Conflict Prevention

Kawa Hassan, Director of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) program at the EastWest Institute, discusses the chances of independence for millions of Kurds living in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran in a recent interview with OpenCanada.

Although the Kurdish nationalists believe that a fragile Iraqi government may enable a transition to independence, Hassan argues that it will be very difficult for the Iraqi government to reconcile with the Kurds in accepting an independent state.

“At the moment, Baghdad is weak and cannot impose its will. But whether they would accept Kurdistan having Kirkuk as providence – I really doubt it”.

Hassan concludes with a warning that there may be ramifications should the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) unilaterally secede from Iraq with Kirkuk, stating that “there will definitely be a war”.

Founded in June 2011 by the Canadian International Council, OpenCanada is a digital publication on public policy, scholarship and journalism.

Read the full article here. 

Miller says while many people carefully analyzes the nuances of outgoing President Barack Obama’s messages, Trump’s tweets should be viewed with broader strokes.

“My biggest concern, with regards to the Trump administration’s policy on North Korea,” says Miller, “is that it needs to maintain solidarity with its allies, such as Japan and South Korea. So there’s a concern … that Trump might just go it alone and look for bilateral negotiations. That’s exactly what the North is looking for.”

Read the full article on Voice of America (VOA) here.

In the December 22, 2016 interview, Gady said the 2017 defense budget—a 1.4 percent increase to 43.5 billion USD—only represented 5 percent of Japan's overall government expenditure.

People in Asia and the world, he said, should not be concerned that this could lead to an arms race or even military conflict with China. Instead, Gady said the development would be more likely to fuel "the continuous occurrence of so-called gray zone coercion scenarios involving the China Coast Guard (CCG) and Chinese maritime militia vessels harassing Japanese maritime assets (primarily Japan Coast Guard cutters and aircraft) in the East China Sea."

Gady's remarks can be accessed here.

To read his commentary on the issue, click here.

The Asia-Pacific region is in for another challenging year, with a number of long-standing tripwires ripening during a period of great geopolitical uncertainty.

The stunning victory of United States President-elect Donald Trump earlier this fall only magnifies a number of these areas of concern, ranging from China's destabilizing activities in the maritime domain to North Korea's relentless march towards a more potent nuclear weapons capability.

But, in addition to uncertainty about the incoming Trump administration, there are a host of other wild cards in the region.

Read the full commentary here.

"On the surface of it, it does seem to run counter to the stated goals of every American leader since the end of the Cold War. That said, American military and political leaders also have called for the upgrading and replacement of old nukes in the argument that they are safer than older nuclear weapons," said Munter in an interview with VOA's International Edition on December 27, 2016.

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump fired off a tweet on December 22, 2016 saying "The United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes", raising concerns of a potential arms race.

Munter added that "we don't know whether these statements will actually lead to actual policies, but it's something that a lot of people are concerned about."

Listen to the interview here.

A delegation of senior officials from the Communist Party of China (CPC) met with U.S. Democratic and Republican Party leaders and global business leaders in Washington, D.C., on November 14, 2016. These discussions were part of the U.S.-China High-Level Political Party Leaders Dialogue organized by the EastWest Institute (EWI) in partnership with the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (IDCPC) and was the ninth round of this dialogue process.

The CPC delegation was led by Guo Yezhou, vice minister of the IDCPC and council chairman of IDCPC’s in-house thinktank, the China Center for Contemporary World Studies. Ronald Kirk, former United States trade representative and a former Dallas mayor, and Tom Ridge, first secretary of the Office of Homeland Security and former governor of Pennsylvania, led the U.S. Democratic and Republican delegations, which also included sitting party officers from both parties’ national committees.

The propitious timing of the dialogue facilitated candid exchange and valuable insights into the outcome and future implications of the November 8, 2016 U.S. elections, prospective governing priorities of the Trump administration, and the outcomes of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee. The delegates also discussed China’s economic development and challenges and opportunities in U.S.-China relations. A highlight of the dialogue was the keynote presentation on the “Changing U.S. Political Landscape and 2016 U.S. Presidential Election Results” delivered by Geoffrey Garin, president of Hart Research, and Neil Newhouse, partner and co-founder of Public Opinion Strategies.

Following the CPC dialogue with the bipartisan U.S. delegation, the EastWest Institute also facilitated meetings for the CPC with senior Republican officials—former Republican National Committee chairman Mike Duncan, current RNC treasurer Tony Parker, and United States Economic and Security Review Commissioner Dan Slane—to further discuss campaign strategies and prospects for U.S.-China relations under the new Trump administration.

Launched in 2010, the U.S.-China High-Level Political Party Leaders Dialogue seeks to build understanding and trust between political elites from the United States and China through an exchange of views on governance and foreign policy issues. The next round of the dialogue will take place in 2017 in China.

Click here to download event report.

Related story: David Firestein Looks Back On P2P History

Photos: From top, left to right

Anthony W. Parker (left), Ross Perot, Jr. and Howard Berman; Cameron Munter (left) and Guo Yezhou; Guo Yezhou (left) and Ronald Kirk; Guo Yezhou (left) and Tom Ridge; Guo Yezhou (left), Tom Ridge, David J. Firestein, Ronald Kirk, and Cameron Munter; keynote speakers Geoffrey Garin (left) and Neil Newhouse; Keynes Li (left) and D. Matthew Dorny; Andrew Tobias; Donald W. Bohn (left) and Timothy P. Stratford; Ma Hui (far right), Guo Yezhou (center) and the Chinese delegation; Tang Fangyu (left) and Guo Yezhou; Carolyn Brehm (left), Michael Z. Qiu and Robert N. Campbell III.

EWI facilitates meetings between the CPC delegation and senior Republican leaders following P2P9:

David J. Firestein (left), Mike Duncan, Guo Yezhou and Anthony W. Parker; (from left) Anthony W. Parker, Mike Duncan, David J. Firestein, Guo Yezhou (across from Mike Duncan); Guo Yezhou (left), Dan Slane and David J. Firestein; (from left) Dan Slane, David J. Firestein, Guo Yezhou (across from Dan Slane).

What was the idea behind the first P2P and what were the initial challenges?

P2P came out of a trip that EWI made to China in 2008, about a year after EWI launched its China program. We asked our Chinese counterparts what we, as an organization, could do in the service of U.S.-China relations that hadn’t already been done by others. Our senior Communist Party of China (CPC) interlocutors said that the one area in U.S.-China relations that had not been fully developed was the linkage between the principal political parties of the two countries: the CPC, the Democratic and Republican Parties of the United States. At the time, the CPC, as a party, had relations or dealings with just about every major political party in the world but for the two U.S. major parties. And with that suggestion, EWI set about the work of establishing the first-ever dialogue between these the major parties.

The process was not without its difficulties—mainly, political sensitivities on the U.S. side about the notion of dealing with the Communist Party of China. And we came to understand that whatever we were going to do would need to be done on a bipartisan basis, so that neither U.S. party would be able to criticize the other for engaging with China’s ruling party. With some diligence and perserverance, and with the involvement of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), we assembled the first bipartisan U.S. delegation to what came to be known as the “U.S.-China High-Level Political Party Leaders Dialogue”—or “P2P,” for short—in early 2010. That delegation was led by prominent Democrat and former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former George W. Bush Administration ambassador to the United Nations Rich Williamson. And on that visit, we had the honor of meeting then-Chinese Vice President and Politburo Standing Committee member Xi Jinping, among other senior leaders.

John Mroz, Richard S. Williamson and Madeleine K. Albright meet with then Vice President Xi Jinping in 2010.

How has P2P, as an event, evolved over the years? Are there more or less challenges in organizing the event?

The formal P2P process now has a history of nearly seven years. The most significant evolution of the process occurred in 2013, when we reached out to the Democratic and Republican Parties and invited sitting DNC and RNC officers to take part in the dialogue for the first time. Whereas in earlier convenings, we had featured prominent Democratic and Republican former statesmen, governors and legislators, as well as former DNC and RNC chairs, now we were also involving sitting DNC and RNC leaders and that added a new element to the talks; it was at this point that we could say we had created a true dialogue channel between the parties themselves. That was no mean feat, in my view; and when you really think about it, P2P might very well be the only formal dialogue mechanism that brings together sitting DNC and RNC officials into the same room and the same conversation—to say nothing of the CPC. So we were very proud of moving the P2P process in this direction and the representatives of the two U.S. party committees consistently characterized the process as being tremendously valuable in terms of increasing their understanding of the politics of a country that, arguably, is America’s most consequential bilateral partner.

Another major development over the years pertains to our substantive agenda. In the first few iterations of the dialogue, we delved into both domestic governance and foreign policy issues. But starting around 2013, we came to understand that our real value-added, as a process, was in the political and domestic governance areas, not in foreign policy, given how many official U.S.-China dialogue mechanisms are already in place with respect to that cluster of issues. So we deemphasized foreign policy and moved much more deeply into politics and domestic governance, which we regarded as P2P “comparative advantages.” To our knowledge, P2P represents the only ongoing, sustained senior dialogue about domestic politics—as distinct from policy—between the two sides. This is where P2P’s unique value really is to be found.

In terms of challenges, I would say that, overall, P2P is easier to run today than it was six years ago, mainly because there is a significant “constituency” for the dialogue now at very high levels. People in both China and the United States understand the process, value the process, and see the process as a unique channel for high-level political discussions that fill a gap in the U.S.-China relationship. It’s become much easier to recruit significant figures to take part in the dialogue than it was in the days before the dialogue existed or became well known in the U.S.-China field. That said, some challenges remain. For example, getting sitting members of the United States Congress to China for P2P visits remains problematic owing to Congressional ethics rules and constraints. And similarly, we now have to condense the visits to the United States and pack more into fewer days owing to new constraints governing these kinds of visits on the Chinese side (as a result of China’s ongoing anti-corruption and “anti-extravagance” campaign). But on the whole, P2P has become easier to execute.

What are some of P2P's achievements over the years in terms of U.S.-China relationship since the first meeting? Do officials from the two countries have easier access to each other? Are there any concrete bilateral cooperations at the country level that resulted from P2P?

P2P fills a unique niche in U.S.-China engagement; with P2P, EWI is doing something that had never been done and that isn’t being done by anyone else. In a sense, EWI, along with our Chinese partners, have a monopoly on the market with respect to the construct of a U.S.-China political party—and more generally, high-evel political—dialogue. So that’s one significant achievement in itself. Building on this point, I would add that EWI has orchestrated the highest-level joint (and, in fact only) DNC/RNC visits to China in history; the only interactions ever between the CPC and the chairs of the DNC and RNC (separately); and one of the relatively few, if not the only, joint visit to China by Cabinet-level officials of both the Obama and George W. Bush Administrations, among other milestones. And in China, we’ve met with Xi Jinping, current Vice President Li Yuanchao, Politiburo Standing Committee member and anti-corruption “czar” Wang Qishan, and numerous other top Chinese officials, including in the Zhongnanhai leadership compound. We have also created a platform for important and timely track 1.5 and track 1 (official) interactions between major foreign policy figures on both sides around such issues as North Korea; and P2P has been a platform for some of the deepest and most detailed discussions of Chinese foreign policy decision-making that have ever occurred between Chinese and U.S. counterparts. Finally, through P2P, CPC leaders came to meet with several of the “finalists,” in both the Democratic and Republican Parties, in the 2016 race for the U.S. presidency.

In 2011, EWI facilitated the first ever meeting between the Communist Party of China and the Republican National Committee Chair. From left to right: Reince Priebus (left) and Wang Jiarui; CPC delegation (left) meets with Reince Priebus (right, standing) and representatives from the Republican party and EastWest Institute;  Reince Priebus (left), Mike Duncan and David J. Firestein.

How does the EastWest Institute follow up after each P2P event?

The primary goal of the P2P process is twofold: one, to increase U.S. and Chinese understanding of the politics of the other country and how those politics bear on policy choices; and 2) to establish and nurture relationships between key players on both sides that can serve as conduits for communications, particularly in times of need or stress in the relationship. After each P2P visit, we present a written summary of key points to major USG stakeholders (e.g., in the White House, State Department and Capitol Hill, primarily), and the Chinese similarly report the P2P proceedings to China’s top leadership. We don’t publish these summaries externally, but do generally publish a more general abstract of the meeting’s discussions.  

EWI facilitated the highest-level tripartite major political party meeting in the history of U.S.-China relations:
U.S. Democratic and Republican delegates meet with Vice President Li Yuanchao (third from right) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing in 2013.

How are the topics decided every year?

For each P2P session, EWI works closely with the CPC’s International Department—effectively, the Communist Party’s “foreign ministry,” if you will—to set the substantive agenda for the visit. As noted earlier, we now tend to focus on politics and domestic governance, rather than foreign policy; and within these broad rubrics, we tailor the specific topics to what’s currently happening in these areas at the time of the visit. Needless to say, for P2P9—on Nov. 14, 2016, just days after the U.S. presidential election—the election, the transition and the election’s (and the domestic political process’s) implications for U.S. China and Asia policy were all on the agenda, as well as a deep dive into U.S. public opinion (regarding the election, in particular). We also heard from the Chinese about China’s own political process and in the course of P2P10 (notionally planned for late 2017) will discuss the all-important 19th Party Congress.

9th U.S.-China High-Level Political Party Leaders Dialogue

The EastWest Institute also organizes other annual U.S.-China events. How do these events complement or overlap each other? How have these separate events shaped, in any way, the relationship between the two countries?

EWI’s three U.S.-China track 2 (and track 1.5) dialogues focus on different areas and issue sets and, in this regard, tend to complement each other.  P2P looks at politics and domestic governance, as I’ve mentioned. The U.S.-China Sanya Initiative (“Sanya”) brings together former U.S. and Chinese 4-star generals (including, on the U.S. side, former members of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example) to discuss military issues of mutual interest, with special emphasis on U.S.-China mil-mil issues and East Asian regional security issues. And the U.S.-China High-Level Security Dialogue (HLSD), which began in 2007, annually brings a distinguished group of U.S. former officials, military officers, think tank analysts and business leaders to China for a week to meet with Chinese counterparts from the Party, the government, the military, the think tank world and academia, and the business world to examine security issues of mutual interest to the United States and China.

Collectively, these dialogues have contributed to a deeper and broader understanding between significant U.S. and Chinese personages and between the two countries and, we believe, increased trust among the participants and between the countries. As the United States transitions from one presidency to the next, the need for this type of exchange remains substantial and we look forward to the work and opportunities ahead.

Related link: 9th U.S.-China Dialogue Explores Bilateral Relations Post U.S. Election

Click here to access publications from the institute's China, East Asia and the United States Program, including from the previous eight P2P events.

The liberation of Mosul may be at hand. Elements of the Iraqi Army move slowly on Mosul from the south, Kurdish peshmerga cross the Ninewa Plains and approach Mosul from the east. And to the west, there are reports of Shia militia units moving on Tal Afar, a strategic town between Mosul and the Syrian border.  No one claims Mosul's fall is imminent, but with the help of American air strikes and advisors, the advance is steady.

Let's not assume the fighting will be easy. But another task will be difficult as well: the task of governance once the battle is won.

This will be a key test in the fight against ISIS: can the government of Iraq, in concert with its domestic partners from the Iraqi Kurdistan (the KRG), as well as the cooperation of international supporters, show itself capable of bringing peace, prosperity, and rule of law to this city of nearly two million when the fighting stops?

Many speculate about a "post-Wesphalian moment" in the Middle East: they speculate that the states whose borders were drawn in the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 must somehow demonstrate that they can serve the needs of the population if these states are to survive. This concern may be overblown, but in the long run, ISIS will be defeated only when the alternative presented by established authorities is attractive, credible, and realistic.

The government of Iraq will need to provide a framework for some autonomy to this mainly-Sunni city. It will have to demonstrate its ability to protect those minorities who survive (many fewer than before ISIS arrived two years ago), such as Christians and Yazidis; it will have to work with the Kurdish inhabitants and their protectors from the KRG. In Tal Afar, to the west, it will need to address the needs of the largely Turkmen population, and cooperate their friends across the border in Turkey. It will need to restore institutions that were anchors of prosperity in Mosul in the past, such as its university. And it will need to create prospects for long-term economic viability throughout the province of Ninewa if the immediate project of pacification is successful.

So while many look at the battle for Mosul in the larger framework on the war against ISIS — that is, mainly as a military target that's a necessary prerequisite for ultimate victory that would drive a vulnerable foe from the regional — what happens after the fighting stops is perhaps even more important. During my own time supervising U.S. assistance in Ninewa in 2006, our traditional efforts at job creation, infrastructure development, strengthening of governing and juridical institutions as well as security forces were simply not adequate. Post-hostilities Mosul will need much more than we were able to muster at that time. Let's hope that the Iraqi leadership is marshaling its reconstruction forces and planning the next, post-hostilities actions.

It will take generosity, patience, and cooperation from Baghdad's leadership, and much of the same from those in Irbil and even Ankara, for a start.  But if those who win the battle of Mosul are unable to demonstrate that they can govern effectively, it will be an enormous setback for all who fight against ISIS and what it stands for. Conversely, if Iraqi authorities succeed in liberated Mosul, it can serve as a model, evidence that stability is still possible in that troubled region.

On November 8, Kawa Hassan discussed live on NRT News, a Kurdish language news television network in Iraqi Kurdistan, about what the two possible outcomes in the U.S presidential election would mean for the Middle East, particularly Iraq and Syria. Below are some key points from Hassan's comments:

• Given the economic, political and military importance of the U.S. in global politics, this election will have a huge impact on global issues ranging from the fight against ISIS, the future of Iraq & Syria after the military defeat of ISIS, to U.S. relations with Russia, China, and the European Union. 
• Both presidential candidates, Hillary Clinton of the Democratic Party and Donald Trump of the Republican Party, have diametrically opposing world views. Broadly speaking, Trump is an isolationist, while Clinton is an internationalist. Trump would focus on the U.S., while Clinton would be more engaged in Middle East issues. This would have profound impacts on their polices in the Middle East. 
• Clinton's personality is also different from that of President Barack Obama.
  • Whereas Obama was very cautious in dealing with Russia in Syria and did not want to have a substantial engagement in Syria, Clinton is known to be more assertive. If Clinton becomes a president, there is a possibility she will take a tougher stance against Vladimir Putin's Russian policy in Syria by attempting to impose a no-fly zone through closer cooperation with Arab Gulf countries. She might also consider giving more arms to Kurdish groups fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq. But beyond more military engagement (excluding boots on the ground), it is not clear whether Clinton would develop and implement a political vision for post-ISIS Syria and Iraq to deal with the myriad of conflicts plaguing both countries.
  • It is true that Clinton has called on Iraq to "get its political house in order", but it is not clear whether she would develop a comprehensive political vision and strategy to help Iraqis to get their house in order. 
• Clinton also favors a tougher stance on Iran compared to Obama. Saudi and other Arab Gulf leaders would therefore hope that Clinton would put more pressure on Iran in relation to the nuclear deal and its influence in the region. 
• The biggest issue with Trump as president is his unpredictability and populism. If Trump becomes president, many regional states will be nervous about his approach towards the complex conflicts in Syria and Iraq, as well as the fight against ISIS. Trump has signaled that he might be ready to cooperate with Putin in Syria. This would make Arab Gulf countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, very nervous. They fear that Trump will "hand over" Syria to Putin. Trump's populism could also have a big impact on Middle East politics. His populist rhetoric might strengthen the grip of autocratic leaders like Syria's Bashar al-Assad on power. In conclusion, his policies probably will strengthen Putin's influence and create a bigger support for radical groups like ISIS.        

Watch the full interview here.