Regional Security

Is it that time again? Talk of Europe developing an independent military force is in the air amid doubts over the credibility of American security guarantees. In this iteration, the conversation revolves around the prospect of a so-called Eurodeterrent—a nuclear weapons force that falls under European Union (EU) auspices and (allegedly) operates independently of NATO. On the surface, this project would seem like a good idea. Rather than relying on a fickle Washington for their defense needs, EU members can use the Eurodeterrent to show that they are finally taking their own security seriously.

Yet many Pan-European defense initiatives are inconsequential and forgettable, and the Eurodeterrent promises to be no different in spite of Brexit and Donald Trump. After all, since the European Union cannot agree on refugee policy and workers’ rights, nuclear strategy seems like a bridge way too far. Indeed, the Eurodeterrent represents a serious underpants gnomes problem—that is, the misplaced faith that a single action automatically leads to the desired outcome. The first step, acquiring nuclear weapons, seems obvious enough but nevertheless features thorny problems that relate to potential changes to France's existing nuclear deterrent and the prospect of nuclear weapons development in Germany. The end goal is supposedly peace and stability. Yet many things must happen in between.

Consider all the controversies that would attend a pan-European nuclear force:

Targeting: What gets targeted with European nuclear weapons? Some EU members will desire a Eurodeterrent because it could help plug gaps in NATO’s deterrent posture relative to Russia. Yet others might prefer strategic ambiguity for fear of spoiling relations with Russia. Whatever the resolution of this issue, defense planners will still need to decide between counter-value (hitting population centers) and counter-force (hitting military assets) targeting. The latter of which might be more “humane,” but its technological requirements are higher and its alleged premium on first strikes risks undermining strategic stability.

Threshold for use: Under what circumstances would the Eurodeterrent be ever used? Of course, the EU could decree ambiguously—like France already does—that nuclear weapons will only be used to defend its vital interests. However, the vital interests of Latvia differ from those from Portugal. Would Lisbon agree to nuclear weapons use, and risk nuclear devastation, in response to a Russian conventional attack on the eastern Latvian region of Latgale? Probably not, and so Russia will still face incentives to engage in so-called hybrid warfare to test the EU’s redlines and to undermine the internal cohesion of the organization even further.

Delivery capabilities: EU defense planners would also have to decide how the EU would deliver nuclear weapons against the adversary. If it chooses a land-based ballistic missile capability, then some states might exhibit NIMBYism and reject having any missiles stationed on their territories whatsoever in order to avoid being early targets for nuclear devastation. Of course, sea-based and air-based deterrents are easier said than done. Notwithstanding Brexit, Great Britain already relies on the Vanguard class submarines to deliver nuclear-tipped Trident missiles. Yet its submarines and missiles both require American technology. European bombers will also be similarly dependent on U.S. defense contractors since they might need to develop long-range stand-off cruise missiles in order to overcome the increasing sophistication of air defenses. Simply put, the European defense industry may neither meet such technical requirements nor tolerate the embarrassment of relying on American good-will to sustain a survivable second-strike capability.

Command and control: Who gets to decide to deploy nuclear weapons in a crisis, within a very short amount of time no less? Will unanimous consent be required on the part of all states? If not, what safeguards will there be to prevent the tyranny of a nuclear-armed majority? To say nothing of accidental use, competing decision-making bodies and diverse national interests could intensify what Peter Feaver calls the always/never dilemma, that is, European nuclear weapons must always be available to be used, but they must also never be used absent an authoritative decision. Debates over who has the legitimacy to pull the nuclear trigger will likely rekindle old tensions.

These issues highlight only some of the controversies that European defense planners would need to tackle if they do seriously intend on pursuing an independent nuclear force. Domestic politics and moral concerns present further complications. In light of all these challenges, talk of the Eurodeterrent will bear no fruit since European decision-makers will inevitably want to avoid the troubling policy considerations it would involve. Like most other pan-European defense initiatives that came before it, this idea’s time will soon be up.

Alexander Lanoszka is lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the City, University of London. His research on alliance politics and European security has been published in International Security, Survival, International Affairs, and elsewhere. You can follow him on Twitter @ALanoszka or visit his website.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

On August 13, 2017, a senior Russian military official announced that Moscow would host comprehensive joint military drills with India from October 19 to 29. This announcement gained widespread international attention, as Moscow’s October drills will coordinate with India’s army, navy and air force in a synchronized fashion for the first time. The timing of Moscow’s decision to expand its military cooperation with India is also intriguing, as the drill announcement occurred just days after Pakistan held negotiations with Russia on the purchase of S-35 war planes.

Russia’s decision to deepen its military cooperation with India and Pakistan simultaneously is a compelling example of Moscow’s balancing strategy in South Asia. Russia’s ability to maintain cordial security partnerships with both India and Pakistan is highly beneficial for its broader geopolitical aspirations.

Moscow’s successful balancing strategy in South Asia highlights Russia’s great power status to the international community, as it demonstrates that Russia can directly compete with the United States and China for influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Russia’s South Asian balancing strategy also ensures that both New Delhi and Islamabad support Moscow’s efforts to prevent instability in Central Asia and Afghanistan.

Moscow’s partnerships with India and Pakistan have been sustained by its efforts to address two key security challenges of mutual concern. The first major security issue that Russia has emphasized in its attempts to cement partnerships with India and Pakistan is that of combatting transnational terrorism.

Even though Indian politicians have routinely highlighted Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism as a major threat to regional stability and Pakistani media outlets have blamed rising Islamic extremism on India’s marginalization of Muslims, Russia has retained favorable relations with both countries by refusing to blame either country for the ongoing threat of terrorism in South Asia.

Instead of emulating the Trump administration’s accusatory approach, Russia has addressed the terrorism threat in South Asia by bilaterally engaging with the Indian and Pakistani governments on areas where they can implement constructive solutions. Russia’s counter-terrorism outreach to India has focused on the enforcement of stricter cross-border controls on the inflows and outflows of Islamic extremists. To convince the Indian government of Moscow’s commitment to cracking down on facilitators of terrorism, Russian President Vladimir Putin supported India’s counter-terrorism raid in Kashmir after the 2016 Uri attacks and openly praised New Delhi’s counter-terrorism policies during his meeting with Modi in June.  

Even though Russia’s support for India’s counter-terrorism policies risks damaging its bilateral relationship with Pakistan, Moscow has eased concerns in Islamabad by highlighting Pakistan’s indispensability as a counter-terrorism partner in Afghanistan. Russian officials have argued that the Trump administration’s hostile rhetoric towards Pakistan risks destabilizing the region, and Moscow has given Pakistan a prominent diplomatic profile in the peace talks it has hosted on the Afghanistan crisis. These actions have reassured Pakistani officials of Russia’s impartiality in South Asia, and have caused Islamabad to support an expansion of Russia’s diplomatic presence in Afghanistan.

The second major security issue that underpins Russia’s South Asia balancing strategy is ameliorating India-Pakistan border tensions, which escalated markedly in 2016. Much like its approach to counter-terrorism, Russia has taken a non-committal approach to the re-escalation of the Kashmir conflict, by refusing to use its position on the United Nations Security Council to condemn either side for the rising hostilities.

While some analysts believe that Russia’s inaction on Kashmir in the UN Security Council constitutes a tacit pro-India stance, as Pakistan had appealed to the UN about casualties inflicted by Indian surgical airstrikes in Kashmir, Russia has highlighted its impartiality in the standoff by advertising itself as a potential mediator in the security crisis.

Russia’s potential to act as a mediator in the Kashmir conflict grew following a fruitful bilateral dialogue between Putin and former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in June. Even though Pakistan has expressed more enthusiasm about a Russian mediation role than India, Moscow’s preference for bilateral dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad, and opposition to judgmental resolutions from multilateral bodies has consolidated its South Asia balancing strategy.  

Even though Russia’s economic and security links with India have greater geopolitical significance than those that bind Moscow to Pakistan, Russia’s use of constructive bilateral engagement on counter-terrorism and offer to mediate border tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad has allowed it to implement a highly effective balancing strategy in South Asia. If Russian diplomatic overtures help ease tensions between India and Pakistan, Kremlin policymakers will be able to expand Moscow’s access to vital new markets for Russian military equipment, highlight Russia’s great power status on the world stage, and demonstrate Russia’s ability to exert tangible influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Samuel Ramani is a DPhil candidate at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He is also a journalist who writes regularly for the Washington Post, The Diplomat and the Huffington Post. He can be followed on Twitter at samramani2 and on Facebook at Samuel Ramani.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Cameron Munter, President and CEO of the EastWest Institute, discusses the motives of Kim Jong-Un in the esclating nuclear tensions with North Korea in a recent article by The New York Times.

"There is a certain universality of wanting to be recognized and respected," said Munter. "And because Americans take this for granted, they don't see just how deeply motivating that search for respect can be."

Click here to read the full article. 

Voice of America (VOA): On Monday, August 21, Masoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, gave a speech on the Kurdish referendum scheduled for September 25. In this speech, he gave mixed messages about postponing the referendum. On one hand, he said there would be no postponement. On the other hand, he says that postponement is possible if there are guarantees from the U.S. and the UN about relations with Baghdad. What do you make of these mixed messages?

Kawa Hassan (KH): In this interview, Barzani gave his analysis about the referendum. He seems to aim at strengthening the "yes camp,” those who want to vote in favor of the referendum should it be held as planned on September 25. 

VOA: Recently a Kurdish delegation visited Baghdad and discussed the referendum issue with Iraqi Prime Minister, political parties, and U.S. and Iranian diplomats. The delegation came back to Erbil and the visit was not seen as successful because the meetings didn't yield any results. Baghdad is opposing the referendum. Can Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) hold the referendum without the approval of Baghdad? Will the referendum be legitimate?   

KH: According to some sources, this meeting is the start of some sort of negotiations between Baghdad and Erbil on the referendum. The delegation also met with the ambassadors of Iran, the U.S., the EU and the UN. Both the U.S. and Iran are heavily engaged behind the scenes in mediating between both parties. Therefore it is too early to say the visit was a failure. The Iraqi government clearly said this referendum is unconstitutional and that they oppose it. The KRG says Baghdad didn’t implement the constitutional clauses that deal with the status of disputed areas (article 140), oil and gas law, and some other issues. Theoretically KRG can hold the referendum. But the question is what would be the implications for relations with Baghdad if Iraqi authorities will not accept the result of the referendum? Will Baghdad's refusal be beneficial or negative for KRG?      

VOA: Those Kurds who would vote yes in the referendum say once the referendum is over, and a de facto independent state is declared, Iraq and other states will accept the new de facto state. They cite the examples of Kosovo and South Sudan which gained international recognition after referendum. To what extent is Iraqi Kurdistan's situation similar to South Sudan and Kosovo? 

KH: Each region [in the world that wants to hold referendum and declare independence] has a unique situation and therefore we cannot make generalized analysis and assessment. This holds true to both Kosovo and South Sudan cases. The South Sudanese referendum and subsequent independence was one of the results of the 2005 agreement between the Sudanese central government in Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). Upon the declaration of independence in 2008 [by the Assembly of Kosovo], Kosovo was soon recognized as a sovereign state by many countries in the world. And in other cases, where regions hold referendum and announced independence, they were not recognized (by the overwhelming majority of international community).

To listen to the full interview (in Kurdish), click here 

Dr. William J. Parker III, Chief Operating Officer of the EastWest Institute, discussed the ongoing nuclear threat from North Korea on Voice of America's International Edition. In the interview, broadcast on August 29, Parker commented on President Donald Trump's recent comment that "all options are on the table" regarding the isolated Asian country.

"Remember threat is both intent and capability. They have stated over and over again through Kim Jong Un's rhetoric that he has the intent to harm the U.S. or its people. Now he is starting to get that capability and that is increasing day by day, so that means the threat continues to increase and it's becoming more and more real every day," Parker said. "If it gets to the point where the only action to be taken is for the United States to operate unilaterally, I believe this president will take that action." 

Click here to listen to Parker's remarks.

Dr. William J. Parker III joined the John Catsimatidis podcast on August 27 to discuss a wide range of global issues, including the latest developments in North Korea and accidents involving U.S. Navy ships.

Listen to the interview below:

BNR: What is EastWest Institute and what does it do? 

Kawa Hassan (KH): EastWest Institute (EWI) is an American organization—its headquarters is in New York with offices in Brussels, Moscow and San Francisco. It focuses on trust building and resolution of conflicts through Track 2 diplomacy. One of the main projects of the institute’s Middle East & North Africa Program is the Iran Saudi Dialogue. As you know both countries are engaged in proxy wars in the region. Our initiative aims at improving relations between both countries through discreet meetings between experts, ex-officials and opinion makers. These meetings focuse on issues of common interest such us ISIS, the refugee crisis, the impacts of climate change on regional dynamics and prospects for regional cooperation. The participants have their own networks back home so that they can inform and influence policy makers back home on the perception of their country in the eyes of their rival and share the knowledge. 
 
BNR: In addition to your work at EWI, you were also a member of an American Task Force that has advised the U.S. administration on Iraq. You were not only an adviser but you also have a personal  connection to Iraq. What is your own background? 

KH: I am Dutch of Iraqi Kurdish origin. I was born and raised in Sulaimanyah, a big city in the Kurdistan region of Iraq and studied at the university in Baghdad. I fled Iraq at the age of 22 and sought asylum in Holland in 1992. I studied political science at the University of Amsterdam. After graduation I worked for the United Nations and NGOs in Sri Lanka as well as in the Netherlands. Since August 2015, I have been working for EWI in Brussels. Therefore, my engagement with Iraq is both professional and personal given my background. 
 
BNR: Mosul has fallen, ISIS is more or less defeated. Iraq may have won the battle but it paid a heavy price for it. What is the situation right now in Iraq? 

KH: ISIS is partly defeated from a military aspect in significant areas of Mosul (province). ISIS still controls parts of Mosul province, it also has sleeper cells inside the city. In addition, it still controls areas in the West and North of Iraq. As it has been weakened in Mosul, ISIS has moved fighters to other parts of Iraq. ISIS is not only a brutal enemy, but is also a formidable, smart and violent group—its ideological appeal is still very strong. You are right that Iraqis paid a very heavy price for the liberation of Mosul but this was an inevitable sacrifice. The destruction in Mosul is perplexing, particularly in the right side of the city where most of the heavy fighting occurred. Therefore the reconstitution and humanitarian needs are enormous. Tens of billions of dollars will be needed for reconstruction and safe return of internally displaced people. The Iraqi government cannot fundthe required reconstruction, it simply doesn't have that money.   
 
BNR: Do you mean money is needed only for the reconstruction of Mosul province or also for other areas? 

KH: Indeed. I have focused only on Mosul province but we shouldn't forget that there is also a need for reconstruction in parts of western Iraq that was liberated from ISIS in 2016. The issue of recovery and reconstruction is a complicated one. On the one hand the Iraqi government with the support of the U.S. and other countries is engaged in an inevitable tough battle against ISIS. In addition to a lack of money, the Iraqi government still doesn't have a detailed and clear vision or policy with regard to the return of refugees and how to provide hope to the innocent people that they will be reintegrated into society as equal citizens (and hence will not be marginalized again).
 
BNR: You say Iraq needs billions to reconstruct liberated areas. Some say Iraq perhaps needs 90 billion USD for reconstruction. Furthermore Iraq is considered one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Also the Kurds want to hold an independence referendum on Sept 25. Taken together this is a very complicated cocktail, isn't it? 

KH: Not only a complicated cocktail, but also an explosive cocktail for now and the future. Indeed Iraq will need tens of billions of dollars for reconstruction. At the moment the Iraqi government doesn't have the money due to corruption within the post-Saddam political order and low oil prices. Furthermore, we can argue that there is an Iraqi government but not an Iraqi state—many Shiite militias that played a crucial role in the battle against ISIS are not under the control of the government. Yet there is also a single reason for hope and optimism: the government, international partners and the general population are very well aware that probably this is the last opportunity to save Iraq. 
 
BNR: You were one of top 25 experts that advised U.S. administration on Iraq. In your view how the international community can help Iraq now? 

KH: The international community can do a lot to help Iraq. But I have to stress that reconstruction and reconciliation is first and foremost is the responsibility of Iraqi leaders; and the international community can definitely help the Iraqis. First, Iraq should be and remain a top priority for the international community, not only at present owing to the war against ISIS, but also in the coming years and decades. This is a dilemma—there are many problems in the world that need attention and the support of the international community. My fear is that after the military defeat of ISIS, the attention of the world will turn to other problems. That is why it remains crucial that both the international community and media continue to focus  on Iraq, so that it remains a priority for policy makers and global public opinion.     
 
BNR: You mean there is a need to develop now a long term plan to support Iraq, But what would be your advise for the international community?

KH: My advice is as follows. First, organize an international donor conference to be led by the UN, the European Union or the US for the reconstruction and reconciliation of post-ISIS Iraq. Major Iraqi groups, and both international and regional powers should take part at such a conference. Donors can pledge financial and capacity building support in return for assurances of good governance, combating corruption and respect of human rights and democracy—in other words conditional support. Special focus and support should be given to the nascent civil society. Second, the intentional community should utilize public diplomacy and communicate directly to Iraqi society to inform them about its support and make sure that the wider population will hold Iraqi leaders accountable with respect to the transparent utilization of all provided funds.  
 
BNR: Talking about conditional support, I have to bring in Afghanistan to our discussion. After the partial withdrawal of the international community in Afghanistan, "thieves" are again ruling the country. How can international community impose its conditions on Iraqi leaders? 

KH: This is possible—it worked also in other parts of the world. Iraq badly needs support and only Iraqis will shape the future of their country. But they cannot achieve this on their own. I would like to refer to the decision of President Obama to withdraw U.S. troops in 2011. This premature withdrawal and lack of U.S. pressure on then Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Maliki, strengthened Al-Maliki's sectarian and authoritarian policies which in turn strengthened ISIS. Hence the role of international community is essential in helping Iraqis to rebuild their countries and make sure funds are well spent. 

BNR: Would you advise to hold elections as soon as possible?  

KH: This is a very difficult question. How can you hold elections in areas which are devastated, and in refugee camps? There are plans to hold elections in April 2018. But perhaps it would be better first to mediate between Iraqis to agree on badly needed political and economic reforms and then hold elections. 
 
BNR: So where does the legitimacy of the current government come from? Who is the Iraqi interlocutor of the international community? 

KH: The international community deals with the Prime Minister Al-Abadi. But there are also other players such as the Shiite militias and Iran. To conclude, despite all these problems Iraq is not a lost cause as yet. Iraqis are sick and tired of terrorism, violence and the corruption of the ruling elites. Iraqi civil society is very active in its struggle for a better Iraq. There are many hopeful stories of Iraqi civil society that strive for human rights, women's rights and combating corruption but unfortunately they don't get the attention of the international media. Simply, Iraq is much more beyond reporting solely about ISIS and corruption of ruling elites.   
 
BNR: Where do you pin your hope on? 

KH: I pin my hope on the resilience of Iraqi society as evidenced against the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, as well as against the authoritarianism and corruption of post-Saddam elites. 
 
BNR: Thank you. 

KH: My pleasure.

To listen to the full interview (in Dutch), click Part One and Part Two.