Strategic Trust-Building

Moderated by EWI’s Jacqueline Miller and Andreas Persbo, Executive Director of VERTIC, the seminar featured presentations by experts Jenifer Mackby and Edward Ifft on technical advancements that have direct bearing on the CTBT’s robust and multifaceted verification regime.

The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on September 10, 1996. The Treaty has yet to enter into force. 157 countries have ratified the treaty. Another 25 countries have signed but not yet ratified the treaty—including the United States. President Bill Clinton presented the treaty to the Senate for ratification in 1999—and the Senate handed Clinton a stinging defeat when the treaty only received 48 of the 67 votes needed.

Opponents of the treaty cited concerns over the effectiveness of the CTBT’s verification regime—and, they argue, those concerns remain valid today. Proponents of the treaty point to successful real-world tests of the verification regime with North Korea’s nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, as well as the March 2011 tsunami in Japan, where data were provided to help the Japanese government issue early tsunami warnings. CTBT monitoring stations also tracked the release of noble gases and radioactive isotopes from the Fukushima nuclear plant. Proponents of CTBT ratification add that verification regime is ahead of schedule and functioning at a higher level than anticipated.

Jenifer Mackby, an Adjunct Fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, spoke first. Mackby has extensive experience in the area of nuclear disarmament and the CTBT in particular, having served as secretary of both the negotiations of the CTBT at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva as well as the Verification Working Group of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission in Vienna. Dr. Edward Ifft, who spoke after Mackby, is an Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service. He has been involved in negotiating and implementing many of the key arms control agreements over the past 40 years, including both the first and second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the first (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) START.

Mackby found the verification mechanisms of the treaty as more than adequate for detecting illicit nuclear tests, noting that “most experts agree the treaty will prevent countries from developing advanced nuclear weapons or improving existing ones, thus impeding a nuclear arms race, curbing nuclear proliferation, and strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty.” Mackby specifically discussed the three main components of the CTBT—the International Monitoring System, the International Data Center, and the On-Site Inspection System. She also singled out some key features in what she considers to be the most far reaching verification regime of any agreement to date. These features include its state-led implementation strategy, zero-yield test threshold ban, and its ability to detect both above- and below-surface detonations. In addition, Mackby noted that current verification capabilities are much greater than when the CTBT was originally signed in 1996, allowing for a much more flexible, nuanced, and focused method of data analysis—or what she termed “precision-detection techniques.”

Ifft discussed the On-Site Inspection System (OSI) under the CTBT and its capabilities and drawbacks. The OSI is a vital part of the verification regime; in some cases it may be the only way to verify an ambiguous event. The CTBT’s OSI is much more intrusive than any other regime, with inspection teams possessing a wide array of techniques at their disposal. Ifft noted that “when the treaty enters into force, OSI will be a powerful force to use for verification.” Despite these positive developments, Ifft cautioned that certain techniques can be used to try to evade detection, namely de-coupling explosions, hiding tests in chemical explosions, and extremely small yield explosions. Despite these potential pitfalls, Ifft maintained, would-be testers would not have a high-degree of certainty that they could avoid detection—something that could serve as a powerful deterrent.

Both Mackby and Ifft concluded that technical advances have strengthened the detection capabilities of the CTBT’s intrusive verification regime. Although it is not yet in force, the treaty has contributed to halting vertical nuclear proliferation and the CTBTO has successfully detected nuclear explosions and monitored the relatively low-level accidental release of radioactive material at Fukushima. But North Korea’s 2009 nuclear rest highlighted the problem for all states when the CTBT is not in force. Since radionuclides were not detected, an OSI could have provided better insight into the scope of the North Korean test.

Mackby added that a number of countries are looking to the United States to ratify the treaty before they do so—China most prominently. President Obama has insisted that that he intends to present the CTBT to the Senate once again for ratification—without specifying the timing. Given the fact that this is an election year and any such attempt would spark new partisan debates, it’s unlikely to be anytime soon.

In your new book, Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War, what are the “Washington rules,” and how do the components you call the American credo and the sacred trinity play into them?

The “Washington Rules” are the hidden-in-plain-sight habits that constitute the essential elements of U.S. national security policy: "defense" forces designed not for defense but as instruments of global power projection; a vast network of bases to maintain a global military presence; the marriage of forces and presence to support a penchant for global interventionism. The "American credo" provides an ideological justification for this "sacred trinity" of practice.

You point to the trend of high-ranking U.S. policy officials mobilizing support from the citizenry for military endeavors abroad through scare tactics such as alluding to an inflated existential threat. You also argue that the U.S. government keeps the public cushioned from the human and fiscal costs of war. In your opinion, what actions can the U.S. public take to reverse these trends and become more involved in foreign policy and defense spending?

Americans universally claim to "support the troops." Alas, that's mostly talk. We need to demonstrate meaningful support for the troops by paying closer attention to how they are actually used. If we value the troops, we should wish to keep them from harm and to protect them from being abused.

Recent U.S. military initiatives have been primarily focused on combating networks of violent extremism. Can extremist ideology and resentment toward the United States be defeated militarily? If not, what other avenues do you advocate for countering these networks?

The American military's MO over the past decade has gone from liberation to pacification to assassination. I'm all for killing bad guys when there is no alternative. The problem with targeted assassination as a policy is that it amounts to war divorced from politics rather than war as a continuation of politics. The animus directed against the United States and the West that comes out of the Islamic world has a historical and political basis. If our "war" in (against?) the Greater Middle East is ever to end, we've got to take seriously the political grievances that sustain the violence directed against us.

In Washington Rules, you suggest limiting the U.S. military footprint, specifically in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, because as you state: “Priority [for base closure] should be given to those regions where the American presence costs the most while accomplishing the least.” What do you think of the argument that the presence pays dividends in stability as several states in the Middle East and North Africa undergo violence and political change?

I don't mean to be rude, but it's bulls–t. If we survey the ever-intensifying levels of U.S. military activism in the Greater Middle East since the promulgation of the Carter Doctrine, the record is quite clear: Our actions promote instability, not the reverse.

Is there a specific point or message concerning U.S. defense policy, or defense policy in general, you want your readership to take away from your other new book The Short American Century?

The new book is a collection of essays in which distinguished scholars reflect on what the American Century was all about—a matter that falls within the purview of historians, since the American Century has ended. The views expressed vary greatly—that was my intent. As to what readers might take away from the book, I can only speak for myself.

I believe that the record of the American Century ought to teach us humility. Those who inhabit (or who seek) positions of power in Washington peddle the notion that history has a purpose and a destination and that Americans are called upon to guide—or, if need be, coerce—humanity toward that destination. It's all nonsense. In reality, if history has a purpose, we humans are incapable of divining it. The best we can do is to try to cope with whatever surprise lurks just around the corner.

The Affordable World Security Conference is designed to weigh competing priorities for future security policy. What do you think receives too little attention?

What receives too little attention is the imperative of putting our own house in order—economically, politically, culturally, and morally.

What emerging security issue—economic stability, environmental sustainability, cybersecurity, etc.—do you think poses the greatest challenge to the current world security structure?

Damage to the environment that stems from the universalization of American-style consumer culture.

Moderated by EWI’s Andrew Nagorski, the conversation provided the audience a window into some of the previously unknown details of the Obama administration’s diplomatic outreach to Iran. With access to over 70 high-ranking officials from the U.S., Iran, Europe, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Brazil—including the top American and Iranian negotiators—Parsi explored the real reasons for the collapse of diplomatic efforts between the United States and Iran.

During his talk, Parsi laid out the series of events that unfolded in the first two years of the Obama presidency, starting with Obama’s offer, 12 minutes into his presidency, of the hand of American friendship to those willing to unclench their fist. However, the legacy of bitter distrust between Iran and the United States, and the skepticism of others that a deal could be negotiated, eroded any initial optimism.  As Parsi put it: “Many wished Obama well but few wished him success.”

Parsi pointed out that serious talks were delayed until after the 2009 Iranian presidential election. Then, when the widespread allegations of fraud triggered mass protests, it became increasingly difficult for Washington and Tehran to focus on the nuclear issue on its own terms.  For various reasons—including the continued technical progression of Iran’s enrichment capabilities and the hardening of attitudes towards Iran in the West—any deal needed to work right away. As a senior State Department official told Parsi, “Our Iran diplomacy was a gamble on a single roll of the dice.”

That roll of the dice came in the form of what was meant to be a confidence building measure, a nuclear fuel swap where Iran would ship out 1200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium (LEU) in return for fuel rods. The fuel rods were for its Tehran Research Reactor, which produces medical isotopes for Iran’s cancer patients.  The West and Iran could not come to terms, but then Brazil and Turkey stepped in to broker a deal they thought would be acceptable to both sides. By then, however, the facts on the ground had changed.  Iran had almost doubled its LEU since talks first began, and the U.S. had won international backing for strong sanctions. As Parsi explained, the Obama administration had opted for sanctions instead of a political deal because it believed diplomacy had failed.

Parsi argued that diplomacy was never pursued as far as it should have been, and unreasonably optimistic early expectations may have contributed to the failure of this effort. ”Negotiations such as these succeed not because the proposals are flawless or because both sides play fair, but because the many flaws associated with the talks are overcome by the political will to reach a solution,” he said.

With tensions and harsh rhetoric escalating on both sides amid increasing speculation about a possible Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, Parsi warned that sanctions could backfire. One result could be that Tehran would walk away from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since all of the current information the West knows about Iran’s nuclear program comes from IAEA inspections and reports, he added, this would create an even more dangerous situation where Washington and others would  be left guessing about what is really happening on the ground—and, in all likelihood, assuming the worst.

Click here to visit Trita Parsi's web site.

Firestein maintained that the U.S. welcomes China's rise, just as China welcomes the U.S.'s role as a contributor to peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, saying "I think those basic statements articulated in the joint statement between presidents Obama and Hu a year ago accurately capture the ways the two countries have viewed each other and the possiblities for cooperation."

The cover story, written by Ding Ying, reviews Xi Jinping's U.S. visit in the context of the U.S.-China relationship.

Click here to read the full article at Beijing Review.

Xi Jinping met with U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta on this trip. What can we expect for military-to-military relations between the two countries if Xi indeed takes the helm in China?

The military-to-military relationship between the United States and China has been one of the most vulnerable areas of the bilateral relationship and has often been disrupted over issues such as U.S. arms sales to Taiwan or clashes off China’s exclusive economic zone. Currently vice chairman of the CPC’s Central Military Commission (CMC)—China’s top military policy decision-making body—Xi Jinping is expected to assume the chairmanship of the commission after taking over from Hu Jintao as general secretary of the CPC. In that context, the meeting with Panetta, like other meetings in Washington, had the forward-looking purpose of setting the tone of future military-to-military relations between the two countries amid China’s political transition.

Both Xi and Panetta said all the right things, including calling for further exchanges between the two militaries and identifying specific areas of cooperation. At the same time, both alluded to growing challenges to U.S.-China military relations. China has concerns about the U.S. strategic shift to Asia and the strengthening of its security and military alliances in the region. The United States has concerns about China’s military buildup and cyber attacks allegedly originating from China.

Tensions over issues such as U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and U.S. military activities off China’s coast will persist. Also worth noting is the fact that as CMC chairman, Xi will be a civilian overseeing a commission of senior military officers, on whom he will have to rely heavily for the handling of defense and military policy matters. It is expected that the CMC itself will have seven of its current 10 military members replaced in the upcoming leadership transition. These add some uncertainty over the direction of Chinese military policy under the new generation of military leaders. At least in the near term, those leaders may turn to a more assertive military policy in an effort to consolidate their power and show strength.

What if anything is truly new from this visit? Has policy moved, or was it mostly a publicity show and get-to-know-you session?

This visit has not yielded anything truly new on the policy front, as can be expected from a visit by a leader-in-waiting who would find it in his best interests to toe the party line while his succession to his country’s top posts isn’t yet guaranteed.

Some objectives of the visit were: to promote economic cooperation between the two countries in order to help them address their respective domestic economic challenges; for Xi and his U.S. hosts to garner insights into their counterparts and their policy thinking; and to ensure continuity during China’s political transition and an important election year in the United States in one of the world’s most important bilateral relationships.

The red-carpet treatment accorded by the United States—a rarity for a visiting vice president—and the concerted efforts by the Chinese government to play down divisions between the two countries over Syria just before Xi’s visit show the importance that both countries ascribe to this visit.

What are the most acute challenges that Xi Jinping will face as the new president of China?

His most pressing challenges will lie in leading his country and his party to manage the gamut of domestic economic and social challenges, primarily through the implementation of China’s 12th Five-Year Plan. On the economic front, efforts include restructuring the economy—away from a reliance on exports and toward higher domestic consumption—to ensure sustained economic growth and development, and addressing other concerns such as inflation and bubbles in the housing and asset markets. Social challenges include bridging the rising income gap, especially between the rural and urban areas, building social safety nets, protecting migrant workers, and controlling the increasingly numerous incidents of unrest across the country.

On foreign policy, Xi will have to manage China’s desire for a more active global role, the responsibilities that come along with that role, and China’s need to assure the rest of the world—especially its neighbors—of its commitment to “peaceful development.”

Piin-Fen Kok is Senior Associate for the China Program at the EastWest Institute.

China-US relations may dominate news coverage this week as the country's presumptive next leader - Xi Jinping - visits the United States. The two countries have conflicting interests and ideologies in currency valuation, military developments in East Asia, and how to deal with the violence in Syria. In an election year, US politicians from both parties can be expected to heighten criticism of China. But as discussions begin between US President Barack Obama and Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping, there are important areas of agreement between the two countries

Differences are real, as should be expected between two large countries with large economies, separated by large differences in development and history. The notion of simple competition between a powerful United States and a rising China, however, does not withstand scrutiny in view of the broad and important areas of agreement and common interest. In an era of global trade and increasingly pervasive digital connectivity, peoples and economies are not so easy to divide along geographic lines.

Three areas of agreement - Iran, clean energy, and cybersecurity - might not get much attention during Xi Jinping’s US tour and the coming political season, but they reveal a change of mindset needed to maintain peaceful ties across the Pacific.

Read the full article at Al Jazeera English.

Image credit: Creative Commons photo via nznationalparty.

After the lows of the U.S.-Russia relationship during the George W. Bush administration, no one thought that Barack Obama’s “reset” policy towards Russia would be easy. But does it have to be this hard?

The reset has been under fire in both Russia and the United States. On the Hill, many Republicans are eager to target a policy that has been such a central tenet of Obama’s foreign policy and to express their lingering mistrust and even outright hostility toward Russia. Russian critics have also pounded the reset, which is closely identified with President Dmitri Medvedev. Especially among Vladimir Putin’s circle, mistrust of the United States runs deep—and Putin himself has been a vocal opponent of his protégé’s policy. The main criticism is that Russia has given up too much and received too little in return, which ironically mirrors a common refrain in Washington: that Russia has given too little and the U.S. too much. In other words, many on both sides continue to view each other in zero-sum Cold War terms. 

While acknowledging that the reset was never meant to be a panacea, the Obama administration rightly points to its accomplishments—notably, the New START treaty, the Northern Distribution Network for resupplying efforts in Afghanistan, and Russian entry into the World Trade Organization.  These have (or should in the case of WTO accession if Congress normalizes the trade relationship with Russia) resulted in concrete gains for both countries. But Iran, missile defense, human rights concerns, Putin’s decision to return to the presidency, the December parliamentary elections in Russia and ensuing widespread protests, and now Syria are important conflict points in the relationship—ones that challenge the optimism of even the most ardent reset supporters.

All of which has led to a ratcheting up of fiery rhetoric. High-ranking U.S. officials publicly used words like “disgusting” and “a travesty” to describe Russia’s Syria veto. During the height of the Middle East uprisings last year,  Senator John McCain used Twitter to convey taunts like “Dear Vlad, The #ArabSpring is coming to a neighborhood near you,” and Putin responded in kind, calling McCain “nuts” and referencing McCain’s lengthy term as a prisoner of war. 

Even before Russia’s recent veto of the U.N. Security Council resolution on Syria, ties had become increasingly fraught between Russia and the United States. A few recent examples: 

• Missile defense has been the thorniest issue in the relationship. Russia insists that NATO’s U.S.-led European missile defense system could eventually be targeted against Russian missiles. Washington has repeatedly offered assurances that the system is not directed against Russia and suggests data exchanges but refuses to provide the written guarantee that Russia is asking for—even though Medvedev knows full well that such a guarantee would never survive congressional scrutiny. In another bit of ironic symmetry, at least one U.S. lawmaker asked Obama to provide written assurances that the United States would not share data with Russia. In response, Medvedev threatened again to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad and even to withdraw from New START. The difficult missile defense talks had collapsed, he said.  
• Secretary of State Hillary Clinton criticized the conduct of the December 2011 Duma elections, which were widely seen as tainted by irregularities at best and rigged at worst. When Russians took to the streets in protest, Putin accused Clinton of sending a signal to protestors and decried the “foreign money” that he claimed was being used to stir up trouble.
• Washington’s new ambassador in Russia, Michael McFaul, was greeted by charges in the pro-government media that he had been sent to foment an Orange Revolution (and/or Arab Spring) in Russia. Shortly after he arrived, his meeting with opposition figures triggered even more criticism. 

The challenges continue to stack up. On Feb. 7 the Russian police announced that they were prepared to prosecute lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, who died at the age of 37 in pre-trial detention on trumped-up tax charges. Never before has Russia undertaken a posthumous prosecution. American critics point to the Magnitsky case as clear evidence of the Russian government’s disregard for human rights and the rule of law. Russian critics point to the U.S. focus on Magnitsky, and especially the legislation introduced in the U.S. Senate and House about the case, as another unacceptable example of American efforts to interfere in Russian domestic politics.

The biggest new challenge for the reset is managing the fallout of Russia’s veto of the U.N. Security Council resolution on Syria. Russia is standing nearly alone in its support for Bashar al Assad. China also vetoed the resolution but has faced far less criticism. The probable reason: There are no striking photos of Chinese officials meeting with Assad as civilians continue to be killed in Homs, whereas Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov took a very public, well-documented, in-your-face trip to Damascus. Russia seems convinced it needs Assad in power to advance what it sees as its strategic and economic interests in the region  

If Assad manages to cling to power, the U.S.-Russia relationship will continue to suffer. Both Putin and Obama may be forced to decide if the practical gains of the reset outweigh this very big, very public falling out over Syria. If Assad is overthrown soon—especially before the U.S. presidential election—the damage to the reset is more likely to be manageable. But in that case Russia will be even more bitter about losing Assad and thus Syria given its lingering resentment about the toppling and execution of Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi. 

All of these tensions are playing out against the backdrop of an election year in both Russia and the United States. That Vladimir Putin will win the presidency of Russia again is not in doubt. What is in doubt—and surprisingly so—is whether Putin will retain enough credibility to effectively govern. For now, he is resorting to the familiar tactic of blaming Washington for his troubles. By so doing, he hopes to discredit many of the protesters and appeal to nationalist sentiments. That means he’s unlikely to ease up on his anti-American rhetoric anytime soon. 

Can the reset survive the next Putin presidency? What is clear is that Presidents Obama and Putin will not enjoy the same kind of relationship the Medvedev and Obama did. And if Obama loses the November presidential election, his victorious Republican successor—whoever that turns out to be—will be coming off a campaign filled with tough talk about Russia. 

But the reset was never set up to resolve all differences, only to work on improving the U.S.-Russia relationship in the areas where their interests overlap. While Putin and Obama will never end up as best buddies, both are practical politicians. And practical considerations are likely to push them in the direction of salvaging the reset. Any new Republican president would be likely to begin the process of abandoning some of his harshest campaign rhetoric once he is faced with the practical task of governing. That is, unless some surprising development, most likely a dramatic new twist in Russia’s domestic political drama, throws all rational calculations out the window. So it seems safe to say it’s too early to write off the reset…sort of. 

Jacqueline McLaren Miller is a Senior Associate in the EastWest Institute's Strategic Trust-Building Initiative, where she runs the U.S. and WMD programs.

This statement places in perspective the reasons behind the deterioration of relations between the US and Pakistan.

Underlying Bin Laden’s death is a raft of more serious questions. One is the report that the government commission constituted to uncover the facts about the May 2 incident has recommended the institution of a case of treason against Dr Afridi by the government.

Yet the UN Security Council, vide resolution 1390 of 2002, defined Bin Laden as a proscribed person who was not to be allowed within the territory of any member state. His detection within Pakistan could therefore lead to serious repercussions that could isolate the country further.

In October 2008, Gen Petraeus said that “There is no question … that Osama bin Laden is in the tribal areas of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan”. Therefore, Pakistani officials’ repeated denials — that they had not known of his whereabouts — is considered by US officials as disingenuous at best.

To revive the credibility of the Pakistani interlocutors it has become necessary to use regular institutions such as the Foreign Office and parliament to define the country’s foreign and security policies. The current de-institutionalised approach to the formulation of policy is harmful.

One can speculate that many of the events that have since transpired between Pakistan and the US, including the tragic episode of Salala and the upheaval caused by ‘memogate’, are part of this sad interaction between the two countries’ national security goals and the dynamics of interpersonal relationships: the breach of trust between the military leaders of the two sides plays a major role in the existing tussle. It has isolated Pakistan in terms of the Afghan peace process.

It is possible to conclude, therefore, that it was the breakdown in inter-institutional communications that was responsible for the Salala attack. The Pakistan military believes that excessive and disproportionate force was used and the attack lasted till the last soldier was killed, despite GHQ’s communication with Isaf.

It may be thus fair to presume that behind the worsening US-Pakistani bilateral relations is the differing negotiating style of the representatives of the two countries.

This difference arises out of the different cultural backgrounds of the two nations, the asymmetry of the US-Pakistan relationship and Pakistan’s assumption that the US will leave it to pick up the pieces after its own strategic purpose is fulfilled.

A recent review regarding the negotiating style of the two nations, Howard and Terresta Schaffer’s How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States, throws light on this complex world where national, cultural and realpolitik concerns coincide.

Some of their important findings regarding the stance of Pakistani military officers in this matter are: Pakistanis insist that they will not be dictated to by India or the US, yet at the same time demand top-of-the line US military equipment; US civilian negotiators know nothing of military matters; Pakistanis begin negotiations, blame the army’s problems on the US and make their American counterparts feel guilty about Pakistan’s difficulties.

The authors: “When [Pakistani] military officers are leading the government, they also play hardball, insisting that unless all their demands are met disaster of one sort or another will follow.” US officials observed that the ISI routinely deceived them, and this led the CIA to develop independent links with the Afghan insurgents. Furthermore, “US negotiators should expect that inconvenient truths will be kept from them”, according to the researchers.

It is thus clear that the asymmetric relationship, differing styles of negotiation and divergent strategic goals in Afghanistan has caused the US-Pakistan alliance to become dysfunctional. It would be correct to conclude that most of the divergence comes from different outcomes expected in Afghanistan after 2014.

Pakistan would like to have in place an Afghan government that is soft towards Pakistan, is Pakhtun-dominated and keeps India marginalised. The US, on the other hand, would want an effective Afghan government that rules the country well and has a strong counterterrorism capacity. The US is not committed to bringing in a Pakhtun-dominated government or one that is pro-Pakistan.

Thus, besides the strategic divergence that exists between the US and Pakistan, there is also now a severe trust deficit in terms of statement by Pakistan, particularly after the discovery of Bin Laden and the denial of our alleged role in other occurrences inside Afghanistan. That this relationship is unravelling at this critical juncture as far as Afghanistan is concerned is unfortunate.

Although the Pakistani security narrative does not perhaps agree with this view — neither did I, till some time ago — the metrics in Afghanistan don’t look too bad from the US perspective.

The surge approved by President Obama in 2009 and the night operations against the Taliban ordered by Gen McChrystal and Gen Petraeus have successfully eliminated many of the Taliban mid-level commanders and have forced the top Taliban leadership to accept negotiations in Qatar.

However, as the last chapter of the Afghan war unfolds with the spring offensive in the eastern districts alongside Fata, it will cause Pakistan more headaches. It could result in cross-border incursions by Isaf. Ending hostilities is often more difficult than starting a war. This is yet another reason to resolve the crisis between the two nations.

Khalid Aziz is the chairman of the Regional Institute of Policy Research and Training (RIPORT), based in Peshawar, Pakistan.

In a speech on U.S. foreign policy in October 2011, Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney outlined an aggressive agenda for American leadership in the world. “In an American century, America has the strongest economy and the strongest military in the world. If you do not want America to be the strongest nation on Earth, I am not your president. You have that president today.” Like Mitt Romney, many pundits lament the diminishing influence of the United States in the world. In international politics, influence is linked directly to power, the sum of components such as the threat of force, economic magnitude, cultural vibrancy and effective diplomacy. In the case of the United States, however, influence in international politics is especially dependent on military operations.

Neither trade nor traditional diplomacy explains U.S. influence over foreign governments. China is the second-biggest trading partner of the United States, yet its influence over China is relatively small. The United States entertains its biggest diplomatic mission in Iraq, more than sixteen thousand strong, yet it fails to influence Prime Minister Maliki’s sectarian politics. That leaves only the military to act as both stick and carrot. U.S influence is strongest in countries that actively need military support—and Washington will increasingly have trouble gaining leverage in countries with little or no need of U.S. military assistance. A prosperous Western-style democracy facing no direct threats and not interested in joining interventions “in search of monsters to destroy” has little use for the superpower’s militarized diplomacy.

Consider the small West European republic of Austria. Bella gerant alii, tu, felix Austria, nube! “Let others wage war, you, fortunate Austria, be content to marry!” goes the fifteenth-century maxim by Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus, who mocked the Austrian Hapsburgs on their path to European ascendancy. Substitute the word “marry” with “invest” in King Corvinus’s statement, and you have Austria’s unofficial foreign-policy doctrine. Almost 72 percent of Austrian trade is with other EU countries. Fifty percent of Austria's foreign direct investment is concentrated in Europe. Austria does not care about much more. The United States is only Austria's sixth-largest trading partner worldwide, and it is outside Austria’s economic interests and strategic calculations. Austria never hosted U.S. bases or joined NATO. With the incentive for military cooperation gone and no fear of U.S. intervention in Austria, how do U.S. policy makers fare in influencing little Austria?

As cables from the U.S. embassy reveal, the United States has little to no influence on Austrian policies. For example, Austria rebuked a proposal to expand participation in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from two to a larger number. The January 2009 cable reads: “On Afghanistan, ISAF's UN mandate has still not overcome Austrian resistance to anything more than a symbolic presence or prevented some politicians from characterizing the fight as an ‘American war.’” Austria refused to accept any former Guantanamo detainees.

Austrians do not hesitate to do business with America’s declared enemies. The Austrian Bank Creditanstalt was involved in financial transactions supporting the Iranian nuclear program and has business ties with North Korea, according to Der Spiegel. The Austrian Raiffeisenbank also entertains transactions with Iran despite numerous protests by the U.S. embassy in Vienna. "In recent years, our leverage over Austrian policy has been extremely limited by the reality that there were very few things Vienna wanted from Washington, "emphasizes the cable. None of this should come as a surprise. With declining military influence and the ongoing economic crisis, the United States increasingly has less to offer the developed world.

The United States fares a little (but not much) better with Austria’s neighbor, Switzerland. According to the former U.S. Ambassador to Switzerland, the country is “a very successful but frequently frustrating alpine democracy”. In 2007, Switzerland ended its four-year cooperation with the ISAF in Afghanistan, recalling its military personnel. Due to Switzerland’s armed neutrality, it never relied heavily on U.S. military assistance during the Cold War and built a formidable citizen army by itself. The result is limited bilateral diplomatic contact. (The exception would be U.S.-Iran policy where Switzerland acts as the U.S. representative in Tehran.) The United States wants more active engagement in counterterrorism activities, particularly on the bank-secrecy laws of the Swiss Federation. But despite the fact that the United States is the largest outside investor in Switzerland and the largest destination for Swiss foreign investment, Swiss officials apparently see little incentive to cooperate.

Two other prospering European democracies, Sweden and Finland, are somewhat different cases, maintaining ties to the U.S. military. Since March 2006, Sweden has led a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) of the ISAF in Afghanistan, with five hundred troops deployed in Mazar-e-Sharif. There are 195 Finnish soldiers who are also part of the Swedish-led PRT. Finnish-U.S. relations have been characterized by both nations as “warm.” Indeed, it was revealed recently that Finland and the United States shared military intelligence during the Cold War. Close military ties persist, and the Finnish Foreign Ministry emphasizes that “U.S.’s commitments to Europe through NATO . . . are of central importance for Europe's stability.”

U.S.-Swedish military relations during the Cold War also were much deeper than previously thought. A researcher at the Swedish National Defence College concluded that the “U.S. saw Sweden as the guardian of the Western world in northern Europe.” The United States subsidized the Swedish military-aircraft industry, including the Saab 37 Viggen, with a strong Swedish air force seen as a deterrent to Soviet aggression. Sweden also participated in the NATO-led mission in Libya, and the Swedish defense industry still enjoys close ties with its American counterparts.

As a result of stronger military ties, Finnish and Swedish policies have been more accommodating to U.S. demands than the Swiss and especially the Austrian hands-off approach. There is virtually no reason for a small Western democracy to deploy troops to Afghanistan unless it desires better relations with the United States.

Has militarized diplomacy become the norm in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy? Such an approach distorts assessments of U.S. influence and obscures the national interest. Short of historic military ties, there is now little the United States can do to influence small Western democracies at the heart of Europe. As military budgets decline, Washington may find itself more isolated than it might have imagined. Threats toward Iran and North Korea are the waning echoes of America’s post-9/11 buildup. Mitt Romney’s “American Century” may be a century too late.

Franz-Stefan Gady is an associate at the EastWest Institute.