Regional Security

The international attention given to Sudan’s normalisation with Israel has shown the country’s importance as a geostrategic site subject to regional rivalries in the Horn of Africa. But increased regional pressure on Sudan is endangering its transition towards an inclusive, civilian government following the peaceful popular revolution that led to the ousting of long-ruling president Omar Al-Bashir on 11 April 2019. This article will describe how regional interference in Sudan could destabilise the transitional process, with a specific focus on the rivalry between the ‘Arab Troika’ and the Qatar-Turkey alliance.

The Sudanese Revolution and Political Shifts

Following the ousting of Bashir in 2019, military and civilian leaders signed a power-sharing agreement which initiated a transition towards a democratic government, under the guidance of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and Chairman of Sudan’s ruling Transitional Military Council, Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. This transition signified a shift in Sudan’s foreign policy.

During Bashir’s 30-year rule, Sudan enjoyed close relationships with Turkey and Qatar. This included a deal between Turkey and Sudan that gave Ankara control over the Suakin Island in the Red Sea, a deal which has since been suspended. However, this did not prevent Bashir from moving closer to the UAE and Saudi Arabia from 2014 onwards, in the hopes of bettering relations with the US and securing financial gains from the Gulf. When the Qatar diplomatic crisis erupted in 2017, Bashir decided to remain neutral, a move that accelerated Sudan’s eventual economic collapse.

Click here to read the full article on the LSE Middle East Centre Blog.

Click here to read an Arabic translation of the article.

Other speakers included EU Ambassador to Iraq, Martin Huth; Netherlands Ambassador to Iraq, Michel Rentenaar; Middle East Institute Non-Resident Scholar, Hafsa Halawa; and MENA Special Advisor at the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, Maria Fantappie, who moderated the discussion.

Click here to watch the full webinar. Hassan’s comments occur during the time interval 35:49-45:42 and begin again at 1:09:01. Click here to read an Arabic translation of Hassan's comments. Read excerpts from his comments, below.

I will talk about one, specific dimension of the EU's Iraq strategy, namely supporting Iraq’s good relations with its neighbors. On January twenty second 2018, almost three years ago, the EU adopted a new Iraq strategy. One of the objectives of this strategy is to support regional dialogue, help Iraq to foster diplomatic engagement with neighboring countries, and encourage Iraq’s neighbors to play a constructive role, to sustain and increase their support to Iraq. Three years on, this strategic objective is more than ever relevant for Iraq and the EU, but it may need to be updated and operationalized to reflect internal, Iraqi and external, regional developments. 

Given systemic corruption and mismanagement, coronavirus pandemic and low oil prices, post-2003 Iraq is on the verge of economic collapse. Without real reforms, Iraq is on the brink of the transition from a fragile state to a failed state. This transformation, should it occur, will be disastrous for Iraq and its neighborhood, and will negatively impact the interests of the EU and its member states as it will undoubtedly unleash waves of migration in the region and towards the EU, will provide ISIS with a new lease of life, and further deteriorate regional security.

In light of these developments, the EU is uniquely well positioned to help Iraq become more independent from external actors especially Iran and the US by developing balanced, win-win political and economic relations with its neighbors. One of the key takeaways of our joint project at EastWest Institute with our partner organization CARPO entitled “Iraq and Its Neighbors,” and supported by EEAS is that across the board in Iraq and the region the EU is considered and perceived as a neutral player without a negative agenda or problematic track record. In the current polarized and fragmented middle east, this neutrality is a unique, strategic asset that assists the EU to pursue its strategic goal of fostering bilateral and regional dialogue focused on the future of Iraq as an independent state. 

In the 1980s during the Iraq Iran war, Saddam Hussein portrayed Iraq as a strategic buffer against Iran, or in Saddam’s terminology Iraq was “Albawaba Alsharqya” or the Eastern Gate [against Iran]. Since 2003, Iraq has become a strategic battleground for proxy and direct conflicts between Iran and the US. History has shown that both regional roles have proved to be disastrous for Iraq and beyond.

Therefore, there is a need for the development of a third way. The EU can help Iraq become a prosperous, positive actor, a meeting, neutral point between and for regional rivals, or what we can call a positive, strategic balancer as opposed to a strategic playground between Iran and the US, and a strategic buffer against Iran.

To translate this analytical concept into a practical policy, the EU can implement a two-prong strategy. Internally, It can engage and encourage key, powerful Iraqi players on official and unofficial levels to achieve a minimum internal consensus that should aim at supporting Iraqi government’s goal of developing balanced relations with neighboring countries in particular Iran and Saudi Arabia. Externally, the EU can engage the key Iraqi neighbors to develop balanced economic and political relations with Iraq, instead of simply seeing Iraq as a market for their products and hence correct the current imbalance trade ties with Iraq, and secondly to stop using Iraq as a theater to settle scores with their rivals.

On November 17, the EastWest Institute (EWI) and Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO) hosted their eighth “Brussels MENA Briefing”—a series of after-work briefings on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region—on the recent election of Joe Biden as U.S. president-elect and the changes his administration could bring to both the United States’ own Middle East policy, as well as its transatlantic relations with the European Union (EU) vis-à-vis the Middle East. 

Speakers included Cameron Munter, former U.S. ambassador and former president of the EastWest Institute, and James Moran, associate senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS). The discussion was moderated by Wael Abdul-Shafi, EWI MENA program associate. 

Biden’s election was received with a huge sigh of relief by the international community, including in Europe. The speakers stated that a Biden administration will likely make efforts to re-establish relations with traditional allies, while rebuilding the damage done under Trump’s “America First” policy. 

As the experts noted, Biden’s strategy in the Middle East will probably be restorative rather than innovative. Preoccupation with national issues, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as an unwillingness by the American public to support strong military interventions in the Middle East, will most probably lead to a decreased role abroad for the U.S. military. Instead, Biden will likely emphasize his support for a multilateral approach to the region, one speaker suggested. It is therefore expected that one of his priorities will be reinstalling the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Although, as pointed to by one speaker, the question of Iran’s willingness to rejoin remains to be seen.  

The speakers mentioned that the most daunting challenge facing Biden’s administration is to reevaluate and determine U.S. foreign policy towards Israel and Turkey. Although the discussants elaborated that while Israel will remain a strong ally of the U.S., Biden will also be willing to deal with the UAE and Bahrain—likely giving more attention to the Palestinian case, for example, by reviving U.S. aid to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Considering Turkey, both speakers foresee the need for a delicate balancing act and close coordination between the EU and the U.S., as Turkey plays an important role in the EU’s migration policy, and the Eastern Mediterranean crises remains unresolved.

During the briefing, Biden was also predicted to take on a tougher stance towards specific Gulf countries, emphasizing a concern for the protection of human rights and democracy. This focus would also affect Egypt, one of the experts explained, where President Sisi could be encouraged to give more space to civil society. One speaker suggested that the U.S. might be able to play an important role in Yemen, where, by working together with the EU within the context of the UN-led peace efforts, it could achieve some sort of breakthrough without upsetting other major players on the international scene, such as Russia. 

Although the Biden administration was received with much optimism in the EU, a word of caution is in order according to one discussant, as a democratic administration will need some time to develop and move ahead with its initiatives. Therefore, it is important for the EU to develop a degree of strategic autonomy. One speaker added that the U.S. will need to adapt to a European continent that has changed. With Britain having left the EU, the U.S. can no longer rely on its traditional ally. Rather, it will need to invest in relations with member states such as France and Germany, who have their own views on the Middle East. 

That being said, the EU will see some familiar faces in the new administration from the Obama presidency. The two speakers concluded on a hopeful note, stating that this offers the possibility of fruitful cooperation in the Middle East in the four years to come. 

About the Brussels MENA Briefings

The Brussels MENA Briefings are in-depth round-table discussions on topics of current significance in the MENA region hosted by EWI and CARPO bimonthly, the first week of every second month. As in-person-briefings are impossible due to COVID-19, EWI and CARPO have temporarily turned this series into a monthly webinar. Please note that attendance is by invitation only.

Should you be interested in being considered for the invitation list, kindly send an email to Desirée Custers mentioning your name, affiliation and geographical or thematic area of interest and expertise in the Middle East.

Dates for upcoming Brussels MENA Briefings:

Tuesday, December 1, 2020: Kuwait

Event Reports from Previous Briefings:

The Economic Dimension of the Conflict in Yemen 

Jordanian Foreign Policy in Light of Regional Geopolitical Shifts

How to Rescue Sudan’s Transition Process?

A New Iraqi Government in Place: Challenges and Opportunities for Iraq in its Neighborhood

The Status Quo of the Libyan Conflict: Is the Berlin Process Obsolete? 

Post-Sultan Qaboos Oman: Transition Opportunities and Challenges

Iran After Parliamentary Elections

On November 10, the EastWest Institute (EWI), together with its partners at the German Chambers of Commerce in Algiers and Casablanca, held a webinar entitled “The Health and Care Industry: Challenges and Opportunities”— the fourth in a series of virtual meetings as part of EWI’s ongoing Algeria-Morocco Business Dialogue. The webinar brought together seven business leaders, three Algerian and four Moroccan, to take part in a cross-border business dialogue aiming to promote greater economic connectivity between the two countries in the healthcare sector. 

The Healthcare Sector

From an outside perspective, the respective healthcare industries in Algeria and Morocco present an attractive investment opportunity. As the two largest populations in the Maghreb region, both countries offer large markets with little competition. According to the latest figures of the Observatory of Economic Complexity (2018), Algeria’s pharmaceutical exports totaled just 6.4 million USD while it imported a whopping 1.77 billion USD. Although nowhere near as stark a difference, Morocco’s trade in pharmaceuticals is similarly heavily imbalanced towards imports with the country importing 662 million USD of products and exporting only 110 million USD. However, despite these vast opportunities for large players in the healthcare industry, the two countries offer completely different experiences in terms of breaking into the market. 

Despite 4.3 billion USD of public spending per year and serving as a unique example of universal healthcare in North Africa, the Algerian system is regularly described as defunct and distinctly lacking in proper medical equipment. A major underlying issue is the numerous bureaucratic, registration and international certification hurdles outside investors must navigate in order to get a foothold in the country. Nevertheless, despite these difficulties, Algeria is growing in relevance for large international private sector players as the government diversifies its economy, which many believe will lead to the inevitable opening of the country to international markets. Morocco, on the other hand, is often described as a much more open and friendly environment to do business, boasting a growing middle class and lower international certification requirements. 

The attractiveness of each country’s respective health care sector has yet to register with governmental officials on either side of the border. Only 1.2 million USD of Morocco’s total pharmaceutical exports made it across the border, accounting for just 0.068 percent of Algeria's total imports in this commodity. Unfortunately, these paltry figures are of little surprise within the context of Algeria-Moroccan trade relations given they echo the same story of missed opportunities across multiple sectors. 

Local Experience and Solutions

Webinar participants came from a variety of businesses across the healthcare sector. From representatives of medical and laboratory equipment manufacturers to pharmaceutical, cosmetic and food supplement producers, the participants represented a wide variety of interests across the entire scope of the industry. Yet, despite their distinct areas of focus, all participants shared frustration at their inability to conduct trade with their counterparts in the neighboring country. However, it was noted that this is certainly not due to a lack of trying. Representatives from businesses on both sides of the border confirmed their willingness to find partners and markets in Algeria and Morocco but testified to their experience of either running into bureaucratic difficulties, facing open discouragement, or in the case of one participant, discounting cross partnership as a viable option.

One of the more structural problems to bilateral trade in this sector is the lack of trust in the capacity and brand of the other country. This has been one of the overarching themes of the entire project to date, with participants across multiple sectors affirming that products from outside the region, such as Europe, are generally more trusted and better received than those originating from the region. The preference for European-made products discourages Algerian or Moroccan businesses from trying to enter the market across the border, since this general attitude among consumers makes it immensely difficult to market products effectively. 

Recommendations 

Made in Maghreb: To address the lack of confidence in locally made products, businesses in the region need to foster an environment where the local market is more forthcoming towards products emanating from the Maghreb. One possible solution could be joint business ventures with the stages of manufacturing taking place on either side of the border. In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, this idea also offers a means to reduce reliance on large supply chains from places like China.

Knowledge Platform: The German-Algerian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (AHK) has already launched an internet platform for Algerian and Tunisian businesses to share information and best practices, but this should be extended to Morocco. This platform would serve as a viable means for business leaders to establish partnerships with their counterparts and identify means to navigate bureaucratic obstacles on either side of the border. 

Joint Risk Management: To date, the COVID-19 pandemic has not ushered a fresh impetus in either capital to cooperate with their respective neighbor in overcoming shared issues; this is despite the fact both countries are two of the worst hit on the African continent. Businesses from multiple industries in both countries have lost markets as a result of the ongoing situation. Nevertheless, the pandemic offers an opportunity for companies to integrate different elements of their crisis management, so they may come out of the other side of future health crises in a healthier and more stable position. 

Training and scientific webinars: Given the economic complementarity between the two countries, knowledge and expertise exchanges offer an immediate and practical means for cooperation. In addition, considering the current lack of interaction between the business communities in Algeria and Morocco, developing education services offers a more viable starting point for the potential development of Maghrebi products in the future. 

Continue the process: Participants to the webinar attested to the importance of holding future meetings and continuing the current process. The lack of opportunities for Algerian and Moroccan business leaders to meet and discuss ideas only highlights the necessity for EWI to continue to establish channels of communication for future trade relations. Developing more sub-sector specific webinars offers a legitimate means to continue and build upon the achievements of the initiative. Regarding the healthcare sector, this could take the form of a series of webinars concerning the pharmaceutical or medical equipment manufacturing industries 

About the Algeria Morocco Business Dialogue

Despite its vast potential, the Maghreb region is often cited as being one of the least economically integrated regions in the world. The Algeria-Morocco Business Dialogue project seeks to bring together Algerian and Moroccan business leaders from multiple business sectors with the aim of overcoming obstacles to bilateral trade between the two neighbors.

The dialogues center on topics vital to successful entrepreneurship in Algeria and Morocco such as food security, agriculture, healthcare, the impact of digitalization and new technologies and energy—with a particular focus on how to attract quality investment, ensure environmental protection and empower businesswomen.

COVID-19 has unfortunately had a detrimental effect on the overall operation and schedule of the project. Each meeting was envisioned as a two-day conference such as the first event on the agricultural industry, which took place as a two-day delegation to Berlin to attend the city’s Green Week—one of the world’s largest international agriculture trade affairs. Nevertheless, EWI has moved the project online in order to maintain the good momentum of the project generated in Berlin. Although this means the discussions between participants are less interactive, they proved no less intensive nor productive as the following policy recommendations attest.

Click here to read a French translation of this event report. 

Click here to read an Arabic translation of this event report.

Links to Reports of Previous Briefings:

Cooperation in the Automobile Industry

Women’s Empowerment and Entrepreneurship: Challenges and Opportunities

The Agricultural and Food Manufacturing Sector

On October 21, the EastWest Institute (EWI), together with its partners at the German Chambers of Commerce in Algiers and Casablanca, held a webinar entitled “The Automobile Industry: Challenges and Opportunities”—the third in a series of virtual meetings as part of EWI’s ongoing Algeria-Morocco Business Dialogue. The webinar brought together six business leaders, three each from Algeria and Morocco, to take part in a cross-border business dialogue aiming to promote greater economic connectivity between the two countries in the automobile sector.

Automobile Industry

In recent years, the governments in both Algiers and Rabat have promised and pushed to establish a more prominent export-focused automobile industry. Under former President Abdulaziz Bouteflika, Algeria sought to found a local car industry in order to reduce imports. So far, these ambitions have largely failed to materialize, with Volkswagen and Kia both shutting down plants recently. Contrastingly, in Morocco, over the past decade the government has successfully signed several free-trade agreements with the U.S. and the EU, helping establish a healthy export-driven auto industry worth 6.19 billion USD. Despite varying successes in the automobile industry, these shared ambitions should precipitate both countries to seek opportunities to collaborate and trade more frequently. However, automotive and transport related trade between the two countries remains small to almost non-existent. 

According to the latest figures from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (2018), Morocco exported only 51,200 USD worth of transport and automotive related goods, including spare parts, to Algeria; less than 0.5 percent of the country’s total exports in this industry. This, almost insignificant, sum is all the more surprising when contrasted with the fact that in the same year, Algeria imported goods worth 5.09 billion USD. These figures are unfortunately consistent with the trade policies of each country towards the other, with both Algiers and Rabat focusing their attention towards the European markets. Nevertheless, the space for complementarity between both countries in the industry remains evident. 

Local Experience and Solutions 

During the webinar, participants shared testimonies of their experiences attempting to conduct trade across the border in the neighboring country, providing some insight as to why the above figures are so low. For instance, one of the Moroccan participants explained that in order to send a shipment to Algeria, the whole process can take up to three months. Upon sending a request, the initial domiciliation period can take up to a month, as funds are frozen before being shipped, which then takes up to an additional two months for their arrival. Other Moroccan participants attested to this, stating that the biggest impediment to trade in Algeria was significant delays in transit. True to the objectives of the project however, the Algerian participants were quick to offer solutions to such problems by suggesting  their Moroccan counterparts should opt to use a pro-forma invoice that enables them to decide how their products are shipped step by step. 

In other testimonies, participants discussed previous experiences in conducting business with counterparts across the border in third countries, such as Tunisia, because of the difficulties in doing business directly. It was stressed, however, that this business practice is far from ideal. The practicality of such a method is only applicable when shipping large quantities, as the transport costs incurred during the transaction are then passed on to the consumer, which in turn makes them less competitive in the respective market. With this in mind, the following recommendations, gathered from industry professionals on the ground in both countries, are intended to address structural obstacles that prevent the automobile industry from fulfilling its potential in the region.

Recommendations

Develop a Regional Brand Strategy: Business leaders should collaborate in jointly formulating a “Maghrebi” or “Arab” brand. Both countries currently focus their attention on European markets, overlooking the potential on their own doorsteps. A long-term strategy and vision is required to overcome this economic tunnel vision, especially given that both local automotive industries specialize in manufacturing spare parts for European automobile giants. 

Leave Politics for Politicians, Continue Economic Cooperation: The political problems between Algiers and Rabat are well documented. Nevertheless, local business leaders should seek and continue to collaborate with one another in order to demonstrate to political leaders in both capitals that there are more benefits to cooperation than in maintaining the current status quo. Participants at the webinar agreed they should work hand-in-hand to develop commercial relations across the border, thereby encouraging politicians to lift the current bureaucratic hurdles preventing greater economic gains. 

Organize Trade Shows: A major part of continuing economic cooperation between both countries could be the organization of more country or trade-specific fairs and exhibitions. Both countries host their own trade fairs, which admittedly have little or no representation from the neighboring country. Addressing this issue would represent a big step in addressing the lack of cooperation between business leaders in both countries and could also take the form of a two-pronged approach whereby the aforementioned brands of each country and the region are built over a period of time to increase the flow of trade between the two countries and outside the region.

Encourage Educational and Training Exchanges: There are multiple means by which the automobile sectors in each country can benefit from training and knowledge exchanges. Webinar participants noted the industrial specialties of each country and how they stand to benefit from collaborating and sharing knowledge. Online webinars are an option to address this issue during the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. Equally, business trips and seminars between similar or complementary organizations offer a more practical solution when the global situation is more conducive to international travel.  

About the Algeria-Morocco Business Dialogue

Despite its vast potential, the Maghreb region is often cited as being one of the least economically integrated regions in the world. The Algeria-Morocco Business Dialogue project seeks to bring together Algerian and Moroccan business leaders from multiple business sectors with the aim of overcoming obstacles to bilateral trade between the two neighbors.

The dialogues center on topics vital to successful entrepreneurship in Algeria and Morocco such as food security, agriculture, healthcare, the impact of digitalization and new technologies and energy—with a particular focus on how to attract quality investment, ensure environmental protection and empower businesswomen.

COVID-19 has unfortunately had a detrimental effect on the overall operation and schedule of the project. Each meeting was envisioned as a two-day conference such as the first event on the agricultural industry, which took place as a two-day delegation to Berlin to attend the city’s Green Week—one of the world’s largest international agriculture trade affairs. Nevertheless, EWI has moved the project online in order to maintain the good momentum of the project generated in Berlin. Although this means the discussions between participants are less interactive, they proved no less intensive nor productive as the following policy recommendations attest.

Click here to read a French translation of this event report. 

Click here to read an Arabic translation of this event report.

Links to Reports of Previous Briefings:

Women’s Empowerment and Entrepreneurship: Challenges and Opportunities

The Agricultural and Food Manufacturing Sector

The seventh edition of the Brussels MENA Briefing, co-hosted by the EastWest Institute (EWI) and the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO), in partnership with the Rethinking Yemen’s Economy initiative, was dedicated to the economic impact of the ongoing conflict in Yemen—a war that started in 2014/15 and has since turned the country into the world’s worst humanitarian crisis according to the UN. 

The Rethinking Yemen’s Economy initiative aims to contribute to peacebuilding and conflict prevention, economic stabilization and sustainable development in Yemen by building consensus in crucial policy areas through engaging and promoting informed Yemeni voices from all backgrounds (the "Development Champions") in public discourse on development, economy and post-conflict reconstruction in Yemen, and by positively influencing local, regional and international development agendas. It is implemented by CARPO, DeepRoot Consulting and the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies and is generously funded by the European Union and the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to Yemen.

The speakers of this briefing were Laila Tawfik Anaam, development champion, co-founder and managing director of the Yemen Loan Guarantee Program at the Social Fund for Development in Yemen, and Rafat al-Akhali, founder and managing director of DeepRoot Consulting. CARPO President Marie-Christine Heinze moderated the session.

When discussing the economic impacts of the war in Yemen, what needs to be emphasized first, the speakers argued, is the plight of the Yemeni population. 80 percent of Yemenis are living in poverty with approximately 70 percent of them lacking access to water, sanitation and health care. This leaves 24.3 out of 29 million Yemenis in need for humanitarian aid. A spike in unemployment further complicates the living conditions, particularly among the youth, where unemployment is estimated at 50 percent.

One of the speakers explained that approximately 40 percent of Yemeni households have lost their primary source of income in both the private and public sectors. It was emphasized that fisheries and agricultural entrepreneurs, in particular, had been hit hard by the devastating effects of the war.

In addition to that, it was outlined that the banking sector has effectively collapsed and that the monetary system has become dysfunctional. Both speakers referred to the severe consequences caused by the split of the Central Bank of Yemen, which has led to conflicting monetary policies. It was highlighted that those government agencies that provided regular income for both public servants, as well as recipients of social welfare have either halted or interrupted their services.

The experts shed light on the grim prospects for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Yemen, which are heavily impacted by closures of and restrictions at sea and airports, as well as land border crossings, which make any form of cross-border trade extremely difficult and cost-intensive. Mobility within Yemen has been reduced massively, it was pointed out, because of the country’s infrastructure—i.e., roads, bridges, tunnels, etc.—being destroyed during the war and because of the high number of checkpoints and lines of conflict that need to be crossed.

Basic needs of companies, such as electricity, pose serious challenges for entrepreneurs, it was explained. They are dependent on private generators, which too often cannot operate due to fuel shortages in the country.

What SMEs in Yemen direly need, according to one speaker, is a legal framework which enables them to operate at sea and airports and border crossings, an overall easing of taxation and the establishment of supporting microfinance institutions with lending capital. It was reiterated that the agricultural sector (fishery, livestock, etc.) should be prioritized in this effort as this would help to address food insecurity.

In general, the war should be seen through the lens of economics, one speaker argued. It is a battle for the “commanding heights” of the country’s economic resources and institutions. It was highlighted that there are currently no real economic incentives for any party to stop the war.

It is important, it was established, that any peace agreement for Yemen entail a clear roadmap for economic stability. The ongoing UN-led peace efforts, it was argued, fall short of addressing the economic drivers of the conflict.

What needs to be put on the agenda, one speaker urged, is the need to re-establish one Central Bank, ensure the resumption of the payment of public sector salaries, define a way to reach an agreement on how to allocate natural resources revenues, and to clearly outline the path towards reconstruction and economic recovery.

While this is a major task, one speaker recalled precedents and blueprints of similar approaches in the past, namely the Dayton Accords and their focus on the Central Bank board and governor in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the Accra Agreement, which entailed a Governance Reform Commission and a Contract and Monopolies Commission; and the case of Angola, where economic power-sharing in the Cabinda Province was part of the conflict settlement strategies.

It was recommended by both speakers that for the European Union to play a role in conflict-resolution in Yemen, these economic factors not only serve as important issues to raise, but as points of departure for European initiatives to support the Yemeni process through diplomacy, aid, investment, capacity-building and efforts for reconstruction and reconciliation.

About the Brussels MENA Briefings

The Brussels MENA Briefings are in-depth round-table discussions on topics of current significance in the MENA region hosted by EWI and CARPO bimonthly, the first week of every second month. As in-person-briefings are impossible due to COVID-19, EWI and CARPO have temporarily turned this series into a monthly webinar. Please note that attendance is by invitation only.

Should you be interested in being considered for the invitation list, kindly send an email to Desirée Custers mentioning your name, affiliation and geographical or thematic area of interest and expertise in the Middle East.

Dates for upcoming Brussels MENA Briefings:

Tuesday, November 3, 2020

Links to Reports of Previous Briefings:

Jordanian Foreign Policy in Light of Regional Geopolitical Shifts 

How to Rescue Sudan’s Transition Process?

A New Iraqi Government in Place: Challenges and Opportunities for Iraq in its Neighborhood

The Status Quo of the Libyan Conflict: Is the Berlin Process Obsolete? 

Post-Sultan Qaboos Oman: Transition Opportunities and Challenges

Iran After Parliamentary Elections

Speakers included Dr. Amer Al Sabaileh, professor at the University of Jordan and well-known security and political analyst, and Dr. Edmund Ratka, designated head of the Amman Office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. The discussion was moderated by Wael Abdul-Shafi, EWI MENA program associate.

After several years of crippling economic challenges, recently exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, Jordan has become more dependent on foreign aid, with the European Union (EU) as one of its most important donors. Meanwhile,  Jordan’s traditional regional alliances are changing dramatically, shifting the political environment’s perception of threat towards both its neighbors as well as international partners. Within this framework, the briefing focussed on Jordan’s role in the region and how this reflects on its relationship with the EU. 

The discussion began with participants emphasizing that Jordan—due to its relative stability, strategic geopolitical position and moderat politics—has often been seen by the international community as a mediary for furthering relations and cooperation in the Middle East. To this end, one speaker aptly asserted that as a small country, Jordan's strategic role lies in “power of policy rather than in policy of power”; thus, Jordan has the potential to become a hub for regional dialogue. The speakers remarked that the EU, as well as individual European countries, have long considered Jordan a key partner in the Middle East. 

One speaker pointed out that because the EU prioritizes Israel’s security and is aware that there cannot be a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without Jordan, it continues to invest in Jordan’s stability. The discussants also emphasized that the EU considers Jordan an important partner, not only when it comes to cooperation on key issues such as the refugee crisis and military operations against ISIS, but also in Amman’s role as a focal point for international organizations working on the Middle East at large. 

However, one speaker observed that as regional alliances are changing, Jordan is presented with a challenging moment in its foreign policy. With a direct connection to the Gulf and Israel, and the growing potential for Iraq to emerge as a hub for regional connectivity and cooperation, Jordan risks exclusion from international efforts, including on the Palestinian issue. Augmenting this point, one speaker raised Jordan’s lack of balanced relations with its direct neighbors, specifically conflict-ridden Syria, as well as Iraq. Another participant noted that in the past several years, Jordan’s relations with Israel have deteriorated. 

In light of these developments, one discussant remarked that Jordan should reshape its foreign policy by redefining its relationship with its direct neighbors, such as Syria, Iraq and Israel, as well as the wider region, including a rapprochement with Gulf countries and renewed relations with Iran. As one speaker elaborated, having a Hashemite King who is neither Shiite nor Sunni can be an asset in developing relations with Iran. 

Concrete examples of cross-border cooperation mentioned during the briefing included Jordan’s assistance in developing regional railways, energy projects and ports. Jordan can also reactivate the Port of Aqaba  to support  Saudi Arabia’s plans to build NEOM, a cross-border city in the Tabuk Province that would combine smart city technologies and tourism. Furthermore, Jordan could also provide aid to its neighbors in coping with the COVID-19 pandemic. As one speaker noted, this would further secure continued EU interest in and financial support of Jordan. 

The discussants emphasized that the EU should not take Jordan’s stability for granted, given the multiplicity of conflicts in Jordan’s immediate neighborhood. The speakers suggested that the EU should engage Jordan as a partner in its regional diplomatic efforts. Furthermore, one speaker pointed to the role the EU could play in deterring and discouraging external actors from pushing Jordan to take sides in ongoing regional conflicts. Jordan truly has the potential to connect the entire region. As the briefing concluded, it is in the strategic interest of the EU to assist Jordan in becoming a “kitchen of solutions for the conflicts of the region.” 

About the Brussels MENA Briefings

The Brussels MENA Briefings are in-depth round-table discussions on topics of current significance in the MENA region hosted by EWI and CARPO bimonthly, the first week of every second month. As in-person-briefings are impossible due to COVID-19, EWI and CARPO have temporarily turned this series into a monthly webinar. Please note that attendance is by invitation only.

Should you be interested in being considered for the invitation list, kindly send an email to Desirée Custers mentioning your name, affiliation and geographical or thematic area of interest and expertise in the Middle East.

Dates for upcoming Brussels MENA Briefings:

Tuesday October 6, 2020: “The Economic Dimensions of the Conflict in Yemen”

Links to Reports of Previous Briefings:

How to Rescue Sudan’s Transition Process?

A New Iraqi Government in Place: Challenges and Opportunities for Iraq in its Neighborhood

The Status Quo of the Libyan Conflict: Is the Berlin Process Obsolete? 

Post-Sultan Qaboos Oman: Transition Opportunities and Challenges

Iran After Parliamentary Elections

The deadly blast that ripped through the Port of Beirut on August 4 provided a tragic reminder of Lebanon’s systemic problems: a deficit of good governance, widespread corruption and a politicized judiciary apathetic to any semblance of accountability. More than a month since the blast, as Amnesty International detailed in a recent statement, it is becoming increasingly clear that the Lebanese authorities “have no intention whatsoever of fulfilling their responsibilities of conducting an effective, transparent and impartial investigation.”

Calls for an international investigation are undoubtedly justified, given Lebanese distrust of state institutions. But from the onset, Lebanon’s President Michel Aoun—an ally of Hezbollah—has rejected any consideration of an international probe, claiming that the aim of an international inquiry would be “to miss the truth.” Aoun’s reason for his refusal is obvious: an international investigation would circumvent a judicial process that he and his allies control, and would risk exposing them to criminal negligence. President Aoun’s party, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), and their allies, have played a central role in the appointment of judges, especially to the Higher Judicial Council (HJC)—a panel of 10 judges meant to ensure the proper functioning of the judiciary. In the investigation into the port blast, the HJC turned down two nominations of independently-minded judges to lead the probe before accepting the nomination of Fadi Sawan, a judge politically aligned with the FPM, Hezbollah, and their allies.

The politicization of Lebanon’s judiciary has repeatedly undermined its objectivity. For cases where political allies are suspect, investigations are perfunctory or non-existent. While the government’s reaction to the explosion is one example, myriad problems impacting the welfare of Lebanese citizens remain unpunished. For instance, subsidized medicine and flour are smuggled into Syria depriving the Lebanese of basic commodities. Exchange offices launder money and prop up a black-market currency exchange that undermines monetary policy. 

The Lebanese government’s reaction to the port explosion mirrored its response to the ongoing economic disaster: shifting blame and finding a scapegoat. A favorite tactic is to weaponize the judiciary by using FPM-connected judges to incriminate legitimate businesses. One example is the politically-motivated prosecution of ZR Energy, a relative newcomer to the local fuel market, which has historically been dominated by a handful of politically connected companies. In what has devolved into a wide-ranging scandal that has implicated the FPM and Hezbollah, ZR Energy was wrongfully investigated and charged in delivering defective fuel in an obvious attempt to distract from the Ministry of Energy and Water’s inability to address Lebanon’s longstanding power blackouts. Notably, the Ministry has long been controlled by the FPM and Hezbollah and has added an estimated 1.2-1.8 billion USD annually to the country’s budget deficit, while delivering little to no electricity. This latest case of scapegoating demonstrates that the judiciary is not only a mechanism used to hand out passes to businesses and officials that run afoul, but also has been weaponized to clear the playing field of business adversaries.

Lebanese leaders are now under international pressure to implement much-needed reforms to bring the country back from the brink of economic and political collapse. French President Emmanuel Macron provided a clear roadmap that, if followed, would unlock much needed aid. On September 8, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned two former ministers for providing “backdoor deals” and relying on Hezbollah for “personal gain and gains for their political allies ahead of the needs of the Lebanese people.” Two Hezbollah connected companies were also sanctioned on September 17. These sanctions send a strong message to the Lebanese ruling elite that they must take politics out of due process and form a government independent of the politicians who have bankrupted the country.

It is becoming clear that similar pressure will be needed to ensure that the Lebanese judiciary is provided with the necessary autonomy to pursue impartial investigations, rather than condemning the political opponents of the FPM and Hezbollah. Lebanon deserves, and the international community must demand, a truly independent investigation into the devastating Beirut port blast. The United States and the broader international community should prioritize bolstering accountability in the next cabinet as Lebanon picks up the pieces and recovers. Judicial accountability must extend not only to potentially negligent port authorities, but also to the political leaders who turned a deaf ear to warnings that tons of ammonium nitrate were being stored steps away from the heart of the city. Only then will the Lebanese people have a chance to rebuild their shattered city, tattered economy and restore their faith in government institutions.

Raymond Karam is the chief program and development officer at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. He previously served as an Associate and the Washington, D.C. representative for the EastWest Institute where he led initiatives with partners in the Middle East on issues of regional security, nonproliferation, economic development and environmental governance.

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EastWest Institute

Click here to listen to the interview on Deutsche Welle (in Arabic). Hassan’s comments begin at 05:16 and end at 34:00.

Read an English summary of Kawa Hassan’s remarks below.

Before heading to Baghdad from Beirut, Macron announced a “new initiative,” in collaboration with the UN, aiming to support and safeguard Iraqi sovereignty. However, little information, if any, is known about this initiative—this makes it very difficult to talk about its details. Macron wanted to visit Iraq in September last year, but was delayed due to the eruption of popular protests in Iraq in October 2019, and the overall political situation in the country. 

The ambitious French president would like to play a more active political, economic and even military role in the Middle East. France’s historic role and interest in Lebanon is clear. His visit to Baghdad comes at a critical and sensitive time for Iraq, and the region in general, as the overall situation in Iraq remains very complex. The cabinet of Al-Kadhimi, Iraq’s Prime Minister, wants to restore state sovereignty and control militias.

The terrorist organization ISIS still poses a threat to Iraq and the region but is no longer as powerful as it was in its heyday [from 2014 to 2018]—ISIS ideology, however, is not dead. France has played, and still plays, an important role within the global coalition against ISIS. It is true that there are external interferences in Iraqi internal affairs and these interferences should end, but what is crucial to remember is that the biggest threat to the sovereignty of the Iraqi state is not ISIS, nor external players, but rather the corruption of the ruling elite and their lack of political will to implement true, not token, reforms. 

Iraq is a battleground for regional conflicts and proxy wars between the U.S. and Iran. Turkey has been attacking PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] bases in Iraqi Kurdistan. The question remains: why has Iraqi sovereignty been violated by external players? The post-2003 ruling class has failed in establishing a strong state that respects the rights and sovereignty of Iraqi citizens and the sovereignty of the state itself due to the fragmentation of the political landscape of Iraqi politics- some powerful political parties possess strong relations with Iran, while others have strong ties to Turkey and other states—all at the expense of the sovereignty of the Iraqi state. 

I think President Macron primarily wanted to send a message to Turkey [and not Iran] when he stressed Iraqi sovereignty. Therefore, we need to place this French focus on the sovereignty of the Iraqi state within the context of the broader regional confrontation with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, Libya and Lebanon. Having said that, the Iraqi government and political parties can benefit from this regional conflict and Macron’s ambition to assist Iraq and decrease external interference. While France can’t support Iraqi sovereignty directly at this time, Iraqi diplomacy can use French political ambitions and assistance to bolster Iraq’s diplomatic position in the security council. 

At the moment, France is not in a position to confront American and Iranian influence in Iraq, but it can continue its important role in the war against ISIS and support economic reforms and reconstruction in ISIS liberated areas. However, this all depends on the willingness of the Iraqi ruling elite (and the Lebanse ruling class in the case of Lebanon) to implement long-overdue structural reforms. No power in the world, including France, can support Iraq if Iraqi leaders do not display a willingness to save Iraq [from systemic corruption they themselves created after 2003]. Currently, such political will is absent. However, the October Uprising of 2019 created a new reality—the Iraqi protest movement, despite being weakened [due to oppression and COVID-19], has become an important player in internal politics and to some extent, in the calculations of external players. Though the Al-Kadhmi cabinet has a plan and is serious in its attempts to implement reforms, intentions alone are not enough. The coming weeks and months will be crucial for Al-Kadhimi to deliver on his reform promises and restore security. 

The Iraqi constitution recognizes the federal status of the Kurdistan Region—in this regard, I don’t see any threat to Iraqi sovereignty. But Baghdad and Erbil have serious disagreements on the distribution of the revenues of natural resources, regional budget and disputed territories. Both sides need to possess political will to solve these problems. It is worth noting that there are [at times] calls for decentralization and even federalism in Southern Iraq. Iraqi leaders should [heed popular calls for redistribution of political and economic powers] through establishment of a state based on real citizenship and respect for the diversity of Iraqi society regardless of religion, sect and ethnicity.

We don’t have enough information as to why Macron didn’t visit the Kurdistan Region; perhaps it was due to time constraints or political reasons. Macron did meet with the President of Kurdistan Region Nechirvan Barzani in Baghdad, however, as there is a history of good relations between France and the Kurdistan Region. But while many Kurds have a romantic view of French support for the Kurdistan region, at the end of the day, sober and strategic interests guide and define France’s Kurdish policy, not emotions. France supports a stable, federal Kurdistan Region within a united and stable Iraq.