first year of the Putin Presidency has seen a leveling of the legal playing field in Russia. Twelve months ago, some 70% of all regional legislation in Russia was in violation of Federal law. Today that number is less than 3%. Reform of the court system is moving ahead as is land and taxation reform. Yet the Western investors who want to enter Russia are held back by administrative barriers and other discouraging elements in the business environment. How this is addressed will determine in large measure what Western investors (and Russian flight capital as well) will do in the decade ahead. The EWI Private Sector Initiative is already working with Russian officials and experts in the areas of Pension Reform and Fiscal Transparency. Soon a major EWI effort on transportation issues will be added in cooperation with the World Bank. These undertakings can only work if Russia's leaders boldly move ahead with the legal and administrative changes needed to make Russia a country more able to integrate with other economies.

EWI continues to deepen its efforts in Moscow and beyond. Our network of correspondents in 60 oblasts is one of the most reliable and far-reaching. Our Russian Regional Report and Russian Regional Investor have wide and diverse readerships weekly and bi-weekly throughout the world's business and governmental communities. Our Russian Regional Bulletin, produced in the Russian language, has the fastest rising circulation of any publication in our twenty years. Objectivity and honesty in reporting are hallmarks of these regional publications. EWI is deepening its work in the regions, particularly in Perm, Pskov and Kaliningrad as well as the Central District of Moscow. The first regional fiscal transparency study is being undertaken this summer. The EWI Moscow Centre has reached out and formed a strong network of experts. The Task Force on How America Should Respond to Putin's Russia is deeply engaged in its work including meetings with the President and the top leadership of Russia. Strategic as well as out-of-the-ordinary partnerships form the basis of EWI's work with Russia.

The EastWest Institute opted for a different approach to the Gorbachev phenomenon. While governments and NGOs the world over sat back and watched events unfold from the sidelines, EWI resolved to engage the new regime directly, and to find out if perestroika was window dressing for public consumption, or represented a fundamental break from traditional Soviet politics.

In October of 1987, EWI challenged the world to answer Gorbachev's new vision for East-West relations. The Institute assembled a strong, bipartisan panel of politicians and Soviet experts, including then New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead, Ken Dam and a prestigious assembly of academics and journalists under Harvard Professor Joseph Nye and Cargill CEO Whitney MacMillan. The result was a brief but powerful publication How Should America Respond to Gorbachev's Challenge?, which the Soviet leader cited as a turning point in U.S. public opinion on his government and which impacted the Western foreign policy establishment for years to come. In addition, in the aftermath of the Washington Summit of Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev, Europeans and Americans came together to recommend new Western policy - figures like Thorvald Stoltenberg, Foreign Minister of Norway; Harry Ott, Foreign Minister of East Germany; and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, accelerated a powerful and productive dialogue.

Sir John Birch of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office remembered this remarkable juncture in the East-West dialogue remarking: 

EWI made a contribution to constructive thinking during those early Gorbachev years. There was still a tremendous suspicion of the Russian bear, and the widely held assumption was that perestroika was a ruse and we were all fools for buying into it. The work that went into EWI's Task Force on New Thinking helped clear people's minds and provided them with a forum to look at the situation in a more enlightened way.

In the final commentary, the Task Force recommended "seizing the opportunities" fashioned by new Soviet policies and contributing to Gorbachev's sweeping reforms, concluding: "New political thinking in the East requires new policy thinking in the West." The Institute thus unflinchingly paved the way for others to partake in this historic opportunity for East-West rapprochement. Strong criticism turned into a deepening respect.

The EastWest Institute released the first joint Russian-American report aimed at defining the “rules of the road” for cyber conflict.  Prepared by a team of Russian and U.S. experts convened by EWI, Working Towards Rules for Governing Cyber Conflict: Rendering the Geneva and Hague Conventions in Cyberspace explores how to extend the humanitarian principles that govern war to cyberspace.

“Today, nearly all critical civilian infrastructure is online, from the electricity grids that support hospitals to the systems that guide passenger planes through the air,” says EWI Chief Technology Officer and Distinguished Fellow Karl Rauscher, who led the U.S. experts group.  “And, by and large, it is not protected by international norms.”        

Rauscher and Andrey Korotkov, the leader of the Russian experts group, are the principal co-authors of the report.  They led the cyber and traditional security experts through a point-by-point analysis of the Geneva and Hague Conventions. Ultimately, the group made five immediate recommendations for Russian and U.S.-led joint assessments, each exploring how to apply a key convention principle to cyberspace, each focused on a crucial question:

• Can protected critical humanitarian infrastructure entities be “detangled” from non-protected entities in cyberspace?
• Just as a Red Cross designates a protected entity in the physical world, is it feasible to use special markers to designate protected zones in cyberspace?
• Should we reinterpret convention principles in light of the fact that cyber warriors are often non-state actors?
• Are certain cyber weapons analogous to weapons banned by the Geneva Protocol?
• Given the difficulties in coming up with an agreed definition for cyber war, should there be a third, “other-than-war” mode for cyberspace?

In the report, the five joint Russian-U.S. recommendations also include essential background information, required commitments, benefits of implementation, next steps and measures of success.

“Our hope is that these recommendations will provoke a broad international, cross-sector debate on the very hot topic of cyber conflict,” says Korotkov.

The report is the first product of an ongoing EWI Track 2 bilateral program that seeks to open dialogue, build sustainable trust and have a positive impact on cybersecurity. In addition to engaging Russia and the United States, EWI is also working with a range of experts from the Cyber40, the world’s most digitally-advanced countries. Next up?  Bilateral and multilateral working group sessions to implement the recommendations, followed by the Second Worldwide Cybersecurity Summit in London in June. 

“We do this work very much in the spirit of the reset,” says Rauscher. “These recommendations carry great potential for engaging the international community, because when Russia and the U.S. speak together, the world listens.”

Click here for the wide media coverage of the report.

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Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment is a product of the Russian and American experts who participated in a working group convened by EWI. Leaders in this field from both countries, including representatives of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and the Russian Federal Drug Control Service, provided briefings and other assistance to the group.

According to EWI Senior Associate Jacqueline McLaren Miller, the project’s main coordinator, “This report demonstrates that cooperation between Russia and the United States is still possible when both countries are willing to focus on a common challenge.”

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov echoed the same sentiments at the February 2, 2013 Munich Security Conference when he stated the need for “closer cooperation with the U.S. on Afghanistan.” There are about 30,000 heroin-related deaths in Russia every year, and most of the heroin comes from Afghanistan.

Cooperation between the two countries is necessary to stem predicted growth of opium production in a post-2014 Afghanistan. The report includes a clear warning: “As NATO and U.S. troops prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan, which is still struggling with a highly volatile security situation, weak governance, and major social and economic problems, the size of the opium economy and opiate trafficking are likely to increase and pose an even greater challenge to regional and international security.”

This paper will be followed shortly by a Joint Policy Assessment report, which will offer specific policy suggestions for both Russia and the United States to curtail the flow of opiates from Afghanistan.

Click to Download

Prepared by a team of Russian and U.S. experts convened by EWI, Critical Terminology Foundations presents twenty terms – the basis for an international cyber taxonomy.

“It may seem like a small step, but Russians and Americans have never before sat down and really agreed on the terms that are the prerequisite for rules of the road for cyber conflict,” says EWI Chief Technology Officer Karl Rauscher who led the process with Valery Yaschenko, Director of the Information Security Institute at Moscow State University. “Defining terms together is the first step for creating international cybersecurity agreements.”

According to experts on the team, several bodies have sponsored efforts to create a U.S.-Russian cyber glossary for over a decade, but they stalled out on the definition of an essential first term: cybersecurity itself.  Unlike Americans, Russians saw cybersecurity as an inextricable part of a larger discussion on information security.  In the EWI-led process, the group resolved this difference by consciously addressing “cyber” as a crucial subset of “information.”

Conducting analysis of usage and needs, engaging in rigorous discussion and consulting existing lexicons, the group went on to define terms ranging from cyberspace to cyber exploitation, then rendering each definition in English and Russian.  The terms were presented in a three-component taxonomy structure that included the Theatre, the Modes of Aggravation and the Art.  The next step, according to Rauscher, is to use the report to launch a multilateral discussion on the most critical terms for the development of international cybersecurity policy, which lags far behind rapidly moving technology.

Today, an advance edition of the report will be presented in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany at the Fifth International Forum "Cooperation between Government, Civil Society and Business in the Field of Information Security and Combating Terrorism.”

Next, a multilateral working group on key terms will meet at EWI’s Second Worldwide Cybersecurity Summit, to be held in London June 1-2.  The summit will bring together over 400 business, government and technical experts from around the world to find new solutions for securing cyberspace.

“Skeptics on both sides said that securing definitional agreement between Russians and Americans was an impossible task,” says EWI President John Mroz. “Thanks to the efforts of this team, the table is set for the start of meaningful multilateral conversations that lay the groundwork for ‘rules of the road’ agreements.”

Click here to learn more about EWI's Second Worldwide Cybersecurity Summit in London

The EastWest Institute released a report calling for Russia and the United States to work together to protect the world’s digital infrastructure, including joint participation in NATO-Russia cyber military exercises.

According to the report’s co-authors EWI’s Franz-Stefan Gady and Greg Austin, this is just one step that the United States and Russia could undertake as a part of a broader effort to secure cyberspace – a potentially groundbreaking collaboration between the two former rivals. Russia, The United States, and Cyber Diplomacy: Opening the Doors takes as its starting point the nations’ pledge to begin talks on promoting cybersecurity made in the United Nations last December – talks that have been slow in coming.

“It is important for both the United States and Russia to recognize that cybersecurity is a global problem, transcending national boundaries,” says Austin. He points out that cyber attacks can be launched from anywhere in the world, target dozens of nations and be impossible to attribute, which prevents individual states from tracking and prosecuting criminals. “Mutual exchanges of information like the cyber military exercises would help both nations better protect themselves against such threats.”

In their report, Gady and Austin recommend three other possible areas of collaboration, each to be jointly addressed in a specific international forum: (1) an agreement on Public Key Infrastructure -- the certificates and identification systems that protect private information on the Internet -- in the International Telecommunication Union; (2) an expanded Network of Contact for High Tech-Crime under the G8 and the creation of a 24/7 point of contact; (3) joint policy assessments of international cyber law in the OSCE.

Given the bilateral relationship’s long difficult history, is it realistic to think that Russia and the United States can cooperate effectively on cybersecurity? The authors believe it is, even to the extent of staging cyber military exercises. As Austin says, “The United States and Russia are facing a shared threat, a shared set of vulnerabilities from personal information and banking records to controls on nuclear power plants. To safeguard the world’s information infrastructure, the old policy paradigms will simply have to change.”

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Foreword

Placing armed forces on some level of alert has been a basic tenet of military readiness for centuries, particularly in countries that have experienced surprise attacks. It is therefore no revelation that a significant part of the nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union were on alert during the Cold War. But twenty years after the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States continue to maintain most of their nuclear forces at the old levels of alert. It is time for a fundamental rethink about this practice, and for creative ideas about levels of operational readiness more suitable for the post-Cold War world and how they might be made operational.

Currently the United States has around a thousand nuclear warheads on alert on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Russia similarly maintains about 1,200 warheads on alert, nearly all of them on ICBMs.

Even during the Cold War, alert levels were not static and moved up or down depending on the security environments. But alert levels since then (after some degree of de-alerting, especially of bomber forces, in the early post-Cold War period) have remained immune to major changes in the later post-Cold War era. As one Russian expert admitted, Russia and the United States remain prisoners of a Cold War legacy.

It is against this backdrop that the EastWest Institute (EWI), in partnership with the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland and the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, launched its project, “Reframing Nuclear De-alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals”. This project addresses the following questions:

1. What was the past experience among nuclear weapon states of reducing the operational readiness of their nuclear arsenals?
2. What is the principal critique of present approaches to decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems and increasing decision-making time? What approaches might be acceptable to the United States and Russia? How might these ideas be operationalized?
3. What is the relationship between efforts to de-alert and efforts to disarm? Are they complementary?

These questions were addressed at a seminar in Yverdon-les-Bains, Switzerland in June 2009 by technical experts, policymakers, military professionals and scholars from the United States and Russia. The discussion was further enriched by representatives from the non-nuclear-weapon states that sponsored the UN General Assembly Resolution titled Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems (A/Res/63/41).

Discussions during the seminar reflected the view that there is no fundamental obstacle to ‘de-alerting’ provided the issue is not framed as a set of narrow, technical measures aimed at lowering the possibility of accidental, unauthorized, or inadvertent use. A broader view of ‘de-alerting’ could pave the way for a serious discussion on de-emphasizing the military role of nuclear weapons--for instance. by moving to retaliatory strike postures and doctrines instead of Cold War pre-emptive or “launch on warning” postures. This broader view would ensure that all relevant stakeholders, including the strategic communities in Russia and the United States, are drawn into the conversation on operational readiness of nuclear forces.

Such an approach may also offer a pathway to bring other nuclear weapon states into discussions on dealerting. Once de-alerting is reframed along these lines several concrete steps become possible. For instance, as part of the START follow-on negotiations, Russia and the United States could examine how measures to reduce operational readiness can accompany the bilateral arms control process. Arrangements to share data and ensure the capability to destroy a rogue missile in flight could also be multilateralized.

This report, which reflects the rich debate not only between the United States and Russia but also the views of other non-nuclear weapon states, elaborates on how the issue can be reframed. More importantly, it outlines a series of practical steps that the United States and Russia might consider as they progress along the road to ‘reset’ their bilateral relations. Such steps are in line with U.S. and Russian efforts to break with the past and set a new and more cooperative course for the future.

EWI is grateful for the generous support of the governments of Switzerland and New Zealand as well as EWI’s own core funders, which made this project possible. EWI also wishes to express its appreciation to everyone who participated in the process and for their creative thinking. At EWI we constantly look to reframe issues in a way that makes new practical breakthroughs possible. Our hope is that this report will be a step in that direction and will encourage the United States and Russia to move to levels of operational readiness which are more compatible with today’s strategic realities and not relics of the Cold War.

John Edwin Mroz

President and CEO
EastWest Institute

Executive Summary

• Nearly twenty years after the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States continue to maintain hundreds of nuclear weapons capable of striking the other side, and to have at least some of these nuclear forces at Cold War levels of alert, that is, ready to fire within a few minutes of receiving an order to do so.
• Even during the Cold War, alert levels were not static and moved up or down in step with changes in the strategic and tactical environments. While the operational readiness of some weapon systems has been reduced, there has been no major change in the readiness levels of most of the nuclear weapon systems in the post–Cold War era. This is in considerable part because Russia and the United States believe that despite fundamental changes in their overall relationship, vital interest requires maintaining a high level of nuclear deterrence.
• The post–Cold War experience also demonstrates that alert levels can be reduced and measures can be taken to reduce the risk of accidents or unauthorized takeover of nuclear weapons. Further measures could be taken to reduce operational readiness of nuclear arsenals. U.S. and Russian experts alike stressed survivability as a key element in the acceptance of these measures because of its importance to maintaining deterrence.
• Cold War legacy postures under which thousands of weapons are kept on high readiness can be altered through top-down policy initiatives, as was the case in the early 1990s with one class of nuclear weapons.
• Technical issues related to the peculiar “ready” character of land-based ICBMs can be resolved by bringing designers into discussions on decreasing operational readiness of nuclear weapons. There was a sense that technical solutions to the problems of nuclear risk reduction are available and can be multilateralized. Information sharing can help implementation of these solutions.
• Concerns over “re-alerting” races and vulnerability of “de-alerted” forces to conventional or nuclear strikes during “reversal” can be addressed through survivable forces, dialogue, and confidence building.
• Other nuclear weapon states apparently have alert practices that differ from those of Russia and the United States. It was debated whether this state of affairs can be ascribed to an absence of nuclear war fighting capabilities or to a different assessment of the post–Cold War nuclear security environment. There was a sense that nuclear doctrines and alert practices of different nuclear weapon states cannot be analyzed in a vacuum and must be evaluated as parts of a larger political and security framework.
• Non-nuclear weapon states’ experts forcefully asserted the legitimate interest their states have in the issue and underlined the practical and constructive approach of the U.N. General Assembly resolution on reducing operational readiness of nuclear forces.
• Non-nuclear weapon states say that lowering of the operational status of nuclear weapons would both reduce the risk of accidental or unintended nuclear war and provide a much-needed practical boost for disarmament and nonproliferation. Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons would be a highly desirable confidence-building measure between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. It would also be a welcome step in the lead-up to the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.
• The principal objection to decreasing operational readiness of nuclear weapons as commonly understood has been that it seeks to address a problem that does not exist. Even if it does exist in some instances, it can be addressed by technical and organizational means updated to cover current threats such as nuclear terrorism. Furthermore, the remedy itself could end up undermining nuclear deterrence and strategic or crisis stability.
• The insight that emerged during the meeting was that the above objection flows from a narrow view of de-alerting as meaning measures that make it physically impossible to promptly launch an attack on order. Such a view also leads to a somewhat excessive focus on verification of technical measures, which ends
  up giving an easy argument to the opponents of de-alerting—that it is not verifiable and therefore should not be attempted.
• There are no fundamental obstacles to many useful measures of decreasing operational readiness of nuclear weapons, provided the issue is not framed narrowly. De-alert has to be seen not only as a technical fix but also as a strategic step in deemphasizing the military role of nuclear weapons, in other words, moving to retaliatory strike postures and doctrines instead of legacy preemptive or “launch on warning” postures. The ongoing U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) offers an opportunity for such a perceptual shift.
• If decreasing operational readiness of nuclear weapons is reframed in this manner, several concrete steps become possible:
  • As part of the START follow-on negotiations, Russia and the United States could examine how measures to reduce operational readiness can accompany the bilateral arms control process.
  • Both Russia and the United States could further strengthen controls against unauthorized action, takeover, and tampering; further increase the capability of warning systems to discriminate real from imagined attacks; and enhance the survivability of their forces and their command and control systems.
  • Arrangements related to data exchange and ensuring a capability to destroy a “rogue” missile in flight could be multilateralized, at least in terms of sharing data, to bring other declared nuclear weapon states into the process.
  • Multilateralization of institutions such as the Joint Data Exchange Center may also have collateral benefits in the area of space security.
  • The premise of maintaining nuclear deterrence between Russia and the United States should not be considered immutable. A dialogue on legacy nuclear postures and doctrines in the Russia-U.S. context may trigger a broader dialogue among relevant states on reducing the salience of nuclear weapons, thus facilitating progress on disarmament and nonproliferation.

Предисловие

В настоящее время у США имеется порядка тысячи ядерных боеголовок в состоянии боевой готовности в межконтинентальных баллистических ракетах (МБР) наземного базирования и баллистических ракетах подводных лодок (БРПЛ). Аналогично порядка 1 200 российских боеголовок (по большей части МБР) находятся в состоянии боевой готовности.

Даже в период холодной войны уровень боевой готовности не был статичен и изменялся в зависимости от условий безопасности. Однако с тех пор (после незначительного выведения из состояния боевой готовности, в частности бомбардировочной авиации, вскоре после окончания холодной войны) уровни боевой готовности не подвергались существенным изменениям. Как признал один российский эксперт, Россия и США – все еще заложники наследия холодной войны.

На таком фоне Институт Восток-Запад (ИВЗ), в партнерстве с Федеральным департаментом иностранных дел Швейцарии и Министерством иностранных дел и торговли Новой Зеландии приступил к выполнению проекта «К новому пониманию проблемы понижения боевой готовности ядерного оружия: вопросы понижения оперативной готовности ядерных арсеналов США и России» в поиске ответов на следующие вопросы:

Каков имеющийся опыт ядерных держав по понижению оперативной готовности ядерного арсенала в прошлом?
В чем заключается критика современных подходов к понижению оперативной готовности систем ядерного оружия и увеличения сроков принятия решения? Какие подходы могут быть приемлемы для Соединенных Штатов и России? Как можно практически осуществить предлагаемые идеи?

Как соотносятся попытки понижения боевой готовности и процесс разоружения? Взаимодополняемы ли они?

Эти вопросы обсудили технические эксперты, политики, кадровые военные и ученые из Соединенных Штатов и России в ходе семинара в городе Ивердон-ле-Бан (Швейцария) в июле 2009 года. Дополнительный вклад в дискуссию внесли представители неядерных государств, которые предложили резолюцию Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН «Понижение оперативной готовности систем ядерных вооружений» (A/Res/63/41).

Дискуссии в ходе семинара продемонстрировали точку зрения, что не существует принципиальных препятствий для понижения боеготовности систем ядерного оружия (ЯО) при условии, что постановка вопроса не ограничивается набором узких технических мер, направленных на снижение возможности случайного, несанкционированного или непреднамеренного применения ЯО. Более широкое понимание понижения боеготовности ядерного оружия могло бы проложить путь для серьезных дискуссий о снижении военной роли ядерных вооружений – например, путем перехода от упреждающей стратегии и стратегии нанесения ответного удара по предупреждению, характерных для периода холодной войны, к стратегии и доктрине ответного удара. Такой более широкий взгляд обеспечит участие всех заинтересованных сторон, в том числе стратегических сообществ России и Соединенных Штатов, в дискуссии по оперативной готовности ядерных вооружений.

Такой подход также поможет предложить путь вовлечения прочих ядерных держав в дискуссию по понижению уровней боеготовности ЯО. Подобное изменение постановки вопроса о понижении уровней боеготовности ядерного оружия позволит предпринять несколько конкретных шагов. Например, в рамках дальнейших переговоров о сокращении стратегических наступательных вооружений (СНВ), Россия и США могут рассмотреть возможность совмещения мер по понижению оперативной готовности с двусторонним процессом ограничения вооружений. Возможно также перевести на многостороннюю основу договоренности об обмене данными о пусках ракет и обеспечении возможности уничтожения неподконтрольных ракет в полете.

Предлагаемый доклад представляет не только содержательную полемику между Соединенными Штатами и Россией, но также взгляды неядерных государств, в деталях рассматривает, как можно изменить постановку вопроса. Что немаловажно, в общих чертах доклад также предлагает серию практических шагов, которые Соединенный Штаты и Россия могли бы рассмотреть в процессе «перезагрузки» двусторонних отношений. Предложенные шаги в духе попыток США и России порвать с прошлым и взять новый курс на сотрудничество.

Институт Восток-Запад выражает благодарность правительствами Швейцарии и Новой Зеландии, а также другим спонсорам и донорам за великодушную поддержку, благодаря которой был выполнен настоящий проект. ИВЗ также благодарит всех участников процесса за творческий подход. Чтобы добиться новых прорывов на практике, Институт Восток-Запад постоянно работает над поиском новой постановки вопросов. Надеемся, что предлагаемый доклад станет шагом на этом пути, а также стимулом для Соединенных Штатов и России изменить уровень оперативной готовности в соответствии со стратегическими реалиями дня сегодняшнего, а не пережитками холодной войны.

Джон Эдвин Мроз
Президент и Главный управляющий директор
Институт Восток-Запад

Основные положения

• Почти 20 лет прошло после окончания холодной войны, а Россия и США все еще обладают сотнями носителей с ядерными боеголовками, которые находятся в состоянии боевой готовности, присущей временам конфронтации, то есть готовы к пуску в течение нескольких минут после поступления соответствующего приказа.
• Во времена холодной войны уровень боевой готовности, как известно, повышался или понижался в зависимости от стратегической и тактической обстановки. Хотя после окончания холодной войны оперативная боеготовность некоторых видов вооружений была понижена, коренные изменения не затронули уровни боеготовности большинства ядерных вооружений. Главным образом это объясняется тем, что Россия и Соединенные Штаты полагают, что, несмотря на принципиальные изменения двусторонних отношений в целом, жизненно важные интересы сторон, по-прежнему, диктуют высокий уровень ядерного сдерживания.
• Опыт, накопленный после окончания холодной войны, показывает, что можно снизить уровень боевой готовности и принять меры по сокращению риска случайного или несанкционированного применения ЯО. Можно предпринять дальнейшие меры с целью понижения оперативной готовности ядерных вооружений. При этом и американские, и российские эксперты исходят из того, что ключевой элемент в принятии подобных мер – сохранение выживаемости стратегических сил по причине отводимой им роли в ядерном сдерживании.
  Морально устаревшие стратегии периода холодной войны, в соответствии с которыми стратегические носители с ядерными боеголовками находятся в высокой боевой готовности, можно изменить путем политических инициатив, исходящих от руководителей государств, как это случилось в начале 1990-х с одним из видов ядерных вооружений.
• Технические вопросы рассматриваемой проблемы, обусловленные присущей межконтинентальным баллистическим ракетам (МБР) наземного базирования высокой степенью готовности к пуску, можно решить путем вовлечения конструкторов МБР в дискуссию о понижении оперативной готовности ядерных вооружений. Сложилось впечатление, что возможность технического решения проблем, связанных со снижением ядерной угрозы, существует, и что эти решения могут быть переведены на многостороннюю основу. Обмен информацией может помочь в практической реализации таких решений.
• Опасения, связанные с возможной «гонкой» по восстановлению боеготовности и в связи с уязвимостью сил, боеготовность которых была снижена, по отношению к ударам с применением обычных и ядерных видов вооружений в период такой «гонки», могут быть устранены благодаря повышению выживаемости сил, а также путем диалога и мер укрепления доверия.
• Прочие ядерные державы, по-видимому, поддерживают уровень боевой готовности своих ядерных сил, отличный от принятых в России и Соединенных Штатах. Обсуждался вопрос, насколько такое положение объясняется отсутствием соответствующих технических возможностей или иной оценкой существующих угроз после окончания холодной войны. Создалось впечатление, что ядерные доктрины и сложившуюся практику поддержания боевой готовности ядерных государств невозможно анализировать в отрыве от контекста их политики по обеспечению безопасности.
• Эксперты неядерных держав активно отстаивают законные интересы своих государств в данном вопросе и подчеркивают практический и конструктивный подход резолюции Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН по понижению уровня боевой готовности ядерных вооружений.
  Неядерные государства заявляют, что понижение уровня боевой готовности ЯО снизит риск случайной или непреднамеренной ядерной войны, а также предоставит столь необходимый практический стимул для разоружения и нераспространения ядерного оружия. Понижение уровня боевой готовности ядерных вооружений также стало бы крайне целесообразной мерой укрепления доверия между ядерными и неядерными державами и долгожданным шагом накануне предстоящей в 2010 году Конференции по рассмотрению действия Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия (ДНЯО).
• Принципиальное возражение в отношении понижения уровня боевой готовности ядерных вооружений в общепринятом понимании заключается в том, что эта инициатива является попыткой решения фактически несуществующей проблемы. Даже если в отдельных случаях вопрос имеет место, его можно решить с помощью технических и организационных мер, адаптированных к современным угрозам, таким как, к примеру, ядерный терроризм. Более того, сама по себе выдвигаемая инициатива может в конечном итоге подорвать ядерное сдерживание и стратегическую стабильность, в том числе и в кризисных ситуациях.
• В ходе встречи высказывалось мнение, что приведенное выше возражение вытекает из узкого взгляда на понижение уровня боевой готовности как на ряд мер, благодаря которым оперативный удар по приказу может стать технически невозможным. Такая точка зрения также приводит к тому, что акценты в дискуссии смещаются к вопросам контроля над применяемыми техническими мерами, что в свою очередь дает возможность оппонентам понижения оперативной боевой готовности выдвинуть контрдовод: поскольку технические меры по понижению боеготовности проверить невозможно, не стоит и предпринимать такие попытки.
  • Если не ограничиваться узкой постановкой вопроса, принципиальных препятствий многим полезным мерам по понижению уровня боевой готовности ядерных вооружений не существует. Понижение боевой готовности необходимо рассматривать не только как техническое решение, но также как стратегический шаг в снижении военной роли ядерного оружия, иными словами, как переход к стратегии ответного удара от морально устаревшей доктрины, основанной на применении упреждающего удара или удара по предупреждению. Текущий процесс подготовки очередного Обзора ядерной стратегии США предоставляет возможность для подобного изменения в восприятии.
  • Если поставить вопрос о понижении боевой готовности ядерных вооружений подобным образом, станут возможными несколько конкретных шагов:
  • В рамках дальнейших переговоров о сокращении стратегических наступательных вооружений (СНВ), Россия и США могут рассмотреть возможность совмещения мер по снижению оперативной готовности с двусторонним процессом сокращения вооружений.
    И Россия, и Соединенные Штаты могут предпринять дальнейшие шаги по усовершенствованию мер контроля с целью предотвращения несанкционированных действий; повышению возможностей систем оповещения отличать реальные атаки от кажущихся; а также по укреплению выживаемости своих сил, средств контроля и систем управления.
  • Договоренности об обмене данными и обеспечении возможности уничтожения в полете неподконтрольных ракет можно перевести на многостороннюю основу, по меньшей мере, в части обмена данными, с целью вовлечения в процесс других ядерных государств.
    Перевод на многостороннюю основу организаций типа Совместного центра обмена данными также может быть взаимно полезным и в сфере обеспечения безопасности в космосе.
  • Ядерное сдерживание между Россией и Соединенными Штатами также не стоит считать незыблемым. Диалог о морально устаревших доктринах и стратегиях в контексте российско-американских отношений может инициировать более широкую дискуссию между государствами о снижении видной роли ядерного оружия и таким образом будет способствовать процессу разоружения и нераспространения ЯО.

Executive Summary

Key Findings

In the face of domestic economic stagnation, widespread social apathy, and a widening technological gap vis-à-vis the West, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has undertaken the most far-reaching revamping of the Soviet system in over half a century. While the Soviet Union remains a closed communist society, Gorbachev has challenged a whole series of ingrained practices and attitudes, from strictly centralized economic management to an often militarized foreign policy, which has been the basis for Soviet policy since Stalin's time. In foreign affairs, he has introduced new concepts and new flexibility into Soviet diplomacy. Yet the West has not come to terms with these changes.

Balancing Soviet power and maintaining a strong Western alliance remain central to U.S. national interests. By the same token, the U.S. and its allies have a long-term interest in encouraging the moderation of Soviet power. Because the Soviet Union is a global power, Gorbachev's initiatives demand an active response by the United States and its Western allies. In many areas, from arms control to emigration, the Soviet Union has begun to make changes in directions long advocated by the West. While far from complete, these changes present new opportunities, and challenges, which the West should not ignore. The Task Force strongly recommends that the United States and its Western allies welcome the reformist tendencies that Gorbachev has set in motion and encourage those which promote a moderation of Soviet power. Toward that end; the U.S. and its allies should engage the Soviet Union in an effort to explore possibilities for agreement and resolve key points of tension.

A purely reactive Western approach in the face of the new Soviet policy is not an acceptable option, the Task Force believes. Western policies as well as Gorbachev's domestic policy priority are bound to affect Soviet foreign policy. There is considerable uncertainty about the long-term success of Gorbachev's reforms. Nevertheless, over time, the new course chosen by Gorbachev will affect the ways in which the Soviet Union carries out its role as a superpower. A more subtle and flexible Soviet diplomacy requires the West to develop a broader and more active policy toward the Soviet Union, including standards to define and meet common security requirements in a rapidly changing international environment. Failure to do so would sacrifice the diplomatic initiative to the Soviet Union as well as abdicate our responsibility to future generations to pursue prospects for substantially improving relations between East and West.

What is Changing in Soviet Foreign and Domestic Policy?

The West needs to think anew about specific changes the Soviet Union has made in its own policies. Many of these changes are only beginnings and ultimate Soviet intentions remain unclear, but it is important to note that some of them move toward long-standing Western preferences:

• Role of the Military - There has been a reduction in the Soviet military's role and influence in the highest policymaking councils, and Gorbachev has made clear to the military that they have to accept spending restraints and greater openness in the dissemination of military information.
• Arms Control - The USSR adopted the Western proposal of a zero option on the INF issue. In addition, the USSR has moved toward the Western positions on verification, including on-site inspection. It has also raised the prospect of asymmetrical conventional force reductions in central Europe. It has accepted the principle of deep reductions in offensive strategic weapons and proposed a concept of "sufficiency" in military forces.
• The International Economy - Gorbachev has placed special emphasis on reducing Soviet autarky by increasing trade, joint ventures, and expressing an interest in cooperating with such major international organizations as GAIT
• The Domestic Economy - Gorbachev has initiated a major decentralization of operational responsibility for the economy, and he clearly intends to move toward a more flexible, modern, and efficient economic planning and management. He has admitted the inadequacy of Soviet statistics and called for more accurate economic information.

• Human Rights - In the fields of culture and dissent, Gorbachev has displayed a degree of openness and toleration unthinkable just three years ago. In the area of emigration, the change has been less dramatic but Gorbachev has increased the emigration of Soviet Jews, Germans and other groups. While glasnost' has a long way to go, it has clearly led to progress on human rights, which has been a major concern of the West.

• Regional Issues - While Gorbachev has as yet made no significant effort to scale back existing Soviet global commitments, he has given a lower priority to the military expansion of Soviet interests in the Third World than his predecessors.
• Eastern Europe - While urging closer and more "efficient" economic integration, Gorbachev has permitted a somewhat more flexible expression of specific national interests in Eastern Europe than his predecessors.

Agenda for Action

These changes in Soviet policies and the prospect of a Soviet-American INF treaty and summit by the end of this year highlight the need to tackle a wide range of problems in East-West relations. The Task Force recommends that as first steps Western policy choices focus on five key areas:

• Security Issues -. The U.S. and its NATO allies should intensify talks with the Warsaw Pact aimed at reducing conventional forces and eliminating offensive strike potentials, particularly those designed for surprise attack. Given the geographical differences and existing force imbalances, new approaches must include asymmetrical reductions of forward-based armored units, which present the greatest threat of surprise attack.

  Both sides need to move rapidly to conclude an agreement on deep cuts in strategic offensive nuclear forces. These reductions should be designed to enhance strategic stability and eliminate the capacity to launch a crippling first strike. At the same time, both sides need to find ways to strengthen the ABM Treaty and to ensure that any research on strategic defensive systems is consistent with preservation of the Treaty.

  The West should push for a rapid conclusion of the global Geneva chemical weapons negotiations, including the establishment of an international verification regime. Such an agreement would help increase confidence in Europe at a time when some are concerned over the implications of the elimination of medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles from the continent.

• International Economic Issues - Except in a precisely defined area of strategic technologies, which entails tighter, more efficient COCOM regulations, expanded East-West trade is in our interest. The West should welcome Soviet efforts to develop the legal foundation for a system of equitable joint ventures. While Western governments should not subsidize credits, neither should they oppose the extension of private credit through normal commercial rates and practices to the Soviet Union. The prospect of observer status in the GATT and IMP should be used to encourage greater openness and information about the Soviet economy.

  If the Soviet Union demonstrates heightened respect for human rights, the U.S. government and Congress should consider bringing their policy in congruence with U.S. allies by reevaluating the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments restricting trade with and credit to the USSR. The West should aim to normalize the framework for trade with all Warsaw Treaty countries, on the basis of mutual and reciprocal interests.

  In addition, the U.S.-Soviet umbrella agreements on scientific and technological cooperation should be revived and expanded, on the basis of full reciprocity.

• Human Rights - The West should welcome increased glasnost' while continuing to make clear to the Soviet government that its observance of internationally recognized human rights is the mark of a civilized power and a condition for truly collaborative relations between the Soviet Union and the West. The West should insist that the Soviet Union fully live up to the commitments it undertook under the Helsinki Final Act to encourage the free movement of people, ideas, and information across international boundaries.

• Regional Issues - In Afghanistan, the West must continue to make clear that Soviet occupation of that country poses strict limits to genuine collaboration between the USSR and the West. Conversely, a rapid Soviet withdrawal, with sufficient international guarantees, would be a forceful demonstration that the "new political thinking" has specific policy implications.

  In other areas of conflict which could lead to possible superpower confrontation-such as Central America, southern Africa, and the Persian Gulf-the West should intensify discussions aimed at clarifying interests and creating conditions for greater stability. Within this framework, U.S.-Soviet meetings on regional issues should be upgraded as part of a regularized summit process. The purpose would be to seek solutions to these problems in conjunction with other concerned parties.

  In the Arab-Israeli dispute, the U.S. and USSR should work together to advance a peace process which guarantees the territorial integrity and interests of all states and parties.

• Political Dialogue – U.S.-Soviet summit meetings, as well as meetings at other governmental and non-governmental levels, should be held on a regular basis.

Conclusion

The West must have no illusions about the need to balance Soviet power, but neither should it overlook opportunities to encourage the Soviet Union to be a more responsible and integrated member of the international community. Although the long-term success of Gorbachev's policy remains uncertain, the process he has launched holds out a promise of a further moderation of Soviet power and an opportunity to develop and institutionalize areas of cooperation in the East-West relationship. Some in the West worry about giving the Soviet Union a "breathing spell." They fear that Gorbachev's economic reforms will simply strengthen the USSR in the long run. But Soviet economic and social problems will not be quickly solved. In the meantime, greater openness and pluralization should be welcomed for their own sake as well as for the effect they can have in moderating the way Soviet power is used.

In order to seize the opportunities offered by new Soviet policies, the U.S. and its allies need to respond creatively to Gorbachev's initiatives. In order to do that, the West must be clear about its own policy objectives and priorities. New political thinking in the East requires new policy thinking in the West.