Global Economies

This piece has been republished on The Diplomat.

The U.S.-China relationship is arguably one of the most important—if not the most important—bilateral relationship in the world. The presidents of both countries have made statements to this effect, not to mention similar pronouncements by countless other officials and scholars from the two nations. But in spite of this professed interdependence, a recent spate of publications by U.S. think tanks on the bilateral relationship have all been negative in nature, calling for a toughening of U.S. policy towards China. 

David Shambaugh has publicly pointed out this trend, labeling the current situation in U.S.-China relations—that of increased tension between the two countries—as the “new normal.” “Hardly a day passes when one does not open the newspaper to read of more—and serious—friction. This is the ‘new normal,’” Shambaugh declared, “and both sides had better get used to it—rather than naively professing a harmonious relationship that is not achievable.”  

Generally well known and often-cited polling data show that the U.S. public is largely in agreement with U.S. experts’ pervasive negativity towards China. A periodic Gallup survey, for example, asks Americans which country they consider to be the United States’ “greatest enemy.” Since 2008, China has consistently placed in the top three and topped the list of responses last year, putting it ahead of Russia, Iran and North Korea.  In other words, a significant number of Americans consider China—the country with whom the United States has arguably the most important bilateral relationship—to be on par with and sometimes even more antagonistic than North Korea, a nation with whom the United States has no diplomatic or economic relations and that regularly threatens the U.S. with impending “final doom.”  

The various sources of negativity in U.S. policymaking circles are relatively easy to pinpoint, with the South China Sea dispute recently serving as the most alarming disagreement between the two countries. Although some of the negativity emanating from those issues may have trickled down to affect the opinions of the American public, the matters that trouble political elites and avid China-watchers are by and large not the ones that average Americans would point to as the sources for their antagonistic perception of China. Despite the potential for dangerous conflict posed by the current situation in the South China Sea, most Americans may not know where the South China Sea is, much less able to detail China’s reclamation activities there or its nine-dash-line claims. The terms “ADIZ,” “Senkaku,” or “Diaoyu” probably do not resonate with most Americans. Many in this country likely have difficulty locating Taiwan on the map; even fewer are aware that China has missiles pointed at Taiwan. 

The China-related ideas and concepts that leave many Americans these days with a bad taste are of a different nature. When one mentions China, people in the U.S. tend to think of government censorship, the lack of voting rights, pirated goods, air pollution and food safety issues—all of which are frequently highlighted by Western media¹. Additionally, the media—including major U.S. news outlets such as The New York Times—regularly highlights socio-cultural factoids such as incidents of backwards and rude behavior by Chinese tourists² and a dog meat festival in China,  which no doubt also contribute to American’s negative impressions of the country. The list goes on, but the one characteristic shared by these examples are that they are largely domestic, not foreign policy, issues. They have very little direct effect on the average American, no matter how much they evoke negative perceptions. Americans may find it disturbing to think of people in China eating dog meat, but no one could claim that any of these conceptions of China are on the scale of the South China Sea dispute in terms of their ability to move either side towards a significantly more hostile relationship.

Even the topic of trade and the notion that “China steals our jobs”—which is the one in recent years that has routinely troubled both policy elites and the general public alike—is not on that scale. Outsourcing of jobs is not blamed exclusively on China—Indian call centers, for example, come to mind just as quickly or more apparently than Chinese factories. Furthermore, the extent that trade with China and the outsourcing of jobs to that country has truly hurt the U.S. economy more than it has helped is an assertion that in and of itself is up for debate; to whatever extent it actually holds true, it still directly affects only a portion of the population—those who have actually lost jobs because of it—while leaving the vast majority of Americans unaffected. Safety problems with products “made in China” is perhaps the one trade-related issue that does affect large swaths of Americans in some form or another. However, the relatively small number of fatalities caused by unsafe Chinese goods combined with the fact that most in this country do not have to buy Chinese-made products minimizes both the pervasiveness of direct impact and the severity on individual Americans. 

One issue has emerged, however, as a concern to both policy elites and the general public alike and is becoming increasingly more prevalent and unavoidable: hacking. Average Americans may not know what China is up to in the South China Sea—despite policy elites ominously declaring that the problem “threatens to drive U.S.-China relations permanently in a far more adversarial, zero-sum direction and destabilize the region” — but they likely know that the Chinese are allegedly hacking into their private information. The key characteristic about hacking that sets it apart from other issues that previously shaped Americans’ perceptions of China is its ubiquitously undiscerning individual impact. People in general do not have the ability to “opt out” of a hacking attack the way one can choose to simply not buy products made in China. All hacking attacks, whether the perpetrator is Chinese, American, or of another origin, affect every person directly. Notices from various companies—whether it is Target, JP Morgan, eBay or others—informing people that their personal information may have been compromised seem to be an increasingly routine affair. Anyone who has an email account, smart phone, or any kind of online presence knows that his or her personal information is at risk. 

The Chinese are, of course, not responsible for all of the breaches in cybersecurity that affect Americans, but with each new high-profile, significant report of a hacking attack by China—such as the recent Office of Personnel Management breach³ —negative perceptions of China in the minds of Americans become more and more engrained. If conceptions of China for generations of average Americans were defined by the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the accumulation of alleged Chinese cyber attacks could become then the new defining issue for generations too young to remember Tiananmen. Images from Tiananmen Square were gripping because of the way television enabled the violence to play out in Americans’ homes, but hacking grabs Americans’ attention today because each attack violates individuals’ privacy. 

Ten-year tourist visas, landmark climate change deals and a multitude of student exchange programs will not change many Americans’ views of China if they see the country as one that consistently hacks into their personal data. The U.S. public may not be in a position to influence foreign policy the way policy elites will, but it is hard to imagine the United States building a constructive relationship based on mutual trust with a country that ordinary Americans view as an “enemy” intruding into their most private information. Hacking could be the issue that brings average Americans’ opinions of China to a new low that has not been seen since the Tiananmen Square massacre. And this reality is part of the “new normal” in the U.S.-China relationship that both countries need to get used to and find a way to address—if they truly consider this bilateral relationship to be the most important in the world.

^1. See, for example: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/13/AR200811... http://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-milk-tainted-with-melamine-again-are-w... http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/19/business/worldbusiness/19toys.html?pag... http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/19/us/chinese-toys-seized/.

^2.   See, for example: http://blog.sfgate.com/sfmoms/2014/07/28/child-poops-on-airplane-seat/; https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/04/30/chinese-to..., http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/28/world/la-fg-wn-china-tourists-ba..., http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/from-ugly-americans-to-ugly-chinese/. 

^3. Also see: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/06/04/obama-office-of-per....   

Публикуемый в переводе на русский язык доклад «Афганский наркотрафик: сценарии развития ситуации после 2014 года» продолжает серию публикаций, отражающих анализ и рекомендации российско-американской Рабочей группы по проблеме афганского наркопотока, организованной Институтом Восток-Запад в 2011 году. С прекращением мандата Международных сил содействия безопасности (МССБ) и выводом из Афганистана значительной части иностранного военного контингента страна сталкивается с вызовами переходного периода, существенно повышающими риски военно-политической дестабилизации и роста производства опиатов.

Учитывая значительную степень неопределенности дальнейшего развития событий внутри и вокруг Афганистана, авторы доклада приняли за основу анализа сценарный подход, основанный на комбинации двух базовых факторов, определяющих уровень безопасности в стране и, соответственно, потенциал развития наркоэкономики как способа выживания в кризисных условиях: степень политического единства и уровень внешней поддержки (прежде всего в отношении Афганских сил национальной безопасности). Примечательно, что в рамках каждого из четырех получившихся сценариев, от более-менее оптимистичного до самого негативного, российские и американские эксперты находят возможности для развития сотрудничества России и США в борьбе с наркоугрозой. К сожалению, подготовка и выпуск доклада (оригинал на английском языке увидел свет в феврале 2015 года) совпали с периодом резкого обострения российско-американских отношений, вызванного украинским конфликтом, а также более глубокими расхождениями во взглядах на современный миропорядок между политическими элитами двух стран. Взаимодействие России и США в сфере противодействия афганской наркоугрозе стало одной из жертв этого обострения, оказавшись фактически замороженным в результате введенных Западом антироссийских санкций.

Однако к моменту выхода в свет русского текста доклада появились признаки растущего понимания руководителями обеих стран того факта, что для решения ряда приоритетных международных проблем сотрудничество России, США и их союзников является насущной необходимостью в интересах их обоюдной национальной и глобальной безопасности и должно быть защищено от влияния политических разногласий по другим вопросам. Так, в телефонном разговоре 15 июля 2015 года президенты В.Путин и Б.Обама выразили «взаимный настрой на продолжение совместной работы в интересах устойчивой реализации венских договорённостей [по иранскому ядерному досье], а также по некоторым другим актуальным международным темам, включая противодействие угрозе международного терроризма.» (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49999). Сотрудничество в борьбе с терроризмом и экстремизмом неизбежно создает предпосылки для возвращения к активному взаимодействию России и Запада в противодействии наркоугрозе, в частности в свете все более очевидных попыток ИГИЛ распространить свое влияние на Афганистан и другие страны центрально-азиатского региона. Как отмечалось в первом докладе Рабочей группы «Афганский наркотрафик: совместная оценка угрозы», «связи между наркотрафиком и организованным вооруженным насилием (и транснациональными сетями криминального и террористического толка) служат источником новых типов угроз безопасности на региональном и глобальном уровнях.» (http://www.ewi.info/idea/afghan-narcotrafficking-joint-threat-assessment-russian-edition). Более подробный анализ этой связи, в частности в сфере использования финансовых доходов от мировой торговли афганскими наркотиками, Рабочая группа планирует представить в одном из своих очередных докладов в 2016 году.

India was admitted to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as an observer in 2005. It has taken ten years for India to be admitted as a full member at the SCO summit at Ufa in Russia in July this year. The principal reason for this long delay has been China’s reluctance to accept India’s membership without admitting Pakistan at the same time.

Russia has been supportive of India’s inclusion, but has been advising India to pursue the application process for full membership only in close consultation with it. Russia has had reservations about Pakistan’s eligibility for full membership because of its terrorist affiliations, its support for the Taliban and its role in promoting instability in Afghanistan. It has wanted Pakistan’s policies in this regard to evolve before considering its inclusion.

The Central Asian states have had serious concerns about the growth of religious extremism and terrorism in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region and the spill over of these pernicious forces into their region and destabilising their secular polities as a consequence. For both Russia and the Central Asian states, Pakistan’s membership was encumbered with unacceptable baggage. India’s membership, on the contrary, carried no uncomfortable baggage.

India, as the largest economy in southern Asia, has much more to offer for the economic development of Central Asia than Pakistan. Its entry would have given the Central Asian states more options, while also achieving a better distribution of power within the organisation

For Pakistan, it would have been a humiliating political defeat if India obtained membership before it did. Pakistan believes it has a Central Asian vocation. Geo-politically, it sees itself as the gateway for South Asia to Central Asia. As an extension of this thinking it treats Afghanistan as its strategic backyard. Pakistan would, if it could, exclude India even from Afghanistan, not to talk of Central Asia. India’s admission to the SCO without Pakistan would have dealt it an intolerable blow in terms of its self-image, its policy of denying access to India to Central Asia and its obsession of parity with India.

Chinese clout

China, ever sensitive to Pakistani views, would not have allowed a preferential decision in favour of India. The “iron” ties between Pakistan and China would explain why India could not become a member without Pakistan in the tow.

China has enormous clout within the SCO. Although the Central Asian states were part of the Soviet Union a little more than two decades ago and Russia still retains great influence in a region that remains its strategic backyard, it has had to contend there with the expansion of Chinese power.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia became enfeebled. It is during this period that China has grown in a spectacular way. The receding Russian power and expanding Chinese power has led to the creation of a new balance between the two in Central Asia. It is ironic that an area that was part of the Soviet Union has been brought together on a common platform, not in Russia, not in one of the Central Asian states, but in faraway Shanghai.

China has already established itself solidly in Central Asia. It has harnessed the region’s hydrocarbon resources to fuel its economy. As the world’s largest exporter, it is not surprising that it has captured the markets in these countries. Russia does not have the economic strength to compete with China in this region. China, in fact, is successfully harnessing Russian oil and gas and other raw materials for the needs of its economy.

This has meant that the two countries have had to establish a modus vivendi in Central Asia. They see it in their mutual interest to work cooperatively there. So, if Russia would have wanted India in and China would have wanted Pakistan in at the same time, neither could, or would, have wanted to over-rule each other’s preference. Hence the stalemate over membership all these years.

In any case, Russia would have had no reason to overly push for India’s membership while keeping that of Pakistan in abeyance, because India is not central to the functioning of SCO and the issue is not of such importance as to justify causing a strain in the cooperative Russian and Chinese stewardship of the organisation.

There could have been a reason to bring India and Pakistan into the SCO some years ago when the US was promoting its New Silk Road idea with the objective of drawing the Central Asian states towards South Asia and tying them together in trade and energy partnerships with a view to lessening their dependence on Russia and China. That US strategy could have been thwarted by opening the doors of membership to India and Pakistan, but this was not done.

Making the grade now

There are several reasons why the membership has now been opened to both India and Pakistan.

The relations between Russia and the West have deteriorated sharply, with the imposition of western sanctions on the country and attempts to isolate it internationally. Russia, as a result, has moved eastwards towards China and is pursuing a Eurasian strategy. China, which sees the US “rebalance” towards Asia as a form of containment of China in the east, has begun to move westwards more decisively. It too has new Eurasian ambitions. Both want to consolidate the SCO as a platform on which as many countries of the larger region can come together, as possible.

This serves the Russian purpose of demonstrating that it is not isolated internationally, and that, in fact, more countries are joining a grouping that is dominated by it and China and one that excludes the West.

Some are projecting the SCO as a potential counter to NATO, but that is a gross exaggeration of its purpose and potential. There is a vast difference in the political, economic and military potential between Europe and the Central Asian states.

India would not want to view its membership of SCO as a political riposte to the West. It has legitimate interests in Central Asia independent of the quality of ties between Russia and China and the US.

For China, the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative would get depth by the inclusion of the two South Asian countries. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project, which is an integral part of OBOR, would link Central Asia to the proposed Xinjiang-Gwadar link, giving an outlet to the sea to these landlocked countries. In this scheme the stabilisation of Afghanistan becomes necessary. Hence the Chinese involvement in promoting the reconciliation process between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

India is wary of OBOR and the CPEC, as it sees these projects as means for China both to create market opportunities for the excess capacities it has built in certain sectors of its economy and, more importantly, as a tool for realising its great power ambitions by using the huge financial resources now at its disposal.

China may be hoping that India’s SCO membership may whittle down India’s reservations and draw India into its initiative. The inclusion of Nepal and Sri Lanka as dialogue partner countries is a pointer.

India’s stakes

The expectation that the SCO can play a role in settling differences between India and Pakistan is far-fetched. China cannot be a broker because of its “higher than the Himalayas” and “deeper than the oceans” relationship with Pakistan and its own territorial differences with us, involving J&K too. Russia’s inclination to become a broker – any throwback to Tashkent – will create serious misunderstandings with us.

On the issue of terrorism, Pakistan may come under some pressure in the SCO. Within SAARC, Pakistan can join the shared rhetoric against terrorism without any pressure to clean up its act, as the only victim of its jihadi policies is India. Within the SCO, Russia, China and all the Central Asian states are concerned about terrorism and Pakistani policies and actions will be under scrutiny.

India may not get too much comfort from this, though. China has shown its colours in the UN Security Council on the Lakhvi case and would shield Pakistan on the issue of terrorism against India. Even Russia has been chary of naming Pakistan as a source of terrorism against India.

All in all, India’s membership of the SCO is a positive development. It recognises India as a legitimate stake-holder in Central Asian developments. Pakistan’s policy of obstructing an Indian role in Central Asia has received a set back. India will have a say in drawing up the SCO agenda. It will have a platform on which it deal with the Central Asian states collectively rather than dealing only individually with them. It will have ideas and programmes to offer in niche areas of its strength for promoting the development of Central Asian countries.

If India has failed to solve its problems with Pakistan within SAARC, our common membership of SCO will not help either.

Click here to read the article at The Wire.

Ties between Russia and Japan are slowly picking up steam again after a 16-month chill following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Earlier this month, Shotaro Yachi, Japan’s national security adviser, traveled to Moscow and met with his Russian counterpart to discuss President Vladimir Putin’s plans to visit Japan later this year. And despite ongoing tensions over Ukraine, there are also signs that Japan’s foreign minister, Fumio Kishida, may travel to Russia in the coming months to prepare for a potential Putin visit. Japan-Russia cooperation is also continuing on the security front with bilateral maritime security drills, focused primarily on border security, slated to take place later this month near Russia’s Sakhalin Island.

Since his election in late 2012, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has expended considerable diplomatic energy toward repairing Tokyo’s relationship with Moscow. Abe has met with Putin on numerous occasions, including two official visits to Russia. Indeed, Abe’s policy shift on Russia was so dramatic that his visit to Russia in 2013 marked the first official trip by a Japanese leader in a decade. Nevertheless, Japan still maintains a need to balance its desire to improve ties with Russia with its obligations, as a member of the G-7 and chief regional ally of the United States, to sanction Moscow for its involvement in the continuing fighting in eastern Ukraine. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Tokyo fell in line with its G-7 partners and implemented a limited set of economic sanctions on Moscow.

Now, even with Ukraine unresolved, Abe is looking to reinvigorate his policy embrace of Russia and maintain a nuanced approach to Putin. This push for engagement is premised on three main pillars. First, Abe remains convinced of his need to resolve the longstanding territorial dispute with Russia over the southern Kuril Islands, known as the Northern Territories to Japan. Second, both Tokyo and Moscow share a desire to enhance their energy partnership. And, finally, both sides have a strategic interest in closer relations as a potential balance or hedge against China’s rapid rise in the region.

On the island spat, there appears to be momentum toward a resolution after decades of failed discussions between the two sides. While Abe has prioritized Japan getting the islands back, he has subtly indicated his desire to compromise on Tokyo’s longstanding insistence that all four of the disputed islands be returned to Japan. Indeed, in early 2013, Abe sent former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori to Moscow as a special envoy on territorial issues. Before his trip, Mori floated the idea of a compromise: “splitting” control of the four disputed islands. Abe has officially stepped back from such an idea, maintaining the position that all of the islands be fully returned to Japan. However, Abe knows that such a one-sided resolution would never be backed in Russia. Japan and Russia continue to have backroom discussions on a potential resolution to the islands dispute, which has resulted in the two sides failing to officially sign a peace treaty ending hostilities from World War II. The stage appears set for a grand bargain on the islands during Abe’s tenure; both sides indicate that the conditions have never been better for a breakthrough.

Moreover, in addition to talks on the island row, Abe and Putin have each announced plans for stronger economic cooperation, with a focus on bolstering Japanese investment in Russia’s far east. The two also have agreed to a more enhanced bilateral energy dialogue. Since Japan shut down its nuclear power plants after the 2011 Fukushima disaster, it has looked to Russia for energy imports, most of all liquefied natural gas. Russia quickly became one of Japan’s top energy trading partners, and plans for a gas pipeline, which have been mooted for decades, were reportedly revived last fall. That has carried over to the security front. Last year, Abe pledged Japan’s support for Russia’s counterterrorism concerns while seeking Moscow’s understanding about Japan’s defense and security reforms.

Before Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Tokyo and Moscow had agreed to regular “2+2” dialogues between their respective ministers of defense and foreign affairs. The first such meeting took place in November 2013 in Tokyo and marked a significant improvement in bilateral ties. During that meeting, both sides agreed to increase cooperation in a number of strategic areas as an initial step toward elevating the partnership. But the Ukraine crisis put a temporary moratorium on these high-level exchanges.

There is a broader strategic element to Japan-Russia relations, too. Abe’s sustained engagement with Russia is based on the conviction that improved ties with Moscow will help Japan’s economy and guard against China’s growth and assertiveness. Tokyo sees this as even more of an imperative, considering the shifting geostrategic environment in the region brought by closer ties between Moscow and Beijing. Russia, for its part, also has an interest in improving relations with Japan in order to balance its complex relationship with China and continue its own stated goal of a Russian “pivot to Asia.” 

Abe and Putin will continue to be challenged in their attempts to bolster their relationship due to external pressures created by the Ukraine crisis. But there is a new opening for a grand bargain involving the Kurils, especially as Abe suffers in the polls because of his contentious legislation to expand the role of the military, currently in the Japanese Diet. Abe may look for a diplomatic win with Russia to help soften the blow of the security bills domestically and distract critics from his polarizing security policy. 

Indeed, Abe appears to be pursuing a similar agenda with China, by improving ties with Beijing and looking for a visit there later this fall. The biggest challenge for Japan and Russia in the coming months will be for both sides to retain at least some of the momentum despite Tokyo’s sanctions against Moscow, which aren’t likely to subside anytime soon, unless in concert with its other G-7 partners. Without that larger change, Japan will be forced to maintain a balanced line with Russia going forward, one that is compartmentalized and issue-specific, but could still yield results.

To read the article published by World Politics Review, click here. 

In the discussion of China’s intentions on its ocean frontier, little attention is paid to the evolution of the academic underpinnings of its policy, especially in the field of international law. When I was writing my 1998 book, China’s Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force, and National Development, there was really only one place to go ─ the State Oceanic Administration of China. That book pointed out that when China participated in the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea from 1973-1982, which resulted in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the country’s international law institutions were virtually non-existent. Most law schools had been closed during the Cultural Revolution that began in 1966 and did not reopen until after 1976.

Since the turn of the century, there has been a growth industry in China for the study of maritime law and policy. For example, the Journal of the Ocean University of China was launched in 2002. This was a product of the Ocean University of China, an institution with a long history after 1959, which has been upgraded several times, most recently in 2002.

There are now also several institutes specializing in the South China Sea. The most visible has been the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, set up as such in 2004, at its predecessor, the Hainan Research Institute of South China Sea, which was founded in 1996. This research center, based in Haikou, has produced a range of studies that are never too far from the government’s lines of policy. For example, its published research and occasional statements by its researchers have vacillated on the meaning of the nine-dashed line in the South China Sea, but most have leaned toward giving it some sort of legal effect. This reflects the unresolved ambivalence in the Chinese government to this line left over from history.

A more interesting organization may be the South China Sea Institute set up in 2012 in the Center for Oceans Law and Policy in Xiamen University.

Xiamen is one of the four original Special Economic Zones announced in 1979, but one which never took off in the same way that Shenzhen did. The main reason for the difference was that Shenzhen was designed to exploit its proximity to Hong Kong’s booming economy, while the Xiamen zone was aimed at exploiting its proximity to Taiwan. Though the latter had a booming economy as well, the evolution of the Xiamen zone remained hostage to the painfully slow development of direct contacts in cross-strait relations in the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, Hong Kong and Shenzhen remained the main transit point for Taiwan commerce into China for most of the time since 1979.

The rapid pick-up of direct links between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan in recent years has seen Xiamen boom. This progress, and its strategic significance, can be captured in an anecdotal way by the emergence in 2005 of the China Oceans Law Review, a typical academic research publication. What makes this law and policy journal special is that it is a collaborative effort between two mainland university centers (the Xiamen University Center for Oceans Policy and Law, and the Shanghai Jiao Tong University Center for Oceans Law and Policy), and centers from Taiwan (Sun Yat-sen University Institute of Marine Affairs), Hong Kong (the Polytechnic University C. Y. Tung International Center for Maritime Studies), and Macau (University of Macau Institute for Advanced Legal Studies). The journal is bi-lingual and is published in Hong Kong. A selection of 60 papers can be viewed here.

As might be expected from a more cosmopolitan enterprise, this journal reflects a certain maturing of the academic debate in China on matters of ocean policy and law. Several articles on the South China Sea are worth noting, including one by Shih-Ming Kao and Nathaniel S. Pearre (“Potential Alternatives to the Disputes in the South China Sea: An Analysis”, No.1, 2013, pp.262-290) and one by Zhao Wei (“Resolving Maritime Delimitation Disputes by Agreement: Practices of States Bordering the South China Sea and Their Implications for China”, No.1, 2013, pp.156-181).

In spite of the uncertainty created about possible new clashes in the South China Sea because of activities by claimants in the past five years, the maturing of Chinese views of ocean law is worth further study. A diplomatic source has suggested to the author that a new initiative by Indonesia, the sponsor of the first effective Track 2 process on the South China Sea beginning in 1990, which led to the 2002 Code of Conduct, may be about to bear fruit. One test of this will be the outcome of a Philippine case in the Permanent Court of Arbitration which convened last Friday, July 10, to deliberate the jurisdiction phase of a Philippines’ case against China’s declaration of its rights to the continental shelf in the South China Sea.

To read the article published by The Diplomat, click here.

In the article, Miller outlines the extent of security cooperation between Japan and the Philippines. He explains how "Manila and Tokyo have joined hands on the security front to add weight to their joint narrative that Beijing is looking to use might to alter well-established norms and laws."

For the full article published by The Asahi Shimbun, click here.

In August, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will make a critical statement to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. The long anticipated statement has been debated and crafted carefully over the past year by the Abe administration and will be influenced by the recommendations from an independent and bi-partisan panel of experts in Japan. In the end, however, the choice of what is – and more importantly, what is not – included in the statement will depend on decisions Abe makes. He will have to balance his own reservations about the traditional narrative of Japan’s war guilt against the considerable pressures, both foreign and domestic, to strongly adhere to previous statements made by former Japanese leaders. 

The Abe Statement will be scrutinized because of its likely direct impact on Japan’s relations with its regional neighboursThe Abe Statement will be scrutinized because of its likely direct impact on Japan’s relations with its regional neighbours, especially China and South Korea. Both Seoul and Beijing have essentially pre-conditioned stronger relations with Tokyo on Abe’s willingness to adopt a more contrite stance on historical issues. This is particularly true in the case of Japan-South Korea relations, which have been paralyzed since Abe took office in late 2012 due to Seoul’s perception of Abe and his Cabinet as historical revisionists. This stalemate has plunged Tokyo-Seoul ties to their present nadir, with an abnormal lack of high-level bilateral meetings. For these reasons, the Abe Statement is critical not just from a historical perspective but also for geopolitical relations in Northeast Asia. 

Historical Precedent and Abe’s Personal Beliefs

The Abe Statement will be closely watched by a number of countries, but will be followed most closely by China, South Korea and North Korea – the three countries in East Asia most impacted by Japan’s war time actions. While the Abe administration would like to frame this statement as a “forward looking” document, it will be challenging to build the foundation for stronger regionalism in Northeast Asia without addressing Tokyo’s wartime role in concrete terms. In this sense, Abe’s remarks will be held up against three key statements made by former Japanese officials: the Kono Statement (1993), the Murayama Statement (1995) and the Koizumi Statement (2005).

In the Kono Statement, made in 1993, then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono said that the “Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women.” The Kono Statement may be the most controversial to date because it revealed the cleavages between conservatives and liberal political views in Japan. An example of this divide was last year’s review of the Kono Statement evidence, through which Japanese conservatives who are aligned with Abe railed against the alleged faulty and disingenuous evidence used to bolster the statement. This review was coupled with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) unrelenting criticism of the well-respected liberal newspaper Asahi Shimbun for publishing unverified stories allegedly used as facts to support Kono’s assertion in 1993. Meanwhile, several members from the opposition parties and liberals within the LDP have pushed the Abe Administration to maintain the integrity of the Kono Statement. 

The Murayama Statement, made in 1995 on the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, noted that Japan’s engagement in the war was “a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations.” While apologizing, Murayama also outlined the “irrefutable facts of history” and stressed Japan’s need to “eliminate self-righteous nationalism.”

The Murayama Statement, while applying to Japan’s role in the war more broadly, was especially well received at the time by China, South Korea, and countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific that were most affected by Japan’s actions during the conflict. It complemented the Kono Statement with a more comprehensive apology that addressed other issues beyond the comfort women. The same reaction, however, was not universally shared in Japan, with several conservative politicians feeling betrayed by a Statement released by a Prime Minister from the socialist party. Many LDP politicians in particular felt at the time that the Murayama Statement was too effusive and contrite in its admission of guilt.

The Koizumi Statement (2005) is the third important, and most overlooked, statement. It was made by Abe’s predecessor (during Abe’s first reign as Prime Minister from 2006-2007), Junichiro Koizumi, on the 60th anniversary of the end of the war. Koizumi was one of the most successful LDP politicians and was the longest tenured Prime Minister in Japan since the reign of Yasuhiro Nakasone in the mid-1980s. Moreover, Koizumi was known both for his pragmatism but also for his pride as a Japanese conservative, evidenced by repeated visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, which drew the ire of China and South Korea.

But while Koizumi rebuffed complaints from Beijing and Seoul on the Yasukuni issue, he maintained a strong balance through consistent engagement with both Northeast Asian neighbors on economic issues. Moreover, in his statement, Koizumi largely upheld the sentiments from Murayama claiming that “Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations.” Koizumi also repeated Japan’s “heartfelt apology and deep remorse,” but noticeably did not reflect upon Murayama’s spear aimed at Japanese nationalists on the “irrefutable facts of history.” Another critical difference between the Koizumi statement and the more apology-focused texts of the Kono and Murayama statements is its predominant focus on Japan’s positive international role after the war.

Abe’s Turn

Abe has stressed the point on numerous occasions that his administration will uphold all statements made by his predecessorsAbe has stressed the point on numerous occasions that his administration will uphold all statements made by his predecessors. However, despite these assurances, South Korea remains critical of Abe’s approach. Before his election in late 2012, Abe criticized the Kono Statement in particular for its explicit reference to Japan’s culpability on the issue of “comfort women” in World War II. Since re-taking office, Abe made sure to take a more pragmatic approach to the issue and has been intentionally ambiguous on his feelings regarding the Kono Statement. While at Harvard during his state visit to the US this past April, Abe remarked that “when it comes to the comfort women issue, my heart aches when I think about those people who were victimized by human trafficking, who were subjected to immeasurable pain and suffering beyond description. My feeling is no different from my predecessors.”

But Abe’s support for the Kono statement appears to be more obligatory than substantive. This has further magnified the image – albeit often distorted for political purposes – in Seoul and Beijing of Abe as a revisionist bent on altering the traditional narrative of Japan’s culpability during the war period. And this sense has not been limited only to officials in China and South Korea. Despite an extremely successful visit from Abe to the US earlier this year, there remains a concern in Washington that Abe is not willing to mend ties with South Korea if that necessitates a public reiteration of the words contained in the Kono Statement. Indeed, several US experts on the region pointed to Abe’s lack of specific remarks about the “comfort women” issue in his Congressional speech as the one “dark spot” in an otherwise successful visit.

In addition, there are concerns that Abe will remove from his own statement key elements from the Murayama Statement, including references to Japan’s use of “aggression” or references to “nationalism” or the “irrefutable facts of history.” Indeed, Abe provoked controversy in 2013 when he questioned the definition of “aggression” in the Diet and remarked that determining these definitions was beyond the scope of politicians. The remarks predictably fueled intense criticism from China and South Korea that Abe was intending to emasculate the statements of his predecessors.

But the Koizumi Statement is especially critical when looking at Abe’s approach and forecasting the language he might use later this summer. Since retaking office in late 2012, Abe has repeatedly stressed his desire to put forth a statement that would be “forward looking” and focus on the public goods that Japan has provided to the international community since 1945. As a snapshot of this, Abe’s speech on the anniversary of the war last year previewed this approach through his articulation on the future and a lack of focus on the apologies of the past.

Geopolitics and History Collide

These historical strains continue to negatively impact Japan’s relations with China and South Korea. With regard to Seoul, many in Japan – and also some in the US – refer to “Korea fatigue “which represents their combined frustration that, after repeated apologies and compensation, Seoul still insists on Japan’s atonement.  On one hand, Japan’s so-called “Korea fatigue” is entirely understandable given that Tokyo has repeatedly apologized and made statements of remorse for its actions during the war period. Japan also provided South Korea with hundreds of millions of dollars in aid and soft loans, which helped to build South Korea’s economy over the past several decades. Tokyo also feels that there should be closure on the historical issues after the two sides agreed to a grand bargain settlement to restore diplomatic ties in 1965 with their Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea.

Thus, Japan has been frustrated with what it sees as South Korea’s unwillingness to separate history from political-security cooperation, which has led to a stalemate in relations between Tokyo and Seoul and created an abnormal situation of Abe and South Korean President Park Geun-hye not having held a formal summit since the latter took office in early 2013. This split has also elicited frustration in Washington, as the Obama Administration pushes to synergize a united trilateral relationship with its two Northeast Asian allies in order to deter North Korea and hedge against Chinese assertiveness and rapid military modernization. 

The US has a strong interest in patching up frayed ties between Japan and South KoreaOf course, the US has a strong interest in patching up frayed ties between Japan and South Korea in order to shore up deterrence against North Korea and push back on China’s increasing regional assertiveness. This has led the US to expend a painstaking amount of diplomatic capital on promoting Washington-Seoul-Tokyo trilateral cooperation and a smoother relationship between Tokyo and Seoul. The results have arguably not been worth the effort as Park only agreed to meet with Abe in a trilateral setting – last year in The Hague – focused purely on North Korean cooperation. However, it appears there might be some positive momentum towards the holding of a bilateral summit before the end of this year as both sides are now in serious discussions aimed at resolving the “comfort women” issue. Moreover, Japan and South Korea have both indicated their interest in attending a summit-level meeting with China at the end of this year. Complementing this high-level traction is a wide range of less recognized – but still important – cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul on a range of issues including security cooperation, negotiations on a trilateral free trade agreement with China, and work on energy security and the environment.  

The new trilateral military information-sharing agreement, signed in December of last year, between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul demonstrates this clash between history and geopolitics. First, it is narrowly focussed on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and makes no mention of cooperation in other key areas on the conventional or cyber level. Second, the agreement, while theoretically trilateral, is essentially the marriage of two separate information-sharing pacts (U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea). The new agreement does not create a mechanism for all parties to evenly share information. Rather, it positions Washington as an intermediary through which information can be passed from Seoul to Tokyo, and vice versa. Unfortunately, this arrangement falls in line with the traditional “hub and spoke” mechanism of US alliances in Asia and does not align with the Obama administration’s rebalancing goal of networking its alliances in the region to be more interdependent.  

The geopolitical divide between China and Japan is fundamentally different than Tokyo’s spat with Seoul. Beijing and Tokyo are engaged in a strategic rivalry, hallmarked by tensions in the East China Sea and wrapped up in the broader trajectory of US-China ties, as a result of Japan’s security alliance with the US. As a secondary element, Beijing has coupled historical issues – such as high-level visits to Yasukuni shrine – with the larger strategic competition in order to help frame a narrative that Abe is both a revisionist and a militarist.       

The Abe Statement: A Choice of Words

Taking these factors into consideration, what will Abe’s statement later this summer look like? Most indications lead to the following general guidelines.

• Abe will almost surely note his intention to uphold the statements of previous Japanese leaders, including Kono, Murayama and Koizumi. This reaffirmation would be regarded favourably in the US, but will be considered insufficient in China and South Korea unless Abe repeats key excerpts from the statements.
• Like Koizumi, Abe will look to focus the attention of his remarks on a forward-looking statement that emphasizes the positive role Japan has played internationally since the end of World War II. This will also be an opportunity to frame Japan’s future role going forward and explain Abe’s policy of a “proactive contribution to peace.”  Much of this language would likely mirror Abe’s speech to the joint session of Congress in the US this past April and will focus on the importance of Japan and the Japan-US alliance in global security. 
• While re-affirming previous statements, it is doubtful that Abe will specifically use verbatim language from his predecessors. Specifically, the new statement might leave out touch words such as “aggression”, “colonial rule”, “irrefutable facts of history.” Such omissions – especially a lack of apology or mention of colonial rule – will likely be seen in Seoul and Beijing as tantamount to a revisionist statement on history.  
• As the statement is not intended to represent closure to the “comfort women” issue, it is unlikely that it will contain details or specific references to Japan’s guilt. While this issue will certainly irritate many in South Korea, this criticism may be dulled if Seoul and Tokyo are able to strike a deal on the “comfort women” issue before the summer’s statement.  
• Taken as a whole, this paints a skeptical picture of the impending Abe statement. However, there is room for optimism. Abe has an opportunity to reiterate a sincere apology to countries in Asia that were deeply affected by Imperial Japan’s war. Moreover, while Abe may be a historical revisionist, he is also a geopolitical pragmatist. This pragmatism – especially the improved state of bilateral ties with China – will induce him to produce a balanced statement that, at the very least, acquiesces to Beijing’s concerns.

Implications for Canada

Canada has largely remained outside of the fray between Japan and its regional neighbors over history. This is understandable as Canada, despite its role in the Pacific theatre of World War II, is not in the position and has not build up the necessary relationships in the region to intervene. Even if Ottawa wanted to wade into the historical spat, it would be ill-advised as evidenced by Washington’s bloody nose. 

Yet, while Canada may not be scrutinizing Abe’s words later this summer, it should be paying close attention to the historical tensions in the region due to their larger geopolitical side effects. Canada’s interests in Asia are contingent on a stable and prosperous region led by dynamic economies with functioning political relationships. Nowhere is this more critical than Northeast Asia, with China, Japan and South Korea being Canada’s top three trading partners in the Asia Pacific. 

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To read the article at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, click here.