Global Economies

In the past years, although Japan has been interested in possible energy supplies from Central Asia, it has not been active enough in the region.

However, recent circumstances have brought forth an appropriate time to explore further the rising opportunities that the two sides have to offer each other. Without putting up any tough competition to China, Japan will like to secure a firm foothold in the region and also to enter joint ventures in a few infrastructure projects for which it has advanced technological edge, better know how and more technical expertise to offer.

According to US Energy Department estimates, in 2020, the Chinese demand for oil will reach 13 million barrels per day, while that for natural gas will rise to 100 billion cubic meters per year. In order for Central Asian states to develop the infrastructure to meet such rising demands, it will need exploration and transportation support structure with much advance technology which is available with Japan. As the Kashagan oil reserves in Kazakhstan and the Galkynysh reserves in Turkmenistan are developed for production in the coming years, Japan is interested to benefit from joint ventures with these two major oil supplier states. This comes at a time when the Iranian energy reserves are about to open up for foreign ventures. Especially so, when an agreement on Caspian Sea is expected in 2016 among the five littoral states namely Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Russia.

Additionally, there are chances for progress on Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India (TAPI) pipeline. Therefore in the medium term, short windows of opportunity will be taken up by others if Japan delays any further in making its move. In future, the central Asian energy companies will need much advanced technologies which are not always available with their Russian or Chinese partners. To overcome this limitation, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan will be exploring how to take advantage of Japanese involvement in such project.

Factors which contribute to hitherto dormant relations included long distances, higher costs and the business environment in the Central Asian states that, to many Japanese investors, appeared both un-prepared and unfavourable in the past years. In the past years, Japan’s reluctance as an ‘island nation’ to considerably invest in land-locked Central Asia provided China an open field which took maximum advantage of such opportunity. The Chinese influence in every Central Asian state is an established reality as Beijing did not miss many opportunities for making investments and entering joint ventures in many spheres where as Japan’s progress in this sphere has been comparatively slow. Akio Kawato, a former Japanese ambassador to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, has pointed out to Japan's NHK news channel that the Central Asian states will not like to become completely dependent on China and hence seek to deflect such dependence and to drive maximum leverage by making various investing nations compete with each other in the region.

The Central Asian states will benefit from greater interest, closer attention and increased prospects for short and medium term investments. According to a Japanese diplomat in Tashkent, representative of Japanese enterprises aim to conclude partnership contracts in Central Asia worth 17 billion dollars particularly in projects involving the conversion of fuel resources to value added products such as plastics and chemicals. According to Japan’s Daily Nikkei, major Japanese companies are involved in a number of key projects in Central Asia: Japan’s Sumitomo Investment Corporation has received orders to build a $300 million thermal power plant in Turkmenistan. Toyo engineering has won a contract for building an $800 million petro-chemical complex in Turkmenistan which is scheduled to complete in 2018. Kawasaki Heavy Industries has received an order from TurkmenChemya for building a gas to gasoline conversion plant by 2018. According to Tokyo’s Diplomat Magazine, five Japanese companies plan to complete an agreement to build a purification plant at the Galkynysh gas field worth $8.3 billion (1 trillion yen), which will be funded in part by Japanese banks.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries has signed agreements to build a natural gas to fertilizer plant in Uzbekistan while Toshiba Corporation aims to export its nuclear plant technology to Kazakhstan.

At a time when falling oil prices have compelled the Central Asian states to attract investment in diverse ventures they have become comparatively eager to benefit from the Japanese co-operation.

Japan neither has the clout nor the capacity or desire to compete with the Chinese and Russian influence in the region. However, it would welcome to be seen as an additional partner which can bring in much needed technical expertise to the region. However, Japan has still many chances for offering its plant technology to the central Asian states.

With the Chinese investment expected to rise in the coming years, Japan may like to carve out its own niche in the Central Asia engineering plants and industries especially when those states aim to diversify the destinations for exporting their oil and gas. Japan will like to pursue its technology for energy diplomacy in those states.

In Central Asia, Japan is seen as an attractive investment partner. On its part, Japan seeks to participate in infrastructure projects that can improve communication, commerce, power- transmission and energy transport from Central Asian to South Asian states. Japan describes such an approach as ‘Corridors of Peace and Stability’ in the context of encouraging what it promotes as ‘open regional co-operation’.

Click here to read the article in Uzbek. 

Click here to read the article in Kyrgyz. 

On August 22, Colonel (Retired) Richard McEvoy, a dedicated soldier and truly great American, was killed in an Improvised Explosive Devise attack near the U.S Embassy in Kabul. My first squad leader in the Army and a fellow brigade commander at the 10th Mountain Division in Fort Drum, New York, Dick’s death caused me to reflect closely on the prospects for Afghanistan. After more than two years serving in Afghanistan as a brigade commander and chief planning officer at ISAF Joint Command, I have continued to be positive regarding the future of the country, but this incident made me question my convictions.

The EastWest Institute has sponsored the Afghanistan Reconnected Program for the last three years. The premise of the program is that in order to capitalize on the successes and progress made in Afghanistan over the last 14 years, Central and South Asian countries must work together to improve regional economic prosperity.

Our regular events involving regional business, governmental and academic leaders have centered on the opportunities associated with Afghanistan’s youthful and better-educated population, central location as a transportation hub, historic agriculture industry and potential mineral and energy sectors.

A high-ranking and dynamic group of private sector leaders and members of parliament from Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Tajikistan, and other countries active in the region has identified concrete measures that can be taken to reduce border crossing procedures, improve the quality and timeliness of cross border commerce, capitalize on regional natural resource development, and streamline visa requirements, among other tangible actions that would serve to improve economic growth.

And while our team fully recognizes the challenges posed by historical mistrust, corruption, as well as an unstable security environment, it asserts that economic growth and regional stability are possible.

After successful trips to Islamabad and New Delhi, where the Afghanistan Reconnected team discussed the actions that could be taken with government and private officials including the president of Pakistan, and senior ministers in Islamabad, the EastWest Institute has been planning to carry these ideas and messages to senior leaders in Kabul.

However, Colonel (Retired) McEvoy’s death has caused EWI to seriously consider our underlying assumptions and analysis. The increase in violence in Kabul combined with Taliban advances in Helmand and Kunduz over the summer serves as another indicator of a tenuous situation. Government concerns regarding the flight of wealthy and educated Afghans are beginning to impact the growth potential of the country as a whole. President Ashraf Ghani’s unity government is only now filling all of its ministerial positions, which has slowed its internal anti-corruption reform and capacity building efforts. In addition, Ghani’s initial overtures, which had been seen as very positive in Islamabad, are not having the desired impact on bilateral cooperation with Pakistan.

The negative reports and indicators are worrisome when taken at face value but with some trepidation, I decided to accept an invitation to speak at the Sixth Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA), hosted by the Afghan Foreign Ministry.

My arrival into Kabul International Airport after a four year absence helped alleviate some of my concerns. The airport itself now supports numerous regional and international carriers, and after the opening of a new international terminal in 2008 it now allows travel to over 15 destinations, and has the capacity to host over 100 aircraft.

The roads, which had been either dirt or in dire need of repair, are now paved with newer cars filling the lanes. The once ubiquitous donkey carts are now mostly replaced by small trucks and new stores. The children were in school and the ministries functioning.

Most importantly, although the security situation has forced international organizations, Afghan government and private entities to retreat behind “Jersey Barrier” walls, commerce and trade continue to flow. Afghanistan has maintained steady economic relations in the region, increasing the country’s trade value by 7.70 percent in 2014. Pakistan is the top trade partner, which, in 2014, benefitted from a strong cross-border trade worth over $1,500 million – up from $1,087 million in 2013 (39.4 percent).

My assessment after a week in Kabul is that despite the disturbing reports and security challenges on the ground, there is an opportunity to consolidate gains in Afghanistan and continue to grow regional economic capacity.

However, various challenges remain, particularly when it comes to securing the country. The Afghan National Security Force continues to have mixed performance reviews, as reflected by the Taliban’s increased presence in the South and North combined with high-profile attacks in and around the capital and Kunduz.

Still, things are not looking as bleak and there are reasons for cautious optimism. Closer analysis of the Afghan National Security Forces indicates that although tending to become fixed to bases and therefore less effective in some areas, they have demonstrated success in offensive capability and independent coordination, and have dramatically improved their special operations capability. The police have been less successful in preventing attacks in the cities but have also proven to be competent and professional in their responses to emergencies. For example, the attack in Kabul in June, where one suicide bomber and six gunmen targeted the parliament building demonstrated police competence. After the suicide bomber detonated a car bomb outside of the compound, the six gunmen attempted to enter the parliament building where members of parliament were meeting with acting Defense Minister Masoon Stanikzai. Afghan security forces reacted quickly and managed to prevent the attackers from entering the building. Ghani personally congratulated one soldier in particular, Sergeant Esa Khan, who played a large role in the counter attack that killed all six gunmen. The Ministry of Interior Affairs has also been vocal in attributing the success of this incident to the effectiveness of police forces.

On top of this, the enemy they are fighting is more fragmented, between competing Taliban elements, ISIS, and tribal elements. This could lead to greater effectiveness as the summer fighting season closes in the coming months.

The NATO led coalition sacrificed thousands of lives and trillions of dollars in order to achieve ultimate stability in Afghanistan. The gains that have been made so far have not met the expectations of either the governments or the people. But the substantial progress that has been achieved cannot be ignored.

The improvements in education, governance, economic capacity, and security from 2001 are substantial. Basic education continues to slowly improve. With the help of the U.S. and other international donors, the Ministry of Education has been able to build more than 13,000 schools and train 186,000 teachers. These improvements are reflected in the increased enrollment of students in public universities which has grown from 7,800 in 2001 to 123,000 in 2013. Challenges with security and stability associated with the Coalition withdrawal are to be expected, but are not catastrophic. The Afghan government, with a respected leader at the helm, continues to make strides in fighting corruption and reaching out to regional neighbors to explore ways to improve economic and political cooperation.

The international community should continue to support the Unity Government, promote regional economic cooperation, assist and train Afghan security forces, and help the Afghan people maintain a positive attitude as they move toward a more stable environment with better prospects for economic security and regional stability.

To ignore Afghanistan now and pull away as we did in the 1990s in Afghanistan and in 2011 in Iraq is to surrender the security and economic gains and squander the sacrifices that have been made, thus insuring ultimate victory to factionalism and extremist voices.

To read this piece at The Diplomat, click here.

To read our report on Afghanistan Reconnected: Regional Economic Security Beyond 2014, click here.

To learn about Afghanistan Reconnected: Advocacy and Outreach Mission to Tajikistan, click here.

To find out more about James Creighton's presentation at RECCA-VI in Kabul, Afghanistan, click here.

Japan's relationship with its armed forces was once a defining characteristic of the nation. Indeed, "Fukoku kyohei [Enrich the state, strengthen the military]" was the battle cry of the reformers who founded modern Japan during the so-called Meiji Restoration beginning in the 1860s.

In the first decades of the 20th Century, Japan, rather than a state with a military, the island nation slowly transformed into a military with a state - "one hundred million hearts beating as one", as a wartime propaganda slogan boasted.

That all changed after the World War Two.

From offence to defence

The country's complete defeat, not to forget the deaths of 2.7 million Japanese men and women, ended Japan's love affair with its military.

A new constitution, written by the victorious occupying Americans, outlawed the creation of any regular armed forces. Japan was to be a "heiwakokka [peace nation]".

However, after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the United States, fearing Communist expansion in Asia, pushed Tokyo to rearm.

To fight off "Red China", the US established the Japan Self-Defence Forces, a military that to this day has not fired a single shot in anger.

Unable to prove their worth in battle and confronted by an almost cult-like anti-militarism, throughout the Cold War, the JSDF suffered from public ridicule and disdain.

Just watch any of the early Godzilla movies showing the JSDF as an unimaginative and - more importantly - ineffective group of men incapable of defending Tokyo from the monster's wrath, and you can capture some of the public sentiments during that time.

Service members walking city streets in uniform in the early days of the JSDF were even pelted with stones.

Accidental heroes

At the end of the Cold War, in the 1990s, Japan's armed forces were finally able to polish up their image - not on the battlefield of course, but as an international peacekeeping force.

The JSDF deployed briefly in southern Iraq as part of the US "coalition of the willing", although they had to rely on others, including the Iraqis, for protection. Indeed, the JSDF are so adverse to violence that when a machine gun went off by accident, it made national headlines.

They also won plaudits for their role in rescue and relief missions after, for example, the Kobe-Awaji earthquake in 1995 and the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster.

To this day, this is how the majority of Japanese see the JSDF - a disaster relief force.

Fast forward to 2015, where things appear to be changing under the leadership of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party.

Two controversial security bills that passed the upper house of the Japanese Diet - Japan's parliament - this September, will allow the JSDF to come to the defence of its allies even when Japan itself is not under attack.

Formidable fighting force

Despite much domestic and international hysteria that Japan could now be drawn into foreign conflicts, and potentially even launch a war, closer scrutiny reveals it still has a long way to go to cast off its pacific post-War legacy.

For one thing, under the new legislation, the JSDF can only come to the aid of an ally under three conditions:

• Japan's survival is at stake
• All other non-military options have been exhausted
• The use of force is limited to the minimum necessary to deter aggression

In addition, the JSDF can come to the rescue of other UN peacekeeping troops and Japanese civilians in danger and would be allowed to use their weapons first, not just strictly for self-defence.

Notwithstanding the narrow circumstances of action, the JSDF at least have the potential to become a formidable fighting force.

For one thing, the Japanese culture with its traditional emphasis on group cohesion, careful planning, and attention to detail - particularly important in today's hi-tech military environment- is an ideal for modern soldiering.

Indeed, American sailors, soldiers and marines who train with the JSDF and participate in various joint military exercises every year to increase operability are generally impressed by the competence of their Japanese counterparts.

The JSDF also sport some of the most modern military equipment in all of Asia, including modern fourth-generation main battle tanks, licence-built Apache attack helicopters, modern reconnaissance drones, and will soon receive new fifth-generation fighter jets.

Japan's navy, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF), is considered to be technologically more advanced, more experienced, and more highly trained than its likely adversary - China's the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). It also has its own highly trained special forces outfit - the Special Boarding Unit.

However, major, cultural, legal and budgetary restrictions remain.

For example, Japan continues to ban "offensive" weapons such as bombers, aircraft carriers, and long-range ballistic missiles and has no plans to acquire them in the foreseeable future, since they remain unconstitutional.

In addition, despite some improvements, the JSDF continue to enjoy a somewhat dubious reputation as a pool for "ochikobore [drop-outs from the regular school system]" and "inakamono [country bumpkins with strong regional dialects from Kyushu in the south and northern Honshu]".

How would the JSDF do in a military conflict with China over let's say the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands - a scenario that the US and Japan are practising every other year?

The JSDF would probably suffer initial setbacks under the chaotic conditions of the battlefield like any other force with no experience in combat, but - given their penchant for constant drill and exercises for such a contingency as well as their excellent planning ability - would do very well on the defence.

Godzilla can rest easy

However, the truth is that Japan's military would not be able to defend Japan alone in the long-run nor go on the offensive, primarily because of its lack of offensive weapons, limited manpower and equipment pool.

Behind the JSDF stands the US, and therein lies any strength it might wield.

Japan still has no obligation to support the United States in a conflict - the two countries, despite public impressions to the contrary, still have no mutual defence pact.

Japan can pick and choose whether it would like to support the United States in a conflict or not. In reality, this means that Japanese support for the United States in any future conflict is not a foregone conclusion.

This undermines their bilateral defence cooperation.

So what are the chances that the JSDF will fire a shot in anger anytime soon? Unless, China attempts an invasion of the Land of the Rising Sun, or North Korea launches one of its missiles against Tokyo, I'd say chances are as high as Godzilla re-emerging in the Sea of Japan.

To read this article at BBC NEWS, click here.

We in East Asia are indeed living in peaceful times. That is the inevitable conclusion one draws in reflecting on the archives of U.S. military intelligence files from the 1930s and 1940s. In one document, Japan’s ambition, declared in January 1941 by its foreign minister, was frightening.

Fresh from negotiations with the Dutch for an oil concession in the Netherlands East Indies, and mediation between Thailand and French Indochina, he told the Diet that the whole world should accept Japan’s racial idea of “hakko ichiu” (eight directions of the world under one roof), a nationalist slogan interpreted variously as a call to “universal brotherhood” (the soft version) or Japanese military domination of East Asia, and then the world, through a sacred or holy war (the main meaning as events came to show).

In 1945, American psychological observation teams — foreshadowing the collapse of Japan’s militarist regime — capitalized on this phrase by telling the Japanese people that they were being invaded from “eight directions,” a rather bitter irony for them.

At a more granular level, another lesson leaps off the pages of the U.S. archives, at least for me. This is a reminder of the role of Hainan in the geopolitics of the South China Sea compared with the much less significant, at least in military terms, Spratly Islands. The history of Hainan and its strategic significance both during the war between Japan and China that raged from 1931 to 1945, and after, is not often canvassed in current discussions of the shifting geopolitical realities.

A U.S. diplomatic cable from February 10, 1939, reports the Japanese invasion and capture of Hainan. It notes that control of the island “would have a great effect on the matter of control of the South China Sea between the mainland and the island of Luzon as well as limiting the sphere dominated by (British) Singapore.”

While represented at the time by Japan’s foreign minister as intended to help “suppress the Chiang Kai-shek regime,” some in China correctly interpreted it as part of Japan’s plan for territorial expansion toward the East Indies.

This action by Japan was met with far greater concern, as reflected in the archive documents, than its annexation seven weeks later of the Spratly Islands on March 30, 1939, followed by its occupation of the Paracel Islands. Japan claimed the Spratly Islands were terra nullius prior to their being occupied by Japanese nationals in 1921, but at least two of the islands had been annexed by Britain decades earlier.

These documents from 1939 cast some light on how the U.S. government viewed the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands at the time, since the Japanese annexation was protested by it. The scope of the protest however was not that Japan had no claim but that it could not annex the entire Spratly group, spread out over a vast territory and comprising quite distant groupings of reefs and islets, on the basis of prior administrative action in respect of a couple of small islands.

Of greater interest today in respect of the Spratly Islands, is a discussion of the French annexation of several of the islands in 1933. Reference is made in one U.S. intelligence report from 1933 to China’s sending a warship to the region as part of its protest against the French annexation. The report notes that these were tiny coral reefs or desert islands, “a few are frequented by Chinese fishermen,” but hitherto they “have been unclaimed by any nation and apparently mostly uncharted.”

The same report mistakenly says that China calls these islands the “Sisha,” almost certainly an erroneous rendering of the Xisha (or Paracel Islands), which the U.S. document reports were claimed by China at that time. In 1933, even with Japan in military occupation of China and the United States, Britain and France pursuing colonial control of diverse territories, the islands were judged to be insignificant.

Later U.S. official documents from 1943 concerning the postwar disposition of the Spratly Islands, once Japan was defeated, are a rich source of understanding how the islands were viewed strategically by the U.S. But the overriding U.S. concern in the postwar disposition was with strategically important territories.

According to the excellent analysis by Kimie Hara, a 2006 book, “The Cold War Frontiers in the Asia Pacific,” several U.S. official reports looking at the disposition of the Paracel and Spratly islands judged them not to be of vital concern to any country, though of interest to coastal countries such as China, the Philippines and Indo-China, and to the safety of commercial shipping.

The first years of communist rule after 1949 were marked by campaigns to defeat Republic of China forces on the many islands along the coast of China from south to north.

In the first month after the declaration on Oct. 1, 1949, of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, it attempted to take Kinmen Island with a force of 30,000 soldiers but failed. In March 1950, People’s Liberation Army forces began a campaign to take Hainan Island and after victory there in May, began preparations in June for an invasion of Taiwan, involving 4,000 motorized junks and 200,000 troops.

The U.S. diplomatic position on the ending of the Chinese Civil War had been to remain neutral, a position which altered three days after the North Korean invasion of South Korea on June 24, 1950. The Korean War and the accompanying change of U.S. position on the defense of non-communist Republic of China forces on Taiwan brought U.S. naval forces to China’s borders in great numbers in 1950.

China cancelled its planned invasion of Taiwan. The decision has been described in a 1996 commentary as follows: “Taiwan was not attacked for the time being. The Navy command of New China had no choice but to swallow the first bitter pill of losing the opportunity for combat owing to lack of strength.”

The author observed that with the decision, the offensive phase of the war of liberation ended, and the navy’s primary tasks became defense “against possible imperialist aggression and guarding the safety of the republic’s coast.”

For China, and for all mainland Chinese with any knowledge of this history, the claim for the Spratly Islands, like the claim for Taiwan, is seen (regardless of how we see it) as a the final stages of the war of liberation and national unification. The “island campaign” launched by Mao in 1949 continues. China only regained its islands of Hong Kong in 1997 and those in Macau in 1999 from two former colonial powers. For China, that war with Japan that began in 1931, and its own civil war, which began in 1927, are not finished yet. China’s ocean frontier is yet to be stabilized after almost 500 years of foreign interference.

China will continue to pursue its claim to the Spratly Islands, but we must not lose sight of the fact that for China, the two great pearls of its maritime frontier in military strategic terms are still, as they were at the historic turning points in 1945 and 1949, the islands of Taiwan (36,000 sq. km) and Hainan (33,000 sq. km).

It was former leader Ye Jianying who was in political command from the Guangdong Military Region of Chinese forces that recaptured Hainan in 1950 and it was he who made the first peace opening to Taiwan in 1979.

As China navigates its understandable historical revanchism, declaring peaceful resolution of the outstanding territorial disputes to be its aim, it must be careful to avoid historical mistakes of others. Chinese President Xi Jinping in Washington last month said that his dream for the rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation was all about the human potential of Chinese. This was a new twist. Most people in China see the China dream as more chauvinist, more nationalistic.

There are a number of Chinese commentators who link the rejuvenation ambition to the old Chinese doctrine of “tianxia” (“all under heaven”), characterized by “harmonious development” and unified under a Sino-centric view of world order. For me, “tianxia” sounds too much like “hakko ichiu.”

I think we can be comfortable with the idea Xi rejects it, but his “human development” twist to the Chinese dream idea seemed a little too artificial, and too simply concocted for an American audience for my liking.

To read the article at The Japan Times, click here.

The transcript of the interview, which aired during Channel NewsAsia’s First Look Asia program, is given below. 

Interviewer: Good morning to you with us on First Look Asia. This hour, there has been a major boost for the United Nations’ struggling peacekeeping missions. At the UN General Assembly, U.S. President Barack Obama has announced that more than 50 countries have offered 30,000 new troops—and amongst them, China. Its president, Xi Jinping, says that China wants to take the lead by contributing 8,000 troops; this would make Beijing one of the largest players. Mr. Xi also offered $100 million U.S. dollars of military aid to the African Union for crisis response. And amid concerns of China’s rising military might, President Xi said that China was committed to peaceful global development. Mr. Xi’s trip to the UN caps off his weeklong visit to the U.S., and at a summit with Mr. Obama, they also vowed to fight climate change that left largely unresolved the issues of cybersecurity and the South China Sea.

Let’s speak now with Ms. Kok Piin-Fen. She’s the director of the China, East Asia and United States Program at the EastWest Institute, and she joins us today from New York. Ms. Kok, President Xi says that China is committed to peaceful world development. How much of this do you think will assuage concerns about China’s military rise and the inroads into the peacekeeping missions?

Kok: I think that to the degree that the rest of the world can see that China is putting its growing military capabilities to global good, so to speak, in the area of peacekeeping, which, as you know, China has been very active in this area for years now. So I think to that degree, some of those concerns will be assuaged. But the problem is really more in China’s immediate neighborhood where other countries in Asia are still very suspicious of its strategic intentions and what it’s planning to do with its rising military, especially on the naval front with all of the territorial disputes happening in the South China Sea and East China Sea. So in that area, it is still going to be very tricky trying to persuade China’s neighbors that its intentions are really peaceful.

Interviewer: So Ms. Kok, just picking up from there, what could China do to comfort or reassure its neighbors in Asia and abroad?

Kok: I think it needs to explain itself a little better. For example, in the South China Sea, a lot of tensions recently have just revolved around China’s actions reclaiming islands and then, after the reclamation, building all sorts of infrastructure, including military infrastructure, and now we’re looking at reports saying that it has built a third airstrip in the South China Sea. I think China needs to explain more clearly and more transparently what its strategic thinking has been behind actions such as these. And it needs to use appropriate words because, to be very honest, in the area of public diplomacy I think it’s still a bit lacking, and some of the words that the Chinese government has used thus far may have come across as disingenuous and perhaps not really constructive. 

Interviewer: Ms. Kok, now Chinese state media have hailed Mr. Xi’s visit to the U.S. as a success. But in your opinion, what were the hits and what were the misses?

Kok: The fact that neither side shied away from addressing the difficult issues such as cyber or the South China Sea, I think that was a good sign because it shows a mature relationship. They’re willing to focus not (only) on the positive or feel-good aspects of the relationship but really get together at the presidential level and be able to talk about the tough issues. 

Firestein gave his comments in Mandarin.

Click here to view the video on YouTube.

Click here to view the video on YouTube.

Amidst much concern and gloom around the situation in and around Afghanistan, it is important to take into view following six factors which may contribute towards increased regional efforts for stabilizing in the coming months. 

Firstly, at a time when the withdrawal of NATO and allied forces from Afghanistan has created a vacuum of power, China has taken cautious steps to take a leading role in that country. Beijing has also realized that time is not at the side of Russia (which could have filled in the gap created after the pullout of the American troops from Afghanistan). Becoming entangled in the aftermath of Ukrainian crisis having annexed Crimea, it will become difficult for Russia to regain its leading status in the region Afghanistan- Central Asia region which is now being assumed by China. In contrast to Russia, the Chinese have approached Afghanistan with utmost flexibility and caution with calculated measures to carve out a space for themselves.   

Secondly, China’s offer to facilitate a dialogue seeking peace and political reconciliation between the Afghan and Pakistan government was among other factors also expedited by Ashraf Ghani who in his maiden foreign visit as Afghanistan’s president requested China in October 2014 to facilitate reconciliation with Pakistan. Having approached with close allies of Pakistan as intermediaries has resulted in senior Pakistani military officials establishing closer contact with their Afghan counterparts. These initiatives will help Pakistan and Afghanistan address each other’s security concerns and also to contribute the two neighbours reshape their respective strategic paradigms as partners in of pursuit of joint solutions to common challenges. It is said that if Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s government provides assurances and guarantees regarding Pakistan’s security, then upon acquiring a reliable partner, Islamabad will not have the need to seek any alternate or additional guarantees from non-state actors in Afghanistan. These have been followed by the initiatives encouraging Pakistan to facilitate negotiations to find ways and means to bring peace and reconciliation between the warring Afghan factions.

A third important development is the talks between different Afghan factions involving the Taliban and the government for bringing peace in Afghanistan with some rounds being facilitated by and held in China. In November of 2014 and on 7th July 2015, China facilitated peace talks between Afghanistan’s warring factions, a third round scheduled for 30th July was postponed as some circles broke the news that the Taliban leader Mullah Omar had died two year ago. Making public of this fact at this stage was aimed to reflect that (a) the Taliban are without any real leadership and (b) they may not have unanimity of ranks and hence (c) in the absence of any genuine unified leadership the Taliban do not enjoy much authority to enter into and conclude any negotiations about the future of Afghanistan. However, the new Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansur is said to be inclined towards a negotiated settlement with the Afghan authorities but he will need to demonstrate how he will rally support for a majority of Taliban followers to back a peace agreement.  
    
A fourth notable matter is that China and India have worked together to bring gradual improvement in their bilateral relations moving from past a relationship of rivalry and mutual misgivings to cautious cooperation. The joint statement issued during Indian Premier Narendra Modi’s May 2015 visit to Peking declared: “We have a historic responsibility to turn this relationship into a source of strength for each other and a force of good for the world.” In his keynote address at the India-China Business Forum, Modi said: ‘Indo-Chinese partnership should and will flourish. As two major economies in Asia, the harmonious partnership between India and China is essential for the economic development and political stability of the continent’.  

Fifthly, the granting of full membership to India and Pakistan in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization makes SCO the organization which now has three countries Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan sharing borders with Afghanistan (also an observer state in SCO). According to Outlook magazine’s commentator Sibal Dasgupta under the SCO auspices China, India and Pakistan will regularly share the same table to consider solutions to common challenges. This is a major development which will help them to look at the issues from a wider perspective and interact with each other in an improved context. Given that India and Pakistan both are being conferred full membership of the SCO, it will be an excellent forum for the two countries to deliberate at the highest level on critical issues like countering terrorism, and break ice on bilateral issues on the sidelines, notes Professor Swaran Singh from Delhi.

Sixthly, with economic sanctions expected to be gradually lifted from Iran, efforts will increase for connecting Western Afghanistan closer with the Iranian port of Chahbahar, a step which will also facilitate increased trade between India and Central Asia and contribute to regional prosperity.

This article was originally published on BBC Uzbek. Click here to read (in Uzbek).

What will be the main points of discussion during President  Xi’s visit to the U.S.?

There are three components to President Xi Jinping's visit. First, he will be in Seattle, meeting with U.S. tech companies at the U.S.-China Internet Industry Forum, so of course there will be a lot of talk about cybersecurity. The U.S. firms will surely be seeking to raise their concerns about new Chinese legislation and regulations that restrict the way they can operate in China. 

I expect that the Chinese will in turn seek some assurance from the companies that they will comply with those legislations and regulations when doing business in China. The Chinese will also likely try to see if there is a way to win the companies over and prevent the Obama administration from going ahead with sanctions against Chinese hackers. 

The next stop will be Washington, D.C., where President Xi will meet with President Obama as well as other senior leaders from both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. I think the issues discussed in DC will primarily be political and national security issues, including, again, cyber, maritime tensions, and in light of the upcoming UN summit in December—climate change. Perhaps with its upcoming presidential election in early 2016, Taiwan will be a point of discussion as well.  

They will also have a good deal of discussion on China’s economy and what’s happening there with the stock market and currency devaluation etc., as well as try to achieve more progress on the U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty. 

The last stop will be New York. It will be Xi’s first attendance at the UN General Assembly session in his position as president. While in New York, we expect him to articulate China’s vision of the world and what kind of role he sees China playing in fulfilling that vision.  

What is the public opinion in the U.S. regarding the visit?

I think the American public will view this visit in the context of three factors. First, there is considerable negative public opinion of China these days—whether you are talking about economic competition and China “stealing U.S. jobs,” or acts such as hacking, stealing intellectual property, manipulating the economy, currency and other trade practices, or increased assertiveness in foreign affairs, such as what we are currently seeing in the South China Sea. 

There is also a lot of concern about the tightening of political controls in China—the Chinese government’s clamping down on human rights, freedom of the Internet, freedom of speech, and trying to control the ability of foreign NGOs to operate in China as well. And indeed, we do see some of those negative opinions being manifested in the discourse among U.S. Presidential candidates. 

The second context would be that there has been a lot of bad economic news coming out of China recently. I think Americans would like to hear from President Xi and other Chinese officials so that they can make sense about what exactly is happening in China, with its economy, where it’s headed, and what possible effects it may have on the U.S. economy and U.S. investors doing business in China. 

Finally, the third area would be that Americans want to have a better idea of who Xi Jinping is, beyond this idea of “the strongest leader since Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping”-- of a country that’s communist, but also the second largest economy in the world. But I think what all this means is that the Obama administration needs to find a balance between advancing its common interests with China and trying to come up with some tangible positive outcomes, but also, at the same time, being able to take a firm position on many of these issues of concern.

 Xi Jinping needs to find that balance as well, as it is a period of vulnerability for China, its economy, politics and leadership. Questions have been arising about whether Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders are equipped to deal with the many problems that are festering at home. During this visit, he needs to be seen by the Chinese people as a strong leader abroad--whether it’s in Washington or at the UN--advancing China’s interests and vision. At the same time, he needs to reassure the U.S. and the rest of the world that he and the Communist Party of China leadership have things under control at home, especially on the economic front.  

What role do you see the South China Sea and cybersecurity playing in the discussions?

These two topics will play a very important role in the discussions. This upcoming summit between President Obama and President Xi will be a great opportunity for the two presidents to sit down and address in a very serious and honest way their mutual concerns not only about those two issues but also regarding the other sources of tension in the bilateral relationship.  

This will also be a great opportunity for the leaders to go beyond specific problems and to clarify their respective strategic thinking behind the actions they are taking, not only regionally but also globally. 

The last presidential summit saw progress in areas such as climate change. Do you foresee any positive outcomes from this visit?

The last summit, held in Beijing in November 2014, produced several significant, tangible and groundbreaking agreements not only on climate change but also with regards to visas, tariffs on high-tech goods and military confidence-building measures. That set a high bar for the upcoming presidential summit. While it is going to be a challenge to match the level of cooperation of the previous year’s meeting in light of all the negativity surrounding current U.S.-China relations, both parties will try to produce some positive and specific outcomes this year. 

We are seeing reports over the last couple of days on a possible agreement to limit cyber attacks against critical infrastructure. I think both sides will also be seeking to build on the military confidence-building measures reached last year. Leaders of both countries will want to announce progress on the bilateral investment treaty and possibly on climate change, in order to pave the way for more constructive and productive talks in Paris at the end of the year. 

All this aside, observers and domestic constituents of both countries will also expect some progress on—or at least a concerted effort to address—the contentious issues as well, such as cybersecurity and the South China Sea. I think, especially in America, people will not deem this meeting a success if those concerns are swept under the rug simply because the leaders wanted something positive to come out of it.