Regional Security

Participants in the first panel, titled: “A Regional Cooperation to Address the Threat of ISIS” underlined the joint opposition of all stakeholders towards ISIS’ spread and its brutality. Participants pointed that the vacuum of authority, governance, and leadership in both Syria and Iraq—as different as the situation in these two countries may be—allowed ISIS to establish its hold in the territory spanning the border between the two countries. The alienation and subsequent marginalization and exclusion of the Iraqi Sunni community, and the failure of regional and international actors to respond appropriately to the crisis in Syria, were identified as having further fueled the group’s rise.

The current airstrikes of the “Global Coalition against ISIL,” while containing the group’s expansion militarily, were seen as at most a short-term approach in the absence of a political process that  addresses the sectarian conflict in Iraq and the lack of  apolitical solution to end the civil war in Syria. Participants acknowledged the possible negative repercussions of a prolonged military campaign that will allow ISIS to mobilize additional forces and recruits and provide the group with a perceived legitimacy resulting from its direct confrontation with the West.

While it seems necessary to contain ISIS on the battlefield, participants emphasized the need to challenge the group on an ideological level, in order to prevent it from abusing religion for its own political and territorial aims. Participants also noted that ISIS’ idea of an Islamic State that provides an alternative to the current state order has proven popular with disenfranchised and marginalized youths in the region. Additionally, ISIS has also succeeded in attracting a growing number of recruits from Western countries—an issue that deserves further studies.

Participants highlighted the importance of exploiting the convergence of interest of all regional actors in defeating ISIS, as well as the necessity of bringing all regional actors to the table to contribute to a political process, including those who have a record of supporting radical movements. For that, it is essential to understand the individual security interests of the neighboring states involved and try to find common ground. 

Participants specifically addressed the role of Turkey, noting that the reluctance of Ankara to fight ISIS militarily stems from the understandable fear of further endangering Turkey and creating more enemies in the region. ISIS has already declared Istanbul as a target for attack. A lack of defined political objectives within the coalition, especially for a solution for Syrian conflict,is also keeping Turkey on the sidelines. Furthermore, the role of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the fight against ISIS is alarming to Turkey, as it sees it acquiring weapons and expertise that the group could possibly use against the Turkish state.

The second panel, “Iran’s Foreign Policy and its Role in the Middle East,” reflected on the interests and goals that drive Iran’s policies in Iraq and Syria. The discussion emphasized that Iran is increasingly a rational actor with clear interests and objectives, regionally and internationally. ISIS presents a new challenge for Tehran, which threatens the territorial integrity of its ally in Baghdad and of the region as a whole.

Participants discussed Iran’s role in contributing to the current situation by having supported former Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki without pressuring him into adopting a more inclusive approach to governance. There was consensus that Tehran has now, however, taking a constructive role in supporting the new government of Haydar Al-Abadi, which is making strides in overcoming the sectarian divide. This influence that Iran exerts over Baghdad emphasizes the need to engage Iran in any joint regional political process aimed at countering ISIS. Participants highlighted Iran’s pragmatic current foreign policy, one that is not limited to groups or states with a particular religious belief.

Participants underlined that for Iran, the history of armed conflict with Iraq has made Iraq’s stability a foreign policy and a national security consideration of highest priority. Tehran also places a great importance on the holy Shia cites in the Iraqi cities of Najaf and Karbala and wants to ensure a secure environment that will allow Iranian pilgrims to freely visit.  

Participants accredited Iran’s efforts in denouncing violence and extremism by sponsoring the "World Against Violence and Violent Extremism” (WAVE) resolution in the UN General Assembly and hosting the WAVE Conference in Tehran in December 2014.

The discussion showcased the necessity of engaging Iran on a regional and international level. The influence Iran holds in Iraq and Syria, as well as the common interest of Iran, the United States, the EU and the Gulf States in wanting to defeat ISIS provides ample common ground for better regional cooperation.

Participants acknowledged that a permanent and satisfactory agreement, limiting Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon, would allow for better cooperation between western countries, Arab states, and Iran to fight extremism and resolve other regional conflicts.

The third panel, “Europe, The EU, And Countering Violent Extremism: Internal and External Challenges,” involved representatives of various EU organs, and dealt with the current EU approach vis-à-vis the rise of ISIS, the cooperation with states in the region and the two-way flow of ISIS fighters.  

Participants acknowledged the unique threat that ISIS presents for the EU as it is the first instance a terrorist organization is in control of a substantial amount of territory in the vicinity of the European Union. Recent estimates show that 3,000 foreign fighters have traveled from Europe to join ISIS forces.

Participants highlighted the fact that European Union anti-terrorism efforts have been extended significantly both internally and externally. Increased measures have been put into effect, such as early identification of potential extremist individuals and the prevention of their travel. As the Internet is used as a major recruiting tool by ISIS aiming at European youths, EU coordination with Internet companies has increased, and more efforts are being made to detect suspicious travel to Syria and Iraq.

Participants urged that efforts by the EU must not come at the expense of human rights and civil liberties and that those measures should be coordinated with the countries of the region, in the form of intelligence sharing and through Intergovernmental Organizations like Interpol.

Participants acknowledged that Europe and the international community have to shoulder part of the blame for the rise of violent extremism, referring to inaction towards the crisis in Syria and the actions, and the unresolved nature of the Israel-Palestine conflict, which all contribute to the rise of extremism in the region.  The European Union and the international community must support a regional dialogue involving local communities with the aim to counter ISIS. 

The fourth session, “Security and Governance in a Fragile Environment: Lessons from Iraq 2003–2014,” pinpointed the failures that have been caused by domestic mismanagement and bad governance, and by the unhelpful role a number of regional and international actors played in Iraq since 2003.

Participants acknowledged that the time after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 brought with it an erosion of the Iraqi national identity and an exacerbation of sectarianism domestic tensions, triggering a process of re-tribalization and drastic weakening of a national identity. The subsequent Iraqi governments have failed to unite Iraqis and instead “clung to sect-centered elitism,” leading to great polarization and disenfranchisement, especially within the Iraqi Sunni population. Several factors led to the rise of ISIS: the lack of authority of the Iraqi central government in certain areas beyond the borders of Baghdad, especially in Sunni majority provinces; the amount of corruption in the Iraqi central governments machinery, coupled with the security vacuum left by the hasty withdrawal of US troops; and the general failure of the state.

Participants analyzed the role of the Iraqi central government under former Prime Minister Maliki, pointing out the fact that Maliki centralized power and weakened Iraq’s better working political institutions, politicized the armed forces for his own goals, and he subsequently ostracized opponents and local communities beyond Baghdad. These failures in governance, and not necessarily Sunni Iraqi’s affinity to the religious and ideological message of ISIS, led many to view the rise of ISIS as a rebellion against a government in Baghdad that they consider to be illegitimate.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Local and National

1. Encourage inclusive governance and Sunni outreach in Iraq. A domestic political process in Iraq that addresses legitimate grievances of the Iraqi Sunni population, Kurds, and other Iraqi minorities is imperative to fight the root causes of the rise of extremist groups such as ISIS.
2. Support reconciliation measurements in both Iraq and Syria.  With the enablement of the international community and regional actors, local reconciliation processes must be fostered, with the aim of finding a way forward for various parties to the conflict and crafting a unified agenda to countering extremist threats by groups like ISIS. The international community in that regard can provide logistics and know-how while leaving the local actors to take ownership of the process. (Regarding the need for political strategy for Syria see also section “International” below.)

Regional

1. Foster an inclusive regional dialogue to address the threat of extremism. There needs to be an inclusive regional dialogue, including an inter-Arab and Arab-Iranian-Turkish dialogue to address the threat of extremist groups in the region. These talks should address broader geopolitical challenges in the region that are fuelling extremist ideology and ways for reducing tensions. Such a process would be most successful with international legitimacy and consensus, especially from the United States, the Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council and the European Union.
2. Challenge ISIS on the battlefield on ideas. The military campaign against ISIS must be complemented by challenging the group on an ideological level, in order to refute the ISIS philosophy, the violence it has perpetrated and halt its recruitment. Regional, especially Muslim, allies need to coordinate a global response to this ideology on university campuses, mosques, media outlets, the Internet, prisons, social media, and refugee camps.
3. Explore the potential of cross-border Sunni dialogue. Regional Sunni partners in Jordan and the Gulf states should undertake outreach to the Sunni tribes in western Iraq in an effort to re-engineer a program similar to the Sons of Iraq program. Baghdad’s Sunni outreach can only be done effectively in cooperation with regional partners, particularly Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The United States and the international community should carefully weigh the risks and opportunities of providing military and non-military support to select tribes if they prove willing to counter ISIS.
4. Increase intelligence sharing between regional and international actors. Although the United States has a wide range of networked relationships with key Middle East intelligence services, such as with Jordan, Turkey and Saudi-Arabia, the scope and speed of ISIS’s rise came as a surprise. Effective counterterrorism efforts throughout the Middle East require a target-oriented exchange of intelligence that goes beyond these established networks.

International

1. Address humanitarian crises in the region.  The Syrian civil war has sparked one the greatest population exoduses in modern history, with more than 3 million Syrians fleeing to neighbouring countries. Inside Syria, some 6.5 million people are estimated to be displaced. The rise of ISIS has brought additional misery to minority groups in both Syria and Iraq. A coherent strategy must address how to protect minorities, alleviate the suffering of refugees, and help stabilize the countries most affected by their influx.
2. Enable reliable and capable regional partners to take the fight directly to ISIS. The United States is providing the greatest support for forces fighting ISIS. NATO and other U.S. allies should together develop a strategy to help the region counter ISIS with technical support and military assistance. This should include specific commitments to provide support to the Iraqi government, Kurdish forces and third-way opposition alternatives to the Assad regime and ISIS in Syria. At the same time, lessons learnt in the past must be taken into account in order not to “nourish false friends”.
3. Rebuild the regional and international foundations to mediate a solution to the Syrian conflict. Although peace talks in Geneva failed in early 2014, conditions should be set for a political transition in Syria. The international community should work to reinvigorate a regional contact group on the Syrian conflict to start building a foundation for new peace talks.
4. Engage the United Nations Security Council to drain the financing sources of ISIS. The UNSC should establish a Sanctions Committee against ISIS, such as the one existent to implement sanctions against Al-Qaida and individuals affiliated with it and formerly against the Taliban. UNSC financial sanctions should be put in place against individuals and organizations providing or allowing direct support to ISIS.
5. Enhance law enforcement and intelligence fusion efforts to identify and counter ISIS and other terrorist fighters holding Western passports. This should build on existing U.S.-European efforts in coordination with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). More than 12,000 foreign fighters are estimated to have flocked to Iraq and Syria; the dangers of extremists coming home to continue the fight with acts of terrorism cannot be ignored. Western countries should partner with allies in the Middle East and local communities on counter-radicalization efforts.
6. Engage local communities in counter-radicalization efforts. Local communities have an important role to play in counter-extremist and de-radicalization strategies in the West. Efforts should be made that counter-terrorism strategies do not further alienate and marginalize the already vulnerable elements of society who are often targets of recruitment by extremist groups.

The EastWest Institute convened the fifth Abu Dhabi Process Meeting, “Afghanistan Reconnected: Businesses Take Action to Unlock Trade in the Region,” in Istanbul on November 26-27, 2014. The Abu Dhabi Process is a series of high-level consultations that address regional economic security issues in Afghanistan post-2014.  

EWI’s Istanbul consultation was held in cooperation with The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB). Over 40 high-level representatives of private sector and Chambers of Commerce and Industries, CEOs of transport and logistic companies and Members of Parliament from the region and beyond were jointly welcomed by TOBB’s President, M. Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu and EWI’s Vice President Martin Fleischer.

The aim of this meeting was to assess trade and transit challenges, as well as opportunities in the trans-Afghan transit and trade corridors, and to agree on a list of policy actionsrequired to unlock regional trade. The conference also assessed regulatory frameworks for investment, and highlighted potential economic gains for the region in the Afghan economy. 

Click here to read the full report. 

Among other discussions, the panel "reiterated the need for progress on the political front, highlighting the political-economic-security nexus amid a backdrop where Afghanistan, and the whole region, can benefit from strategic cooperation rather than competition." The event took place at the United Nations Headquarters.

To read the report, click here. 

The EastWest Institute’s Brussels Center hosted a roundtable discussion “Managing Conflict in Europe and its Neighborhood: Lessons Learnt and Future Prospects” on September 25, 2014. Selected policy makers, academic experts and NGO-representatives reflected on previous cases of conflict management in Europe, specifically the Balkans, with a focus on the ongoing crisis in Eastern Ukraine.

The first panel, “Ethnic and National Conflict in Europe: the Case of the Western Balkans,”,was chaired by Jonas Jonsson, Head of Division for Western Balkans, European External Action Service. The panelists focused on how ethnic and national tensions have been fueled over the years, what the status quo is today, and which conflict management tools have been used – or have remained unused - in the region and by the European Union.

The power of nationalism was a key aspect of the discussion. Because nationalism and populism continue to have the potential to lead to violent extremism, the need for working up joint approaches to historical accuracy on an educational and youth level was emphasized. While guns are silent and will hopefully remain silent in the western Balkans, there is no genuine peace and reconciliation between ethnic and national groups, which prevents movement beyond the conflict management phase.

The panelists also discussed the role the European Union plays in managing conflict through its Enlargement Policy and the prospect of European Union membership for several Balkan candidate countries.  As one participant put it, “The EU dangles the carrot of membership in front of accession candidates in the Balkans, and if they behave, they can become a member.” The obstacles placed by individual European member states were also mentioned; the absence of a common European position, on issues such as the independence of Kosovo, contributes to a merely managed status quo, without prospects for an ultimate conclusion. The Kosovo issue remains central to tensions in the Balkans, considered by Serbia as an integral part of its territory, and considered by Albanians as part of a the “greater Albania.”  Asking either side to relinquish the claim on Kosovo is synonymous to asking them to give up a part of their identity. Attendees emphasized that a successful integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union is also a matter of credibility; unless the EU can achieve a sustainable peace in the Western Balkans, the EU will hardly be successful in any other processes of stabilization in its neighborhood.

The second panel, “Prospects for Managing and Overcoming the Ukraine Crisis,” was chaired by Georgi Pirinski, Member of the European Parliament, Former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria. The panel addressed three major aspects of the crisis in and around Ukraine and the prospects for eventually managing the conflict: the internal Ukrainian problems, the complex Ukraine-Russia relationship and the strategic dimension relating to Russia’s concerns towards an extension of the European Union and NATO.

The common perception that there are ‘two’ Ukraines divided by different loyalties towards Europe/”the West” and Russia/”the East”, respectively, was challenged. It was noted that only two provinces in Ukraine actually rebelled against Kiev, and it was argued that they could not have done so without significant external support. Different scenarios addressed how the situation with the two regions of Luhansk and Donezk could evolve, including: a federalization model;, a neutralization of Ukraine according to a Finland/Austria model; and a frozen conflict scenario as is the case with Georgia and the breakaway provinces of South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, and with Moldova and Transnistria. While the latter scenario was discussed the most intensively, there were different views on whether Russia bears an interest in a frozen conflict scenario; the lack of clear borders to Donezk and Luhansk as opposed to Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia was also mentioned. .

The role of the European Union was discussed at length, with a specific focus on the European Eastern Partnership initiative. While the Eastern Partnership initiative has provided much needed assistance to Ukraine in many areas, such as trade relations, tariffs, and economic strategy, it has failed to address existing “hard-core” security issues of concern to Ukraine, and was consequently unprepared to deal with the unfolding security situation in the wake of the current crisis. The first step to building a stable state with a functioning economy is to ensure the security and territorial integrity of that state by securing a functioning police force, army, and independent intelligence service. Consequently, it was recommended to introduce a security and defense dimension to the Eastern Partnership framework.

The panel noted that the European Commission, represented by the newly established Support Group for Ukraine, is committed to assist Ukraine in implementing much needed reforms domestically; however, the Support Group will only be effective if the Ukrainian leadership makes a positive choice towards harmonization and integration, and sets up a credible strategy towards that aim instead of using the fighting in the east as an excuse to stall the reform process.

With regards to the Ukraine-Russia dimension, the heated debate illustrated how there is a complete lack of trust and confidence between the involved actors. The Russian strategy, in its western neighborhood and specifically with regards to Ukraine, was subject to different analyses. Russia sees the association agreement between the European Union and Ukraine as a threat to its existing trade relationship with Ukraine; the opposing argument is that Ukraine can have a free trade zone with both Russia and the European Union, as is the case with Serbia, without diminishing the existing Russian-Ukrainian trade relationship.

The session concluded with the prevalent view that, although the crisis in Ukraine is not yet at the conflict management stage, no time should be lost in preparing for reconciliation and trust- building efforts on all possible channels through constant dialogue and contact with all involved parties.

In the concluding session, the conference chairman Ambassador Martin Fleischer, EWI’s Vice President and Director of Regional Security, elaborated a number of conclusions and “lessons learnt”:

1. Building trust is often perceived as a challenge of post-conflict, peace-building; however, trust is also a main pre-condition for managing a conflict. Trust-building must be done through complementary channels. While these obviously include governments, international and regional organizations and civil society, too little use is made of parliamentary channels.
2. Extreme nationalism, fueled by its typically one-sided interpretations of history, remains a challenge for every peace settlement. But there are encouraging examples of joint initiatives by historians and also on an educational level to overcome national-centric and ethnocentric standpoints and work towards long-term reconciliation.
3. National governments continue to bear the major responsibility. They must actively take matters of reconciliation and trust-building into their own hands and not be allowed to rely on civil society and outside actors such as the European Union. 
4. Within the European Union, differing national interests of member states still impede a genuine common foreign and security policy and jeopardize the efficiency of the EU’s strongest instrument for conflict-settlement, i.e. its neighborhood policy and the membership perspective. The case of Cyprus exemplifies failure in this regard.
5. The Eastern Partnership initiative has thus far failed to address the defense and security needs of the Eastern Partnership states. Strengthening the defense and security dimension in the Eastern Partnership initiative would give the European Union added leverage in its goal to support the institutional development of target states.
6. In spite of these shortcomings, the EU must and can play a more result-oriented role in conflict management and conflict prevention.

•  For insurmountable border issues in the Balkans, there is no alternative to step-by-step integration into a unified Europe in which borders lose their importance.
• The case of Ukraine is different, as EU-membership is no immediate perspective, and westernization is probably no cure-all. History teaches us that lasting conflict solutions must respect the interests and at least be honorable and “face-saving” to all major stakeholders