Conflict Prevention

In the ungoverned corners of the world, conflicts simmering under the surface will almost inevitably boil over every now and again. Given the variables involved, the conflict in Pakistan’s Balochistan province looks ready to do just that — and it will almost certainly spill over Pakistan’s borders.

Pakistan strategists will often talk about the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Pakistan-Afghan border as security considerations, but rarely examine Balochistan, the largest and most resource-rich province in Pakistan, in detail. This can be misleading: The FATA make an ideal backdrop against which to praise the Pakistani Army’s relatively successful Zarb-e-Azb counterterrorism offensive, yet in Balochistan, the main stage for China’s $46 billion infrastructure investment, security forces falter.
 
The active Baloch separatist movement dates from the time of Pakistan’s partition from India, and militants have complicated the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’s centerpiece, a highway connecting China’s western provinces with the new deep-water port in Gwadar (allowing China overland access to the Persian Gulf). Increased attacks by militants on CPEC construction sites in the past year pushed project leaders to reroute the highway largely through Sindh province, rather than directly through Balochistan.

Click here to access the full article in Foreign Policy.

EastWest Institute (EWI) Director of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) program, Kawa Hassan, will be speaking at the 2017 Global Peace Convention in Manila, the Philippines. 

Hassan will deliver his insight on root causes of the emergence of extremist organizations, particularly the Islamic State, with focus on the Middle East and North Africa regions. Hassan will join the panel for “Dialogue & Trust: Real Lessons in Countering Violent Extremism” on March 1. 

EWI partners with the Global Peace Foundation to organize the four-day convention, bringing together leading global experts and practitioners to share best practices and develop multi-sector partnerships for sustainable peace and development and the achievement of the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). A combination of plenary and parallel sessions will provide an opportunity for participants to share, learn and collaborate on achieving a collective impact.

In September last year, Hassan delivered remarks on "How to De-glorify and Discredit ISIS" at the the Global Peace Leadership Conference in Belfast organized by the foundation. He also participated in the panel on "Ethical Leadership in Action." 

Click here to see the full schedule of the Manila convention.

French and Japanese Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense met in Paris on January 6 with the purpose of deepening strategic cooperation between the two countries. Gathering for their third 2+2 meeting, the ministers agreed to move forward with joint-development of defense equipment (undersea drones for minesweeping). Discussions on the signing of an ACSA (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) were also launched, which could ultimately allow the two countries to share defense supplies and services thus expanding cooperation in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations.

This reflects a new norm for Japan: to inch more toward security cooperation with “like-minded” countries in the military realm as Tokyo’s regional environment is growing more insecure and volatile. However, if European countries, such as France, are deepening cooperation with a country they consider a new proactive security actor, more dialogue is needed to narrow the perceptions and expectations gap to allow for a more substantial partnership.

Converging interests from Asia to Africa

Despite being geographically distant, France and Japan share a number of converging interests, beginning with their attachment to liberal values and the protection of Rule of Law, as well as common concerns on unilateral challenges to the international order (by China in the East and South China Sea and by Russia in Europe), nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, piracy, and so on. Thus, their security cooperation is expanding, with 2+2 dialogues at the ministerial level since 2014, maritime cooperation in the Pacific (HA/DR operations) and in the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy operations, coordination on building the capacities of third countries in East Asia and Africa, among others.

This said, each country has its own agenda.

For Japan, the primary objective is to ensure that France and other European partners share its analysis of the security challenges raised by the Chinese maritime expansion in East Asia. Tokyo is indeed looking for political support to face what it sees as attempts by Beijing to dominate its neighborhood and reshape the global order. Paris is generally sharing Tokyo’s line and in their Joint Statement, both countries expressed their ”strong opposition to unilateral actions that increase tensions, such as reclamation or building of outposts” in the South China Sea. Japan also wishes that France, which maintains prepositioned forces in the Pacific Ocean, increase its military presence in East Asia. Expectations in Tokyo have been particularly high after the French Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian called at the Shangri-La Dialogue last year for coordination between European navies to ensure a regular and visible presence in the maritime areas of Asia.

While France’s Asian policy has long been driven by its economic relations with Beijing, Paris increasingly wants to be recognized as a responsible stakeholder in the region. Under the administration of Francois Hollande, France has diversified its approach to Asia, building up ties with new partners (Japan, Australia, India, South Korea, Malaysia or Singapore). This new approach has also been driven by a more pragmatic objective: as a major provider of defense equipment in Asia, France cannot remain indifferent to the security concerns of Asian countries. Prime Minister Abe’s efforts to strengthen Japan’s defense posture convinced the French strategic community that Japan would soon be a normalized defense partner, eager to attain the best equipment and willing to increase security cooperation and coordination even beyond East Asia.

Indeed, both countries see an opportunity to geographically expand their security cooperation all the way to the Indian Ocean and Africa. A Joint Plan for Africa, adopted in 2015, already provides grounds for some modest security cooperation such as joint funding of peacekeeping schools on the continent. The definition of a Japanese “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”, announced by Prime Minister Abe at the Japan-Africa TICAD conference last August, should provide an impetus toward greater coordination in the field of maritime capacity building.  

By stepping up its security cooperation with Paris in Africa, Tokyo can benefit from France’s precious knowledge of the African security environment, especially in the context of growing terrorist attacks (10 Japanese citizens died during the In Amenas attacks in January 2013 and two were beheaded by ISIS in 2015). Indeed, Japanese defense attachés based in African countries benefited from a first briefing from French defense officers in January 2016. In return, France can count on Japan to contribute to funding some security-related activities in the Sahel and West Africa.

A promising, long-term cooperation despite some challenges

If security cooperation is now under a positive dynamic, certain challenges remain. First, a threat perception gap still exists between the partners: Japan was shocked when France, along with most European countries, joined the China-founded AIIB back in 2015. Second, Tokyo is also still suspicious of France selling dual-use equipment to Beijing, despite the bilateral consultation forum on export controls set up in 2013 to reassure Japan. Finally, some differences regarding the nature of the security challenge posed by Russia can also emerge between Paris and Tokyo, as the latter has been courting Moscow despite the Crimea annexation.

Furthermore, Japan is impatient to see more concrete steps in terms of an expanded French military presence in East Asia, while Paris considers that Tokyo’s commitment to shift from checkbook diplomacy to more tangible security contribution in Africa is still too modest. Paris remains  dubious about the real opportunities offered by the Japanese market to its defense equipment, as Japan remains very much U.S.-centered in this domain.

One additional and unexpected challenge the two partners now face is the management of their respective alliances with the United States under Trump administration. For Japan, the rapprochement with European countries serves both to reinforce the existing web of U.S. allies and to complement it, in the case of an American retrenchment. In the present case, the strong uncertainty about Washington’s future diplomatic orientations requires additional consultation and political coordination between Tokyo and Paris so as to weigh on U.S. options.  

Despite these challenges, Franco-Japanese relations present no major points of friction. Looking to the future, the latest 2+2 also sought to demonstrate ambition for a long-term security relationship by expanding cooperation in fields such as space-based maritime surveillance and cyberspace. So the strategic partnership is set to grow, slowly but surely.

Céline Pajon is a Research Fellow at the Center for Asian Studies at the Institut français des relations internationales. She tweets @CelinePajon. 

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: "Weathercock of France Mountain : フラ�" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by Dakiny

By virtue of its size, the Department of Defense (DoD) is a sort of “natural monopoly” within the U.S. government. The State Department employs approximately 24,000 foreign, and civil service employees across its embassies, consulates and offices globally. The Pentagon alone has over 23,000 military and civilian staff working within its five walls, with thousands more spread across Defense agencies, offices and headquarters. To be clear, these are not the “warfighters” carrying rifles, flying planes or driving ships, but the bureaucracy that runs the military.

Karl Ikenberry, a former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and retired three-star general, has highlighted that the State Department’s Bureau of Africa Affairs has about 180 staff, while the military’s analogous Africa Command headquarters has over 1,500, with additional staff covering various “Africa Desks” throughout the Pentagon and Defense agencies. This doesn’t mean the DoD is more efficient, has the expertise or required competency to take the lead on many foreign policy and foreign assistance programs. But because it can commit more staff-power, man-hours and, often, more money than other more thinly-manned and resourced departments, it simply has the bureaucratic capacity to do work others can’t.

In wartime, having staff-power to “make things happen” is a necessary virtue. In peacetime, however—especially in a quasi-bellicose environment, such as the period immediately following 9/11—it can weaken institutional checks by the State Department, nominally, the lead agency for foreign affairs responsible for creating the national policies traditionally relied upon to reconcile the military’s parochial interests with broader U.S. interests.

Who Directs Foreign Aid?

One area in which this plays out is foreign aid. Each year, the U.S. provides billions in aid to foreign partners. In the past, most of this money belonged to the State Department, though the DoD administered some. What foreign aid funds the Defense Department did have (which it calls security cooperation or security assistance) were largely subject to approval by the State Department as the lead agency for foreign policy. But after 9/11, the scale of aid rapidly increased, as did the share of exclusively DoD-administered funds. Just as military commanders’ disproportionate prestige can lend priority to their more limited issue portfolios, the DoD’s massive staff and funding can overwhelm the State Department’s ability to ensure that Defense security cooperation activities align with U.S. foreign policy—even in those cases where State has oversight.

One solution is to better resource the State Department. Instead, the DoD has sought greater authority over its security cooperation funds. The Pentagon cites efficiency; the State Department’s staff is too small to keep up with the pace and scale of assistance that DoD wants to disperse. The Pentagon believes its ability to rapidly deploy foreign aid is, at times, critical to preserving regional stability or propping up partner countries, reducing the likelihood of new regional conflicts or nation-building efforts.

Preventing conflicts before they happen is a compelling argument. But the Pentagon’s near-term quest to preserve stability has sometimes backfired. A case in point is after World War II when the U.S. Army founded the “School of the Americas” to train Latin American military leaders to defend against communist insurgencies and revolutions, not unlike training the U.S. provides to Iraqi and Afghani security forces today. However, part of this post-war legacy is that some of the school’s most high-profile graduates, like Manuel Noriega in Panama, went on to use what they learned to become despots who, themselves, required U.S. intervention to overthrow.

Oversight, Ends, Means and Effectiveness

More recently, some aid efforts surpass even the DoD’s capacity to manage. Because of widespread concern that large portions of reconstruction aid provided to Afghanistan was lost to waste and corruption, Congress established a unique, independent Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction in 2008. One report found that one-third of completed aid projects were unused, many more under-used, and nearly two-thirds failed to meet original project specifications or requirements. Of the latter, some were found to be totally unsafe or unusable because local contractors substituted cheaper, inferior materials or methods to increase profits. Some local contractors were even found to be using profits from DoD aid to support the insurgency.

Whether additional layers of bureaucracy or cross-departmental checks could have prevented these problems is outside the scope of this series. However, while perhaps less “efficient,” the State Department’s role is to provide input into what best serves long-term U.S. interests, veto potentially short-sighted Pentagon priorities or, at minimum, more deeply grapple with the tradeoffs involved. A 2016 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report concluded that when DoD controls assistance funds, it skews regional relationships, potentially giving Geographic Commanders more influence over a partner nation than the State Department-run U.S. Embassy.

The CRS report also echoes the concern that DoD’s capacity is disproportionate to its more limited goals and priorities: “DoD’s overwhelming advantage in personnel and funds allow it to evade State Department direction and oversight and to conduct activities better carried out by civilians, which may be to the detriment of long term U.S. interests.” Apart from the intense nation-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the DoD also provides a host of “institution building” services to help create effective foreign defense bureaucracies. Other activities defy intuitive links to Defense priorities, like DoD’s contribution to the Women, Peace, and Security effort that guides countries in women’s inclusion in peace-building, gender perspectives on peace and security policy, and other gender-specific issues. Institutional reform and gender issues are unquestionably important to long-term peace and stability, but is the military the best conduit for providing these kinds of services?

During his first year as defense secretary, Robert Gates advocated for a dramatic increase in funding for the State Department and “the civilian instruments of national security.” Later, he worked closely with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to create a stronger working relationship between the two departments, and clear recognition by Defense that “the Secretary of State is the principal spokesperson for United States foreign policy.” Since then, efforts to reconcile these dynamics have faded, and the Defense Department, because of its size, prestige and imperatives to simultaneously prevent, and prepare for, future conflict continues to accrue influence over the shape and execution of U.S. foreign policy.

Steven Stashwick is a writer and analyst based in New York City. He spent ten years on active duty as a U.S. naval officer with multiple deployments to the Western Pacific. He writes about maritime and security affairs in East Asia and serves in the U.S. Navy Reserve. The views expressed are his own. Follow him on Twitter.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.​

Although demography is a vital pillar of national security—alongside water, food, health, energy, natural resources and cyber, not to speak of military power—it somehow does not receive the attention it requires and deserves.

In most cases, countries lack adequate systems of monitoring, regulation, planning and legislation in sharp contradiction to the other pillars of national security. While there is a general understanding that states need early warning systems to alert against wars, natural disasters and food shortages—and indeed, in most cases, the required mechanisms are in place—demography does not fare that well.

Suffice to look at the aging and decreasing population in Japan or at the impact of "one child" policy in China to get an idea about the consequences of the absence of an effective early warning apparatus in this domain. Another good example is continental Europe, whose native population is shrinking as the influx of refugees, immigrants and asylum seekers increases uncontrollably. Arguably, the damage sometimes is equitable to the results of a serious military setback or a natural disaster (or worse), but whose impact may only be felt in a decade or two.

The European Union opened its doors, quite hastily, to a massive wave of refugees without serious consideration of the demographic implications and ramifications, and without a coordinated mechanism in place to handle the inflow. Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey are major recipients of refugees to such a degree, it might upset their delicate demographic balance. Also, the recent upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa brought to the surface another set of demographic issues such as ethnic cleansing, mass migration and vast areas that have become depopulated because of the havoc and chaos caused by civil wars or ISIS.

An interesting twist came to light recently when satellite imaging determined that because of the civil war in Southern Syria, many farmers deserted their lands and stopped irrigating their fields and orchards. This resulted in neighboring Jordan—one of the most arid states on the globe—getting extra water through the Yarmouk River.

One man's disaster is another's good fortune or opportunity.

At present, the priority of all involved—either in the West or Russia—is to stabilize the situation and to deal with the impact of ISIS-inspired terrorism at home. It seems that very few, if any, in the intelligence community, the halls of government or even academia are closely examining the demographic aspects of realities around the world, nor are they providing authorities a worthy forecast or an alert on the impact that demographics currently has and will continue to have on national and regional security, economics and stability.

Even a notable establishment such as the U.S. National Intelligence Council, which runs the Long Range Analysis Unit, seems to focus its attention on forecasting democratic transition in the Middle East and North Africa based on future median age rather than on more urgent demographic issues.

Only Australia stands as an exception with a clearly defined demographic policy; drafted in 2010, it quickly adjusted its refugee and immigration policy following the upheaval in the Middle East and the emergence of ISIS. But Australia benefits from being an island continent and can buffer itself against undesired flows of immigrants.

The ongoing tragedy associated with migrants indicates it is high time to upgrade demographic early warning systems on the scale of national security priorities—to avoid catastrophic results in the years and generations to come. Forecasting the coming age of democracy is important, but assessing the impact of sudden mass migration into new terrains is more urgent. Mass migration, from urban and rural areas alike, has its effects in economic, ecological and human terms.

In addition, consideration should be given also to those elements which fill the vacuum created by the mass migrations. In the case of Southern Syria, some areas were partially taken or infiltrated by ISIS (Daesh) thus posing a real danger to neighboring Jordan. In the Iraqi case, the presence of pro-Iranian Shia militias causes concern, as well. The Jordanian Chief of Staff was very clear about that in a recent interview with the BBC (in Arabic). Here, an early warning or alert is more than crucial.

These realities, in turn, raise several fundamental questions for policymakers: which organization or body is most suitably charged with monitoring demographic changes and providing alerts in a timely manner? Should it be the responsibility of intelligence agencies or national security councils or should this be addressed by government-sponsored think thanks? Perhaps an international organization might be able to take the lead in this important work.

Even when policymakers decide on the framework, what is the timeframe for an early warning system? Military intelligence is expected to issue an alert about outbreak of hostilities or a war in a matter of hours or days. What is the time period for an alert about a ticking "demographic bomb?” Are democratic leaders who are facing elections every four or five years able or geared to cope with such a task, which in many cases necessitates unpopular and sometimes tough measures? The answers to these questions are not simple, but inaction today might prove to be calamitous tomorrow.

Ambassador (ret.) Jacob Rosen served as Israel's ambassador in Jordan (2006-2009). He is currently an independent consultant on demographic mapping and collects books about "Lawrence of Arabia." 

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.​

The Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme (FMSH) in Paris has selected Kawa Hassan, Director of Middle East and North Africa Regional Program at the EastWest Institute, to serve as co-project leader of a working group to support the "rights and protection of minorities in the Middle East”. This working group is part of a new initiative established by FMSH—the International Panel on Exiting Violence (IPEV).

"We take great pride in knowing that Kawa Hassan has been selected to head up this working group for the FMSH, a recognized interdisciplinary research institute,” said Dr. William J. Parker, COO of the East West Institute. "As a highly respected expert on the issue of countering extremism in the Middle East, Kawa will bring his unique knowledge, perspectives and management skills toward the benefit of this very important and timely effort.” 

Hassan will co-lead the group along with Orit Bashkin, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History at Chicago University. Together, they will coordinate and supervise a group of global experts to assess existing obstacles to the rights and protection of minorities in the Middle East. This working group represents one of ten such groups of researchers and experts under the IPEV initiative.  

Over a near two-year period, the IPEV will gather an international community of outstanding scholars to examine the issues of violence and exiting violence, with a focus on the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. Specific issues to be addressed include the aspects of failed states, new forms of authoritarianism, proliferation and the metamorphosis of jihadism in the Middle East, and the integration of migrants, presence of Islam and the crisis of political systems in Europe. Issues will be explored in-depth both at the local and regional levels, and by conducting comparative experience analyses of other regions, such as Latin America. This effort will conclude with the publication of a comprehensive report with policy recommendations intended for local, national, and international institutions, NGOs, policy makers and other stakeholders. 

The IPEV was established by the Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme, with support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Conseil Supérieur de la Formation et de la Recherche Stratégique (CSFRS, Paris) and the Dabran Foundation (Iraqi Kurdistan). 

Since last year’s surprising election of Donald Trump, Beijing has looked to up the stakes and increase its leverage in the disputed South China Sea. This past December, China seized a U.S. Navy unmanned underwater vehicle near the Philippines. The seizure was made outside of Beijing’s expansive and ambiguous “nine-dash line.” While the drone was eventually returned to Washington, the incident reveals a new level of mistrust and strategic rivalry between China and the United States. It has also further colored the water amid growing uncertainty on the future trajectory of Sino-U.S. relations under the coming Trump administration.

Beijing is looking to adapt on the fly to the new team in Washington, which has a frenetic, and uncertain, foreign policy direction toward China and the region. On one hand, Beijing was cautiously cheering the defeat of Hillary Clinton—as it worried the former presidential favorite would enact a tougher line toward bilateral relations. Beijing also watched gleefully as Trump repeatedly castigated allies in the region—especially archrival Japan—for not paying their fair share of the burden for U.S. security guarantees. Trump’s denouncement of the Trans-Pacific Partnership was icing on the cake as Obama’s rebalance policy—largely viewed in a containment lens in Beijing—suffered a crushing body blow.

The full commentary can be accessed here.

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump will likely have little time to celebrate his inauguration. The President will inherit a world with numerous foreign policy challenges. High on the list remains defeating terrorism and realizing a stable post-ISIS Iraq.  

During the election campaign, then presidential candidate Trump stated emphatically that he will defeat ISIS by "bombing the hell out of them." This traditional security focused strategy will simply not work. On the contrary, it will prove counter-productive, giving ISIS and al Qaeda a new lease of life and providing the perfect context for further radicalization of a disgruntled Sunni community in Iraq and beyond.

The military campaigns against ISIS are making some tangible progress. The terrorist group is losing territories in Iraq, Syria and Libya. Yet this is neither the military end nor the political and ideological defeat of ISIS. This apocalyptical and genocidal menace is a consequence and not a cause of the current catastrophe in Iraq and Middle East. The root causes that led to its emergence are:

• Sectarian, political and economic exclusion and marginalization of Sunnis by the post-Saddam political order;
• Systemic corruption, lack of good governance, rule of law, transparency and accountability;
• Saddam Hussein’s despotism and horrible human rights violations that created the natural and perfect habitat for ISIS’s genocidal mindset and strategy;
• Intolerant and exclusivist educational curriculum pre- and post-2003;
• Political and military miscalculations and overreach by the U.S.; and
• Geopolitical jockeying by regional and international powers for influence. 

The only way to defeat ISIS entirely is by addressing these root causes in a comprehensive manner. On a macro and conceptual level this begins with a thorough understanding of the factors that lead to radicalization. On a policy level, there is a need for developing the right strategy that should support true and real reforms in Iraq. To be fair to the new U.S. administration, it is the responsibility of Iraqi authorities, especially the ruling Shia majority, to build a truly inclusive state in which Sunnis, Kurds and other communities feel as equal citizens with equal rights. But President-elect Trump can play a crucial role in this process given the political and military leverage of the U.S. in Iraq. While already endorsing a wider approach, Trump’s strategy for Iraq should take into consideration the following components:

• Realization that a traditional and exclusive  security approach will not fully tackle, but rather aggravate root causes of the conflict; ideally an approach that combines military, political and development aspects is required ;
• U.S. should take the lead and cooperate with the EU, UN and other actors in mediating between Iraqis and initiating short-, mid- and long-term political, military and economic measures. The objective is to encourage Iraqi leaders to find common ground and reach painful but vital, historic and much-needed mutual compromises on existential topics, including the form of state governance, power sharing, fair redistribution of wealth and resources, and resolving conflicts over disputed territories; and
• Establishment of a long-term international fund for recovery and reconstruction of post-ISIS Iraq.

However, this recommended support strategy should be conditional. It has to be based on basic democratic principles, namely: true power sharing, peaceful transfer of power when office terms come to an end, implementation of real reforms, rule of law, human rights and addressing human rights violations, transparency and accountability.   

Without such a long term strategy, the new Iraq will be the old Iraq, and ISIS will be back, probably even with more brutality and vengeance. The consequences for Iraq, U.S. and the rest of the world will be destructive and far-reaching.      

Kawa Hassan is EWI’s Director of the Middle East & North Africa Program and a member of Atlantic Council’s Task Force on the Future of Iraq, which is making policy recommendations for the Trump administration on how to deal with the Iraq conflict.  

Photo: "010720-F-8217W-002" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by U.S. Army Korea (Historical Image Archive)