Conflict Prevention

As the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) shapes itself into a “world-class force,” it is also modernizing its nuclear weapons stockpile. Keeping one’s nuclear deterrent in good repair, maintaining strict control, and clearly communicating its purpose is the mark of a responsible actor. China, however, is doing much, much more while keeping the rest of the world in the dark. Now, some observers even suggest China may abandon its longstanding “No First Use” (NFU) nuclear policy, which would signal China’s intent to stand alongside the United States and Russia as a nuclear power capable of inflicting destruction beyond ordinary catastrophe.

During the September 2015 World War II Victory Parade in Beijing, the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) unveiled China’s DF-26 intermediate range ballistic missile, capable of delivering both nuclear and conventional payloads throughout the western Pacific. The PLA is further continuing to develop its DF-41 ICBM, which Western analysts suspect may carry multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).

Furthermore, China is developing a sea-based nuclear deterrent with its Jin class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (Type 094 SSBN). The PLA will begin building a new class of SSBN in the early 2020s: Type 096, equipped with the JL-3 next-generation submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

China’s nuclear deterrent is also increasing in size: between 2015 and 2016, the U.S. Department of Defense reported an increase in China’s ICBM force from between 50 and 60 missiles to between 75 and 100. Xinhua in 2010 and again in 2013 reported China’s first successful tests of missile defense technology under what it calls Project 863. Although China’s air expeditionary capabilities currently lag those at sea, one wonders whether an air-based nuclear deterrent can be far behind.

Although these advances are significant, particularly in light of stagnant U.S. defense spending, most striking is China’s de facto acknowledgment that its DF-5C missile is equipped with MIRVs, as reported by China’s official military newspaper. If China’s nuclear force remains the “countervalue” force that it claims — possessing only the capability to deliver a punitive second strike after another power has struck it - it has yet to explain why it is increasingly taking on the profile of a great nuclear power.

Is it possible that China is simply modernizing its arsenal while upholding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s stated goals of “cessation of the nuclear arms race” and undertaking “effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament?”

Some Chinese scholars still recommend NFU as a policy not just for China, but for all nuclear powers to follow. Zhou Bo of the PLA Academy of Military Science states: “China is not the strongest power either in nuclear weapons or in conventional weapons. If China can make such a commitment [to No First Use], why can’t the U.S., Russia, Britain and France do the same? It is a shame for the strongest military powers with superiority in conventional weapons to talk about using nuclear weapons first.”

But veteran security commentator Nan Li of the National University of Singapore notes that “it is evident that as China modernizes its nuclear forces, it is also debating a shift in strategy, including the abandonment of its No First Use (NFU) policy.” He continues: “One view is that NFU may impose certain limitations on the strategic use of China’s Rocket Force, implying reduced crisis response flexibility due to the highly centralized decision-making in employing nuclear weapons. Moreover, some believe that NFU reduces the credibility of China’s already small nuclear forces, and that abandoning NFU may enhance China’s nuclear deterrent.”

According to Li, some Chinese strategists envision first use of nuclear weapons in certain situations: Taiwanese independence, attacks targeting China’s nuclear weapons or nuclear command and control, a conventional attack with force equivalent to a nuclear attack, and of course if faced with regime change.

But are these questions particularly new or serious? I do not think so. Rather they reflect the ongoing internal debate about long-term issues. A good example of such a debate is China’s stance on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. China-DPRK relations were once those of normal allies. When China normalized diplomatic and economic relations with South Korea in the 1990s, however, it was only natural for some to wonder about China’s commitment to its ally. But it wasn’t until North Korea smashed the nuclear status quo on the peninsula that China brought this dispute out in the open, culminating in China’s willingness to punish North Korea.

In contrast, China’s NFU policy is still in the second stage of questioning: the development of new technology is providing China some incentives to abandon the policy, but there has not been a crisis comparable to North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons to shift the debate in China. Until it occurs, I do not believe China will abandon its policy.

Particularly operative in this respect is the fact that China is free at any time to abandon its policy and use nuclear weapons. Thus, unless it saw some indispensable deterrent effect of jettisoning NFU - for example to keep Taiwan from declaring independence, or to prevent the U.S. from supporting Taiwanese independence — China is unlikely to alter its commitment to NFU.

China is, however, entering the realm of the nuclear great powers, previously limited to the United States and Russia, without the attendant controls, especially the MRBM treaty. As long as China refuses to take on the responsibilities of a great nuclear power — or make clear its status as a lesser nuclear power — its opaque policies will strain the status quo and become yet another area in which China has chosen to disrupt the international system.

Ben Lowsen is a specialist in Chinese political and security affairs working as a China advisor for the U.S. Air Force’s Checkmate office. He tweets at @lowsen88.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, U.S. Government, or EastWest Institute. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Photo: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DF-5B_intercontinental_ballistic_missiles_during_2015_China_Victory_Day_parade.jpg

We are witnessing the dawn of a new “Great Game” in the Middle East. The turmoil that has engulfed the Middle East since the outbreak of the so-called “Arab Spring” in 2011 brought about the collapse of the regimes in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, as well as catastrophic upheavals in Syria and Iraq. The collapse of state power in the region, the rise and fall of Islamic State (ISIS) and the realignment of tribal structures are just a few of the more immediate consequences.

This ongoing turmoil combined with the perceived waning of great power influence has opened the doors to the gradual reemergence of two regional powers with imperial pasts and contemporary aspirations to restore their glorious heydays: Turkey, the heir to the once might Ottoman Empire, and Iran, the Old Persian Empire.

Both countries have long and well established administrative and governance experience, as well as traditions accumulated through generations and now find themselves at the prospective forefront  of new regional opportunities. Arguably, both countries endeavor to extend their spheres of influence by restructuring the most destabilized parts of the Middle East region: Iraq and Syria in the North; and Yemen, which is guarding the southern approaches to the Red Sea in the south.

Naturally, this new regional power rivalry has deepened mistrust between Ankara and Tehran, underlined by the deep historical Sunni-Shia divide pitting Sunni-dominated Turkey against the Shia-dominated Islamic Republic of Iran.  

For example, the recent Turkish military activity in Afrin in Northern Syria (Operation Olive Branch), under the pretext of chasing terrorists and checking the Kurds along its southern flank, was met with suspicion by Iran, which saw it as an attempt to infringe on Syria’s territorial integrity and establish a permanent Turkish presence there. Conversely, Turkey has watched with misgiving Iran’s ongoing attempt to establish a land corridor stretching from Iran via Iraq and Syria, both weakened states, to the Mediterranean Sea either in Syria or Lebanon. (This land corridor is sometimes dubbed “The Shia Crescent”.)

Iranian and Turkish interests are also clashing in Northern Iraq, where Iran has encroached on Turkey’s historic and economic interests, especially when it comes to its relationship with the Turkmen minority and the export of natural resources from the oil rich province of Kirkuk. If Iran will manage to establish the intended land corridor to the Mediterranean it will have an impact on Turkey’s economy, which earns revenues from the oil pipelines passing through its territory.

The latest competition between the two regional powers is likely to occur in the south. The Iranian involvement in the current war in Yemen has by now been well documented. Among other things, Iran has been sending advanced weapons and military advisors to its Shi’ite ally, the Houthi movement, which recently threatened to disrupt navigation at the southern tip of the Red Sea. The Ottoman Empire ruled Yemen for several centuries and understands the perils of pro-Iranian regime there.

Turkey’s involvement in the countries neighboring the Gulf of Aden is also on the rise. Following the rift between Qatar and its Arab neighbors in the Persian Gulf, Turkey hurried to dispatch an extra military contingent to its forces, which have been stationed there since 2014. The recent visit of Turkish President Erdogan to Sudan resulted, amongst other things, in an agreement which will allow Turkey to restore the old Sudanese port of Suakin. This port, during Ottoman rule, was the main departure point of Muslims from Africa to the annual pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia.

The new Sudanese-Turkish agreement allows the presence of the Turkish Navy in the port. Needless to say, that is not welcomed by neighboring countries and regional rivals such as Iran. Turkey is building a military presence both in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to the west and east of the watchful Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is also a factor that cannot be ignored as the Kingdom is immersed in an intense dispute with Iran. Interestingly, the move coincides with Houthi threats to shut down the Red Sea and interrupt shipping in the Gulf of Aden.

Both Iran and Turkey already have a naval presence in the region under the umbrella of the international anti-piracy naval task force patrolling the Horn of Africa. As in Qatar, Turkey has maintained a military presence in Somalia since 2014. A serious disruption of the maritime routes in the Red Sea and its environs may have a tremendous impact on the oil supply from the Middle East to Europe. It is of little surprise than that both Turkey and Iran are maintaining a naval presence around the Horn of Africa. Interestingly, one may observe that this jockeying for strategic interests has resulted in an almost symmetrical positioning of Turkish and Iranian forces or proxies in the area facing off against one another.

Although history never repeats itself exactly along the same lines, it is recommended that this growing competition between Iran and Turkey for regional influence be closely observed for it is slated to increase in intensity. Both countries will certainly need local partners and proxies as sub-contractors to counter each other and effectuate their respective strategies. Turkey is counting on the Sunni Arabs while Iran is counting on the pro-Shia elements. But in the shifting sands of the region there might be other configurations that will require or compel other parties to join in and select sides bringing even more complexity to the region, and risk. This is especially the case when the southern approaches of the Red Sea and their oil supply routes will be in danger. The Middle East’s new great game is on.

Ambassador (ret.) Jacob Rosen-Koenigsbuch served as Israel's ambassador in Jordan (2006-2009). He is currently an independent consultant on demographic mapping and collects books about "Lawrence of Arabia." 

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: "The Middle East" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by Big Richard C

On January 10, Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif met with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov in Moscow to discuss the resolution of the Syrian civil war and U.S. President Donald Trump’s threats to suspend the Iran nuclear deal. After their meeting, Zarif praised Russia’s resolute support for the implementation of the Iran nuclear deal, and reiterated both countries’ shared willingness to preserve the territorial integrity of Syria.  

Even though Zarif’s recent meeting with Lavrov aimed to showcase the strength of the Russia-Iran alliance to the international community, the long-term sustainability of the Moscow-Tehran alignment remains unclear. The uncertainty surrounding the survival of the Russia-Iran partnership can be explained by both countries’ conflicting strategic visions for the Middle East regional system.

Russia’s strategic vision is chiefly focused on eliminating sources of instability and preventing U.S.-led military interventions, which from Moscow’s perspective facilitate the creation of failed states. The Russian government justified its September 2015 military intervention in Syria as a necessary measure to restore stability to the country, and to deter Washington from using force to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Russia views its Syria campaign as an integral step towards achieving its broader goal of establishing itself as an indispensable guarantor of collective security in the Middle East.  

Although Iranian policymakers frequently tout Tehran’s role as a stabilizing force in the Middle East, collective security promotion is only a peripheral goal in Iran’s strategic vision. Iranian policymakers are primarily focused on expanding Tehran’s sphere of influence in the Middle East and containing Saudi Arabia’s power projection capacity across the Arab world. These expansionist objectives have caused Iran to cooperate more extensively with belligerent non-state actors than Russia and engage in military activities that undercut the effectiveness of Moscow-backed political settlement initiatives.

These divergent objectives threaten to unravel Russia-Iran cooperation in Syria, as the conflict transitions from the military to diplomatic phase. Even though Russian military officials have praised the effectiveness of Hezbollah troops during pro-Assad military operations, Iran’s use of Syrian territory to create a permanent transit point of weaponry to Hezbollah has alarmed Russian policymakers who seek to preserve strong relations with Israel.

Iran’s unwillingness to suspend military operations in Syria until Assad has completely vanquished opposition forces also deviates from Russia’s more limited objective of ensuring that Assad controls enough territory to negotiate with Syrian opposition factions from a position of strength. Iran’s belief in the feasibility of a military solution in Syria has made it less willing than Russia to diplomatically engage with Syrian opposition or Kurdish factions during diplomatic negotiations, limiting the scope of the Moscow-Tehran partnership.

Prospects for constructive cooperation between Russia and Iran on resolving other regional conflicts, like Yemen and Afghanistan, also appear dim. In Yemen, the already-strained relations between Russia and Iran-aligned Houthi rebels have deteriorated further since the assassination of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh on December 5. These tensions have prompted Moscow to establish stronger lines of communication with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on resolving the crisis.

A similar divergence in objectives restricts the potential for Russia-Iran cooperation in Afghanistan. Russia is seeking to implement an Afghan political settlement, which includes the Taliban, as swiftly as possible. While Iran wants a peace settlement in Afghanistan to be achieved in the long-term, it is unwilling to suspend military action until anti-U.S. forces have gained a position of primacy in western Afghanistan. As Iran continues to provide military assistance to Taliban forces near its borders, Russian policymakers are concerned that Tehran will obstruct the Afghan peace process to advance its own objectives.

Although divergent interests make the Russia-Iran partnership weaker than many analysts have assumed, U.S. policy choices could also profoundly impact the strength of the alliance. As former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul noted in a August 2017 interview, the re-imposition of a stringent U.S. sanctions regime against Iran by abandoning the nuclear deal could cause Tehran to pivot strongly towards Moscow. If the United States decides to militarily retaliate against Assad’s use of chemical weapons, it will likely re-awaken Russia and Iran’s long-standing opposition to U.S. military interventions, further strengthening their partnership in Syria.

Although a marked improvement in Washington’s relationships with Russia or Iran is unlikely to occur in the near-term, U.S. policymakers can influence the trajectory of the Russia-Iran relationship. To capitalize on disagreements between Russia and Iran’s Afghanistan strategies, U.S. diplomats could re-establish diplomatic dialogue with the Taliban, which would provide a genuine basis for U.S.-Russia cooperation in Afghanistan and isolate Iran’s support for a military solution from the international consensus.

U.S. policymakers could also attempt to strengthen dialogue between Geneva and Astana talks participants in Syria. This move would give Russia the status recognition it desires, and weaken the Moscow-Tehran partnership, as Iranian policy makers remain concerned that heightened Russia-US cooperation will cause Moscow to distance itself from Tehran, like it did during the early years of the Obama administration.  

Even though the Russia-Iran alliance appears robust, both countries’ divergent strategic visions could render the partnership unsustainable in the long-term. To weaken the Russia-Iran alignment, U.S. officials should refrain from implementing overly hawkish retaliations to Moscow and Tehran’s destabilizing conduct, and look to expose cracks in the partnership through targeted diplomatic engagement with Russia. If U.S. policymakers implement this strategy, the Moscow-Tehran partnership could weaken considerably once military operations in Syria draw to a close, potentially strengthening Washington’s influence in the Middle East for years to come.   

Samuel Ramani is a DPhil candidate in International Relations at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He is also a regular contributor to the Washington Post, The Diplomat and The National Interest. He can be followed on Twitter at samramani2.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/countries/IR/events/50770/photos/42565

On December 13, the vice director of Russia’s National Defense Command Center, Victor Kalganov, and three prominent Russian Ministry of Defense officials made an official visit to North Korea. Kalganov’s trip to Pyongyang came after United States Secretary of State Rex Tillerson called for renewed DPRK-U.S. diplomacy, and underscored Moscow’s commitment to a peaceful resolution of the North Korea crisis.

Since North Korea fired four ballistic missiles towards Japan on March 6, the Russian government has devoted considerable diplomatic resources to resolving the nuclear standoff. Many analysts have cited Russia’s desire to increase its influence in the Asia-Pacific region and alignment with the North Korean regime as rationales for its expanded diplomatic involvement on the Korean peninsula.

While these factors have shaped Russian policymakers’ perceptions of the DPRK crisis, the best explanation for Kremlin’s active role in resolving the standoff is Russia’s desire to showcase its great power status to both its domestic audience and the international community. To this end, , Russian diplomats have rallied support from European and Asian leaders for a peaceful resolution to the North Korean crisis, and used a mixture of coercive diplomacy and back-channel negotiations to convince the DPRK to come to the bargaining table.

These diplomatic initiatives are principally aimed at preventing a war between the United States and North Korea. Much like how Russia’s successful diplomatic outreach to U.S. allies in Europe and the Middle East on Syria helped soften Washington’s position on Assad’s removal, Kremlin policymakers believe that building an international consensus around the need to avoid war with North Korea will moderate President Donald Trump’s hawkish rhetoric towards Pyongyang. Enticing North Korea to the bargaining table would also assist this aim. If Russia can help successfully prevent a war, Moscow’s status as a conflict arbiter will increase tremendously, expanding Russia’s alliance network and Putin’s prestige at home and abroad.  

An Increased Voice

Russian policymakers believe that revealing the chasm in perspectives between Trump administration’s hawkish rhetoric and the international community’s perceptions will cause the United States to de-escalate and align with the international consensus. To facilitate this effort, Russia is trying to convince U.S. allies to support its preferred solution to the DPRK crisis and pressure Trump to refrain from military action.

Since March, Russia has emerged as a leading international supporter of China’s dual freeze proposal, which calls for a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear weapons development in exchange for the suspension of joint U.S.-South Korea military drills on the DPRK’s borders. Even though the United States has rebuffed the dual freeze proposal, Russia has reached out diplomatically to U.S. allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region to convince them to endorse the plan and pressure Washington to follow suit.   

For example, on August 18, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held a bilateral dialogue with his German counterpart Sigmar Gabriel. Berlin’s subsequent expression of support for the dual freeze proposal gave Moscow’s position on North Korea critical legitimacy within the European Union.  

The Russian government has also attempted to expand support for the dual freeze proposal in the ASEAN bloc. On August 9, Lavrov announced the creation of a permanent Russia-ASEAN mission to bolster security cooperation with Southeast Asia on North Korea and transnational terrorism. Public statements expressing solidarity with the Russian position on North Korea by ASEAN leaders like Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte have also gained widespread coverage in the Russian state media, reaffirming the link between Moscow’s great power status aspirations and diplomatic involvement on the Korean peninsula.

In addition, Russian officials have leveraged improved relations with South Korea to shape Seoul’s perspective on the North Korea crisis. Moscow’s outreach to moderate members of South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s inner circle has produced tangible results, as a group of Moon’s foreign policy advisors expressed tentative support for a dual freeze proposal on September 14.

If the Trump administration responds to Moscow-induced diplomatic pressure from U.S. allies by loosening its preconditions for diplomacy with North Korea and desisting from further military threats against Pyongyang, respect for Putin as a peacemaker will grow considerably. Such an outcome would  help Putin consolidate his nationalist base ahead of the 2018 presidential elections, and bolster the credibility of Russia’s arbitration ventures in other regions.  

Coercion and Co-option

To steer North Korea towards a peaceful course, Russia has combined coercive diplomacy with co-option. To highlight its displeasure with Kim Jong-Un’s brinkmanship, Russia supported the imposition of comprehensive UN sanctions against North Korea on September 12. As Russia has replaced China as North Korea’s most trusted international partner, according to the DPRK’s February 2017 ranking of international allies, Moscow hopes its expressions of displeasure with Pyongyang will resonate with North Korean policymakers.

Even though Russia remains officially committed to implementing the entire UN sanctions regime against North Korea, in practice, Russian policymakers have distinguished between “legitimate” punitive sanctions worthy of full compliance and “counter-productive” sanctions that threaten North Korea’s economic stability.

Russia routinely violates sanctions against the DPRK that it deems to be counter-productive, believing North Korean aggression is more likely if Kim Jong-Un faces internal instability. As such, in November 2017 Russia increased oil exports to North Korea aimed at preventing  volatility and unpredictability associated with a potential collapse of the North Korean economy.

In exchange for this vital material support, Russian diplomats have held bilateral dialogues with North Korean officials aimed at convincing Pyongyang to accept diplomatic negotiations with the United States over its nuclear program. If Russia can convert the goodwill accrued from Putin’s post-2014 rapprochement with North Korea into a diplomatic breakthrough, Moscow will highlight its diplomatic independence from China and great power status in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Russian government’s efforts to steer the United States and North Korea towards a peaceful course has increased its credibility as a diplomatic stakeholder in the region. Arguably, based on its ability to maintain a line of communication with both North Korean officials and pro-engagement members of South Korea, Russia is presenting itself as a useful partner for U.S. policymakers seeking a peaceful resolution to the DPRK nuclear crisis.

As Washington’s current strategy of combining sanctions against North Korea with periodic engagement of China struggles to gain traction, the prospect of Russia as a go-between in the crisis may take on increased relevance.

Samuel Ramani is a DPhil candidate in International Relations at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He is also a journalist who contributes regularly to the Washington Post, The Diplomat and Huffington Post. He can be followed on Twitter at samramani2 and on Facebook at Samuel Ramani.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: "Entering the Kremlin walls." (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by SusieQ158

Ambassador Cameron Munter discusses the political situation in Lebanon, following the surprise resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri. Munter talks to Voice of America, beginning around the 7:28 mark.

Listen to his remarks here.

Click here to read a Q&A with Munter following his meeting with Lebanese President Michel Aoun.

Photo: "Faraya Mzaar Ski Resort, Lebanon" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by Paul Saad

The East West Institute is mentioned in a Huffington Post article regarding its Track 2 work with Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO). In the article, CARPO's head Adnan Tabatabi shares the joint effort by the two organizations to bring together a group of influential figures from rivaling neighbors Arab Saudi and Iran on a regular basis. The meetings are confidential.

The collaboration between EWI and CARPO has so far produced four policy reports: Iranian and Saudi Perspectives on ISIL, Iranian and Saudi Perspectives on the Refugee Crisis, Iranian and Saudi Perspectives on the Post-Oil Economy, and Iranian and Saudi Perspectives on the Risks of Climate Change and Ecological Deterioration.

Click here to read the article on Huffington Post.

Photo: "Wadi Rum" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by twiga_swala

“The escalation in the Korean Peninsula is an opportunity for the Korean people to unite, to share the blessings of a democracy and to eliminate all nuclear weapons, serving as an example for the rest of the world to follow,” said Dr. William J. Parker III, Chief Operating Officer of the EastWest Institute (EWI), delivering a keynote at the International Forum on One Korea 2017: Solutions to the Korean Peninsula Crisis, in Seoul on December 7-8.

EWI co-organized the event, along with the Global Peace Foundation, Action for Korea United, and One Korea Foundation in partnership with the National Unification Advisory Council of the Republic of Korea. The Seoul event was an extension of a previous conference held in Washington D.C. on November 14-15. This set of fora provided a multi-track platform for leading global experts to address and discuss solutions to the Korean peninsula crisis, and build global cooperation with civil society and national stakeholders.

Warning of the dire consequences associated with the security of fissile material should North Korea's nuclear program continue unchecked, Dr. Parker singled out China as particularly vulnerable to consequences of war breaking out on the Korean peninsula, saying the crisis presented China with an opportunity to exercise its options as a growing influence in the region.

“If North Korea is allowed to continue its nuclear weapons program, Japan and South Korea will very likely build advanced nuclear weapons systems,” remarked Dr. Parker. “And it does not stop there. China will undoubtedly feel a need to expand its weapon systems. Other nations will watch and we may well see a proliferation of Gulf States and others building their own systems.”

"The opportunity for a stable, prosperous, self-reliant and unified Korea is within our grasp," added Dr. Parker.

Other forum speakers included Dr. Sue Mi Terry, Senior Fellow for Korea at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea; Rev. Kenneth Bae, President of the Nehemiah Global Initiative and the longest-held American prisoner in North Korea; Dr. Tarja Cronberg, former European Union Parliamentarian and Distinguished Associate Fellow with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; Dr. Jai Poong Ryu, President of the One Korea Foundation, and scholars, economists and human rights advocates from Korea, Japan, Russia, China, Mongolia and the United States.

More information about the event, including a complete agenda, can be accessed here.

Photo: "170322-N-GD109-270" (CC BY-NC 2.0) by U.S. Pacific Fleet