Regional Security

“The escalation in the Korean Peninsula is an opportunity for the Korean people to unite, to share the blessings of a democracy and to eliminate all nuclear weapons, serving as an example for the rest of the world to follow,” said Dr. William J. Parker III, Chief Operating Officer of the EastWest Institute (EWI), delivering a keynote at the International Forum on One Korea 2017: Solutions to the Korean Peninsula Crisis, in Seoul on December 7-8.

EWI co-organized the event, along with the Global Peace Foundation, Action for Korea United, and One Korea Foundation in partnership with the National Unification Advisory Council of the Republic of Korea. The Seoul event was an extension of a previous conference held in Washington D.C. on November 14-15. This set of fora provided a multi-track platform for leading global experts to address and discuss solutions to the Korean peninsula crisis, and build global cooperation with civil society and national stakeholders.

Warning of the dire consequences associated with the security of fissile material should North Korea's nuclear program continue unchecked, Dr. Parker singled out China as particularly vulnerable to consequences of war breaking out on the Korean peninsula, saying the crisis presented China with an opportunity to exercise its options as a growing influence in the region.

“If North Korea is allowed to continue its nuclear weapons program, Japan and South Korea will very likely build advanced nuclear weapons systems,” remarked Dr. Parker. “And it does not stop there. China will undoubtedly feel a need to expand its weapon systems. Other nations will watch and we may well see a proliferation of Gulf States and others building their own systems.”

"The opportunity for a stable, prosperous, self-reliant and unified Korea is within our grasp," added Dr. Parker.

Other forum speakers included Dr. Sue Mi Terry, Senior Fellow for Korea at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea; Rev. Kenneth Bae, President of the Nehemiah Global Initiative and the longest-held American prisoner in North Korea; Dr. Tarja Cronberg, former European Union Parliamentarian and Distinguished Associate Fellow with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; Dr. Jai Poong Ryu, President of the One Korea Foundation, and scholars, economists and human rights advocates from Korea, Japan, Russia, China, Mongolia and the United States.

More information about the event, including a complete agenda, can be accessed here.

Photo: "170322-N-GD109-270" (CC BY-NC 2.0) by U.S. Pacific Fleet

BY: SASKIA VAN GENUGTEN

Politicians and commentators commonly mention the need for “stability” and “stabilization” when referring to the current situation in the broader Middle East and North Africa (MENA). For the policy community concerned with Afghanistan and Iraq, this has been true for over a decade. Now, key international actors, regional players and local constituencies alike are similarly consumed with the question of how to put an end to the years of revolutionary uncertainty, upheaval and conflicts in several countries in the region—sparked by the 2011 Arab uprisings and exacerbated by domestic infighting and foreign meddling.

Indeed, most pundits agree that stabilization is what the broader MENA region desperately needs. Policymakers seem willing to work towards that goal of stability. But at the same time, a lack of consensus around what stability entails and how to get there keeps fueling instability instead.

When assessing international actors’ ideas concerning the meaning of “stability” and the process of “stabilization,” it generally is agreed that stability can be understood as an environment that is reasonably predictable and non-violent, while stabilization is a process that entails the blending of military means with other tools of statecraft and foreign policy. It brings together different, overlapping and interacting policy dimensions, which in institutionalized settings often is referred to as a “whole of government” or comprehensive approach.

Starting with the international reaction to the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, experiments with blending military, political, economic, humanitarian and developmental tools—as well as elements of transitional justice and reconciliation—became the norm. In the past decade, Afghanistan has served as the most important litmus test for this approach. But unfortunately, for all the tryouts in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and elsewhere, the stated ambitions versus realities on the ground have remained far apart and the few success stories, such as in Iraq’s Anbar province, short-lived.

The problem is that beyond the common, basic understanding of the two buzzwords, ideas differ regarding which non-military policy instruments should be part of the stabilization tool box, which instruments are priority, what the priorities are and whether a specific sequencing is appropriate. This already holds true when comparing approaches to stabilization within the West, and even within the different policy communities of a specific country. Military actors, for example, come to the table with different professional cultures and priorities from those working on the humanitarian and development aspects of stabilization.

Most importantly, with an increasing number of external actors, ideas about what the end state should be and what acceptable forms of stability are also have started to differ. Indeed, the number of voices and ideas increases significantly when actors from other parts of the world are equally involved with “stabilization operations.” The West might have an ideal society in mind while others, including Russia and the Gulf countries, have their own vision, reflecting what they believe makes for a stable situation.

Current developments in the MENA region, where the West is no longer the only cook in the kitchen, are shaped by this mismatch of explicit and implicit objectives and the differentiation in views regarding acceptable paths towards stability. Reflecting on recent experiences of stabilization efforts in the MENA region, Western policymakers can learn several lessons, including:

1. Democratization does not necessarily increase stability in the region. For Europe and the U.S.—the two dominant forces of stabilization efforts in the broader MENA region until several years ago—the envisioned end state tends to be one of increased democracy and liberal market economic practices. Initially, the ideas were derived from democratic peace theories in vogue in the 1990s, which argued that democratization and open markets would lead to more sustainable forms of peace. While potentially true in the long-run, in the short-term, political elections in conflict and transitional situations are likely to spark more violence and civil wars. The MENA region has been a case in point, with Libya and Iraq being prime illustrations.
    
2. Stabilization takes time and aftercare, with change needing to happen at many levels. Removing an undesired regime or throwing money at development projects, does not miraculously create a more stable and secure political environment. Corruption, radicalization and imperfect information play their respective roles and are difficult to tackle, with long-term root causes such as population growth, adverse effects of climate change and low oil prices compounding the precarious situation. While President Trump’s recent line on Afghanistan might sound appealingly simple (“killing terrorists” instead of focusing on nation-building), it is unlikely to be a winning strategy.
    
3. Europeans and Americans are no longer the only kids on the block. In recent years, many other actors have become actively involved in the MENA region. As they come in with different histories and different economic and political systems, their views on what stability should look like and the preferred path toward stabilization, also differ. New powers including Turkey, Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, are increasing their presence, while a resurgent Russia is trying to assert itself in the region. Competition between the permanent members of the UN Security Council illustrates this change. And in contrast to the West, these new powers do not yet suffer from “intervention fatigue” or squeezed defense budgets.

Renowned pundit Dominique Moisi, in a recent article, states the following:

Today, too, mainly European, or Western, approaches to ensuring stability in the Middle East no longer work. As a top European diplomat told me recently, the Middle East crisis is in desperate need of fresh thinking and new leadership.

Moisi makes a very important point: the first step Western policymakers need to take is to reevaluate their own thinking, reflect on their own definitions of stability and stabilization of the MENA region, as well as on how these might differ from—and, in particular, how these interact with—other important international approaches to stabilization in the region.

Only by thoroughly understanding the world views, objectives and approaches of other external (and domestic) actors involved, as well as by appreciating the changing balance of powers between these key external actors, can the West expect to promote its own “ideal” in the Middle East’s increasingly crowded marketplace of ideas.   

Saskia van Genugten is Senior Research Fellow at the Emirates Diplomatic Academy and co-director of the Academy’s “Stabilization Research Initiative.”

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo credit: "Flag of Egypt all over Tahrir Square" (CC BY 2.0) by RamyRaoof

European Western Balkans: The opening of the EastWest Institute office in Belgrade has been recently announced, when you, together with the CEO of the Institute, Cameron Munter, met with the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, the Prime Minister, Ana Brnabić, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivica Dačić. When will the office be put in motion?

Maja Piščević: At its spring meeting in London, the Board of Directors of the EastWest Institute supported the proposal of Ambassador Munter that the Institute, after more than a decade, ought to return to the Balkans and to support, from Belgrade, the economic integration processes and the prevention of future conflicts in the region.

The aim of the meetings with the President of Serbia, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs was to familiarize them with the mission and the specific way the EWI works, as well as concrete talks on possible ways of engaging EWI through its wide network of diplomatic and expert contacts around the world. EastWest Balkans has been operational since the beginning of July and I hope that we will soon be able to announce the first projects.

EWB: Since the office in Belgrade will be the third office of the East-West Institute beyond the borders of the United States, after Moscow and Brussels, should this be understood as a signal of the importance of this region for global security?

MP: Absolutely! The wars that occurred in this region as a result of the disintegration of Yugoslavia are today a past, but the region continues to face numerous challenges, regardless of the fact that they are rarely written on the front pages of the Western media. The Dayton Agreement that ended the war in Bosnia represents today a fragile and often inefficient structure for managing the country. The agreement between Serbia and Kosovo has not yet been reached, and it is a prerequisite for the European future of both actors. Macedonia continues to face internal challenges, and the same can be said for Croatia, although it is a member state of the European Union.

Click here for the full interview.

BY: VALBONA ZENELI

In Europe, there is a clear understanding that unresolved ethnic and geopolitical conflicts are threats to regional stability. Stabilization of the European Eastern neighborhood has been a security imperative for the European Union (EU) for some time. A principal goal of the 2016’s EU Global Strategy and the revised European Neighborhood Policy is to invest in the resilience of Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgina, Moldova and Ukraine.

The EU’s primary objective in the EaP is to fund the development of democratic institutions, good governance and economic development. However, there exists a dilemma within the region when it comes to its economic integration with the EU, resulting in new divisions and dissent amongst states.

All EaP countries would like to take advantage of closer economic links with both the EU and Russia via the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Politically and economically, the integration dilemma between the EU common market and the EAEU remains deeply divisive—the EU is the largest economic block in the world, while Russia’s regional focus appeals to some EaP nations.

According to IMF data, in 2016, the average income per capita in the region was 3,378 USD per year, which is only eight percent of the EU’s average per capita income. Moldova is the poorest country in the region with only 1,871 USD per capita, in 2016. When considering a weak regional recovery following the global economic crisis—which saw an average economic contraction of negative six percent in 2009 (with the exception of Azerbaijan)—hopes of catching up with the rest of Europe are fading.

In the current environment, Russia remains a significant player, exerting influence using economic, energy and political leverage. Understandably, the combination of internal vulnerabilities and external pressures creates a very challenging situation, where instability and lack of economic security support a cycle of weak governance, high levels of corruption, poverty and inequality, and weak economic development.

Competing Orbits

The difference in allegiances of the EaP nations is increasingly apparent. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are signatories to the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), bringing relations between these countries and the EU to new economic levels. Meanwhile, Armenia and Belarus have opted to join the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in partnership with Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Azerbaijan remains neutral).

Countries are free to choose the trade agreement that best serve their trade and economic interests. In the case of the EaP region, it is important to look at the essential differences between the EU and the EAEU, their purpose, complexity and attractiveness.  

Informally formed in the 1990’s, by 2015, the EAEU has since grown into an established economic union. The EAEU’s mission mimics the EU’s in its intention to encourage economic integration through the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers. To date, it has proven ineffective, with statistics showing a six percent decrease in trade between EAEU partners in 2016.

In contrast, the EU continues to engage in trade with all nations in the region more frequently than the EAEU, excluding Belarus. The DCFTA has significantly increased trade between the EU and the three signatory countries. The EU is the largest trading partner for Moldova with 64 percent of its trade (40 percent for Ukraine and 32 percent for Georgia). Because all three countries together make up only one percent of the EU’s total trade, there remains scope for even greater growth. Most importantly, the DCFTA is not only about trade liberalization, but also serves to increase the competitiveness of domestic companies across the region, making them increasingly attractive to foreign investment. Currently, the entire EaP region attracts less than 0.5 percent of global FDI.

The EAEU’s four trillion USD common market consisting of 182 million consumers represents less than two percent of global GDP at the current exchange rate. Members of the EAEU are too different in terms of economic development and structure, and econometric calculations suggest that the EAEU causes more trade diversion than trade generation. Most importantly, the EAEU market is based on extractive industries and not on innovation and know-how, which raises important questions about future regional capacity and competitiveness. Arguably, while access is easier to the EAEU, a political agenda dominates the economic one.

Ultimately, the EAEU’s main objective is to negotiate comprehensive treaties with its largest economic partners—the EU and China. While no real progress can be achieved with the EU until its own current political crisis is resolved, there is ongoing dialogue to involve EAEU countries in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, China appears to be more interested in investing in those countries that have signed the DCFTA with the EU, owing to broader opportunities and easier access for Chinese products to the European market.

The Path Forward

Importantly, DCFTA requirements are meant to achieve a legal approximation to the acquis communautaire that would formalize technical standards for products and establish an EU-like regulatory environment. Certainly, in the short run, there are challenges associated with the implementation of DCFTA, including adjustment costs owing to industrial restructuring, loss of market share and structural reforms, as well as the growing need for infrastructure investments.

That notwithstanding, in the long run, the economic effects on the DCFTA countries—Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine—are likely to be positive due to regulatory framework convergence with the EU, which will help attract FDI—increase competitiveness, foster trade and productivity gains—allowing for income growth and better quality of life.

Although EU integration seems to be a distant prospect for the EaP countries, at a minimum, if they were to follow the DCFTA integration requirements now, they would be well on their way to modernizing their economies and becoming more competitive in regional and, perhaps, global markets.

Dr. Valbona Zeneli is the director of Black Sea Eurasia Program at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. 

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: "Berlaymont" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by Eoghan OLionnain

Former Prime Minister Sooronbay Jeenbekov—from the pro-presidential Social Democratic Party—has won the Kyrgyzstan presidential election, with 54.81 percent of the vote. His main opponent, Ömürbek Babanov, leader of Respublika–Ata Jurt—the second-largest party in parliament—received 33.74 percent of the votes. 

Jeenbekov’s ascent to power indicates voters’ clear preference for stability over any potential risk of a radical, yet uncertain shakeup of the country’s socioeconomic policies—as advocated by Babanov. Speaking to Interfax, Babanov stated that his role in the election was to “provide an alternative vision for the country's development of the state." Babanov added that "success lies in the fact that we have managed to change people's thinking."

The outgoing president, Almazbek Atambayev, pursued a coalition aimed at maintaining a balance of interests between the affluent, trade based communities in the country's north, and the primarily agricultural based majority in the south. Jeenbekov, a southerner himself, is recognized as “a son of the soil,” having served as Agriculture Minister and Governor of Osh, a populous province bordering Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Effectively, the election outcome reflects Kyrgyz politicians’ inclination towards an arrangement that falls short of taking any far-reaching measures would address the existing economic and wealth disparities, reflected by the north-south divide.  

The succession from Atambayev to Jeenbekov also appears to be a result of the country’s leadership pursuing a skillful balancing of Kyrgyzstan's regional relations, especially with Kazakhstan—the country's largest neighbor to the north—and Uzbekistan, the country with the largest population among all Central Asian states, to the south.

Both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are part of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)—a trade bloc that also includes Belarus and Armenia. Just this week, however, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan agreed on steps to ease checks on the movement of people and goods along the 1,212 km border between the two countries. The border issue arose amid accusations of Kazakhstan potentially interfering in the Kyrgyz presidential campaign.

On its other border, Uzbekistan, with a population of 29 million—projected to exceed over 33 million by 2025—has growing water needs but is increasingly wary of Kyrgyzstan’s plans to dam rivers for hydropower projects.

Russia, another regional neighbor, also has a direct interest in the results of the election. Sharing a common past—Kyrgyzstan was under Soviet rule for seven decades—and close economic and security interests, commentators in Russia have voiced their expectations about the results of Kyrgyzstan’s presidential polls. Speaking from Moscow, Dmitry Alexandrov—an analyst with the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies—expressed that the vote affirmed Kyrgyzstan’s desire for stability, while recognizing that a top priority for the new president will be to "conduct a dialogue with the constituencies in the country's northern districts, including Talas and Chuy.” Alexandrov, like many Russian commentators, also wishes to see Kyrgyzstan continue to maintain close bilateral ties to Russia including a Moscow-led economic and security alliance and a deepening integration with the Eurasian Economic Union.  

Nevertheless, while the relationship with Russia may remain strong, it is important to remember that Kyrgyzstan shares a 1,063 km border with China, a neighbor whose foreign direct investments continue to rise. The Chinese Petroleum Company funded 300 million USD for building a refinery, operating since 2013. It was envisaged that the refinery would help reduce Kyrgyzstan’s dependence on the supply of processed fuel and lubricants from Russia. Plans for ​​building a China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway are under discussion. When launched, Kyrgyzstan will receive a portion of the projected investment, estimated to be up to three billion USD. Moreover, Kyrgyzstan is looking for China to invest in the construction of energy facilities, especially the Upper Naryn and Kambarata-1 hydroelectric power stations in Kyrgyzstan. Hence, Bishkek will very likely, and wisely, leverage the shared economic interests of Russia and China, maintaining parallel arrangements and engaging on Beijing’s One Belt and One Road Initiative and in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 

The new administration will to need allay long-running misgivings in order to win the public’s confidence on numerous domestic and international issues. This includes addressing ethnic and regional divides, criminal activity as well as expanding commercial interests and good governance—the lack of which, at times, poses a power vacuum. 

Above all, Kyrgyzstan’s ruling Social Democratic Party (SDPK) made a commendable choice to seek wider endorsement from the public, thus, marking a clear departure from previous practices where a narrow but powerful circle selected their favorite candidate to rule. The intending message is clear: among all Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan has pursued the path to democratic transition—a commitment which merits further consolidation. The onus now rests on the tri-partite ruling coalition to rise decisively above petty politics to ensure much needed stability.   

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Ambassador Cameron Munter spoke to Voice of America (VOA) about how new conflicts could be emerging in the Balkans due to a number of unresolved issues from the past.

In the interview, published on September 26, Munter also posed the question if Europe still had "the magnetic charm it had" for countries in that region.

Click here to listen to Munter's remarks, beginning around the 9:00 mark.

Related:

As Crisis Brews in the Balkans, the West Looks On

BY SARAH KREPS AND SARAH MAXEY

In his speech outlining U.S. policy towards Afghanistan, Donald Trump assured the public that he shared their frustration with a foreign policy that did not pursue U.S. “security interests over all other considerations.” This laser-focus on achieving U.S. security at all costs echoes realists from Thucydides to Thomas Hobbes to George Kennan, who have long represented the conventional wisdom when it comes to the way that states should or do interact with other states. From this view, political reality must be intertwined with power and self-interest—morality is simply a sideshow against this theoretical backdrop.

Trump’s ends-justify-the-means rhetoric and concern with public opinion date back to campaign promises that his policy towards the use of torture would depend on whether “Americans feel strongly about bringing back waterboarding and other tactics.” But, is President Trump right to assume the public shares his frustration with a foreign policy focused on anything other than the narrowly defined promotion of U.S. security interests? Our research, published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, suggests the opposite is the case. Moral obligation plays an important and overlooked role in U.S. public attitudes towards military action.

In this research, we recruited a national sample of U.S. adults to participate in a survey experiment that examined whether support for humanitarian interventions is grounded in moral concerns about protecting foreign civilians or more instrumental, national interest-focused concerns about costs and consequences. In the post-Cold War period, half of the United States’ military interventions have taken the form of humanitarian interventions, the use of force across borders for the primary purpose of saving foreign civilians. The 1990s were the heyday of U.S.-led humanitarian interventions, referred to by critics as a foreign policy of “social work.” Examples from this period include the Somalia intervention in 1992-1993, Bosnia in 1995, and Kosovo in 1999. However, more recent interventions in Libya and Syria also carried humanitarian overtones, suggesting that the practice is alive and well in this decade.

Findings show that these humanitarian overtones actually increased public support for humanitarian intervention scenarios compared to “realpolitik”-style operations such as restraining an aggressive state. However, higher levels of support for these interventions derived not from the assumptions about costs in blood and treasure that shape responses to security interventions but from moral motives. Faced with the prospect of a humanitarian crisis, individuals were drawn to support military action out of a sense of moral obligation and belief that the US and its allies “ought” to intervene on behalf of foreign civilians.

Today, in an increasingly polarized political context where partisanship pervades every aspect of public life, a follow-up analysis was conducted to investigate whether individuals’ party identification plays a role in the types of interventions they support and why. Results drawn from our 2015-2016 study indicate that Republicans offer high and consistent levels of support for all forms of military intervention and the prospect of humanitarian motives does little to boost their support for the use of force—in other words, there is a ceiling effect that makes additional upward movement more difficult. Republicans also felt a sense of moral responsibility for intervention of all kinds, whether humanitarian or ejecting an authoritarian leader who invaded another country. On the other hand, Democrats were more leery of the use of force in response to foreign aggression but were animated by the prospect of humanitarian motives because they were concerned about harm done to foreign civilians and felt a sense of moral obligation for U.S. action. While the content of their moral concerns varied, across the board moral considerations loom large for both Republicans and Democrats.

Our research has focused primarily on attitudes of Americans because the United States has tended to assume a dominant international role when it comes to the use of force. Previous studies suggest, however, that other democratic publics, especially the United Kingdom, often converge with American attitudes when it comes to support for military force, suggesting that these attitudes likely travel to other democratic populaces as well.

Several years ago, the political scientist John Mearsheimer reported that “realism is a hard sell.” Realist compatriot Henry Kissinger similarly lamented that “Americans cannot sustain major international obligations that are not justified by their moral faith.” Despite efforts aimed at offering a more self-serving perspective of the public, our research indicates that the realist lament largely rests on firm ground. Americans are not simply moved to expend resources for self-interest or for violations of state sovereignty. They value the prospect of saving strangers in distant lands, and do so exactly on the basis of moral faith. Leaders who dismiss these moral mechanisms undermine not only the international legitimacy of military action, but their own domestic basis of support.

Sarah Kreps is an associate professor of government and adjunct professor of law at Cornell University. Sarah Maxey is a postdoctoral fellow at Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. This article outlines the findings of a recent article in the Journal of Conflict Resolution.  

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Kawa Hassan, who leads the institute's Middle East and North Africa Program, said in Bloomberg that the Iraqi Kurds should have held formal talks instead of holding a referendum on September 25.

“The risk of confrontation is big, and nobody will benefit from a new round of war,” he said.

Read the full article in Bloomberg here.

In an interview with Christian Science Monitor, Hassan said that holding the vote amid heightened internal, regional, and international opposition would fragment and weaken the Kurdish position.

Read the full article here.