The EastWest Institute (EWI), in partnership with the China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC), convened the seventh meeting of the U.S.-China Sanya Initiative from July 6 to 9, 2016. Senior retired flag officers of the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force met with retired flag officers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Washington, D.C. and New York City to discuss critical issues in the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship.

The meeting occurred against the backdrop of an impending arbitral decision on the China-Philippines dispute over territorial claims in the South China Sea and a fractious U.S. presidential election campaign. While in Washington, D.C., the delegations met with Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Tom Cotton (R-AR) from the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Congressman Rick Larsen (D-WA) of the U.S.-China Working Group and Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel. In New York, the delegations spent two days in off-the-record dialogue and also met with C.V. Starr & Co., Inc. Chairman and CEO Maurice Greenberg.

Substantive and candid discussions during the week focused on a number of key strategic and security issues. Participants exchanged views on China’s military reform and defense policy; maritime issues in the South and East China Seas; U.S. deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system in South Korea; cross-strait relations; and other issues of mutual interest such as North Korea, cybersecurity and counterterrorism. Both sides agreed that continued dialogue, transparency and mutual trust are essential to fostering bilateral relations and avoiding strategic misjudgment.

Since 2008, the Sanya Initiative has regularly brought together retired U.S. and Chinese senior generals and admirals in order to build stronger military-to-military ties between the two countries.

Photo credits: Kaveh Sardari

Click here to download the report.

In the discussion, held on August 3 in London, Hassan shared his insight:

• All Kurds agree on one thing and principle: Kurds are entitled to statehood. This is a dream of every Kurd, but there is a difference between dream and reality.  
• After the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and Syrian revolution in 2011, new political realities emerged in Iraq and Syria. Both countries are collapsing due to the war against ISIS, civil war and infighting. Political parties and societies in Iraq and Syria are fragmented. This creates opportunities for more Kurdish rights, self rule, federalism and con-federalism. 
• But just like Arabs, Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds also are deeply fragmented and divided. In Iraqi Kurdistan, the issue of independence has become a factor in further dividing rather than uniting the Kurds. The political parties have different views on the timing and the way independence issue has been pursued by Maosud Barzani, whose term as president has expired but still is in power.
• In the four countries where Kurds live—Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran—sadly there is a kind of Kurdophobia, an asusmption that granting rights to Kurds will lead to the partitioning of these countries. There is not one major Kurdish party that calls for the establishment of Grand Kurdistan. What Kurds want are equal political, economic, cultural rights. More Kurdish self rule will strengthen these countries and societies since Kurds will feel they are equal citizens. 
• The Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq faces serious challenges: economic downturn, political paralysis, paralyzed government, social disintegration. Due to these problems and challenges at the moment, the conditions in Iraqi Kurdistan are not ready for the establishment of an independent state. Instead, Iraqi Kurdish parties should first put the Kurdish house in order, then set up a common vision and plan for their relations with Federal Iraq. They should engage in serious, strategic and deep negotiations with Baghadad about their demands but also about what they can offer to Iraq. There is a need for creative ideas to reach agreements on oil and gas revenues, disputed territories and economic relations.   
• Given the complexity, fluidity and dynamism of developments in Iraq and Syria, it is very difficult to predict future prospects and scenarios of the Kurdish issue. 

To watch the program (in Arabic), click here.

After 15 years of international cooperation following the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan has progressed dramatically although from an undoubtedly low starting point. Literacy rates and school attendance for both boys and girls have risen. In major cities electricity is now expected where it was non-existent 15 years ago. Large-scale projects, such as the Salma Dam, are breaking ground and others, such as the Kajaki Dam, are advancing toward utilization. Roads between all major cities that were a series of loosely connected potholes in 2001 are now functional. However, considering the massive expenditure and effort to reach this point, the results are not satisfactory. The opportunities presented to the Afghan people by overwhelming international support will slip away without persistent and patient attention.

The Afghan Government Working to Earn Respect

International commitment is waning as a result of the Afghan government’s stalled progress. The unity government remains intact but, despite an expansive vision from President Ashraf Ghani, has not lived up to expectations.  Corruption at the ministerial down to the district level is rampant as many officials are more concerned with personal rather than common interests. Cooperation between the President and the CEO, Abdullah Abdullah, exists in public, but there is growing separation and mistrust in private. After a delay of over a year, parliamentary elections are scheduled for October 15 October 2016, but planning and preparation are lagging. Government institutions suffer from a lack of funding and ineffective human capacity at all levels.

Despite all this, there are signs of hope. President Ghani’s personal energy and vision for a positive future include specific actions to address the major concerns. His outreach to improve relations with Pakistan in March 2015 failed to deliver an expected reciprocal response, which cost him significant political capital and good will with many within Afghanistan’s political environment.  

President Ghani’s dialogues with Pakistani military and ministerial leaders in March 2015 acknowledged the special relationship between the two countries and the economic and security gains that could potentially be gained by effective cooperation. Afghan-Pakistan history is fraught with mistrust, subterfuge and competition; however, the two countries’ collaboration is pivotal to the eventual defeat of the Taliban and promotion of regional economic cooperation and growth. After Ghani’s visit to Pakistan in March 2015, the Pakistani government committed to demonstrating tangible results toward improved relations. After 15 months, this commitment has fallen flat, and the relationship has continued to sour. President Ghani has subsequently shifted his focus. He is looking to Iran in the west, China in the east and the Central Asian republics to assist in developing Afghanistan’s economic potential. This extension will help but will not allow Afghanistan to maximize its economic potential nor create the environment for cooperation against the Taliban and other insurgents. The governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan must continue to work toward a more cooperative relationship militarily and economically. A close alliance does not seem achievable, but both countries need to work together to combat insurgent forces that pose an existential threat to them. There is no silver bullet that will resolve the tensions; therefore, both sides must look to small actions that can begin to build a more trusting relationship. Cooperation on visa requirements for local Pashtuns affected by the Durand Line is one area that could represent a small step forward.

A Stagnant Economy

The significant decrease in foreign investment and aide has hindered economic growth and infrastructure projects. This decrease was not unexpected. The government of Afghanistan, in close cooperation with the Resolute Support and Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), has instituted significant reform of its procurement and contracting system. Touted by the President and confirmed by CSTC-A, the procurement initiative began in early 2015 (and still ongoing) and has significantly improved transparency, and through competition, reduced considerably the costs of the hundreds of contracts in support of the government, including its army and police.  The reform has ensured compliance with Afghan law, fair and open bidding, and improved integrity of contract selection. A modified National Procurement Authority and National Procurement Commission lead the directed change. Approved this year, a new National Procurement Law has introduced multi-year and framework contracts allowing for consolidation and centralization.  All of these procurement changes have set the conditions for economy of scale in pricing, fair competition and flexibility to meet the rapidly changing needs of security operations, and a drastic reduction in total contracts to be managed. The Afghan government has introduced effective corruption-resistance measures, along with reform in procurement and contracting. These initiatives will go a long way toward improving sustainability and affordability in running the government, providing much needed services to the Afghan people and increasing the government's contribution toward the country's security and defense. The scrutiny of contractual agreements has also focused on reducing corruption and improving transparency. Combined, these initiatives will go a long way toward the development of a sustainable infrastructure.

The economy has struggled with the loss of coalition demand for goods and services. There are several demonstrative aspects hindering economic growth and regional cooperation:

• The friction with Pakistan over the long-term status of the Durand Line has marginalized the gains achieved in durable multi-entry visas, border crossing point procedures and trade and transit cooperation.
• Afghanistan has not been able to raise the capital and international investment needed to exploit the one trillion USD worth of mineral potential in Afghanistan.  
• The stability of Afghanistan’s financial system and rule of law has not earned the trust of international investors, which inhibits the vast potential for regional and international direct investment in Afghanistan. 
• The tax code and rules associated with optimal business practices are at best written but not promulgated, or at worst yet to be codified.
• The migration of educated and capable Afghans and their capital is having a negative impact on the ability of the government and private sector to build economic capacity.  
• The narcotics driven illicit economy continues to grow and fund insurgent activities.

Despite these many challenges, the economy grew by 1.3 percent in 2014 and 1.5 percent in 2015; trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan reaches 20,000 licit and illicit vehicles crossing the border a day; and major regional and global agreements are moving forward.

Afghanistan’s acceptance into global and regional trade associations has been slow, but continuous movement on regional infrastructure agreements bodes well for the long term. Afghanistan was formally accepted into the World Trade Organization on 17 December 2015. Afghanistan has been an active member of the South Asia Association of Regional Cooperation (SARC) since April 2007. The Central Asia–South Asia power project, CASA 1000, a center-piece for regional cooperation, has been approved for engineering and continues to move slowly through funding agreements. China’s 44 billion USD One Belt One Road agreement with Pakistan is seen as an opportunity for Pakistan and Afghanistan to cooperate. The Chinese will build the road and connect it to both Karachi and the new Gwadar Port. China’s infrastructure investment as well as India’s agreement with Iran to build the Chabahar Port will yield an opportunity to connect east and west routes to north and south routes. The approximately 100 miles between the two ports offer the opportunity to link Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran to major trade routes. Although in the near term progress is slow and tangible results are often hard to see, mid-term and long-term integration efforts continue to move forward.

Securing the People

The security environment continues to deteriorate with a resilient Taliban and the infiltration of other insurgent organizations. The killing of Taliban leader, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, created a vacuum in the insurgent leadership, which has contributed to a delayed summer fighting season. Hezb-i-Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, appears ready to formally reconcile with the Afghan government. This would be a big win for the Ghani government and would enable it to focus on a more narrow insurgent threat base. The Taliban has expanded its influence in many provinces in the south and east as well as the region surrounding Kunduz in the north. In provinces such as Helmond and Uruzgan the insurgents have tested the Afghan National Security Forces, limiting government influence and communications, especially in the rural and remote regions.  For its part, the Afghan Army took the offensive in Kunduz where it was able to prevent a repeat of last year’s capture of the provincial capital. The army has been able to recruit over 50,000 new soldiers over the last year, replacing large losses due to enemy contact, desertion and normal attrition, which is a positive view on a difficult first year without substantial coalition military support.

The Resolute Support mission to "enhance the Enduring Partnership with Afghanistan" lends credibility to the long-term security prospects. While the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) continue to improve, they have many obstacles to overcome. They must develop strong literate junior leaders who can act independently in the rural areas of the country. Their logistics systems and accountability suffer from an over reliance on coalition support (enabled by the coalition in many cases). The inertia of a fire base mentality is beginning to give way to a more proactive posture; however, the insurgents still exploit gaps in security created by ANDSF units that stay in their secure redoubts.  

Local leaders and citizens are not blind to the resilient Taliban, persistent corruption, and economic slowdown. In general, they want a better life for their families and path to a secure lifestyle. They are willing to support whichever route will get them to this goal. Consequently, there is a general feeling that in the threatened areas people are hedging their bets. They do not support the Taliban inherently but will tolerate abuses of authority if the Taliban represents a more direct line to a secure and predictable environment. This is offset by a general deterioration in the people’s confidence that the government will prevail in providing a reasonable environment. The Afghan government has the opportunity to prove that it can provide a more stable situation and positive future; they just have to make it happen.

In addition, the inconsistent nature of the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan makes it difficult for citizens to trust the long-term viability of their own government. The government needs consistent guarantees of international commitment in order to improve and earn the support of its people.

Avoiding the Back Slide

Progress in Afghanistan is glacial. It is a unique and challenging environment where realizing positive change is fundamentally arduous. The Afghan government has failed to capitalize on the tremendous international good will and support over the last 15 years. Internally, the levels of corruption, ineffective government institutions, and inability to provide a secure environment have compromised citizen trust which jeopardizes long-term development. Externally, the coalition has squandered opportunities by not clearly understanding the unique challenges at the local level, not properly administering development funding, killing civilians through accidental (and tragically sometimes purposeful) misuse of force, and failing to adequately assist the government of Afghanistan in creating a more stable environment—despite a continued commitment of thousands of lives and billions of dollars to the challenge that is Afghan security, stability and eventual growth.  

In retrospect, the initial premise after September 11, 2001 was accurate—prevent a terrorist safe haven and help build a stable Afghanistan. Considering where Afghanistan was in 2001 with regard to social well-being, infrastructure, education, security and just about every other indicator, the country has moved the needle. The way forward remains difficult, But the coalition’s continued unambiguous support is vital for ultimate Afghan stability, while the Afghan government must redouble its efforts to fix the problems it knows all too well. Letting the achieved progress slip away would only serve to squander the sacrifices made as a result of the good intentions of an unprecedented coalition.

Colonel (ret.) James Creighton commanded a coalition brigade in Uruzgan from 2010 – 2011 and was the lead author in writing the operations plan for the surge in 2009. He is a distinguished fellow at the EastWest Institute and has interviewed dozens of officials at the highest levels in Afghanistan.

Several anticipated moves include announcing an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), further militarizing existing artificial islands (with offensive assets), initiating land reclamation in Scarborough Shoal or reemploying a blockade of Second Thomas Shoal. An ADIZ would be easy to declare, difficult to enforce and likely ignored; meanwhile, offensive military assets (such as fighter jets or missiles) deployed to China’s artificial islands could be readily withdrawn.

However, land reclamation at Scarborough Shoal or a blockade at Second Thomas Shoal would carry significant escalation risks—including potential military conflict between China and the Philippines that could draw in the United States. Such aggressive and risky moves immediately following the arbitration award would likely undermine nascent opportunities for rapprochement between Beijing and the new government in Manila.

Playing the Reed Bank Card

Considering the risks and tradeoffs, Beijing may instead choose to engage in a potentially less destabilizing option—presenting Manila with a choice between China’s unilateral exploration of Reed Bank or joint development on China’s terms. This could prove a compelling proposition for Manila since Reed Bank—located approximately 80 nautical miles northwest of Palawan within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) but claimed by China—is thought to hold one of the highest concentration of undiscovered resources within the SCS: 764 million to 2.2 billion barrels of oil and 7.6 to 22 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.  

While Reed Bank’s potential resources are modest relative to China’s massive energy consumption, the area is essential to Philippine future energy security. In particular, the Philippines is looking to develop Reed Bank to replace the Malampaya gas field, also located offshore west of Palawan, that is expected to be depleted by 2024-2030. The Malampaya gas-to-power project, led by Royal Dutch Shell, currently supplies about 30 percent of the electricity demand of Luzon, the largest and most populous island in the Philippines.  

Indeed, geography and economics suggest that the most viable option to monetize Reed Bank gas is the Philippine market. This implies that although China may flagrantly engage in unilateral exploration, it is highly unlikely to unilaterally develop the gas without first locking in the Philippine market. This is politically impossible without Philippine participation, which means that joint development may be the only pragmatic way forward. Manila’s only other option is to hold an offshore licensing round with the expectation of developing Reed Bank through a consortium of international oil majors over Chinese objections.

However, past efforts by the Philippines to unilaterally explore Reed Bank, engage in joint exploration with China and solicit international partners have all proved unsuccessful. In 2004, the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) signed a Joint Maritime Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) that included Reed Bank. PetroVietnam reluctantly joined in 2005 as a fait accompli. Yet, the JMSU lapsed in 2008 due to domestic political opposition, corruption allegations and legal challenges in the Philippines.

Since then, bilateral energy relations have deteriorated. In 2011, China Marine Surveillance patrol ships aggressively interdicted the MV Veritas Voyager, a French owned and Singapore-flagged survey ship chartered by UK-listed Forum Energy to survey the Sampaguita gas field in Reed Bank, which Forum Energy operated under Service Contract 72 (SC-72) awarded by the Philippine government. This incident was one of several reasons that prompted Manila to file arbitration proceedings against China, in 2013. In 2012, Philex Petroleum, the majority shareholder of Forum Energy, approached CNOOC about possible joint development of SC-72. CNOOC declined since a deal would have implied recognition of Philippine sovereignty.

Furthermore, Manila has attempted without success to solicit international partners to help it explore and develop Reed Bank since Philippine companies lack the technology, capital and operational experience to go it alone. In 2014, Manila held its fifth licensing round but it failed to attract any international players. Then in 2015, Manila ordered Forum Energy to indefinitely suspend exploration due to the pending the arbitration and granted a force majeure on SC-72.

Double-Edged Dilemma

Now that the arbitration award has been announced, Manila will face increased lobbying pressure as well as public support to resume exploration in Reed Bank. Silently capitulating to possible unilateral Chinese exploration is not a viable political option for Manila. The dilemma for Manila will be whether to engage in preemptive or reciprocal unilateral exploration that would almost certainly be forcefully opposed by Beijing and present escalation risks, or enter into negotiations with China on joint development that would risk inciting domestic political opposition, as well as disapproval from Washington.

On July 5, recently elected President Rodrigo Duterte repeated his interest in holding bilateral negotiations with China. On July 8, the Philippine Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay, Jr. stated that the new government was willing to discuss with China options to jointly explore and mutually benefit from disputed resources. However, Yasay had to issue a rejoinder the following day to clarify his previous comments in response to public backlash. If history is any indication of future behavior, Philippine public opinion will be strongly opposed to any agreement that is perceived as too compromising on national sovereignty over its offshore resource to China’s benefit. As with the defunct JMSU, joint development would likely be highly scrutinized by the political opposition,  significantly restraining Duterte’s maneuverability in negotiations with Beijing.

The forceful logic of China’s presumptive position toward Reed Bank is clear: With the Malampaya gas field expected to be depleted in 8-12 years, the timely development of Reed Bank is essential to Philippine energy security. However, time is on China’s side. Through coercion and harassment, China can indefinitely delay exploration and development. The Philippines’ only rational option is to agree to joint development with China, albeit on China’s terms, since Philippine companies are unable to develop Reed Bank alone and international partners are reluctant to participate.

If successful, joint development would be a geopolitical victory for Beijing; it would facilitate a rapprochement between Beijing and Manila, make China a critical partner in the Philippines’ long-term energy security, drive a political wedge between Manila and Washington and further weaken ASEAN unity. The downside risk for China is that a heavy-handed play could provoke a public backlash that pushes the populist Duterte to take a strongly nationalist position. In this scenario, Beijing’s gambit would likely have the unintended consequence of scuttling Chinese-Philippine rapprochement while steering Duterte closer to Washington. This would lock in the status quo, with Reed Bank exploration and development indefinitely delayed and Philippine energy security in a vulnerable position.  

Jeremy Maxie is a Senior Advisor at Longview Global Advisors. He tweets at @jeremy_maxie. 

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

“Neither side wants outright conflict,” said David Firestein, who oversees the China, East Asia and United States Program at the EastWest Institute, “and I continue to believe that, for the long-term picture in the South China Sea, this judgment won’t have a decisive impact, it doesn’t change dynamics.”

Firestein was commenting on a decision on July 12 by the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration that rejected China's claims over some areas in the territory. This was the first time an international body has laid down a legally binding ruling in the South China Sea dispute, a tangled web of overlapping claims from seven nations.

But the tribunal has no enforcement powers. China said it did not recognize the ruling in the case, which was brought by the Philippines.

To read the full story, click here.

Russia's aggressive foreign policy is an expression of weakness rather than strength, but we should still treat the country as a significant power. Russia is currently not very interested in dialogue, but we should flood it with offers of dialogue and engagement. Russia seeks to be unpredictable, but we should try all we can to make our relationship more stable, transparent and predictable. Russia has violated international law, but we should be demonstratively observant of international agreements and accords. Russia is acting like an adversary of the West, but we should still constantly look for ways to engage constructively.

All this may sound paradoxical and may not make sense to everyone immediately. But this is the right way to go for the West if we want to defend our interests and values. Our strength enables us to take the long view, to show strategic patience—and to avoid walking into the trap of an escalation spiral.

Such an approach is also warranted given public opinion in Europe. The reactions to German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier's warnings of "saber-rattling" have made clear that there are strong pro-Russia and anti-NATO currents in German and European public opinion. Very negative Russian reactions to the NATO summit—which are to be expected—might further deepen the divide. Thus, the more the West adheres to the seemingly paradoxical guidelines sketched out above, and seeks to engage Russia constructively, the more likely it is we can prevent deeper rifts within the West.

Based on this, four further observations:

1. The risk of escalation is high—and we have to do more to reduce it.

The current crisis has produced the most dangerous situation in and around Europe since the end of the Cold War. The flexing of military muscles—for example, this April, very low passes by Russian fighter planes over a U.S. destroyer in the Baltic Sea—carries a high risk of miscalculation, and of unintended or accidental escalation.

There is no joint NATO-Russia crisis reaction center today—and not even an agreed procedure for how to manage a crisis in case of a military incident. It is not clear who would contact whom, and how, in order to prevent an escalation. But the less clear the procedure in a crisis, the higher the risk of catastrophic developments. We need a joint crisis reaction unit as a first step towards confidence building through military to military contacts.

2. The classic "double-track strategy"—strengthening NATO's defense capabilities on the one hand, strengthening dialogue and cooperative engagement on the other—paired with strategic patience, remains the best recipe for dealing with Russia.

Frankly, the current and planned NATO reassurance measures are quite modest—especially when compared to the much bigger Russian exercises and mobilization activities. And the planned rotating deployment of NATO troops in Eastern Europe stays within the limitations spelled out in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The 4,000 troops that will be stationed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland cannot seriously be considered an "encirclement" of Russia. Their presence demonstrates solidarity with our Alliance partners in the East. No less, but also no more!

Even so, as German Foreign Minister Steinmeier has observed, we need to make sure the two tracks are well balanced: visible military measures, yes, but please more than just fuzzy rhetoric on the second, on the cooperation track!

Sure, we do engage with Russia in some important ways (even though these activities could be advertised and presented more forcefully). There are permanent and consistent diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine, led by France and Germany, and actively supported by the U.S. The quest for joint economic perspectives ("connectivity") is a key component of Germany's current chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The NATO-Russia Council has been revived—but unfortunately, Russia has rejected having another council meeting ahead of the NATO summit. The NATO secretary general regularly renews the West's offer to Russia to jointly update and strengthen the Vienna Document and other arms control regimes in order to increase stability and transparency. And on Syria and, more recently, on Libya, there are at least joint attempts to find solutions.

But we could do more.

The strongest signal to the Russian people that we seek an open relationship instead of confrontation would be for the EU to offer visa-free travel to Russians. If this is possible for Turkey and Ukraine, why not also for Russia? It will not be easy to find agreement on this among Schengen countries, but there would be an enormous echo to such an initiative in Russia, even if it were just a first step in a longer process. And we should multiply the number of scholarships and exchange programs for Russian students and academics: The more Russians can see for themselves what Central and Western Europe are really like, the more probable it is that they will see how ridiculous and unfounded anti-EU and anti-West- propaganda in the Russian media is.

A second suggestion: We should work hard to reaffirm and possibly update the fundamental principles of the European peace order enshrined in the Final Act of Helsinki. For this reason, an OSCE-mandated Panel of Eminent Persons recommended going "Back to Diplomacy." Reigniting the "diplomatic machinery"—after a successful implementation of the Minsk process—could also help jump-start U.S.-Russian relations, before or after the U.S. elections. This is particularly important since progress in the broader crisis between East and West won't happen without direct White House-Kremlin talks. That's what Putin ultimately seeks: to be seen on this level. In the interim, the German OSCE chairmanship should continue to prepare the ground for the longer term goal of a Euro-Atlantic summit of all OSCE participating states.

Third: In order to deal with predictably negative Russian reactions to the upcoming NATO summit, a very high-ranking NATO representative should fly to Moscow right before or after the summit to brief Russian leaders—and provide transparency about NATO's intentions.

3. Russia is militarily strong—but weak in many other respects.

The West's reaction needs to be based on a clear analysis of Russian power: How strong is Russia?

Economically, Russia is certainly not a great power. Russian GDP lies in between that of Italy and Spain. In 2015 alone, the Russian economy has shrunk by around 4 percent. Its power of innovation and modernization is too weak to compete successfully in global markets. Even a recovery of oil prices would only bring minor, and hardly sustainable, relief.

Politically, Russia has outmaneuvered itself on various fronts. Within a few months, Putin has managed to convince 40 million generally Russia-friendly Ukrainians that his country poses the biggest threat to Ukraine; the Eurasian Union is not moving forward at all; for the first time in decades, Sweden and Finland are now discussing the potential advantages of NATO membership; enhanced cooperation with Beijing has not really brought the expected benefits; and for large parts of the Sunni Arab world, Russia has turned into a long-term adversary.

In addition to its economic and technological plunge, Russia's foreign policy appears heavily burdened and lacking any form of "soft power." The Kremlin seeks salvation in backward-looking self-assertion instead, romanticizing about the past rather than preparing the country for the 21st century. Many in the Russian elite understand that in the longer term, this strategy is not sustainable, that it is doomed to fail.

Apart from its role as a nuclear military power, Russia is thus nothing more than the famous "Scheinriese," or "illusionary giant," from the famous children's book "Jim Button and Luke the Engine Driver" by German author Michael Ende: seen from far away, a threatening giant, but coming closer, getting smaller and smaller—and with a depressingly poor outlook.

The best remedy for the West is to act unanimously and judiciously. Only then will we stand chances of implementing Minsk and lifting the sanctions. Actually, getting Minsk implemented is not impossible at all.

The biggest danger lies in Europe's own weakness. From Putin's point of view, the recent "Brexit" was a success for Russia—and much more important than anything he himself could have achieved through his own actions.

4. A sober Western assessment should also be self-critical—even if Russia rejects any self-criticism.

Of course, admitting our own failures cannot mean that we accept a Russian security doctrine that prohibits the free choice of alliances—in violation of the principles of Helsinki 1975 and Paris 1990. But we can and should take a critical look at some of our own decisions:

One of two key pillars of NATO's policy from the 1990s, developing the relationship with Russia, has not been successful. The two pillars—NATO enlargement on the one hand, and a new quality of NATO-Russia relations on the other—were supposed to be equally important. That was the understanding reached in Madrid in 1997. Unfortunately, we failed to develop the second pillar as planned, while further enlargement rounds were prepared and successfully implemented. When U.S. President George W. Bush tried to advance Ukraine's and Georgia's NATO membership prospects in 2008 against stiff Russian opposition, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy finally pulled the emergency brake. But by that time, the relationship with Russia was already seriously damaged, as President Putin pointed out in Munich in 2007.

As a result, the dispute over the territorial status quo in Europe which we thought had been settled with the German "Ostverträge," the Helsinki Final Act, the Two Plus Four Agreement and the Paris Charter, has re-erupted. Those who are now suffering the most are the "countries in between," such as Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova: They feel threated from the East, and unprotected by the West.

In 2008, Georgia and Ukraine were promised NATO membership—without any date attached. Do we stand by this promise? Or has this become an empty pledge? If so, does this mean that we carry some responsibility for the fact that both countries have de facto lost parts of their territory since? Should we encourage both countries today to continue on the NATO track, or should we instead encourage them to follow the Finnish or Austrian models, in order to ease the situation politically and militarily, and in order to normalize their economic relationship with Russia? But would that not mean that we abandon our own principles, in particular that of the free choice of alliances? Would that not lead to a massive loss of our credibility? Or, if we invite them to stay on the NATO track, are we prepared and determined to assure the economic survival of both countries by offering sustained and comprehensive political and financial support? Are we prepared to say we will do whatever it takes in order to create a greater sense of stability and confidence in Kiev and Tbilisi? We have to confront these and other questions, even if they may require painful responses. Strategic clarity is required if we want to bring the current crisis of European security to an end.

We might also ask ourselves whether now was really the right time to take the next steps on ballistic missile defense, which has long been the subject of such heavy criticism from Russia? Would it not have been better to take a breather? Why the rush?

If we openly address such issues, we will be in a better and more credible position to debunk some of the myths promoted by Russia to mislead and confuse Western publics. A prominent example is NATO enlargement itself: The Soviet Union, it is claimed, was promised in 1990 that there would be no NATO enlargement. The facts are, however, absolutely clear: By signing the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, Russia explicitly and formally accepted NATO enlargement. Debate closed!

This is also one of the reasons why we should adhere to the NATO-Russia Founding Act regarding the deployment of NATO troops in Eastern member states. And we do—even though Russia has violated its provisions in several ways.

Our policy goal is to prevent a new dividing line through Europe, 1,000 kilometers east of the Berlin Wall. We would like to have Russia as a Euro-Atlantic partner if and when Moscow decides to reaffirm its respect of the principles of the European peace order, jointly elaborated decades ago, in Helsinki and in Paris.

Until then, we need strategic patience. That means two things, above all: to be true to our principles and values, not to zig-zag—and to keep calm, not to overreact. Thus, what might seem like a paradox is actually the intelligent Western policy approach to the challenge presented by Russia today.

Click here to read the article on Spiegel Online International.

The nuclear agreement and the lifting of sanctions offer a window of opportunities for Iran to economically and politically reintegrate into the international community. Against this background, EWI and Tehran-based think-tank IPIS solidified their partnership by signing a MoU.

Short-term joint projects will be an international conference on Afghanistan to be held in Iran, and a seminar on the technicalities of lifting sanctions to be held in Brussels. At the same time, EWI—which sees itself as a non-partisan broker—will continue its informal dialogue between Iran and Saudi Arabia in cooperation with the German think-tank CARPO. 

EastWest Institute’s Vice President for Regional Security, Ambassador Martin Fleischer, and the director of EWI’s MENA program, Kawa Hassan, visited Tehran from June 6 to 9, 2016, at the invitation of The Institute for Political and International Studies of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IPIS). Along with IPIS’s director, Dr. Mostafa Zahrani, Amb. Fleischer signed a Memorandum of Understanding to pave the way for cooperation not only in the field of research and academic exchange but notably in “Track-II Diplomacy.”

The MoU says in this regard: “The Contracting Parties shall jointly work towards holding or facilitating workshops and similar programmatic activities with the purpose of promoting cross-border trust-building across policy areas. Special regional and international issues of mutual interest include the future of Afghanistan and its neighborhood, migration, refugees, combating narcotic drug trafficking, environment, climate change, sustainable development, human rights, as well as security and cooperation in the Persian Gulf region.”

Amb. Fleischer and Mr. Hassan also held talks with other academic institutions, such as Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies. In addition, Mr. Hassan gave two presentations at Tehran International Studies and Research Institute (TISRI) and Center for Strategic Research (CSR) on the war against ISIS and Post-ISIS Syria and Iraq. 

The delegation also visited the Iranian Trade promotion Agency (TPA) with a view to engaging Iranian businesses into EWI’s Afghanistan Reconnected Process, which promotes regional economic cooperation in greater Central Asia. 

Modern China’s emergence onto the global stage brings with it both concern and hope: concern for how the world will accommodate an emerging great power and hope that a great civilization will enrich every aspect of global exchange. The world is looking to the United States as the cornerstone of the existing international system for leadership as it negotiates its relationship with an independently minded China. Against this backdrop, it is now more important than ever that the United States and China better understand one another, particularly in the realm of security and military affairs around key regional issues. 

Unless the two countries appreciate the similarities and differences in their military cultures, traditions and norms, the ongoing dialogues between them will never fully realize their potential.  

Institutional Military Culture

Perhaps the most obvious difference between the American and Chinese militaries is the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) use of conscripts versus U.S. use of volunteers. This can be misleading because there are in fact many more potential conscripts than entry-level positions within the PLA. Thus the “conscripts” are the most qualified among those who have volunteered. Effectively, the PLA offers desirable employment for young people coming from agrarian communities whose prospects might otherwise be quite limited.

A key difference between PLA volunteer conscripts and true U.S. volunteers is the terms and expectations of enlistment. In the PLA, conscripts serve for two years after which the best are asked to continue in service as noncommissioned officers (NCOs). In the U.S. military, two-year enlistments are the exception with most being at least three years. Also, there is nothing to prevent capable, educated, and motivated U.S. troops from attaining NCO rank during their initial enlistment. Moreover, other than during a drawdown, the U.S. military attempts to retain as many good enlisted members as it can for subsequent enlistments. Thus, there is less separating first-time enlistees from veterans in the U.S. military than in the PLA.

In some respects, Chinese and American military culture bear a striking resemblance, for example, professional military education and the military academic institutions that troops attend at specified junctures during their careers. This begins with the military academy, a major source of commissioned officers. For the United States this includes the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the U.S. Naval Academy, and the U.S. Air Force Academy. Beyond these federally mandated institutions, there are a few senior military colleges and a great many Reserve Officer’s Training Corps (ROTC) programs at regular civilian universities, all of which produce military officers.

In contrast, China has an abundance of national-level military academies, each organized around a military specialty such as armor or engineering (the Nanjing Army Command Academy, PLA University of Science and Technology (PLAUST), and National University of Defense Technology (NUDT) are among the best). This means that most officers will graduate without having worked extensively with their comrades in other arms, branches, or regions. This may necessitate an adjustment period as newly commissioned officers learn how to apply the formulas they studied at the academy to the needs of a multi-arm—and increasingly joint—force. The PLA is also building on the National Defense Student program, its answer to the ROTC.

Beyond the academies, both militaries have a system of specialized academic institutions for members at other points in their career that roughly mirror one another. This includes academies to train NCOs as well as more academic settings providing continuing education for mid-level officers, senior officers (the U.S. service war colleges and PLA “Tigers” course), and executive-level officers (the U.S. National Defense University and PLA “Dragons” course).

A final note specific to the U.S. Army: all soldiers regardless of specialty or unit of assignment are eligible for training in military parachuting, helicopter assault rappelling, and intensive patrolling (ranger) courses. Beyond the badges earned, this system provides a degree of cross-skills training and solidarity within a large organization. I suspect most forces, including the PLA, would see training personnel with skills they will not use directly as a wasted effort.

Interpersonal Military Culture

The most salient difference of interpersonal culture is subordinates’ willingness to speak their mind to superiors. Free expression within the PLA is limited by the expectation that, barring some catastrophic event, units will perform basically without error. Troops work very hard to ensure that this is the case. On the other hand, PLA leaders do at some level see the need for honest assessments. Thus, when it comes time to evaluate one’s own performance, there is a relatively narrow band of comments one makes to show needed improvements while maintaining the appearance of excellence.

Although there is a corresponding drive for perfection in the U.S. military, the ideal is that of fighting hard: making a solid but not excessive plan, expecting things to go wrong, and dealing with them effectively. There is no penalty for things going wrong as long as you deal with them well.  This tolerance of unexpected events allows for a more candid, thorough after action review.

On the social front, the PLA is notable for certain formalities in its entertaining, especially its emphasis on protocol. Of course, both militaries acknowledge rank in a formal setting, but the PLA deploys it in a broader range of social situations. U.S. military members interacting with Chinese counterparts should be aware of and express deference to their seniors, American and Chinese. This means allowing and encouraging them to walk in front and being aware of what they are doing. Failing to do so can create confusion and embarrassment—not insurmountable obstacles, but certainly an unnecessary distraction.

PLA officials should likewise be aware that the U.S. is generally less stringent about protocol and understand that any failing in that regard (for example involving visa processing, table seating, etc.) is not meant as an insult, only that the U.S. system has not yet found a way to accommodate that aspect of protocol.

As contact between China and the United States continues to grow in frequency and importance, each side must make an effort to understand and accommodate the customs of the other while maintaining their own traditions. Just as we can only realize our finest hopes through a realistic assessment of each other’s interests, U.S. and Chinese officers must blend flexibility with strength as they represent their own national and military culture while learning to appreciate their counterparts’ views. This creates the type of understanding and fellowship that can prevent simple misunderstandings from escalating into thorny disagreements or worse.

Ben Lowsen, writer for The Diplomat, is a former U.S. Army officer and military attaché in Beijing. A China specialist, he is a frequent writer on U.S. and Chinese military culture, including:  the way each military trains, basic unit leadership, fundamental PLA knowledge, and PLA history.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.