Politics and Governance

Not a man of many words, Kayani who had partnered with Mullen in papering over frequent tensions in the US-Pakistan relationship over the past four years must have been severely jolted. If nothing else the Pakistani COAS must be deeply embarrassed by this “unkindest cut of all”, Et tu, Mullen? Such trust deficit among the military heads of the two countries is counter-productive and will be difficult to overcome in the future.

The “Afghan leaders” propped up in Kabul by the US must now be really apprehensive about the US exiting Afghanistan. Soviet puppet Najibullah hanging publicly from an electric pole is not something people forget easily. No wonder Burhanuddin Rabbani, the peacemaker, was assassinated; some people have a vested interest in keeping the conflict going. The overwhelming public perception is that failing to meet its stated goals in Afghanistan, the US is passing the buck onto Pakistan, the ISI being a most convenient scapegoat for all perceived ills in the world even at the best of times. The US diatribe has further aroused public feeling against the US in the drawing rooms and streets of the country, even the most diehard friends of the US are aghast at the allegations made by responsible US officials.

The Haqqani faction of the Afghan Taliban is mostly concentrated in the Paktia and Paktika and later Khost. These fiercest of Afghan fighters are from the Zadran tribe. The Haqqanis only crossed the porous border into the adjacent Pakistani territory after the Soviet invasion; from here they operated against the Soviets with active help from both the CIA and the ISI. Where are the coalition forces bases that should have been formed in this area to “do more” in combating the Haqqanis? While targeting the safe havens of the Haqqanis on our territory, can we risk that the Waziris, who mostly inhabitant North Waziristan become collateral damage? Mostly rural guerrillas, Haqqanis seldom operate in the Afghan towns and cities since their very distinct facial features make them recognisable.

While all intelligence agencies maintain some links with the opposition, there is a vast difference between having contact and actively aiding and abetting terrorism. If it were the Haqqanis who attacked the US embassy in Kabul, they could have only homed onto their targets with active insider help within the city from the many guerrilla factions that have melted into the city’s population.

The Pakistan Army is most reluctant to open up a front against these fierce fighters without “casus belli”. Almost 200,000 of our combat troops are very heavily engaged in Swat, South Waziristan and other Fata agencies, some units have been out in the field for over two years. Pakistan’s available helicopter fleet can hardly support the ongoing operations; moreover our ammunition reserves have been seriously depleted. Going into Haqqani-infested areas will have a blowback that will make our present terrorist-ridden situation seem like a walk in the park, to do so would be illogical bordering on insanity. Time, space and logistics (and public sentiment) are against us at the moment.

Our civilian and military sacrifices compare at a ratio of almost 10:1 to all Afghan civilian and coalition forces put together. The Afghan National Army (ANA) casualties number only a few hundred against our thousands, the less said about them the better. One incongruous thought, why the sudden concentrated diplomatic and media offensive by the US? Is it an amazing coincidence that every time the PPP coalition is in danger of a meltdown, the army and the ISI are put on the block by the US to relieve the existential threat to this inept and corrupt government?

Notwithstanding the rhetoric from the US about attacking Haqqani safe havens in North Waziristan, and Pakistan giving “a suitable reply”, both are nonsense. US “boots on the ground” in Pakistani territory is not a viable option, and not for political reasons alone. The US gameplan is to exit Afghanistan according to an enhanced schedule with the minimum casualties; this will only mean more body bags.

While one can expect escalation of drone attacks, and possibly even cruise missiles and limited air incursions, will the US risk a fire fight with the Haqqanis that could involve the Pakistan Army, and US coffins flying into Dover Air Force Base? One can expect an escalation in the war of words but not direct conflict. On our part, nobody in his right mind would counsel confrontation with the US, that is not an option. One would be stupid to go that route.

The US Congress would do this country the greatest favour if it passes the Bill to cut off aid to Pakistan, this government can than declare freedom! First, we should re-affirm our commitment to continue fighting the war on terror, but on our own terms. Second, we must pull out as many troops as we can from Fata and mobilise the tribal militias as in the past. Third, we must not take any further aid of any kind, economic or military, saddled with conditions. Fourth, we must charge transit fees (and the wear and tear to our infra-structure) at internationally acceptable rates for all goods passing through Pakistani territory.

These fees should be paid at points of entry, and fifth, we must clearly define the parameters of future collaboration with the US in the war on terror, this should include intelligence sharing, drone strikes, overflights, etc. This should spare the US administration from their present discomfort of giving us aid subject to all sorts of intervention by uninformed members of Congress playing to the conservative gallery which believes in bombing all problems into oblivion, and damn the consequences.

What exacerbates the US-Pakistan relationship is that no defined “terms of engagement” exist. This grey area allows each country to push its own agenda with motivated interest, this serves to create festering problems. While we lurch from crisis to crisis the underlying threat of crossing a fail-safe line will not only be detrimental for the US and Pakistan but will have long-term effects on future peace and stability on all the countries of this region. We must define clearly the “terms of engagement” for the future; “out of the box” thinking must remove the rough edges that mar the relationship between us. A well-defined “terms of endearment” will provide for a genuinely productive and meaningful relationship in the future.

Click here to read Sehgal's piece in The News

Rabbani was a controversial choice to head the High Peace Council, which was charged with seeking to negotiate with the Taliban. As president of the country from 1992 to 1996 and briefly again in 2001, he had been a fierce opponent of the Taliban.  However, he proved skillful in managing a broad range of contacts and reaching out to regional and ethnic leaders. Since he was a Tajik, his appointment was particularly symbolic and tricky because he had to deal with the Pahtun-dominated Taliban.  So, too, is the aftermath of his assassination since it has only exacerbated ethnic divisions and convinced many Tajiks, in particular, that there is no point in seeking reconciliation with the Taliban. The opponents of reconciliation are convinced that the Taliban has no interest in genuine power-sharing once most of NATO’s troops withdraw by 2014.

If the peace talks are to have a chance, the Taliban and Pakistan will need to make a clear commitment to participate in them. But so far, the Taliban have not even taken an official position on Rabbani’s assassination. They did deny a media report that they had claimed responsibility for the killing, but have remained studiously vague on whether this was indeed their handiwork. Prior to the assassination, the Taliban launched attacks on NATO headquarters and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, and they have continued to target top Afghan officials.

The insurgents may believe that their campaign against other Afghan officials is actually strengthening their hand in negotiations, and Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar offered a conciliatory statement in his August 28 statement in his Eid-ul-Fitr (end of Ramadan) message , when he called on all ethnic groups to participate in any future settlement. But by any measure, the Rabbani assassination undercut the Taliban’s credibility with most Afghans.

Some officials maintain that the Taliban may be genuinely split on some of these issues, and that more militant factions like the Haqqani network are the most probable culprits in the bloodiest attacks. Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Senate Armed Services Committee recently: “The Haqqani network acts as a virtual arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency.”  This has prompted angry recriminations from Pakistan and a growing rift in the Washington-Islamabad relationship. 

The reality of the peace process so far is that contacts with the insurgents a have flowed through a variety of channels, not always through the High Peace Council. The U.S. has led much of this effort, but Rabbani’s assassination will only add to Afghan concerns about protecting their interests in any possible deal. One possible next step: with the backing of Washington, a team of Afghan and international representatives would head to direct talks with the Taliban in Pakistan. In such talks, the divisions within the Taliban would have to be dealt with, as well as the tensions between the U.S., Afghanistan and Pakistan.

But whatever efforts are made now to keep the peace process alive, many Afghans have already decided that it has lost its legitimacy. For them, the Rabbani assassination was a clear signal that the Taliban wants to seize power again instead of sharing it in any way. All of which suggests that even if the West manages to broker a deal with the Taliban for a political settlement, it needs to win the backing of the Afghan people. That is difficult to imagine —unless the Afghan people can help determine its terms so that their growing misgivings can be allayed.

According to the host organization’s report of the meeting at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Mullen went on to suggest that it would be in the American national interest to resume contact with Tehran at either a political, diplomatic, or military-to-military level.

On 14 September, as reported by the Pentagon, Mullen said that Iran is attempting to develop nuclear weapons and wants regional hegemony in the Middle East; and the lack of contact between the United States and Iran could be dangerous to the region and the international community.

One could see these views more or less as a statement of the obvious – the United States needs to be talking to countries that give it concern. However, given the negative political sentiment in the United States toward Iran and given the rigid policy position of the U.S. government, then Mullen’s statements seem to indicate a division of some sort in the Obama Administration about the wisdom of continuing to isolate Iran diplomatically.  Another possible meaning of the remarks, though less likely, is that Mullen is just expressing U.S. frustration that as far it is concerned, Iran has not conducted itself properly to allow re-establishment of contact; and that it is Iran’s behavior that leads to the lack of contact.

Assuming the former interpretation (and not the latter) is correct, Mullen’s views open up the obvious question of what is it that the United States has to do or can do to start meaningful bilateral conversations on both nuclear issues and regional security issues.

Any restoration of formal relations seems highly unlikely in the next 2-3 years. The United States has, at least in a practical sense, made that conditional on a number of significant policy reversals by Tehran. In U.S. policy, Iran is more or less where it was when George Bush gave his “axis of evil” speech in 2002.  That said, the route of informal diplomatic “contacts” would be relatively easy if Iran and the United States were both willing.

Yet Mullen’s mention of military and political contacts in contrast to diplomatic efforts suggests a complete roadblock on one side or both to unofficial diplomatic contact. Military contacts would seem even more difficult. It is almost impossible to imagine that the State Department would agree to the idea that military officers would conduct any part of the diplomacy with Iran while diplomatic relations are so strained.

Moreover, at least as far as the public record is concerned, there does not seem to be much of a foundation for military to military contacts. So what about “political contacts”? In the run up to a Presidential election in the United States in 2012, this would seem at first glance to be extremely high risk.

Then there is the problem of who in Iran to talk to. The level of the contact would need to be finely set, and at a fairly middle level, to minimize political risk. Any prediction of what might come from Mullen’s statements would be foolhardy. Yet the ground-breaking significance of his comments as a very direct and unusually public opening to talk with Iranian leaders cannot be discounted.

Click here to read Austin's piece in New Europe

It seems therefore, if we are to credit Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey’s foreign minister, with the diplomatic talent so often ascribed to him, that there are now ambitions in play beyond the current game -- that is, outside the frame of the bilateral relationship. Turkey is now playing for a different Israel. This is not good news for Netanyahu.

Israel’s diplomatic environment may be at its most turbulent and uncertain for almost thirty years, even worse than during the two wars in Iraq in 1991 and 2003. The United States President has gone public on his insistence that Israel return to 1967 borders (with some land swaps), the United Nations General Assembly may recognize Palestine as a non-member state, and the Arab spring is playing itself out with profound effects in Syria, Egypt, Jordan and the Arabian peninsula. Turkey, which has powerful military forces, is downgrading its relations with Israel and challenging the legality of its blockade of Gaza. Disputes over Israel’s maritime resource boundaries have re-emerged in recent months. This all comes at a time of a persistent protest movement inside Israel against economic and social conditions, a movement inspired in part by the Arab spring. Terrorist attacks inside Israel continue and its government reports a reconstitution by Hamas of its military capabilities. Netanyahu’s promotion of his ambition for Israel to be recognized as a Jewish state as part of peace settlements runs against the demographic trends inside Israel, which will see the Arab share  of the population rise from its current 20 per cent to 25 per cent several decades hence.  However, it also offends the moral sensibility of Israel’s neighbors. 

What does Turkey want? It wants nothing more than a normalization of its regional environment. Since the uprising and associated violence in Syria, that ambition seems shattered and stability seems to have disappeared. Turkey has had a rather public spat with Iran over how to respond to events in Syria, even as Erdogan announced plans for a visit to Egypt this week. There is talk of a new security agreement of some sort between the two countries, and Turkey has been campaigning in support of the UN General Assembly resolution to recognize Palestine as a state.

In short, Turkey has laid down the gauntlet. It seems that Turkey refuses to return to the status quo where Israel was conducting its Palestine policy with no significant interference from Turkey. Turkey at government level is now threatening to take on the role of spoiler against Israel. The moral and legal challenge that the government of Turkey has now taken to the international stage against Israel is unambiguously a sharp turn in policy. It was a decision not taken lightly, yet Turkish citizens were killed in a manner that made any other policy path for Erdogan impossible.

Only time will tell, but we may come to remember the Erdogan/Davutoglu gambit to Israel in September 2011 as a major departure point for a new reckoning in regional affairs. We will probably have to wait for Netanyahu to leave office before that new reckoning can begin to take shape. 

Click here to read Austin's piece in New Europe

Because it occurred when the Indian prime minister was in Bangladesh charting a new relationship with that country (which, until Sheikh Hasina came to power, had provided a safe haven for terrorists targeting India), the attack could be construed as a reminder that covering our flank does not lessen India’s vulnerability.

Or, it could be that the terrorists were expressing their anger at the Indian justice system that condemned to death Afzal Guru, the co-conspirator of the terrorist attack against the Indian Parliament in 2001. In their eyes perhaps, India’s constitutional justice had to submit to the vengeful dictates of Islamic justice.

Perhaps the terrorists’ idea is to periodically keep mauling the financial and political capitals of India—Mumbai and Delhi, respectively, to keep India off balance, inflame domestic tensions, deepen its domestic fault lines and distract its attention away from its global ambitions and toward the management of its domestic situation.

India’s rise may be welcomed by those distant from India’s shores as a counterweight to the threatening ascent of China, but some of India’s neighbors obsessed by parity with India would hardly be enthused by this prospect and, lacking state capacity to directly confront India, might want to use nonstate actors to flatten India’s rise as much as possible.

Terrorism in India was earlier an instrument of state policy of its western neighbor: Pakistan. Now that country itself is being bled by terrorism, which makes increasingly difficult its policy of fighting one set of terrorists for internal security reasons and supporting another for external security ones (especially as now the U.S. too, as a victim of Pakistan’s dichotomous policies on terrorism, is keeping a watchful eye on that country’s conduct).

Yet, the plague of terrorism has spread so widely in the region that India cannot insulate itself from it. If aggrieved terrorist groups want to settle scores with Islamic Pakistan, non-Islamic India cannot escape their rancor, particularly as Pakistan has nourished for decades feelings of hatred toward Hindu India. The nonstate actors earlier used by Pakistan against India for terror onslaughts have, with Pakistan losing some control, enough capacity to target India autonomously. Even if every terrorist attack against India cannot be laid at Pakistan’s door today, it needs recalling that it is Pakistan that opened wide the doors to terrorist acts against India in the first place.

India is peculiarly vulnerable to terrorism. Its borders are not secure. It has an open border with Nepal and a porous border with Bangladesh; terrorists can infiltrate these borders as well as the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir into India. Its coast is not adequately defended, as the Mumbai terrorist attack tragically demonstrated. Under scrutiny for its terrorist affiliations, Pakistan has been developing the shield of deniability by creating terrorist cells in India, so that when terrorist attacks occur they are attributed to local terrorists and not Pakistanis. This strategy has worked politically, as India now recognizes that there are indigenous Islamic terrorist groups operating in the country to seek redress for local grievances.

India has been trapped by its soft diplomacy toward Pakistan: a policy that recognized that both India and Pakistan were victims of terrorism, and that terrorists should not be allowed to disrupt the India-Pakistan dialogue. With this position India could no longer blame Pakistan directly for acts of terror, as that would entail derailing this policy. From being on the defensive, Pakistan now claims that instead of knee-jerk reactions against Pakistan, India should deal with its home-grown problem of terrorism. This, of course, obfuscates the reality of Pakistan’s policies and the integrated nature of the terrorist threat, which derives from a shared religion, world views, social mores, madrassah education, mosque-based politics, training, and financing.

India’s governance problem is reflected in its inadequate disposition to deal with terrorist threats even now—despite being perhaps the country most lacerated by terrorism over the years. Decision making is slow, acquisition processes are dilatory, and maintenance of the equipment bought is poor. The police forces are understaffed, insufficiently trained, and ill-equipped. The federal nature of the system obstructs a comprehensive overhaul of the policing system as law and order is the responsibility of the state governments. Besides, political interference in police functioning has damaged its professional caliber and capacity.

India’s public places are generally highly congested. The streets overflow with people and all kinds of vehicular traffic, parking is chaotic, posts for public service are always crowded—and so soft targets are plentiful.

On top of it, in a country wracked constantly by terrorism, there is no consensus on framing a tough antiterror law. Politics distorts the debate. For fear of alienating Muslim voters, tougher laws are resisted for fear that Muslims may feel targeted. More divisive feelings are generated by bringing to the fore “Hindu” terrorism as an equal problem.

The Delhi terror attack is a sad reminder that India’s tryst with terror will not end easily.

Click here to read the text on The Daily Beast.

With progressing globalisation, borders have become increasingly irrelevant, thus reducing the probability of external aggression. Conversely threats to a country’s security emanate internally because of lack of economic development, unemployment, failing internal security because of religious, sectarian and/or ethnic strife, shifting of identities in the wake of globalisation, radicalisation of society and growing terrorism thereof being recent additions. It has not been possible in our relatively new nation state to properly work out the national identity and borders, both traditional (external) and internal security threats have started to overlap. Societal security is the prime responsibility of the state; our rulers have generally cold-shouldered this to our lasting detriment, as we can now see on graphic display. Societal threats undermine national cohesion and identification with the state, the resultant radicalisation and extremism results in law and order situations, rioting, rise of criminal gangs and gang wars, due to money-laundering and easy availability of weapons because of the nexus between corruption, organised crime and terrorism.

A credible accountability system is missing, without proper investigation, effective prosecution and delivery of swift, untainted justice is not possible. Perjury is not only rampant but is the order of the day, credible witnesses are in short supply and even they are susceptible to influence, by use of money and/or the force of public office. Our Supreme Court (SC) has become captive to endless bureaucratic manoeuvring, fighting a losing battle against a virtual bag of administrative tricks to defy and/or frustrate their judgments and instructions. Both the NICL and Haj cases are likely to enter the “Guinness Book of Records’, sophisticated filibustering making them into an endless exercise without a likely outcome. Failure to fulfil the main function of maintaining law and order to protect lives and properties of its citizens and ensure impartial, even-handed justice hastens the deterioration of the state and its institutions. The failing identification with the state impacts negatively on the connection between citizen, the government and the army. This dissolution of the Pakistani identity results in growing influence of foreign interests, this spawns intervention and support for secessionist movements like in Balochistan.

Duly fanned by a well-meaning but immature media, paying little attention to core national interests, the vacuum provides a robust platform for promoting radical ideas, readymade for religious exploitation by extreme elements, making an alternative form of a purely Islamic state with all its ramifications resonating with the public. The spread of terrorism is detrimental to economic growth, the bad investment climate and the lack of development is extremely detrimental to the economy. The diminishing value of individual lives makes killing condonable and justifiable (Karachi killing, collateral damage). Despite the so-called truce between the warring political parties within the coalition government, hundreds of people have died during the past month alone. The consequent ugly cycle of unemployment and high inflation leads to stagflation. There is flight of both capital and manpower from the country, weakening the economy further. The failing economy destroys jobs and incomes, creates more poverty and destabilises society leading to fuel riots, electricity riots, water riots, food riots, etc, desperation in the mass psyche of citizens, suicides, destruction of families, etc. This creates favourable conditions for criminals and terrorists, further impacting negatively on the overall security. This diverts the right amount of attention and the material support necessary for external security. A whole process of cataclysmic changes is taking place in the political, economic and social transformation in South Asia. The structures of governance being diversified and differentiated, only lip-service is given to poverty reduction and improving governance. In such conditions corruption is rampant.

The Anna Hazare backlash we are seeing in India was waiting to happen, the more violent form being manifest in the four decades-old Maoist Naxalite movement. With an economic transition in the region, the majority of countries have inculcated globalisation to address their economic crisis. This has accelerated the process of growth but the impact of globalisation has not been accompanied by the reduction in poverty or improvement in human development through the formation of social capital. Increases in population growth is by itself a time-bomb. Pakistan’s security interests can be best served if elements having disruptive potential to our socio-political profile are contained, thereby giving no excuse or opportunity to our detractors and enemies to take undue and adverse advantage. Factors responsible for the declining social and human security and strengthening of extremism have to be identified. The human element remains the biggest resource for Pakistan, the government must utilise this to promote safety of the population and counter the threat of extremism engulfing this nation. The political leadership and all other stakeholders (who have a vital role to play) must agree to cooperate and formulate a national strategy to eradicate this menace. To cope with external threats, Pakistan has to keep up both conventional and nuclear deterrence necessary but should at the same time aim at socio-political solutions for long-term sustainable alleviation of our problems. The army has had increasingly to deal with internal strife instead of securing the borders. Other than drawing crucial reserves away from countering the aggressive defence postures of the Indians, they are forced to devote time and effort to burgeoning internal problems of different dimensions. Fighting against ones own population can put stress on any army in the world, raising adverse perceptions among the populace, extremely dangerous for a country that thrives on glorifying its armed forces.

The international media is fully mobilised against Pakistan’s critical national security assets, but of more serious concern is not only the erosion of local media support, but rather an antagonistic view from some motivated sections. The compromise of the media’s integrity is extremely detrimental to the national aims and objectives. The concerted campaign against the ISI, and by extension the army, is deliberately motivated despite our sacrifices not being matched in the war against terror by all the coalition partners in Afghanistan put together. The unfortunate irony is that an instrument of war – the armed forces – is also the ultimate guarantor of internal peace. One can understand it not being part of the decision-making process where democracy is institutionalised, in less developed countries this is a paradox. This leaves absolute power, at least in democratic theory, in the hands of a pre-modern feudal and agrarian mindset elected through a tainted process on fraudulent votes, as the ultimate arbiters of nation security and societal society, and by default, the destiny of the nation. Who will make the change? (Extracts from Part-II of the Talk on ‘Linkages between Socio-Political Factors and National Security” given recently at the National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad).

Click here to read Sehgal's piece in The News

The approach toward Iran from India is very different from that of the United States. In March 2011, India’s National Security Adviser, Shivshankar Menon, visited Tehran for discussion with his counterpart, Saeed Jalili, who is the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Menon also met with President Ahmadinejad, the Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, and Speaker of the Majlis, Ali Larijani. In June 2011, the Deputy Secretary of Iran's SNSC, Ali Baqeri, visited India “to attend the joint strategic committee of the two countries”, according to Iran’s Press TV.  In July 2011, India’s then Foreign Secretary, Nirupama Rao, visited Tehran for the ninth round of formal ministry level bilateral consultations. Topics included terrorism, energy security, the North-South Transport Corridor, developments in Afghanistan and regional security. The two countries have a joint intergovernmental commission that had its 16th meeting in 2010, when six new agreements on a range of cooperative measures were signed.

Not everything is plain sailing of course. To secure its nuclear agreement with the United States, India had to experience humiliating pressure from Washington, including Congress, on how to conduct relations with Iran. The news this week is that unpaid Indian debts on oil imports from Iran will soon be paid in full, following reports several weeks ago that only two-thirds of the debt would be paid. In recent years, India has been Iran’s second or third biggest oil market (the position varies according to source). This is not surprising given India’s growth, its proximity to Iran, and the fact that Iran is the fourth-largest crude oil exporter in the world.

By contrast, the United States bans all trade with and investment in Iran.  In June 2011, India’s representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri, made an appeal that is in direct and active conflict with the United States’ position. He said: “All efforts should be made to ensure that legitimate trade and economic activities of Iran and other countries do not suffer while implementing the measures sanctioned by the relevant [UN] resolutions.” (These UN sanctions are limited, in broad terms, to the nuclear-related and missile-related entities and activities of Iran, as well as certain military exports to Iran.)

Military ties between Iran and India have been bothering Washington as well. The parameters of this concern are well laid out by Harsh Pant and include direct military to military dialogue and information exchange. Of special interest though are reports from elsewhere, including U.S.-based Symantec and Russian company Kaspersky Lab, that the Stuxnet worm, understood by many analysts to have been designed in the United States or Israel to attack Iran, had by January 2011 infected many more systems in India than in Iran. Regardless of who invented Stuxnet, India and Iran clearly now have common cause in military strategic defence against cyber weapons – and the US or one of its allies may be on the other side.

This past week, an Iranian-flagged ship of the Iran India Shipping line, held by Somali pirates for 5 months, was rescued by the Indian navy, an ordeal and an outcome demonstrating that certain basic daily realities of security bring Iran and India together. Piracy is of course a lower level of concern than the vital strategic interests that India and Iran share in Pakistan and Afghanistan. India and Iran are good neighbors toward each other, even if India does observe the UN sanctions.  

The contrast between the Indian and American views of Iran could not be more stark. If Pant is right, then the United States needs help to end its “obsessive” behavior toward Iran. Should the United States look to pull back from its position on broad-ranging trade and investment sanctions against Iran? Obsession may not be compatible with effective diplomacy.

To read Austin's piece online, click here and scroll to pg. 5 of New Europe

Indiana Jones, despite being chased by Nazi thugs through Europe and the Middle East, manages to select the one Holy Grail among hundreds in a cave chapel in the dramatic finale of Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade. His ominous adversary, an American businessman who has allied himself with the SS, predictably fails in his selection and meets his untimely death but not before the grail guardian -- a wise, gray, bearded old knight -- utters the admonition, "He chose poorly."

Unfortunately in the policy world, we do not have a Grail Knight reproaching foreign policy makers for their choices, especially when they invoke historical analogies to justify a particular policy. With Vice President Biden's state visit to China this month, and Beijing's eagerness to discuss the issue of the South China Sea and arms sales to Taiwan, it would be valuable to examine historical precedents regarding U.S. Naval policy towards China.

In a recent Commentary Magazine piece, Max Boot uses the recurrent analogy of Wilhemine Germany and the British-German Naval Race of the early 20th century. He cites former U.S. Representative to the UN, Robert O'Brien, who states,

"China has big maritime ambitions, and they are backed up by a naval build-up unseen since Kaiser Wilhelm II decided to challenge British naval power with the building of the High Seas Fleet at the turn of the last century."

Boot gloomily adds,

"At least Britain was able to match the German naval build-up at the turn of the 20th century with its own building program . . .We desperately need a ship-building and plane-building program to match China's. Instead, savants in Washington are discussing further cutbacks."

This sort of alarmist historical analogy often leads policy makers astray from the actual reality of a particular issue.

Yuen Foong Khong , author of 'Analogies at War-Korea, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decision of 1965', defines historical analogy as

"an inference that if two or more events separated in time agree in one respect, then they may also agree in another . . . appeasement in Munich occurred as a result of Western indolence; appeasement in Vietnam is also occurring as a result of Western indolence. Appeasement in Munich resulted in a world war; therefore, appeasement in Vietnam will also result in a world war."

Analogy is thus used to predict possible outcomes of certain policy decisions and provide prescriptions.

Analogies also are used widely for justification or advocacy or to assist in processing difficult information. The problem arises when policy makers select 'bad' analogies. As Khong asserts, had the Johnson administration used the French example in Indochina (especially their defeat at Dien Bien Phu) rather than Munich and the Korean War, the fateful decision in 1965 to commit ground troops to Vietnam might have been viewed very differently.

He also makes a compelling argument that ultimately it was analogy rather than domestic political considerations, bureaucratic politics, or the political military ideology that caused President Johnson and the National Security Council to decide to intervene in Vietnam. Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, offered the plausible rationale at a National Security Council meeting. "I feel there is a greater threat to start World War III if we don't go in. Can't we see the similarity to our own indolence at Munich?" Historical analogies are thus powerful tools in the hands of an eloquent advisor.

Taking a closer look at U.S. naval policy towards China and applying the historical analogy of the German-British naval race as used by Max Boot, we might conclude that unchecked, Chinese aggression could destabilize the region and even lead to World War III. At least by applying Khong's framework, this would have to be the logical conclusion; however, even the most hawkish defense analysts would find this statement difficult to accept. The general consensus of expert opinion is that despite its increasingly martial tone, neither the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy nor the People's Liberation Army can in any way challenge the United States globally. Thus, using the German-British naval race of the early 20th century as an analogy to illustrate U.S. policy options toward China is simply inappropriate.

Perhaps then if we look for proper historical analogies to use in discussing the rise of Chinese naval power, we might choose the rise of the Italian naval power in the inter-war years. As it turned out, the Italian Navy did not really impact the outcome of World War II substantially. However, like the Chinese today, the Italians were engaged in many military innovations throughout the 1930s, faced a similar strategic outlook and were confronted by a technologically superior force.

The post-World War I Italian Navy, similar to the current Chinese Navy, possessed specific regional aspirations. With the conclusion of the war in 1918, the Italian Navy agreed that it must first dominate the Adriatic Sea and then expand into the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. China has a similar sequential strategy with attempting to control first the Straits of Taiwan and the South China Sea followed by the First Island Chain. Finally, China plans to project power all the way to the Second Island Chain.

Often echoed in Chinese newspaper editorials, China, like Italy in the 1930s, feels boxed in and claims the right of an emerging power to a strong and powerful navy because the "Chinese nation's existence, development, and great resurgence all increasingly rely on the sea." Mussolini in 1926 forcefully asserted that "a nation which does not have free access to the oceans cannot be a great power; Italy must become a great power!" He reiterated this point in 1939 when he argued, "The bars of this prison are Corsica, Tunesia, Malta, and Cyprus . . .The fundamental aim of the Italian foreign policy must be 'to break free of this prison . . ." The strategic straightjacket for China, as Robert Kaplan put it in his book Moonson, is Taiwan; for Italy in the 1930s it was Malta -- both islands often referred to as unsinkable aircraft carriers. The Italian Navy's prime obsession during the 1930s, especially during the Mediterranean Crisis in 1935, was the conquest of Malta, which greatly troubled Admiral Domenico Cavagnari, the head of the Italian Navy ministry, since he, much more than Mussolini, was aware of the inherent weakness of the Italian Regia Marina.

Another similarity between Italian strategic thinking in the 1930s and current Chinese strategy is striking. Afraid to face the might of Great Britain -- the most powerful naval force of its time -- starting in 1936, Italy began to develop an access denial strategy based on light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines to defend the coast and to cooperate with the air force in creating torpedo bombers squadrons, light surface-assault craft, underwater assault techniques and the rapid construction of motor torpedo boats.

Today, China likewise aims to implement an access denial strategy to offset the powerful U.S. Navy by developing an anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21-D, with the ability to target U.S. carrier groups within 1000 miles of the Chinese coast. They possess over 50 high speed anti-ship cruise missiles carrying patrol boats, and since the 1990s, China has more than quadrupled its submarine fleet, capable of firing anti-ship cruise missiles. Additionally, the new Lyang II Class Guided Missile destroyer is equipped with a sophisticated phased-array radar system similar to the Western Aegis system. Like the Italian example demonstrates, this is largely a sign of perceived weakness and should not be misinterpreted.

Closely analyzing French and British Naval policy towards Italy in the 1930s, one also notices how little both navies factored in cultural and psychological aspects (e.g. some naval historians, argue, that due to their experience in the 19th century, the Italians had developed a keen aversion to large sea battles, after a devastating defeat by the Austrian Navy in the Adriatic in 1866, which made any aggressive Italian action in the 1930s less likely) which also today are neglected in alarmist statements on the Chinese Navy. The French for example greatly overestimated Italian naval strengths throughout the 1930s, which substantially influenced their policies. The British more accurately assessed the Italian Navy's fighting strengths, yet their forces to protect global commerce and the far-reaching British Empire could not withstand the loss of even a single battleship. This is similar to the United States' fear of losing a single aircraft carrier to Chinese missiles; the psychological impact would be just too shocking to contemplate.

If there are so many parallels between the Italian and Chinese navies, why has this analogy not once appeared in any Congressional hearing or serious policy paper? Using the analogy of Germany prior to World War I is not only alarmist but simply a non-sequitur. Applying the logic of historical analogies to the British-German naval race, the corollary is the following: if the United States does not increase its naval spending, a resurgent Chinese Navy will lead China to pursue a more aggressive, unpredictable global foreign policy with the aim of guaranteeing "China's place in the sun," which sooner or later will lead to war. The intra-wars Italian navy was, at least in magnitude, a formidable force, and, although equipped with modern battleships and cruisers, was untested by war, badly trained, and lacking an aggressive offensive doctrine, European political rhetoric to the contrary. If, however, we can instill in foreign policy makers an apposite analogy, we can draw a more rational conclusion regarding the Chinese Navy and the Communist elite, which would help us develop a more prudential naval policy vis-à-vis China.

Coming back to Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade, before the Grail Knight lets any of the contesters for the Holy Grail select their choice, he delivers a firm warning. "Choose wisely, for while the true grail will bring you life, the false grail will take it from you." While this might seem Biblically prophetic, when applied to the field of policy, misused historical analogies can certainly diminish a country's power and influence and indeed shorten the 'life' of a nation. Alarmist statements supported by superficial historical analogies should be taken, as the ancient Italians used to say, cum grano salis.

By every rhetorical indication, the “reset” of U.S.-Russia relations is in trouble again. In fact, many observers in both Russia and the United States are proclaiming, sometimes jubilantly, that the reset is doomed. But such a judgment is decidedly premature. The reset survives—and, despite profound disagreements, the two sides could still find it in their interests to work together on a broad range of issues and temper their rhetoric, trying to keep emotions in check going into an election year.

That won’t be easy, especially when dramatic human rights cases like the death in police custody of Sergei Magnitsky, a 37-year-old lawyer working for a Western investment firm, are triggering new angry recriminations.  After he accused police and interior ministry officials of perpetrating a $230 million fraud against the Russian government, Magnitsky was jailed by those same authorities for alleged tax evasion. An investigative commission has now pinned the responsibility for his death on two prison doctors, but human rights activists charge that this is only an attempt to cover-up the complicity of higher officials in his brutal mistreatment that led to his death. Frustrated with what they saw as the Obama administration’s weak response, Republicans and Democrats in both the House and the Senate introduced legislation named after Magnitsky to ban Russian officials connected to the case from traveling to the United States as well as freezing any of their U.S.-held assets. Similar bills have made headway in Europe and Canada.

Russia’s establishment has responded with mixed signals about the case, promoting some of the officials involved while claiming it will make sure that any abuses will be punished. But there has been nothing ambiguous about its reaction to the proposed bills on Capitol Hill. After the State Department quietly enacted a travel ban on certain Russian officials, Russia instituted a tit-for-tat visa ban on U.S. officials, allegedly targeting those responsible for the extradition of Russian arms deal Viktor Bout from Thailand. (Neither government has released the list of banned officials.) And the Obama administration sent a detailed memo to Senators raising its concerns with the legislation. Instead of seeing the Obama administration’s actions as an attempt to straddle the controversy and soften the Congressional legislation, Kremlin officials argued that this proved that they couldn’t count on the White House either. In other words, forget the reset.

This is far from the only issue bedeviling U.S.-Russia relations.  The ongoing application of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, which links trade relations to emigration practices, is a long-standing source of Russian ire (see earlier article).  Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama have been unable to get Congress to graduate Russia from the amendment and grant permanent normal trade relations. Ballistic missile defense also continues to spark controversy. Obama’s decision to move away from Bush’s planned deployment of assets in Poland and the Czech Republic provided just a momentary lull. And the lingering fallout from Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia continues to provide ample opportunities for mutual recriminations, including a leaked U.S. intelligence report linking a Russian intelligence official to a bombing near the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi.

Despite these contentious issues, the reset has scored some significant successes. To be sure, it was slow to deliver on its initial promises. The negotiations for New START dragged on for over a year, allowing START to expire. After finally concluding negotiations with Russia, the Obama administration had another hard-fought battle in the Senate to get the treaty ratified. But the entry into force of the New START treaty was one of the major foreign policy successes for the Obama administration and its reset policy.

There has also been progress in addressing other strategic U.S. concerns, most significantly Iran and Afghanistan. Washington secured Russian agreement on both over-flight rights for lethal cargo and overland transit of non-lethal cargo to resupply the Afghanistan effort. This took pressure off the Pakistan supply route—now estimated to be used for only 35 percent of supply efforts as compared to about 90 percent two years ago.  And Russia recently agreed to expand the distribution network by allowing two-way transit and overland shipment of lethal goods.  The United States was also able to gain Russian and Chinese support for sanctions against Iran because of that country’s continued intransigence on international inspection of its nuclear enrichment facilities.

The benefits of the reset have been mutual, as demonstrated by New START. Moscow also had reason to be particularly pleased when the U. S. implemented the 123 civilian nuclear agreement, laying out the parameters of peaceful nuclear cooperation with Russia that needed to be in place before U.S. and Russian companies could expand commercial collaboration. After the Russian invasion of Georgia, it had been withdrawn from congressional consideration. Another success of the reset is firm U.S. backing for Russia’s World Trade Organization aspirations. It is expected that Russia’s tortured 18-year application process may finally come to an end at this December’s WTO ministerial in Geneva. Russia is the largest economy outside of the organization and Medvedev’s ambitious modernization program needs the benefits of WTO membership

What both sides need to understand is that the reset offers the best hope of maintaining cooperation on key areas of mutual concern and keeping inevitable disagreements within reasonable bounds.  To that end, leaders in Moscow and Washington should deliver that message to their highly skeptical domestic constituencies more often.  The Obama administration needs to undertake a sustained effort with a Congress that is still deeply suspicious of Russia and could still undermine the reset, especially during an election year. And Russian leaders should think twice before they engage in the kind of rhetorical overkill that only fuels Cold War thinking.  Angry rhetoric won’t disappear anytime soon, but it needs to be kept in check. Otherwise, both sides are likely to lose out.