Strategic Trust-Building

Not a man of many words, Kayani who had partnered with Mullen in papering over frequent tensions in the US-Pakistan relationship over the past four years must have been severely jolted. If nothing else the Pakistani COAS must be deeply embarrassed by this “unkindest cut of all”, Et tu, Mullen? Such trust deficit among the military heads of the two countries is counter-productive and will be difficult to overcome in the future.

The “Afghan leaders” propped up in Kabul by the US must now be really apprehensive about the US exiting Afghanistan. Soviet puppet Najibullah hanging publicly from an electric pole is not something people forget easily. No wonder Burhanuddin Rabbani, the peacemaker, was assassinated; some people have a vested interest in keeping the conflict going. The overwhelming public perception is that failing to meet its stated goals in Afghanistan, the US is passing the buck onto Pakistan, the ISI being a most convenient scapegoat for all perceived ills in the world even at the best of times. The US diatribe has further aroused public feeling against the US in the drawing rooms and streets of the country, even the most diehard friends of the US are aghast at the allegations made by responsible US officials.

The Haqqani faction of the Afghan Taliban is mostly concentrated in the Paktia and Paktika and later Khost. These fiercest of Afghan fighters are from the Zadran tribe. The Haqqanis only crossed the porous border into the adjacent Pakistani territory after the Soviet invasion; from here they operated against the Soviets with active help from both the CIA and the ISI. Where are the coalition forces bases that should have been formed in this area to “do more” in combating the Haqqanis? While targeting the safe havens of the Haqqanis on our territory, can we risk that the Waziris, who mostly inhabitant North Waziristan become collateral damage? Mostly rural guerrillas, Haqqanis seldom operate in the Afghan towns and cities since their very distinct facial features make them recognisable.

While all intelligence agencies maintain some links with the opposition, there is a vast difference between having contact and actively aiding and abetting terrorism. If it were the Haqqanis who attacked the US embassy in Kabul, they could have only homed onto their targets with active insider help within the city from the many guerrilla factions that have melted into the city’s population.

The Pakistan Army is most reluctant to open up a front against these fierce fighters without “casus belli”. Almost 200,000 of our combat troops are very heavily engaged in Swat, South Waziristan and other Fata agencies, some units have been out in the field for over two years. Pakistan’s available helicopter fleet can hardly support the ongoing operations; moreover our ammunition reserves have been seriously depleted. Going into Haqqani-infested areas will have a blowback that will make our present terrorist-ridden situation seem like a walk in the park, to do so would be illogical bordering on insanity. Time, space and logistics (and public sentiment) are against us at the moment.

Our civilian and military sacrifices compare at a ratio of almost 10:1 to all Afghan civilian and coalition forces put together. The Afghan National Army (ANA) casualties number only a few hundred against our thousands, the less said about them the better. One incongruous thought, why the sudden concentrated diplomatic and media offensive by the US? Is it an amazing coincidence that every time the PPP coalition is in danger of a meltdown, the army and the ISI are put on the block by the US to relieve the existential threat to this inept and corrupt government?

Notwithstanding the rhetoric from the US about attacking Haqqani safe havens in North Waziristan, and Pakistan giving “a suitable reply”, both are nonsense. US “boots on the ground” in Pakistani territory is not a viable option, and not for political reasons alone. The US gameplan is to exit Afghanistan according to an enhanced schedule with the minimum casualties; this will only mean more body bags.

While one can expect escalation of drone attacks, and possibly even cruise missiles and limited air incursions, will the US risk a fire fight with the Haqqanis that could involve the Pakistan Army, and US coffins flying into Dover Air Force Base? One can expect an escalation in the war of words but not direct conflict. On our part, nobody in his right mind would counsel confrontation with the US, that is not an option. One would be stupid to go that route.

The US Congress would do this country the greatest favour if it passes the Bill to cut off aid to Pakistan, this government can than declare freedom! First, we should re-affirm our commitment to continue fighting the war on terror, but on our own terms. Second, we must pull out as many troops as we can from Fata and mobilise the tribal militias as in the past. Third, we must not take any further aid of any kind, economic or military, saddled with conditions. Fourth, we must charge transit fees (and the wear and tear to our infra-structure) at internationally acceptable rates for all goods passing through Pakistani territory.

These fees should be paid at points of entry, and fifth, we must clearly define the parameters of future collaboration with the US in the war on terror, this should include intelligence sharing, drone strikes, overflights, etc. This should spare the US administration from their present discomfort of giving us aid subject to all sorts of intervention by uninformed members of Congress playing to the conservative gallery which believes in bombing all problems into oblivion, and damn the consequences.

What exacerbates the US-Pakistan relationship is that no defined “terms of engagement” exist. This grey area allows each country to push its own agenda with motivated interest, this serves to create festering problems. While we lurch from crisis to crisis the underlying threat of crossing a fail-safe line will not only be detrimental for the US and Pakistan but will have long-term effects on future peace and stability on all the countries of this region. We must define clearly the “terms of engagement” for the future; “out of the box” thinking must remove the rough edges that mar the relationship between us. A well-defined “terms of endearment” will provide for a genuinely productive and meaningful relationship in the future.

Click here to read Sehgal's piece in The News

According to the host organization’s report of the meeting at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Mullen went on to suggest that it would be in the American national interest to resume contact with Tehran at either a political, diplomatic, or military-to-military level.

On 14 September, as reported by the Pentagon, Mullen said that Iran is attempting to develop nuclear weapons and wants regional hegemony in the Middle East; and the lack of contact between the United States and Iran could be dangerous to the region and the international community.

One could see these views more or less as a statement of the obvious – the United States needs to be talking to countries that give it concern. However, given the negative political sentiment in the United States toward Iran and given the rigid policy position of the U.S. government, then Mullen’s statements seem to indicate a division of some sort in the Obama Administration about the wisdom of continuing to isolate Iran diplomatically.  Another possible meaning of the remarks, though less likely, is that Mullen is just expressing U.S. frustration that as far it is concerned, Iran has not conducted itself properly to allow re-establishment of contact; and that it is Iran’s behavior that leads to the lack of contact.

Assuming the former interpretation (and not the latter) is correct, Mullen’s views open up the obvious question of what is it that the United States has to do or can do to start meaningful bilateral conversations on both nuclear issues and regional security issues.

Any restoration of formal relations seems highly unlikely in the next 2-3 years. The United States has, at least in a practical sense, made that conditional on a number of significant policy reversals by Tehran. In U.S. policy, Iran is more or less where it was when George Bush gave his “axis of evil” speech in 2002.  That said, the route of informal diplomatic “contacts” would be relatively easy if Iran and the United States were both willing.

Yet Mullen’s mention of military and political contacts in contrast to diplomatic efforts suggests a complete roadblock on one side or both to unofficial diplomatic contact. Military contacts would seem even more difficult. It is almost impossible to imagine that the State Department would agree to the idea that military officers would conduct any part of the diplomacy with Iran while diplomatic relations are so strained.

Moreover, at least as far as the public record is concerned, there does not seem to be much of a foundation for military to military contacts. So what about “political contacts”? In the run up to a Presidential election in the United States in 2012, this would seem at first glance to be extremely high risk.

Then there is the problem of who in Iran to talk to. The level of the contact would need to be finely set, and at a fairly middle level, to minimize political risk. Any prediction of what might come from Mullen’s statements would be foolhardy. Yet the ground-breaking significance of his comments as a very direct and unusually public opening to talk with Iranian leaders cannot be discounted.

Click here to read Austin's piece in New Europe

It seems therefore, if we are to credit Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey’s foreign minister, with the diplomatic talent so often ascribed to him, that there are now ambitions in play beyond the current game -- that is, outside the frame of the bilateral relationship. Turkey is now playing for a different Israel. This is not good news for Netanyahu.

Israel’s diplomatic environment may be at its most turbulent and uncertain for almost thirty years, even worse than during the two wars in Iraq in 1991 and 2003. The United States President has gone public on his insistence that Israel return to 1967 borders (with some land swaps), the United Nations General Assembly may recognize Palestine as a non-member state, and the Arab spring is playing itself out with profound effects in Syria, Egypt, Jordan and the Arabian peninsula. Turkey, which has powerful military forces, is downgrading its relations with Israel and challenging the legality of its blockade of Gaza. Disputes over Israel’s maritime resource boundaries have re-emerged in recent months. This all comes at a time of a persistent protest movement inside Israel against economic and social conditions, a movement inspired in part by the Arab spring. Terrorist attacks inside Israel continue and its government reports a reconstitution by Hamas of its military capabilities. Netanyahu’s promotion of his ambition for Israel to be recognized as a Jewish state as part of peace settlements runs against the demographic trends inside Israel, which will see the Arab share  of the population rise from its current 20 per cent to 25 per cent several decades hence.  However, it also offends the moral sensibility of Israel’s neighbors. 

What does Turkey want? It wants nothing more than a normalization of its regional environment. Since the uprising and associated violence in Syria, that ambition seems shattered and stability seems to have disappeared. Turkey has had a rather public spat with Iran over how to respond to events in Syria, even as Erdogan announced plans for a visit to Egypt this week. There is talk of a new security agreement of some sort between the two countries, and Turkey has been campaigning in support of the UN General Assembly resolution to recognize Palestine as a state.

In short, Turkey has laid down the gauntlet. It seems that Turkey refuses to return to the status quo where Israel was conducting its Palestine policy with no significant interference from Turkey. Turkey at government level is now threatening to take on the role of spoiler against Israel. The moral and legal challenge that the government of Turkey has now taken to the international stage against Israel is unambiguously a sharp turn in policy. It was a decision not taken lightly, yet Turkish citizens were killed in a manner that made any other policy path for Erdogan impossible.

Only time will tell, but we may come to remember the Erdogan/Davutoglu gambit to Israel in September 2011 as a major departure point for a new reckoning in regional affairs. We will probably have to wait for Netanyahu to leave office before that new reckoning can begin to take shape. 

Click here to read Austin's piece in New Europe

“We need to give the world human security,” said Kazakhstan’s Ambassador to the UN Byganym Aitimova, who delivered the opening remarks. Kazakhstan, which destroyed its cache of Soviet-era nuclear weapons, has been a leader in global disarmament

While largely positive in tone, the speakers said that vast progress still needs to be made to implement the 64 concrete disarmament measures detailed in the May 2010 Nonproliferation-Treaty Review Conference’s final document.

Libran Cabactulan, the Philippines’ Ambassador to the UN and Chair of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, recommended that countries strike nuclear weapons from their defense doctrines and create a convention that makes nuclear weapons illegal. More immediately, Cabactulan said that it is “essential” to hold the Middle East Conference on a nuclear-free zone in 2012 as planned, even though a facilitator has not been chosen. He explained that the conference “may not result in an agreement on a WMD Free Zone outright, but it could be the first step to one.”

Several speakers called for a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons testing, including the UN’s High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Sergio Duarte. “A test ban is part of a larger process of delegitimizing nuclear weapons,” he declared.

Annika Thunborg, spokesperson for the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), called for the ratification of the CTBT. She said that  if any of the nine outstanding states, especially those that are nuclear-armed, were to lead the way and adopt the treaty, the "logjam" on on the CTBT would be broken.  

CTBT ratification is a priority of the Obama administration, according to U.S. State Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Marcie Ries.

Ries, who delivered the workshop’s most upbeat remarks, called last December’s Senate ratification of the New START a “bright spot” in U.S.-Russian relations, saying that U.S. and Russian weapons inspectors have conducted a total of 15 reciprocal site visits since April. Ries also signaled U.S. enthusiasm for future talks among the P5 and for further multilateral talks to prepare for the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

“We hope that all countries will join in the common effort to increase transparency and build confidence,” said Ries. “Confidence-building at its very core is, of course, a shared effort.”

Global Security Institute President Jonathan Granoff reframed the nuclear weapons debates in terms of human rights. “Nuclear weapons are unworthy of civilization,” he said. “We have to get rid of them.”

A lively discussion followed, with participants speaking about everything from technical measures to chip away at standing nuclear weapons stockpiles to the damage done to Kazakhstan -- and other countries -- by nuclear-weapons testing.

“We need to build political support for eliminating nuclear weapons in countries that, unlike Kazakhstan, have forgotten what nuclear weapons can do,” said EWI Vice President Greg Austin, who moderated the workshop. “We need to take this discussion out of the UN and back into the public sphere.”

Click below to read speakers' remarks:

Ambassador Byrganym Atimova, Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations

Sergio Duarte, the UN’s High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

Marcie Ries, U.S. State Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

H.E. Mr. Libran N. Cabactulan, President of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations

Dr. Annika Thunborg, Spokesperson and Chief of Public Information of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)

Jonathan Granoff, President Global Security Institute

The approach toward Iran from India is very different from that of the United States. In March 2011, India’s National Security Adviser, Shivshankar Menon, visited Tehran for discussion with his counterpart, Saeed Jalili, who is the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Menon also met with President Ahmadinejad, the Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, and Speaker of the Majlis, Ali Larijani. In June 2011, the Deputy Secretary of Iran's SNSC, Ali Baqeri, visited India “to attend the joint strategic committee of the two countries”, according to Iran’s Press TV.  In July 2011, India’s then Foreign Secretary, Nirupama Rao, visited Tehran for the ninth round of formal ministry level bilateral consultations. Topics included terrorism, energy security, the North-South Transport Corridor, developments in Afghanistan and regional security. The two countries have a joint intergovernmental commission that had its 16th meeting in 2010, when six new agreements on a range of cooperative measures were signed.

Not everything is plain sailing of course. To secure its nuclear agreement with the United States, India had to experience humiliating pressure from Washington, including Congress, on how to conduct relations with Iran. The news this week is that unpaid Indian debts on oil imports from Iran will soon be paid in full, following reports several weeks ago that only two-thirds of the debt would be paid. In recent years, India has been Iran’s second or third biggest oil market (the position varies according to source). This is not surprising given India’s growth, its proximity to Iran, and the fact that Iran is the fourth-largest crude oil exporter in the world.

By contrast, the United States bans all trade with and investment in Iran.  In June 2011, India’s representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri, made an appeal that is in direct and active conflict with the United States’ position. He said: “All efforts should be made to ensure that legitimate trade and economic activities of Iran and other countries do not suffer while implementing the measures sanctioned by the relevant [UN] resolutions.” (These UN sanctions are limited, in broad terms, to the nuclear-related and missile-related entities and activities of Iran, as well as certain military exports to Iran.)

Military ties between Iran and India have been bothering Washington as well. The parameters of this concern are well laid out by Harsh Pant and include direct military to military dialogue and information exchange. Of special interest though are reports from elsewhere, including U.S.-based Symantec and Russian company Kaspersky Lab, that the Stuxnet worm, understood by many analysts to have been designed in the United States or Israel to attack Iran, had by January 2011 infected many more systems in India than in Iran. Regardless of who invented Stuxnet, India and Iran clearly now have common cause in military strategic defence against cyber weapons – and the US or one of its allies may be on the other side.

This past week, an Iranian-flagged ship of the Iran India Shipping line, held by Somali pirates for 5 months, was rescued by the Indian navy, an ordeal and an outcome demonstrating that certain basic daily realities of security bring Iran and India together. Piracy is of course a lower level of concern than the vital strategic interests that India and Iran share in Pakistan and Afghanistan. India and Iran are good neighbors toward each other, even if India does observe the UN sanctions.  

The contrast between the Indian and American views of Iran could not be more stark. If Pant is right, then the United States needs help to end its “obsessive” behavior toward Iran. Should the United States look to pull back from its position on broad-ranging trade and investment sanctions against Iran? Obsession may not be compatible with effective diplomacy.

To read Austin's piece online, click here and scroll to pg. 5 of New Europe

By every rhetorical indication, the “reset” of U.S.-Russia relations is in trouble again. In fact, many observers in both Russia and the United States are proclaiming, sometimes jubilantly, that the reset is doomed. But such a judgment is decidedly premature. The reset survives—and, despite profound disagreements, the two sides could still find it in their interests to work together on a broad range of issues and temper their rhetoric, trying to keep emotions in check going into an election year.

That won’t be easy, especially when dramatic human rights cases like the death in police custody of Sergei Magnitsky, a 37-year-old lawyer working for a Western investment firm, are triggering new angry recriminations.  After he accused police and interior ministry officials of perpetrating a $230 million fraud against the Russian government, Magnitsky was jailed by those same authorities for alleged tax evasion. An investigative commission has now pinned the responsibility for his death on two prison doctors, but human rights activists charge that this is only an attempt to cover-up the complicity of higher officials in his brutal mistreatment that led to his death. Frustrated with what they saw as the Obama administration’s weak response, Republicans and Democrats in both the House and the Senate introduced legislation named after Magnitsky to ban Russian officials connected to the case from traveling to the United States as well as freezing any of their U.S.-held assets. Similar bills have made headway in Europe and Canada.

Russia’s establishment has responded with mixed signals about the case, promoting some of the officials involved while claiming it will make sure that any abuses will be punished. But there has been nothing ambiguous about its reaction to the proposed bills on Capitol Hill. After the State Department quietly enacted a travel ban on certain Russian officials, Russia instituted a tit-for-tat visa ban on U.S. officials, allegedly targeting those responsible for the extradition of Russian arms deal Viktor Bout from Thailand. (Neither government has released the list of banned officials.) And the Obama administration sent a detailed memo to Senators raising its concerns with the legislation. Instead of seeing the Obama administration’s actions as an attempt to straddle the controversy and soften the Congressional legislation, Kremlin officials argued that this proved that they couldn’t count on the White House either. In other words, forget the reset.

This is far from the only issue bedeviling U.S.-Russia relations.  The ongoing application of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, which links trade relations to emigration practices, is a long-standing source of Russian ire (see earlier article).  Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama have been unable to get Congress to graduate Russia from the amendment and grant permanent normal trade relations. Ballistic missile defense also continues to spark controversy. Obama’s decision to move away from Bush’s planned deployment of assets in Poland and the Czech Republic provided just a momentary lull. And the lingering fallout from Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia continues to provide ample opportunities for mutual recriminations, including a leaked U.S. intelligence report linking a Russian intelligence official to a bombing near the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi.

Despite these contentious issues, the reset has scored some significant successes. To be sure, it was slow to deliver on its initial promises. The negotiations for New START dragged on for over a year, allowing START to expire. After finally concluding negotiations with Russia, the Obama administration had another hard-fought battle in the Senate to get the treaty ratified. But the entry into force of the New START treaty was one of the major foreign policy successes for the Obama administration and its reset policy.

There has also been progress in addressing other strategic U.S. concerns, most significantly Iran and Afghanistan. Washington secured Russian agreement on both over-flight rights for lethal cargo and overland transit of non-lethal cargo to resupply the Afghanistan effort. This took pressure off the Pakistan supply route—now estimated to be used for only 35 percent of supply efforts as compared to about 90 percent two years ago.  And Russia recently agreed to expand the distribution network by allowing two-way transit and overland shipment of lethal goods.  The United States was also able to gain Russian and Chinese support for sanctions against Iran because of that country’s continued intransigence on international inspection of its nuclear enrichment facilities.

The benefits of the reset have been mutual, as demonstrated by New START. Moscow also had reason to be particularly pleased when the U. S. implemented the 123 civilian nuclear agreement, laying out the parameters of peaceful nuclear cooperation with Russia that needed to be in place before U.S. and Russian companies could expand commercial collaboration. After the Russian invasion of Georgia, it had been withdrawn from congressional consideration. Another success of the reset is firm U.S. backing for Russia’s World Trade Organization aspirations. It is expected that Russia’s tortured 18-year application process may finally come to an end at this December’s WTO ministerial in Geneva. Russia is the largest economy outside of the organization and Medvedev’s ambitious modernization program needs the benefits of WTO membership

What both sides need to understand is that the reset offers the best hope of maintaining cooperation on key areas of mutual concern and keeping inevitable disagreements within reasonable bounds.  To that end, leaders in Moscow and Washington should deliver that message to their highly skeptical domestic constituencies more often.  The Obama administration needs to undertake a sustained effort with a Congress that is still deeply suspicious of Russia and could still undermine the reset, especially during an election year. And Russian leaders should think twice before they engage in the kind of rhetorical overkill that only fuels Cold War thinking.  Angry rhetoric won’t disappear anytime soon, but it needs to be kept in check. Otherwise, both sides are likely to lose out.  

The main purpose of the dialogue was to explore concrete ways to increase strategic trust between the United States and China. During the talks, participants addressed a number of critical concerns in U.S.-China relations, including Taiwan, the South China Sea, U.S.-China military-to-military relations, and cybersecurity.

The U.S. delegation consisted of the following members (listed in alphabetical order):

• Joel H. Cowan, member of EWI’s Board of Directors
• David J. Firestein, EWI Vice President for the Strategic Trust-Building Initiative and Track 2 Diplomacy
• Eugene E. Habiger, former Commander in Chief of U.S. Strategic Command
• Piin-Fen Kok, Senior Associate for EWI’s China Program
• T. Michael Moseley, EWI’s Perot Distinguished Fellow and former Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force
• John Edwin Mroz, President and CEO of EWI
• Jonathan D. Pollack, Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution’s John L. Thornton China Center
• Karl Rauscher, EWI’s Chief Technology Officer
• Daniel M. Slane, Founder and Co-owner of The Slane Company
• Timothy P. Stratford, former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative

Organized in conjunction with the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), the think tank of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the week-long dialogue began with three days of discussions with: Chinese experts hosted by CIIS; experts from the China Reform Forum (CRF), a non-profit policy research organization officially affiliated with the Party School of the Communist Party of China (CPC); and military officials and experts hosted by the National Defense University of the People’s Liberation Army (NDU-PLA).

Following these exchanges, the U.S. delegation then met with a number of Chinese and U.S. government officials, including: Minister Wang Yi of the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office; Vice Minister Liu Jieyi of the CPC’s International Department (IDCPC); Assistant Minister Yu Jianhua of the Ministry of Commerce; Director Li Wufeng, head of the State Council Information Office’s Internet Affairs Bureau; and Dr. Robert S. Wang, Chargé d'Affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. The delegates also visited several Chinese think tanks and companies: the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Institute of Taiwan Studies; the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR); and Horizon Research Consultancy Group, a public opinion polling firm.

During the weeklong dialogue, participants recognized Taiwan as the main potential flashpoint in U.S.-China relations, and much of the Taiwan-centered discussions focused on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Both the U.S. and Chinese delegates agreed that new approaches are needed to prevent increased friction over this issue, which affects both the overall U.S.-China relationship and specifically the military-to-military relationship. To a larger degree, the discussions focused on whether it is possible to achieve a balanced approach that takes into consideration China’s core interests, U.S. commitments and objectives, and Taiwan’s security concerns.

On the military-to-military relationship, participants noted that U.S.-China military contacts are often the first to be suspended when one country wants to express displeasure with the other’s policies or actions. However, both sides agreed that it is precisely when friction arises that maintaining the relationship—and thus the channels of communication—between the two militaries becomes even more important. To strengthen the relationship, participants recommended more operational and technical collaboration between the U.S. and Chinese militaries on common challenges, such as increasing cooperation in joint relief and humanitarian aid efforts. Delegates also stressed that it is important for both political and military leaders in the two countries to recognize the value of maintaining the military-to-military relationship, and that both countries should agree on an appropriate strategy for developing this relationship.

On the South China Sea issue, participants noted that differences between the United States and China are rooted in both legalities and politics. Some delegates recommended that the United States ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which would be a useful first step in addressing the legal differences. Politically, both countries need to recognize the broader historical and strategic backdrop affecting their relations with each other and with Southeast Asian nations over the South China Sea tensions. In addition, a focus on U.S.-China shared interests in the South China Sea, such as the importance of securing and maintaining shipping routes, would help to mitigate and prevent continued rifts on the issue.

There’s a need for a similar focus on common interests in dealing with the cybersecurity challenge. While mutual concerns were discussed, including China’s reservations about the new U.S. cybersecurity strategy, dialogue participants agreed that no single country is able to ensure security in cyberspace on its own, and thus cooperation between the United States and China is critical. Both delegations reported their countries as targets of frequent hacking attacks and stressed that identifying and preventing such attacks—including attacks on critical infrastructure—would require joint efforts. Delegates welcomed the prospect of U.S.-China collaboration to establish common norms and terms of references for cyberspace, and a possible first step could be an in-depth analysis of the similarities and differences between U.S. and Chinese cyber doctrines.

Other topics discussed during the dialogue included:

• Impact of recent developments in the Middle East and Southwest Asia on U.S.-China strategic relations;
• Perceptual barriers to U.S.-China economic relations and ways to overcome these obstacles;
• U.S.-China cooperation in nuclear and space security.

Overall, through the dialogue, Chinese and American participants clarified their respective concerns, enhanced their understanding of one another’s policy positions, and explored policy options for achieving progress on some of the most critical and timely issues affecting China-U.S. strategic trust. These positive outcomes were achieved, according to participants, as a result of a higher level of candor in this round of discussions than in previous years.

On July 28, 2011, the EastWest Institute, in partnership with the Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan, held the fifth and final meeting of the Nuclear Discussion Forum at the Mission’s office.  Bringing together states with different vested interests, the meeting series aimed to build trust and help surmount political barriers to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.  

Eduardo Ulibarri, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the UN, chaired the meeting, which was attended by representatives of 26 permanent missions to the United Nations, as well as representatives from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs and Department of Public Information. 

In the meeting, Amy Woolf, a specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy at the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress, and Hans Kristensen, Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, led a discussion on reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines. 

Woolf discussed “the who and the what of nuclear deterrence,” adding, “Once we establish who we are trying to deter with nuclear weapons and what we are deterring them from doing then we can start thinking about reducing their role. Reducing the list of ‘the who and the what’ would mean reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines.”

Kristensen said that the biggest challenge to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines is the fact that nuclear-weapon states did not do so at the end of the Cold War. Instead, he added, they  seamlessly transitioned their nuclear doctrines and found new threats to deter against.

Ulibarri stated that changes in the geopolitical environment and the evolution of thinking regarding the role of Nuclear Weapons have forced a reassessment of the position of nuclear weapons in national security policy. The new trends of thinking among academics, states, and international organizations include nuclear de-alert, pledges of no first use, strengthening negative security assurances, and establishing regional nuclear weapons-free zones.

In the Nuclear Discussion Forum, previous meeting topics included overcoming obstacles to a Middle East nuclear weapons free zone, managing and verifying disarmament and providing negative security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

“Our common intent to contribute to these issues has led us to come together despite our political differences,” said Byrganym Aitimova, Ambassador of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations, greeting participants. “Our biggest gain is that we are all now more optimistic that we can work together in this field.”

Overview of the Nuclear Discussion Forum

Over the past seven months, the Nuclear Discussion Forumhas acted as a laboratory for innovative thinking, enabling frank discourse to bridge East-West divides on the roadblocks towards achieving “global zero,” or a world without nuclear weapons. The forum also built trust between states, which is a necessary step for overcoming the political obstacles that hinder bilateral and multilateral efforts towards nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.

The forum was sponsored by the government of Kazakhstan, which has been a leader in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. After its independence, Kazakhstan found itself owning the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal. Ultimately, the Kazakh government made the decision to destroy the Soviet weapons or move them to Russia; the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing site in western Kazakhstan was closed; and all intercontinental ballistic missile silos were destroyed. Kazakhstan went on to lead the successful effort to establish the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ).

The Forum, which met five times between February and August 2011, engaged the UN diplomatic and policymaking community, including representatives from nuclear weapon states, non-nuclear weapon states, international organizations, and outside experts. Each meeting featured a speaker and discussant with a specialized area of knowledge relating to disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation. After initial remarks from the speakers, an open discussion followed in an effort to build trust among key states, identify the next milestones towards global zero, and mobilize international political will around concrete and practical actions.

“The topics discussed were the most salient on the international Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation agenda,” said Jim McLay, Ambassador of New Zealand to the UN. He added that he was awaiting concrete recommendation from the final report, which would serve as a roadmap to global zero.

In September 2011 EWI will disseminate a record of proceedings that highlight the main findings from the series. The work and outcome of the Forum will be presented in a panel event at the UN General Assembly First Committee meeting on October 24, 2011.

In an interview on For Your Ears Only Franz-Stefan Gady discusses the possible causes of violent extremism in Europe, in light of the most recent terrorist attack in Oslo.

The full episode of the program is available here.

Writing for the Journal of Foreign Relations, Franz-Stefan Gady analyzes the historical overlap of literature and politics.

Click here to read Gady's piece in the Journal of Foreign Relations

Gady also analysed the latest tensions around the South China Sea disputes in an interview with Der Standard.

You can read the full interview here.