Conflict Prevention

Dr. Parker offered three theses on Turkey’s changes as a result of the April 16, 2017 referendum: first, Turkey has become significantly more complicated since the 2016 coup attempt and the Referendum; second, Turkey is located in a challenging geographic area and it’s important to view Turkey from the perspectives of Turkey itself, its neighbors and of the United States, and understand where each other is coming from; and third, Turkey matters; and U.S.-Turkey/Turkey-NATO relationships matter even more.

He explained how Turkey, with a population of over 80 million people, exists in a complicated region of the world surrounded by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Iran, Iraq and Syria, just across the Black Sea from Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. He stated Turkey has the second largest military in NATO, and that four million refugees have come to call Turkey their new home in the past decade. To put this influx of humanity into context, it would be the equivalent of the United States suddenly receiving a flood of 16 million refugees over a decade, equal to the population of 14 states, or 61 percent of Texas. Dr. Parker noted that Turkey does not call these new residents “refugees,” preferring instead to call them “guests,” as a sign of respect from Turkish citizens.

Dr. Parker also discussed key results of the 18 changes made to Turkey’s Constitution as a result of the referendum’s passing, which effectively transition Turkey from a parliamentary to presidential democracy, and reset term limits. The changes also provide for elections to be held within 45 days of the presidential post being vacated for any reason, effectively preventing a military coup from turning into a new government.

The EastWest Institute (EWI), the National Institute of Strategic Communication at Peking University (NISC), the Centre for China & Globalization (CCG), and the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC) convened on June 15-16 an international symposium entitled “’Afghanistan Reconnected’: Renewed Opportunities Under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” in collaboration with the Embassy of Afghanistan to China, Kabul University and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

Following the Belt & Road Summit in Beijing in May of this year, the EWI symposium was the first follow-up event dedicated to one particular country along the “New Silk Road.” Given the tragic backdrop of the recent terror attacks in Kabul, the symposium was a timely event in reinvigorating a collective hope for the future as the general consensus was that peace in the region is dependent upon a stable and thriving Afghanistan.

The event focused on how China’s new outgoing economic strategy can provide benefits for Afghanistan's stability, security and prosperity in a regional context. To this end, it aimed to build trust between political and business contacts among countries (India, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan) with significant interests in the future stability of the country as well as to develop policy recommendations for regional economic cooperation.

Conceived as a Track 2 dialogue, the symposium brought together parliamentarians, diplomats, academics and professionals from across the private sector and several international organizations. Despite being an unofficial event, significant assurances from speakers associated with the National Reform and Development Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) represented the authentic expression of Chinese government strategy.

Key Themes

As a consequence of Afghanistan’s weakened governmental institutions and endemic corruption, the need to address the very real concerns that BRI may forgo Afghanistan completely was a main topic of concern. However, amongst Chinese reassurances that Afghanistan is very much a central cog of BRI, other delegates warned that an unstable and economically regressive Afghanistan will also hamper the future success of its neighbors.

Chief among several tangible Chinese pledges was the commitment to further financial investment and professional training.  Improving and increasing the possibilities for people-to-people exchanges between all countries along the New Silk Road was also emphasized as a perquisite to BRI’s possible success.  Several Chinese speakers voiced China’s commitment to provide 10,000 scholarships to train Afghan researchers, managers and engineers to run 50 jointly-organized laboratories.  The mining industry, in particular, was identified as a specific area of win-win cooperation, as Afghanistan boasts rich deposits of several minerals and can benefit from the infrastructure and technical expertise of China to exploit these resources.

Along with discussions concerning trade and transit, investment and infrastructure, and energy cooperation, sustainable or “green” development was a new theme to emerge as a guiding principle of BRI. In order to ensure the New Silk Road is conscious of its environmental impact, there were calls for concerted efforts from the Chinese government and its international partners to share information in order to develop thorough regulation and policy. In addition to its abundant natural resources, Afghanistan also has masses of renewable energy potential waiting to be tapped into, such as 23,000 megawatts of hydropower which, if developed, could be exported to Pakistan. Furthermore, well over 200,000 MW of solar energy and tremendous possibilities for wind energy are yet to be realized. As a concrete outcome, cooperation between Kabul University and Poly Solar Technologies was concluded to help both the university train Afghan students and the company invest in the Afghan market.

During the discussions, participants drew attention to how BRI can both learn and expand from previous initiatives which attempted to revitalize and reestablish the centrality of the Old Silk Road in global economics. Several philosophies underpinned previous attempts, but BRI’s strength lies in its extensive research and identification of significant focus areas, including Afghanistan.  A major task for BRI in this regard is to address the large trade imbalance between China and Afghanistan by creating stronger trading links through the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

When considering the more polarizing foreign policy emanating from Washington, a significant geopolitical observation to come out of the symposium was the prospect for BRI to be a driving force in convincing regional states to put aside their differences in order to foster a richer culture of cross border cooperation. With over 20 terrorist groups said to be operating in Afghanistan, several delegates dispelled the myth that a difference between “good” and “bad” insurgent groups exists. Delegates, therefore, expressed the hope that both the U.S. and China would use their leverage over Pakistan and Afghanistan to work towards a common understanding of combatting violent extremism, and at the same time towards connecting the two countries through the existing and new rail and road systems. EWI’s CEO Cameron Munter, former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, pointed out that BRI and the converging interests of the U.S. and China represent not only an immense mobilizer of unprecedented economic opportunities, but also an opportunity to strengthen institutional capacities and state building.

These arguments echoed Afghan President Ghani’s sentiments just a week prior, while he was in Astana, Kazahkstan as part of the latest Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, where he expressed his willingness to step up cooperation in transportation to enhance connectivity. Chinese influence is seen as a potential driver for brokering bilateral agreements regarding border management control along the hotly contested, and often tense, Durand Line. A common complaint, reiterated several times throughout the symposium, was that despite hundreds of agreements and MoU’s in place between Afghanistan and its neighbors, these policies often go unimplemented. In terms of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Chinese/U.S. influence was envisioned as serving the dual purpose of providing an independent check on illegal crossings and assisting with trade management processes for trucks transiting goods in and out of either country.

Contrary to more pessimistic reports amongst geopolitical and international relations analysts, and with respects to other local infrastructure projects in the region, delegates at the event highlighted the potential synergies between the Iranian Chabahar and Pakistani Gwadar ports. Some see the construction of the two ports as physical manifestations of the wider geopolitical tensions in the region, especially considering the former is largely viewed as an avenue by which India and Afghanistan can increase trade by circumventing Pakistan. Yet, it was the compatibility of the two ports which garnered most discussion at the symposium with comments that Gwadar could complement the overall function of Chabahar by handling any spillover cargo. Moreover, the short distance between the two ports was seen as the ideal reason to implement a feeder vessel service, transporting both cargo and people to greatly enhance the economy and build trust between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

All parties to the symposium were thus unanimous in their insistence that Afghanistan will be an indispensable building block in the realization of BRI as it shall provide the bridge between east and west. More importantly, all delegates agreed BRI offered a unique chance for the countries of the region to focus on their mutual interests, rather than their mutual differences, in pursuit of economic prosperity and peace. As one delegate put it succinctly, this is a chance the region must not pass up.

Beijing, China — The EastWest Institute (EWI), the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC), the National Institute of Strategic Communication at Peking University (NISC), and the Centre for China & Globalization (CCG) will co-host the international symposium “’Afghanistan Reconnected’: Renewed Opportunities Under China’s Belt and Road Initiative” in collaboration with the Embassy of Afghanistan to China, Kabul University and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) from June 15-16, 2017. 

The symposium will focus on ways to unlock both Afghanistan’s and the region’s economic potential during a time of transition, and on fresh opportunities provided by China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In light of a declining security situation, these discussions will be a timely reminder of the importance of stabilizing Afghanistan and utilizing its strategic location as a pivot towards greater economic cooperation. Senior political and business leaders from Afghanistan, China, India, Iran, and Pakistan will work in multiple panels towards producing a set of feasible recommendations concerning trade & transit, investment & infrastructure, energy, and regional dynamics. 

The opening event will offer keynote addresses from EWI’s CEO Amb. Cameron Munter; Mr. Mou Xiongbing, Director of International Economic Cooperation Office, Academy of Macroeconomic Research, National Development and Reform Commission; and Ambassador of Afghanistan to China, H.E. Mr. Janan Mosazai.

The Beijing symposium is set to be the final stage of EWI’s multi-year “Afghanistan Reconnected Process.” Sponsored by the government of Germany and private donors, the Process addresses regional economic security issues in Afghanistan and its neighborhood. The focus is promoting the win-win potential of enhanced regional economic and political cooperation in order to not only foster development but also security and stability in Afghanistan and greater Central Asia. EWI established a network of senior experts from governments, parliaments, and the private sector, mainly from Afghanistan, Iran, India, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, China, the U.A.E., the U.S., and Europe, as well as from multiple regional and international organizations. Through a series of high-level consultations, this network identified major obstacles to regional trade and transit. A set of practical recommendations on how to overcome these obstacles have been presented to the governments of Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Iran.

EWI Senior Fellow Franz-Stefan Gady spoke at the annual GLOBSEC Bratislava Global Security Forum, held on May 26-28.

Gady joined other panelists to discuss "Disruptive Technologies and Future Conflict: Investing in the Future of Defense." The panel asked some of the pressing questions today such as:

• How do we characterize the most urgent common threats that disruptive technologies must resolve? 
• What are the important emerging technology trends that could impact transatlantic defence?
• To what extent do we have viable approaches to evaluate where to make technology investments?
• How do we define the measures of success of these disruptive technology investments?

Watch the panel below.

By the end of this month, the bulk of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) acting as part of the United Nations (UN) mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) will be withdrawn from the field. While the authorities argued the contrary, the degradation of the security situation in South Sudan was the primary cause of the retreat. This marks the temporary end of meaningful JSDF participation in any UN Peacekeeping Operation (PKO), and raises doubts about the ability of Japan to play a greater proactive peacekeeping role, especially in Africa.

Over the last decade, Japan’s security contribution on the continent has been actually on the rise with the unprecedented participation of the SDF in an international counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden (from 2009), the subsequent build-up of its first overseas military base in Djibouti (2011), and the SDF’s longest participation in a UNPKO in South Sudan (2012– 2017). These measures contrast with the traditional Japanese approach to Africa based on development aid, as characterized by the provision of development assistance and showcased by the TICAD Summit (Tokyo International Conference on African Development). Assessing the way forward for Japan’s security commitment in Africa thus requires identifying the factors behind this new activism and understanding the means and limitations of Japan’s security-related activities.

Japanese interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are of an economic nature, and quite modest (12 billion USD of FDI stock in 2014, three times less than China). Tokyo’s active security policy is meant, in great part, to reassure a risk-averse business sector and encourage it to step up its investment in light of an increase in terrorist attacks on the continent. Japan’s Africa diplomacy also aims at checking the rising Chinese presence on the continent by emulating Beijing activism and offering an alternative model of development. The importance given to keeping up with China highlights the survival of the traditional Japanese “reactive approach.”

Looking more broadly, Japanese strategic security interests remain, first and foremost, centered on its immediate neighborhood, meaning an upgraded, more ambitious military commitment to Africa is unlikely to happen. Indeed, while media attention is focused on Japanese SDF dispatch in Africa, the bulk of Japan’s security contribution remains very low-key: mostly in the form of financial contributions (securitization of aid) and capacity-building assistance, and it is often channeled through, or in partnership with, multilateral institutions or via a third country, such as France. The withdrawal from South Sudan shows that the government is still very much constrained when dispatching its forces abroad, and the passing of the Legislation on Peace and Security in 2015 changed nothing. If a law-enforcement mission such as in the Gulf of Aden is possible, risky operations on the ground are not. Japan is thus likely to continue to rely on comprehensive principles and approaches such as “human security” and “peacebuilding” that associate security with development and favor civil-military operations in a post-conflict environment.

That said, despite the present, limited approach, new features of Japan’s diplomacy may signal the gradual, heightened integration of Africa into Japan’s overall strategic interests. First, despite limitations in terms of mandates and rules of engagement, SDF deployments to Africa are being facilitated. The proactive commitment of Japan to a peacebuilding approach is providing opportunities for the SDF to act in post-conflict, safer environments, in synergy with development assistance activities. This can constitute the real value-add of Japan’s security contribution in Africa.

Second, Africa is now being associated more tightly with Japan’s strategic core interests. Terrorist attacks on the continent pose a direct risk to Japanese nationals. Threats to the security of vital maritime shipping routes, transiting from the Middle East to the Indian Ocean and all the way to Japan, are directly undermining Tokyo’s commercial interests. The inclusion of Africa in the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”—a Japanese counter-initiative to China’s Belt and Road project—also demonstrates Japan’s will to adopt a more strategic approach to Africa. This might lead to greater engagement, with respect to investment in infrastructure, maritime capacity-building and peacebuilding operations. The expansion of the Djibouti military base is an important symbol of this longer-term security commitment in the region.

These recent developments, however, have not yet led to a defined strategic approach. Despite political declarations of interest, there still exists a significant gap between the discourse and the reality of what Japan wants—and what it can achieve in Africa. As Japanese companies remain extremely risk-averse, insufficient or unsustainable interest in Africa on the part of Japan’s private sector would jeopardize the current ambitions to increase Japan’s economic and politico-strategic profile on the continent. Finally, Japan still lacks expertise in African affairs, which undermines its capacity to design a proper strategic approach, as advocated by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe—emphasizing increased investment and a more significant security presence. If Japan truly wants to engage more deeply in Africa, and develop a more calculated approach to the continent, , it will need to sustain political and economic interest in Africa over the long-term and continue to refine its understanding of Africa’s complex political and cultural dynamics.

Céline Pajon is a Research Fellow, Center for Asian Studies, Ifri. The author recently published a policy paper: “Japan’s Security Policy in Africa: The dawn of a strategic approach?”, Asie.Visions, No. 93, Ifri, May 2017.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

The EastWest Institute (EWI), in partnership with the Tehran-based Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) and with the support of the German Federal Foreign Office, convened a dialogue in Tehran in December 2016 as part of EWI’s “Afghanistan Reconnected Process;” a multi-year program aimed at contributing to Afghanistan’s future stability by encouraging regional cooperation.

The Tehran dialogue extended to both policy makers and the business community to gain a deeper understanding of the challenges and opportunities facing Iran as an essential neighbor of Afghanistan. The dialogue aimed to deliver relevant policy recommendations that have a reasonable prospect of implementation. Specifically, discussions focused on identifying obstacles to trade, transit and energy cooperation between the two countries, and proposing viable solutions to these obstacles. The present briefing, jointly issued by EWI and IPIS, is intended to highlight the findings of the dialogue and the resulting recommendations. 

Executive Summary 

Iran’s re-entry into the global fold presents a number of unprecedented opportunities, positioning the country to contribute considerably to the development of neighboring Afghanistan in the coming years. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s strategy of fostering regional economic cooperation as the linchpin for long-term growth and stability in Afghanistan will encourage and even necessitate Iranian participation. As a vital neighbor emerging from global isolation, Iran can serve as a critical partner in this long-term plan, and also in the efforts of the international community.  

Tremendous opportunity exists to increase trade and economic cooperation between Iran and Afghanistan. Sharing a 936km border with trading routes through Herat in Afghanistan’s north, water sharing agreements on the Helmand River, and mutual opportunities for resource development, Iran is well-positioned as an integral member of Afghanistan’s regional development sphere. The India-supported construction of Iran’s Chabahar port represents an important step toward taking advantage of Iran’s access to deep water points. Opportunities also arise in addressing the massive trade imbalance between the two countries. At the end of the Iranian calendar year in March 2016, Afghanistan exported less than 26 million USD in non-oil trade to Iran, while importing only 2.5 billion USD from its neighbor in return. 
Iran stands ready to increase its role in Afghanistan, but there are clear obstacles to maximizing the potential of the Iranian/Afghan relationship: namely, poor connectivity and infrastructure, a deteriorating security situation, endemic corruption in Afghanistan, an absence of contacts and networks between Iranian and Afghan business people operating in either country, unfavorable visa policies and tariffs, and a lack of trust in the Afghan market.

Cooperation between Iran and Afghanistan to create a more secure environment is vital to long term economic growth in both countries. Iranian influence both in western Afghanistan and in a broader regional context can serve to improve security, assist Afghan governance improvements, and implement long term regional economic plans grounded in trusted agreements. A genuine partnership between Afghanistan and Iran, as well as strengthened regional and international efforts toward cooperation, will be crucial for future prosperity in the coming decades.

Download the full report here.

In an interview with Australia's Radio National, Gady talks about what a second Korean War might look like. Listen here.

Read Gady's full analysis on The Diplomat here.