Politics and Governance

After a fairly auspicious start to 2011, relations between the United States and China have soured once again over the issue of cybersecurity.

Google’s assertion earlier this month that hackers located in China had been seeking to steal the passwords of hundreds of Gmail account users, including those of senior U.S. officials and Chinese political dissidents, sparked the predictable denials and counter-accusations from Beijing.  The fact that the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is looking into the allegations lends an additional air of seriousness to the spat, as do the recent statements on the issue by the U.S. secretaries of State and Defense and senior Chinese government spokesmen.

In U.S.-China relations, each decade seems to have its own thorny issue that rises above the others and defines the relationship to a disproportionate degree.  In the 1990s, human rights was the major issue of concern (from the U.S. vantage, at least).  In the first decade after the turn of the millennium, in the wake of China’s accession into the World Trade Organization, trade became the predominant source of friction.  Recent developments suggest that cybersecurity is going to be the U.S.-China issue of this decade – and it just might make the other issues look easy by comparison.

The very term “cybersecurity” embraces a number of different dimensions.  Breaches of cybersecurity can range from mere technical glitches; to willful cybermisfeasance – relatively minor acts of cyber-mischief; to cybercrime, such as acts of theft or fraud; to cyberespionage (both commercial and political-military) – the illicit seeking of sensitive economic or national security information of another country; to cyberterrorism and even full-fledged cyberwarfare – violent acts of non-state and state actors, respectively, targeting civilian and critical national assets.

One of the dynamics that tends to complicate U.S.-China relations around the issue of cybersecurity is the propensity of U.S. journalists, and even some experts, to characterize actions that fall within the first several categories of activity noted above, and that were likely perpetrated by private individuals (with no or, in any case, varying degrees of coordination with the central government), as “cyberwarfare.”  Like a number of other observers, I believe the utilization of the term “cyberwarfare” by U.S. writers in these lesser contexts is misleading and unhelpful.  As I have often said, if we were ever in a state of true cyberwarfare with China (or any other major cyber power, for that matter), we’d certainly know it – and frankly, it would probably be the least of our problems at that point.  (I cannot easily envision a scenario in which two nations would be in a full-on cyberwar with each other that would not almost instantly become a full-fledged, total war between them.)  The tendency in the United States to cast cyber tensions between the United States and China as manifesting a state of “cyberwar” between the two countries reinforces a general sense, among average Americans, that China is somehow the “enemy.”  In turn, China’s invariably shrill responses to charges like those Google recently made only serve to perpetuate the old rhetorical cycle.

I am convinced that somewhere in a newsroom tonight, there is a China affairs or foreign affairs reporter who is already writing the news copy for the next iteration of this story; I doubt he or she will have to edit the piece much when the actual events occur some weeks or months from now.  The script is pretty predictable.

Of course, rhetoric is by no means the only aspect of the problem.  At the core of U.S.-China cyber tensions is a simple truth:  the two countries, like virtually all countries, spy on each other, including via cyber means.  As outgoing U.S. Defense Secretary (and former CIA director) Robert Gates himself testified before the U.S. Senate earlier this month:  “Most governments lie to each other.  …[S]ometimes they send people to spy on us, and they’re our close allies.”  If that’s true amongst our “close allies,” then it’s certainly true of countries whose basic ideologies are so antithetical and whose political systems are so profoundly different. 

The United States and China will continue to probe each other’s cyber capabilities and defenses for many years to come.  That should surprise no one.  Still, what is needed is a more substantive and open dialogue between the two governments about cybersecurity.

In sharp contrast to the cases of human rights in the 1990s and trade and economic issues in the 2000s, in which – despite the sharp divergence in perspectives on the issues – there was intensive engagement between the two governments on a nearly daily basis, there is as yet relatively little concrete and sustained engagement between the United States and China on cybersecurity.  Indeed, cybersecurity was added to the agenda of the all-encompassing Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) discussions between the two governments only this year.  I was glad to see this development; in a March 2010 op-ed in the Dallas Morning News, I was the first voice in the U.S. media to call for cybersecurity to be added to the S&ED agenda.

The EastWest Institute, a New York-based foreign policy think tank specializing in track 2 diplomacy, has made a concerted and fruitful effort to address the “dialogue deficit” between the United States and China on cybersecurity.  We invited senior Chinese officials to address our Worldwide Cybersecurity Summits in Dallas in 2010 and London in 2011 and invited Chinese internet experts, from both the public and private sectors, to play an active, and indeed integral, role in our multilateral efforts to establish international rules of the road in the cybersecurity domain.  The EastWest Institute also brought together top-level U.S. and Chinese experts to explore what the two countries could do, on a voluntary basis, to combat the dissemination of spam – and in the process, helped produce the first U.S.-China consensus set of recommendations on a cybersecurity topic. This is a strong foundation on which further cooperation can be built.

The fact is, the cybersecurity challenges we face today are global in nature; they require international collaboration. Both the United States and China, as two of the preeminent cyber powers in the world today, need to be at the table.

As posited above, the news story about the next U.S.-China cyber flap has probably already been written; it’s old news before it has even occurred. Perhaps it’s time to write the next chapter in this important story.

David J. Firestein is vice president of the EastWest Institute.  A former U.S. diplomat, he is the author of three books on China, including two China-published best-sellers.

For years, instability and militancy in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have threatened not only Pakistan’s internal security, but also stability in Afghanistan. The situation in Pakistan’s tribal territories has become a growing concern, with coalition troop withdrawal approaching and transition of security to Afghan forces slowly gaining momentum. Current Pakistani military efforts to combat militancy in the FATA have been very weak, as indicated in early June in South Waziristan, where 150 militants seemingly effortlessly attacked a Pakistani security check post.

Pakistan must step up its military efforts and improve security in FATA. As this article argues, the strength of militancy in the tribal belt is largely due to insufficient Pakistani troop presence there, due to the deployment of Pakistani troops on the India border at the expense of sufficient troop strength at its western border. As so often is the case in Pakistan’s history, an important Pakistani interest is being held hostage by the country’s difficult relationship with India. The India-Pakistan rivalry is diverting Pakistan’s military resources, undermining the country’s stability and its chances for economic development.

The latest chapter in Pakistan’s troop deployment began with the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which deteriorated India-Pakistan relations just as they had begun to show very shy first signs of détente after the departure of President Pervez Musharraf. The Mumbai attacks were conducted by Lashkar-e-Taiba agents with close connections to Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). The resulting outrage in India and internationally led the Pakistani government to fear that the Indian government would retaliate with a ground attack across the border. These fears prompted the Pakistani government to move about 20,000 ground troops fighting militants in the tribal areas to the Indian border. With these troops gone, extremist groups gained freedom to maneuver, expanding their influence and ability to wage attacks on both sides of the Durand Line.

In April 2010, almost one-and-a-half years after the Mumbai attacks, Pakistan finally began moving about 10,000 troops back to the Afghan border. While this may have signaled the Pakistan government’s commitment and desperate need to solve the domestic insurgent threat, the violence of the past months indicates that it may be too little too late for success in FATA.

Impact of Pakistani Military Operations in FATA

In his April 2011 bi-annual report on Afghanistan, President Barack Obama highlighted the ineffectiveness of Pakistan’s military in FATA. The report stated that the 147,000 Pakistani troops involved have been unsuccessful fighting the tribal belt militants and that the Pakistani government needs to commit more resources to FATA.

A closer look at the impact of recent Pakistani military operations in the region, particularly North Waziristan, demonstrates the price Pakistan has paid for diverting its resources to the Indian border.
Over the past few years, the military cleared some tribal agencies of militants in FATA only to lose the territory shortly after, due to the lack of troop strength.

In early 2010, the Pakistani military claimed they had cleared Mohmand Agency in FATA. These claims were undermined by Taliban-led attacks in the agency as early as July 2010, which killed over 100 civilians. The Taliban once again controlled the Mohmand agency in 2011, which forced the Pakistan military to again conduct major operations there in February 2011. These operations displaced 25,000 people.

In June 2011, the Pakistani military claimed that Orakzai Agency was clear of extremist militants after hundreds were killed. However, the history of military claims in Mohmand Agency raises doubts that this claim is true. Orakzai Agency had only recently become home to insurgent group – groups that fled there when the Pakistan military launched operations against militants in South Waziristan.

The conclusion is clear: even if the Pakistani Military clears a tribal agency of extremists groups, it is merely a matter of time until the militants regain power in a neighboring agency. There are simply not enough troops to secure the entire FATA region. The movement of insurgent groups in FATA from one agency to another proves that the Pakistani military is unable to maintain any security in the seven tribal territories as a whole. This demonstrates that the Pakistani military needs to a holistic approach to the tribal territories and to increase overall military strength there. This demonstrates that the Pakistani military needs to use a holistic approach to the tribal territories and to increase overall military strength there.

Lack of Financial Resources for FATA Operations

The Pakistani government’s concern over India’s intentions has not only diverted troops to their shared border – it has also tied up major financial resources related to that troop deployment. In 2009, Islamabad continued to ignore warnings from the World Bank that the millions of dollars being spent on maintaining troops on the border threatened Islamabad’s economic capability. In this context, it is worthwhile pointing out that troop expenses and additional services that the Pakistani military gives to the families of soldiers deployed along the Indo-Pakistani border has directly drained financing for military operations in FATA. The World Bank also noted that an improved relationship with New Delhi would boost economic prosperity.

Recent developments have confirmed that the World Bank’s warnings were accurate.  In January 2011, as the Pakistan military was preparing for military operations in the insurgent hotbed of North Waziristan, the Federal Finance Ministry stated that Pakistan’s struggling economy could not handle any more substantial military operations. This further delayed the crucial military operations in North Waziristan, one of the most dangerous and unstable regions in Pakistan. Instead, the money meant for operations in North Waziristan went to stationing Pakistani troops and resources on the Indian border.

In March 2011, the Pakistani military deployed around 20,000 troops to North Waziristan in preparation for military engagement. Ironically, the number of troops was the exact same amount of troops moved from the tribal territories to the Indian border in 2008 after the Mumbai attacks. Even so, Islamabad leaders continued their claims that they would not make a decision on the operations, due to lack of resources. It is not surprising that the Obama administration’s bi-annual report on Afghanistan in April 2011 concluded that Pakistan’s economic situation poses the country’s greatest short-term threat to its stability.

Overall Effect of Troop Redeployment

Pakistan’s inability to clear FATA of insurgents has only led to increased speculation over the ISI’s involvement with the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan. Although it is difficult to determine the exact extent that Pakistan’s troop redeployment had on the Pakistani government’s ability to take control of FATA, it is clear that the move crippled the country’s ability to combat the extremist insurgent groups on their western frontier.

Moving forward, it will be very important that leaders in Pakistan and Afghanistan come to terms with a role for India in Afghanistan that takes into account the legitimate strategic interest of both countries. Such an understanding will first and foremost have to be found between Afghan and Pakistani leaders. If achieved, this may also lead to more detente in the troubled relationship between Pakistan and India.

Literally meaning the ‘land of the pure’, Pakistan has been in the grip of extremism of one sort or the other - ethnic, linguistic, sectarian and religious – almost since its birth. Six decades after independence, we continue to struggle with basic issues relating to identity, democracy and constitutionalism. Elections are always a saga of fraud and violence.  Student militias and weaponry were introduced into our universities under the garb of student unions in the 70s, the rampant murders of political opponents and deteriorating law and order situation transformed Pakistani society into a fertile ground for what has become one of our biggest headaches.  Contrary to popular perception, radicalization is not confined to religion alone. Anyone can be a radical i.e. a minister, a driver, an officer or a cleric - ignorance being the basic factor behind radicalization.

Pakistan today is perceived by the international community to be one of the most radicalized nations.  After driving the Soviets out, Mujahideen groups, which had poured from all over the world into Afghanistan to fight the infidels, indulged in years of infighting among themselves.  Forsaken by their own countries and with nowhere to go, many crossed over into Pakistan and settled in the border areas.  They have played a significant role over the years in radicalizing local groups.  To add to this, tribesmen in FATA have been influenced throughout history by events in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s history of political chaos, economic mismanagement and religious exploitation has spawned disillusionment among the masses. Without a robust political platform the youth were especially affected.  This situation was tailor-made for religious organizations, those with a radical bent, providing a platform leading young people in directions without sense of balance in their lives. Religious and political extremism has flourished like never before.

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) are the most radicalized areas.  This malaise is afflicting us because of a weak and outdated system of governance, influence of the Islamist political parties, lack of public participation in political and governance process, etc. Other factors are lack of development and progress, widespread poverty, acute unemployment, inflation, food insecurity and absence of social justice for the people. Some structural causes related to the war on terror has resulted in resentment in the people and radicalism on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border, viz Taliban’s exclusion from the Afghan government, Pakistan’s policies as a key US ally are seen as being harmful to Pakistan, the government’s failure to halt US drone attacks, issue of Afghan refugees, etc.

Analysts and counterterrorism practitioners believe that if the extremism and terrorism threatening almost every country in the world is to be defeated, there is a need to go beyond security and intelligence measures. Pro-active measures must be taken to prevent vulnerable individuals from radicalizing and rehabilitating those who have already embraced extremism. De-radicalization is the process of changing an individual’s belief system, rejecting the extremist ideology, and embracing mainstream values. This concept is manifested in the counter and de-radicalization programmes to demobilize violent extremists and their supporters in many countries, including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. Most of these programmes have been influenced by work on de-radicalization and re-integration of former terrorists being carried out in Saudi Arabia.  The success of the Saudi strategy is composed of prevention, rehabilitation, and aftercare programmes.  Increasingly using unconventional and “soft” measures to combat violent extremism has borne some very positive results. Saudi authorities claim a rehabilitation success rate of 80 to 90%, only 35 individuals have been re-arrested for security offenses. Their rehabilitation campaign seeks to address the underlying factors that facilitate extremism and prevent further violent Islamism. Others in the region, including the United States in Iraq, have adopted a similar approach.

To its credit the Pakistan Army has started de-radicalization programmes on its own, one school has been set up in Swat Valley aimed at de-radicalizing young children who were either forcibly or voluntarily mixing with various militant groups operating in the country. Organizers of this first of its kind boarding school in Pakistan say it is providing a small but valuable window into the backgrounds of Pakistan's young fighters and the triggers that vault them into the hands of militants. The Center is called "Rastoon," meaning "Place of the Right Path." There are other Centers in the Swat Valley -- another one for men, one for women and one for adolescents. Officers at this school, aided by psychologists, have spent months researching whether and how Taliban helpers and sympathizers could be de-radicalized.

More resources need allocation because of the growing numbers of child fighters. As opposed to people in older groups, children are extremely vulnerable to the militant threat because of their youth and innocence, they can be manipulated and brainwashed by a group's ideology without much effort. In her article “Pakistan’s Child Fighters”, Kulsoom Lakhani makes a case for this Center, “as a pilot school, to apply best practices from successful programmes of rehabilitating child soldiers in other countries. For example, in Sri Lanka, the government established numerous transit centers as part of a complex programme to rehabilitate former child soldiers of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The ICC alongwith the Sri Lankan Cricket Association and UNICEF have partnered a program using cricket to rehabilitate and engage these children”. Before he became Adjutant General of the Sri Lankan Army, my own Coursemate from 34th PMA Long Course, MajorGeneral Ananda Weerasekera, was the Head of the Rehabilitation Program for theJanatha Vimukthi Peramuna(JVP) hardcore who had surrendered at the end of a particularly tough and bitter counter-terrorism campaign in the early 80s.  Thanks to him and Coursemates late Maj Gen “Lucky” Vijayratna (killed in action) and Maj Gen Siri Peiris, who became Chief of General Staff Sri Lankan Army, I was lucky to have witnessed the program at first hand.

An excellent paper on “Counter-Recruitment Initiative” (CRI) was presented by Hans Giessmann of the Council of Counter-terrorism of the World Economic Forum (WEF), urging Global Leaders to promote the creation and dissemination of counter-terrorism initiatives within identity-based communities to separate terrorists from the larger groups, especially of ethnic or religious peers which terrorists take hostage for legitimising violence against innocent people and for propagating their case in communities they claim to protect. Promoting tolerance, dignity, respect and empathy, CRI proposes to preventing people from becoming attracted, radicalized and ultimately recruited, by addressing the grievances which make people susceptible to hate speech and the propaganda of terrorist networks.

To win the ideological battle the bane of poverty, one of the prime factors fuelling radicalism, must be addressed. The ranks of militants have flourished because of social and economic inequalities in our society, the widening gap between the rich and the poor and the erosion of the middle class. That radical clerics are behind radicalism may be true but it is not the whole truth.  The Government must take pragmatic measures to empower the masses by broadening the country’s economic base and address the inequalities in society 

Gist of the paper prepared for the Seminar on “De-Radicalization” organized by the Pakistan Army in Mingora, Swat on July 4-7, 2011.

In December 2009, when announcing the “surge” of an additional 30,000 US troops into Afghanistan President Obama had simultaneously promised the beginning of the draw down of American forces in July 2011. This artful decision was tailored to satisfy those wanting the US to stay the course in Afghanistan and those demanding an end to this wasteful war during a period of a dreadful recession. Whatever its political dexterity in terms of domestic politics, the decision to induct more troops and announce a reduction in advance must have seemed militarily viable too.

The “surge” was intended to give the US and NATO forces the required means to degrade the Taliban militarily, enough to induce them to negotiate a political solution. This goal  does not seem to have been adequately achieved. US political and military representatives had also begun annotating the President’s July 2011 draw down commitment by stating that there was nothing sacrosanct about it, and that any decision would be taken after a careful assessment of the ground situation at the appropriate time. President Obama’s June 22 address on the Af-Pak situation was therefore important in this context.

The questions on the minds of observers would have been the size of the initial draw down, the subsequent troop reductions, the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces to take over security responsibilities, progress in the reconciliation process with the Taliban, and US ability to effectively manage the essential but problematic Pakistan factor, especially after the discovery of Osama bin Laden in a safe-haven in Pakistan and his elimination by US Special Forces. 

The state of play with the Taliban has been the subject of considerable interest and speculation, and, in India’s case, concern. On this subject the speech recycles known formulations and reveals little. The US, according to Obama, will join initiatives that reconcile the Afghan people, including the Taliban, with the process being led by the Afghan government and those joining agreeing to break with the Al Qaida, abandon violence and abide by the Afghan Constitution. He says, without elaboration, that there is reason to believe progress can be made.

Some have detected a new openness in these words towards the reconciliation process. But then, as far back as December 1, 2009, Obama had in his Af-Pak address stated that the US “will support efforts by the Afghan government to open doors to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect human rights of their fellow citizens”. Using similar language in his second Af-Pak address on December 16, 2010, he said that the US “fully supports an Afghan political process that includes reconciliation with the Taliban who break ties with the Al Qaida, renounce violence and accept the Afghan Constitution”.

Obama is resorting to familiar formulations, except for expressing this time the belief that progress can be made in the reconciliation process. The basis for this cautious optimism could be actual progress in the contacts with the Taliban, or the intention may be to strengthen President Karzai’s hand as well as encourage “moderate” Taliban leaders to come forward, or it could simply be an expression of hope that the developing circumstances, with bin Laden eliminated, might have improved the chances of reconciliation.

Many observers believe, however, that contacts with the Taliban have been at low level, the military situation is stale-mated, the size and location of US bases in Afghanistan suggest not a military withdrawal but an Afghanization of the conflict, the Taliban’s refusal to open an office in Turkey or elsewhere indicates an unwillingness to bite the bait of negotiation easily and, above all, reconciliation cannot be reconciled with the declared intention to eliminate Haqqani and Mullah Omar.

Obama has been very cautious in his draw down decision, which he was obliged to take  for his own credibility. The actual scaling down has been fitted into his re-election strategy,  not what may be objectively required. Only 10,000 troops will be withdrawn by the year-end, with as little as 5000 troops by September. Later, when winter arrives and military activity declines, he will withdraw another 5000. To extract the maximum political capital, by next summer, closer to the elections, Obama intends to bring the 30,000 “surge” troops back home. That will still leave 68,000 US troops in Afghanistan- twice the number there when he became President. 

With the “surge” reversed, US troops will be withdrawn at a “steady pace” until 2014 when they will move from combat operations to a supportive role for the Afghan forces. Meanwhile, at the May 2012 Chicago summit, NATO will discuss the next phase of transition in Afghanistan. This forward looking approach, with flexible time-tables and fluid commitments, gives Obama political space in the context of the electoral calendar.

Obama does not, in any case, have a complete military withdrawal from Afghanistan in mind. In his December 2010 speech Obama had spoken about forging a new strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan in 2011 that would commit the US to the “long term security and development of the Afghan people”. Indications are that the US intends  to acquire a number of permanent bases in Afghanistan, retaining 25,000 troops according to some reports, as part of US’s larger regional strategy.

In the wake of the bin Laden episode, references to Pakistan in Obama’s speech assumed   more than usual importance. The President spoke of terrorist safe-havens in Pakistan, of working with Pakistan to root out the cancer of violent extremism and insisting that Pakistan keeps its commitments, and emphasizing that he will not tolerate a safe-haven for those targetting the US. While recognizing Pakistan’s role in decimating the Al Qaida leadership, he pointedly gave the credit for the bin Laden operation only to US intelligence professionals and Special Forces.

Lest anyone views this as a hardening of tone towards Pakistan, it is worth recalling that in December 2009 Obama had spoken of the cancer of extremism having taken root in the border region of Afghanistan, and the need for a strategy to “work on both sides of the border”. He warned then that he would not “tolerate a safe-haven for terrorists whose location is known and whose intentions are clear”. In his December 2010 address he again warned that the US will “continue to insist to Pakistani leaders that terrorist safe-havens within their borders must be dealt with”. All Obama has done is to repeat his earlier admonitions which, as we know, did not deter Pakistan from sheltering bin Laden. Pakistan is now posturing as the wronged party!

Obama’s June 22 speech was notable for containing nothing new; it carefully treaded known ground. With the end-game in Afghanistan approaching, many may have hoped that his latest discourse would break some new ground, explain more clearly how he intends to deal with the several uncertainties that still dog the situation in Aghanistan, and answer to an extent the many unanswered questions in the minds of non-western observers about some crucial aspects of US policy. In the event, not only the substance of the speech, even the obligatory high sounding rhetoric of US Presidential speeches was a recycled echo of the President’s two earlier addresses.

The writer is a former Foreign Secretary

Click here to read Sibal's piece in India Today

Over two days in Islamabad, the visiting lawmakers met with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari; Speaker of the House Dr. Fehmida Mirza; Prime Minister Gillani’s advisor on human rights, Mustafa Khokhar; Deputy Speaker of the House Faisal Karim Kundi; and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Caucus.

“These high-level calls reflect the Pakistani leadership’s conviction that women belong in the center of the state’s political life,” said Dr. Attiya Inayatullah MP and former Minister of Women's Development, Social Welfare and Special Education.

Many Afghan women fear that reconciliation with the Taliban could undermine their newfound political rights and say they need to play a role in making peace to ensure the region’s long-term stability.  Afghan MP Golalei Nur Safi, who belongs to the Wolesi Jirga and the High Peace Council, called women an “absolute must” in all negotiations.

Despite impressive gains, women in Afghanistan are still struggling to play a significant political role at home. Although women hold 68 seats in the Afghan Parliament, in part thanks to a constitutionally-mandated quota, women rarely serve on decision-making bodies or play a meaningful role in peace processes.

The June 3-4 trip grew out an EWI-organized international conference held at the European Parliament in December 2010, where Afghan and Pakistani women lawmakers decided to form a regional network. The aim: to build bilateral trust, and support Afghan women as they work for peace.

In Islamabad, the network went into action for the first time, with the Women’s Parliamentary Caucus of the National Assembly of Pakistan hosting the Afghan Women Parliamentary Delegation.

“In Brussels we made a step forward in the bilateral dialogue between Afghan and Pakistani women MPs,” said Razia Sadat, Member of the National Assembly of Afghanistan. “But here in Pakistan, we made two or three steps forward toward building a strong regional network of support for Afghan women MPs.”

The delegation’s visit began with a closed session between the Afghan delegation and the Women Parliamentary Caucus (WPC) chaired by Dr. Nafisa Shah, Secretary of the Caucus. The Pakistani parliamentarians shared concrete experiences and lessons learned with the Afghan delegation, with a focus on progressive legislation including the Family Law (a similar law is currently under discussion in Afghanistan) and setting up a bank for small loans for women to support women’s economic empowerment.

Delegates addressed the issues of violation of human rights in traditional societies, informal justice and customary law. It was commonly agreed that women lawmakers in both countries should work together in addressing the misuse of religious beliefs, as well as involve prominent religious leaders in an ongoing dialogue on this topic. The media was identified as one avenue for shaping public opinion and raising awareness of these issues.

On behalf of the National Assembly of Pakistan and also on behalf of the Women’s Parliamentary Caucus (WPC), in her capacity as the Patron of the Caucus, the Speaker of the House, Dr. Fehmida Mirza, pledged her complete support for the creation of a regional women’s parliamentary network. She suggested creating a permanent forum of women parliamentarians of the two countries and proposed the WPC as the hub.

Participants said that a regular forum or network would help Afghan women lawmakers learn transferable lessons from Pakistani women lawmakers, who have managed to take a leadership role in a country traditionally ruled by men. Regular interaction between Afghan and Pakistani lawmakers would also build trust person-by-person, and help improve the strained bilateral relationship.

"The delegation was a step forward in terms of changing the face of politics of the region,” says Shinkai Karokhail, Member of Afghan Parliament. “It creates solidarity and a common language among women who have committed themselves to strongly advocate for peace, security and human rights, and stand together for a common cause.”

The Afghan and Pakistani women parliamentarians put forward an Islamabad Action Plan which lays out next steps and concrete recommendations for the network. In the plan, the Afghan delegation agreed to revive an inclusive women’s parliamentary caucus, with the support of Pakistan’s Women’s Parliamentary Caucus. The women lawmakers also resolved to continue the ongoing dialogue, establish women parliamentarian advocacy groups in both countries, and to work together on issues of common concern, particularly women’s inclusion in security dialogues.

EWI has been requested to facilitate a follow-up meeting in Kabul in the autumn of 2011.

To learn more, please visit EWI’s website, where the Islamabad Action Plan will be posted in the coming weeks.

The height of his diplomatic career came at a time of crucial moments in our history, including the end of the Cold War and development of democracy in central Europe, the first Gulf War, and German reunification. His management of seemingly intractable situations in Yugoslavia and the Middle East firmly set him apart from his colleagues; the world today is better off for it. He was, as Jim Baker put it, “as good as they come.”

I first met Larry Eagleburger thirty years ago when Larry was asked by the White House to ‘take responsibility’ within the U.S. Government for dealing with the Institute for East-West Security Studies (EWI’s name in 1980).  Larry was then Undersecretary of State. He bemusedly and quickly nicknamed me; thereafter, for three decades I was always introduced by Larry to others as “my favorite pink-o.” When asked by a former EWI Director why he did that, he responded that “nobody brought more important persons from the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies to the United States or Western Europe during the Cold War than young Mroz.” 

Twenty eight years later, Larry hosted for EWI a key gathering in Washington of top GOP leaders to meet with top Communist Party leaders. The topic was whether it was possible to create a political party backchannel between the CPC and the Democratic and Republican Parties. Several other prominent GOP personalities had declined to host that session. Larry said “let’s do it” and came in from Charlottesville in his wheelchair to lead the session. Secretary Madeleine Albright hosted the Democratic Party side for EWI that same day.  The rest is history—the three party talks are now a feature of political life. At the start of the GOP meeting, the Secretary loudly addressed me across the room with a greeting “well Mroz, some things just don’t change, do they!”  

For our Institute, Larry Eagleburger will always be known as a founding godfather and crucial player in enabling EWI to take risks in building trust and seeking solutions. His involvement with EWI has been constant and frequent. More than a decade ago, Larry Eagleburger told a large international gathering “This EastWest Institute claims it is a family. Let us be honest. It is a strange family but one I am proud to belong to. Let’s face it, we are all people who would probably never have worked together had it not been for the vision, values and action-orientation of EWI’s founding fathers.”  Secretary Eagleburger frequently told the story of the “young man who could not understand the word ‘NO.’”  Larry was frequently providing advice and using his vast network to help EWI.  Few earned their way into my heart as did Larry Eagleburger.

Please join me in offering my deepest condolences to Larry’s family. Today, we mourn the loss of a great man, a loyal friend and visionary. We will miss you, Mr. Secretary.

John Edwin Mroz

Cutting military and economic assistance to a country in crisis is generally seen as a failure of foreign policy. Such imperial hubris can lead to a miscalculation of national interests and leave a power vacuum. In February 1947, however, when Britain announced it could no longer support Greek nationalist forces against the communists, the United States was ready to step in, fearing a communist takeover. The mutual concern of the United States and Britain to contain communism made it possible for the Attlee government to step aside and for Truman to move in. Today, another such confluence of interests exists in Pakistan: China and the United States have a vested interest in containing violent Islamic extremism.

With the recent killing of Osama Bin Laden and the uncertainty of Pakistan’s role, some U.S. lawmakers are questioning the wisdom of continuing the multibillion dollar civilian and military aid program to Islamabad. Amidst a struggling economy, high unemployment and global commitments, should the United States cut its aid and let China fill the void?

This may seem counter to U.S. national interests, but the main objectives of Washington’s presence in in South Asia are denying terrorists a safe haven in Afghanistan and preventing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of extremists. With Osama bin Laden dead and the withdrawal from Afghanistan in sight, Pakistan is bound to play a diminishing role in U.S. strategy; its importance for China is growing.

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is fraught on virtually every level. Of the approximately $22 billion in American aid to Pakistan since 2001, most of it supported the domineering Pakistani military, which invested it (counter to U.S. demands) into military equipment aimed at deterring India. In an attempt to counter this, the Kerry-Lugar Act—a $7.5 billion aid package passed by the U.S. Congress in 2009—stipulated that the military must be subordinate to the civilian government. This infuriated the Pakistani public, seen as it was as an infringement on Pakistani sovereignty. The United States undermines its own efforts by focusing most of its diplomatic energies on Pakistan’s military and its Chief of Army Staff, Asfaq Kayani, rather than on the weak civilian Zardari government. As Manreet Singh, Indian MP and chief editor of the monthly Defense and Security Alert, states: “The major obstacle in the United States’ dealings with Pakistan is that it focuses on persons rather than institutions and by doing so is undermining the democratic institutions in Pakistan.”

On the strategic geopolitical level, the situation is even worse. After spending billions of dollars in aid, if the United States succeeds in stabilizing Pakistan and Afghanistan, it will play into China’s hand; for decades Beijing has quietly fostered a special partnership with Islamabad—an “all weather friend” in the words of Pakistan’s government.

China’s activity in Pakistan has increased noticeably in the last couple of years. In 2007, Chinese investment in Pakistan hovered around $4 billion. In December 2010, Pakistani Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao signed deals worth around $25 billion. China also provided millions of dollars in aid for the victims of the recent floods and for reconstruction projects. In July 2010, both countries held their third joint military exercises focused on counterterrorism. While the exercise was little more than a PR tactic, China is genuinely worried about the potential destabilizing influence of Pakistani militants on its own Muslim minority in Xinjiang.

China is also one of Pakistan’s main weapons suppliers—around 70 percent of Pakistan’s battle tanks are of Chinese origin. Back in 1990, the PRC allowed Pakistan to test its first nuclear device in Lop Nor. China even footed the bill for transporting the Nodong and Taepodong missiles purchased by Pakistan from North Korea after the United States refused to deliver F-16 fighter jets and the Pakistani Army had to seek other means of transporting its nuclear weapons.

All of this is in China’s self-interest. By geographically controlling the Western gateways of China, Pakistan could serve as an alternative route for its critical energy supply, which is bottlenecked in the Straits of Malacca (65 percent of Chinese energy imports—mostly crude oil—run through the strait). Beijing is heavily investing in a railroad from the port of Gwadar—constructed with Chinese money and strategically located on the Makran coast—to the Karakoram pass leading into the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang. This is part of what some US commentators have dubbed China’s “string-of-pearls” strategy, a strategy aimed at building strategic partnerships and securing ports and airfields from the South China Sea through the Strait of Malacca and across the Indian Ocean to the Arabian Gulf to protect its energy supply routes. The mouth of the Persian Gulf is only 350 km from the nearest Pakistani port. A permanently based Chinese naval squadron in the port of Gwadar increases China’s ability to project power into the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.

The key question: If the United States decides to scale back spending on Pakistan, will China increase its aid correspondingly? Pakistan is confronting a major financial crisis. In the last two decades, it has twice come to the brink of financial collapse—once in 1990 and then again in 2008. It was saved only by massive infusions from the United States, Europe, Saudi Arabia, the IMF and China. Blatantly poor management by the Musharaf and Bhutto administrations has been compounded by the global financial downturn. There is insufficient electrical power to meet the country’s needs, and major cities experience periodic outages and blackouts. Food prices have escalated, as have the costs for the large amounts of oil that the country must import.

Chinese influence in the years to come, however, will in no way approach the level of U.S. involvement, and whether Beijing’s support will ever match that of Washington is questionable—at least in the short term. Chinese aid is in general quieter and more subtle with fewer conditions attached. While China is interested in combating terrorism and calming its Muslim minorities, the Chinese military traditionally has not played an important role in Chinese diplomacy. Deploying Chinese troops abroad is still a very alien subject to decision makers in Beijing, and the capabilities of the Chinese Armed Forces in counterinsurgency and police training have been largely untested and can in no way compare to those of the United States military. But this is all subject to change.

Most observers are certain that Chinese influence will increase in Pakistan in the near future. The shock of the Pressler Amendment—US sanctions imposed on Pakistan and quasi-abandonment of the country after the Soviet withdrawal in the 1990s—still sits deep in Pakistan’s consciousness. In response to the killing of Osama Bin Laden, General Kayani announced that Pakistan will reevaluate military and intelligence cooperation should Pakistan’s sovereignty be violated again. The future of US-Pakistan relations remains uncertain at best.

Prime Minister Attlee’s announcement in February 1947 to abandon the Greek nationalists and cede its Raj to India, amidst the worst British snowfall of the twentieth century, marked the beginning of the end of Britain’s postwar global power status and induced the birth of modern Pakistan. While the United States’ presence in Pakistan is in no way comparable to the British situation in India or Greece in 1947, U.S. policy makers should bear in mind that strategic disengagement is meant to preserve rather than diminish national power. In the case of Pakistan, China might be eager to fill the vacuum should the United States decide to trim down its efforts, something that would serve the U.S. national interest well in the long term.

Click here to read this piece in National Interest

The arrest of Mladic is a highly symbolic marker that Serbia is now a normal state, prepared to enforce European values, EWI Vice president Greg Austin tells Time.