Strategic Trust-Building

Retired Colonel-General Victor Esin, former Chief of Staff of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, offers an analysis of the latest START agreement and its implications for the Russian strategic forces:

The new START Treaty signed by U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Prague on April 8, 2010 has to be analyzed at two interconnecting and intercorrelated levels.

The essence of the first level is that, after seven years of the new Treaty entering into force, both parties will have a total number of not more than 8,000 deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and nuclear-armed heavy bombers each.

The second level limits the number of strategic carriers and corresponding warheads. After seven years, the limits of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and nuclear armed heavy bombers for each party cannot exceed 700 units and 1,550 nuclear warheads.

The five following aspects are very important:

First, all ICBMs and SLBMs launchers, including those for testing, military personnel training and those at the space launch sites, which are intended for the launch of space launch vehicles, will be taken into account.

Second, under the Treaty, only nuclear armed heavy bombers are subject to the limits and accounting. The number of conventional armed heavy bombers is not covered by the Treaty. But the Treaty has special provisions for the procedure of the conversion of nuclear armed heavy bombers into conventional armed bombers which, according to experts who participated in the Treaty negotiations, does not allow for their re-conversion.

Third, the limits and accounting cover all types of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs irrespective of whether they are tipped with nuclear or conventional warheads.

Fourth, the limit of 1,550 warheads includes all warheads – both nuclear and conventional – on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and nuclear arms for deployed heavy bombers. In addition, a special accounting rule is stipulated for heavy bombers: one bomber counts as one warhead. This may be a defect of the Treaty because the heavy bomber actually can carry from twelve to twenty nuclear-armed cruise missiles and more than twenty nuclear bombs. Nuclear bombs can be carried only by U.S. heavy bombers. Russian heavy bombers are armed only with cruise missiles.

Fifth, each party has the right to define the structure of its nuclear forces on its own and in accordance with “the levels” for the launchers and warheads established by the Treaty. Now Russia has been freed from the burdens established on the structure of its strategic nuclear forces by START I. It is very important for Russia that the new Treaty does not forbid the replacement of single warheads of existing RS-12 ICBMs by MIRVs.

Can Russia maintain parity in strategic nuclear arms with the U.S. under the new Treaty? To answer this question we must assess the current status of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces.

According to the rules (pro forma in many respects) of START I, as of July 1, 2009 (the date of the latest exchange of written notifications between the parties of the Treaty containing updated information on their strategic offensive arms) Russia’s arsenal totaled 809 strategic launchers fitted with 3,987 warheads, and the U.S.’s totaled 1,188 strategic launchers with the associated number of 5,916 warheads. However, de facto, as of March 2010, Russia’s deployed nuclear strategic forces included 560 launchers fitted with approximately 2,500 warheads while the U.S. had about 800 launchers fitted with 2,100 warheads.

What does this mean for the U.S. and Russia?

Russia:

To fulfill the new Treaty obligations, Russia (if it does not want to go below the level of 700 deployed launchers) will need to accomplish two tasks. First, the launchers with the expired operational terms, subject for disposal, should be replaced with new ones. Second, another 140 new launchers should be put on operational posture in order to reach the agreed 700 limit thus filling the currently existing gap between this limit and the actual number of deployed launchers.

United States:

The U.S. has the easier task – only to reduce the excessive quantity of the strategic launchers.

Should Russia overcome these many difficulties to maintain parity with the U.S. in number of launchers as it did in Soviet times? My answer is: No, Russia does not need to match the U.S. launcher for launcher. Russia’s main goal is “to have such strategic nuclear-forces potential, which is able to provide assured nuclear deterrence.” But this task, according to expert calculations, can be successfully accomplished by the unbalanced number of strategic launchers in Russia compared with the U.S. It should be enough for Russia to have 500 deployed strategic launchers and 1,550 warheads that will provide compatible combat capability with the U.S., which will have: 700 deployed launchers and the same number of 1,550 deployed warheads. In reality, warheads destroy targets not launchers .

Undoubtedly, the U.S. will have bigger reloading potential than Russian strategic nuclear forces. But this superiority does not play a decisive role in Russia’s nuclear deterrence potential.

What is an actual threat to Russia is the unlimited build-up of the U.S. global ABM system. That is why Russia made a special statement on the ABM problem during the signing of the new START Treaty in Prague. The statement declared that the Treaty can work and be vigorous only in the absence of qualitative and quantitative build up of the U.S. ABM capabilities. The Russian Federation can withdraw from the Treaty under Article XIV of the Treaty if the threat posed by the U.S. ABM capabilities leads to the devaluation of Russia’s strategic nuclear potential.

Sibal, a former foreign secretary of India and a member of EWI's Board of Directors, suggests that U.S. and Indian interests are not aligned closely enough to elevate the two countries' relationship to the level of a "strategic dialogue.

"At what stage is normal diplomatic parleying ready for being upgraded to the level of a strategic dialogue?" he asks. "Clearly, the basis has to be sufficient bilateral understanding on key issues that materially affect the fundamental interests of the countries involved, enough to be able to work together to align interests as much as possible and formulate and adjust policies accordingly."

Sibal suggests that such an alignment of interests does not exist in the U.S.-India relationship. "In reality, it is not possible for the U.S. to reconcile the contradictions inherent in any serious 'strategic' discussions with India as well as countries that India sees as most antagonistic to it in strategic terms -- China and Pakistan," he writes.

Specifically, he argues that the U.S. will be reluctant to compromise its sensitive relationship with China, and India would prefer to resolve its issues with China without U.S. intervention. " In the case of India’s relationship with China, serious strategic issues are at play, whether those relating to the unsettled border, China’s strident claims on Arunachal Pradesh, the militarization of Tibet, China’s relationship with Pakistan etc.," he writes. "These contentious issues will remain outside the scope of the India-U.S. strategic dialogue. The U.S. would not like to wade into them and India too would be averse to bringing in any third party into its bilateral territorial problems with China."

Similarly, he suggests that U.S. ambitions in Afghanistan and Pakistan also complicate the India-U.S. dialogue. "Pakistan will continue to receive military aid both as an incentive to cooperate more with the U.S. in counterinsurgency operations against the Taliban and as an assurance of a longer term engagement with the country that would endure beyond the resolution of the Afghanistan problem, of which enhanced economic aid and the strategic dialogue at Foreign Minister’s level are an integral part," he adds. "Notwithstanding what is being said about not allowing any country to have any dominating role in Afghanistan, the fact remains that a political solution in Afghanistan that provides for Taliban’s participation would give Pakistan the role it seeks. An upgraded India-U.S. strategic dialogue is not going to alter these realities."

"Notwithstanding the rhetoric and atmospherics and India’s interest to explore the full potential of improved bilateral ties in our own national interest, the upgraded strategic dialogue with the U.S. should not beguile us into believing that a strategic understanding with it has been reached," he concludes, adding: "Were the U.S., which has overlooked China’s proliferation activities in Pakistan in the past, to condone them again,  the limits of an India-U.S. strategic understanding would have been clearly drawn.

Click here to read the article on Mail Today.

Writing for his fortnightly column on livemint.com, Sidhu describes two views on the recent nuclear deal. One, popular in the global South sees a new, more assertive role for successful developing countries, and the other, popular among the developed world, that sees the deal as naïve and unrealistic. The reality, he suggests, is somewhere in between.

"While it is true that both Brazil and Turkey have been more assertive in the international arena on issues well beyond their borders … they have also been cautious in their approach and have sought to work closely with the P5," he writes." The Tehran agreement is not a radical new proposal and resembles the earlier agreement that Iran has discussed with the Vienna group since October 2009."

Sidhu argues that the limited scope of the agreement highlights this deference to the five permanent members of the Security Council. "Had there been an anti-Western sentiment, the contours of the Tehran deal would have looked very different," he suggests. "Brazil might have offered to supply the enriched uranium directly, instead of reiterating that it be supplied by the Vienna group (as was envisaged in the original agreement discussed between Iran and the Vienna group)."

But despite Brazil and Turkey's efforts to accommodate the P5, the P5 has responded with its own draft resolution in the UN Security Council with a new round of sanctions against Iran. Sidhu considers this response disappointing, calling it short-sighted and indicative of "an anti-South attitude." Further, he suggests that the new resolution is unlikely to be effective. Competing demands from the U.S., China and Russia have watered it down, and, because Brazil, Turkey and Lebanon are unlikely to support the resolution, it will not be unanimous. "In this light, a resolution passed by the majority will lack credibility," Sidhu suggests. "The failure to effectively impose these sanctions will only further signal the growing weakness of the P-5 in UNSC."

Sidhu concludes with a call for a united effort. "What is abundantly clear is that to effectively address the crucial issue of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, there will have to be a combined effort of the West and key non-Western powers," he writes. "Neither one can be successful on its own."

Click here to read Sidhu's article on livemint.com

In May 2010, the United States announced the “initial operational capability” of its new joint Cyber Command, appointed the first leader of it at the rank of four-star general, and commenced work on a new cyber warfare intelligence center in San Antonio Texas.

But classic terms like cyber warfare and “information dominance”, long a standard in the international security discourse, may be on the way out, according to a U.S. Army Manual released in February this year. Prepare instead for “full spectrum operations” (FSO). All wired, wireless and optical technologies may now be the new field of operations, as the United States seeks to build and maintain technological advantage over its “adversaries”.
The Manual describes “three interrelated dimensions”, each (it says) with its own logic and solutions: 

• “the psychological contest of wills against implacable foes, warring factions, criminal groups, and potential adversaries,”
• “strategic engagement, which involves keeping friends at home, gaining allies abroad, and generating support or empathy for the mission,”
• “the cyber-electromagnetic contest, which involves gaining, maintaining, and exploiting a technological advantage”.

The situation that led to these world-changing developments is itself new. As the Manual says: “Unprecedented levels of adverse activity in and through cyberspace threaten the integrity of United States critical infrastructure, financial systems, and elements of national power.” The origins of the threat include “unwitting hackers,” criminals, terrorists and states.

But most importantly for the social organization of coercive power, the United States has assessed that, “collectively, the threats create a condition of perpetual turbulence without traditional end states or resolution.”

Thus, while it seemed bad enough that states have not yet agreed to common definitions of cyber war or cyber peace, we are now faced with an absence of reference points for “cyber victory.” And the cyber enemies of the United States may not even have hostile intent, but merely be “unwitting hackers”.

The good news of course is that the United States is at least moving to match its national security policy to one of the more serious threats it, like other states, faces. 

How does NATO respond? What does point #2 above (“gaining allies”) look like for NATO? The Albright report on NATO’s new security concept also released in May 2010 identified “cyber assaults of varying degrees of severity” as one of three more probable forms of attack. The report recommended, without clear reference to the massive transformation that would be involved, that NATO should plan to mount a fully adequate array of cyber defense capabilities, including passive and active elements”. The authors suggested that military commanders be given pre-authorized rules of engagement for immediate response to cyber attack.

As it responds to the Albright report, NATO will have choices to make about the three dimensions mentioned above. How will NATO manage the psychological contest with adversaries? (Not well it seems so far!) Who beyond NATO will be useful allies? Could Russia qualify? And how should NATO prepare for the day to day electro-magnetic contest with the diverse range of witting and unwitting threats? It is almost inconceivable that NATO could build a joint “cyber command”? Or is it?

Maybe that should be a NATO aim for the next decade, with a concentration on just parts of the spectrum of threat, such as protection of critical information infrastructure. And, for no other reason than their mutual dependence on normal energy trade and high-volume international bank transfers, NATO and Russia have to be allies.

Of some note to NATO planning, a new US Army (single service) Cyber Command, also announced in May this year, will be set up with “no new growth or impact to Army end strength” and “will be funded from within existing fiscal resources”. Now that will be a challenge. 

In "Euro-Atlantic: Equal Security for All," an article to be published in the May 2010 issue of Revue Defense Nationale, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov makes a case for a rethink of European security, naming the EastWest Institute among the sources of thought leadership on the issue. The article was reproduced by ISRIA, an online news service specializing in diplomatic and intelligence information.

EWI Vice President W. Pal Sidhu is quoted in a Xinhua article regarding regional security in Southwest Asia, and the current state of U.S.-Afghan relations.

Click here to read the article on Xinhua News.

Andrew Nagorski's recent piece in Newsweek, America's Age of Angst, received considerable attention from the media and several notable blogs. A sampling of websites carrying the piece:

News:

• The Anchorage Daily News
• ESPN

Websites and Blogs:

• Atlantic-Community.org
• God, Gold and Guns
• Economy In Crisis.org
• Last.fm

David Firestein's recent piece in The Dallas Morning News, "U.S., China must join forces on Cyber-Security," was mentioned in USA Today .

Click here to read Firestein's piece in The Dallas Morning News.