Politics and Governance

In your new book, Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War, what are the “Washington rules,” and how do the components you call the American credo and the sacred trinity play into them?

The “Washington Rules” are the hidden-in-plain-sight habits that constitute the essential elements of U.S. national security policy: "defense" forces designed not for defense but as instruments of global power projection; a vast network of bases to maintain a global military presence; the marriage of forces and presence to support a penchant for global interventionism. The "American credo" provides an ideological justification for this "sacred trinity" of practice.

You point to the trend of high-ranking U.S. policy officials mobilizing support from the citizenry for military endeavors abroad through scare tactics such as alluding to an inflated existential threat. You also argue that the U.S. government keeps the public cushioned from the human and fiscal costs of war. In your opinion, what actions can the U.S. public take to reverse these trends and become more involved in foreign policy and defense spending?

Americans universally claim to "support the troops." Alas, that's mostly talk. We need to demonstrate meaningful support for the troops by paying closer attention to how they are actually used. If we value the troops, we should wish to keep them from harm and to protect them from being abused.

Recent U.S. military initiatives have been primarily focused on combating networks of violent extremism. Can extremist ideology and resentment toward the United States be defeated militarily? If not, what other avenues do you advocate for countering these networks?

The American military's MO over the past decade has gone from liberation to pacification to assassination. I'm all for killing bad guys when there is no alternative. The problem with targeted assassination as a policy is that it amounts to war divorced from politics rather than war as a continuation of politics. The animus directed against the United States and the West that comes out of the Islamic world has a historical and political basis. If our "war" in (against?) the Greater Middle East is ever to end, we've got to take seriously the political grievances that sustain the violence directed against us.

In Washington Rules, you suggest limiting the U.S. military footprint, specifically in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, because as you state: “Priority [for base closure] should be given to those regions where the American presence costs the most while accomplishing the least.” What do you think of the argument that the presence pays dividends in stability as several states in the Middle East and North Africa undergo violence and political change?

I don't mean to be rude, but it's bulls–t. If we survey the ever-intensifying levels of U.S. military activism in the Greater Middle East since the promulgation of the Carter Doctrine, the record is quite clear: Our actions promote instability, not the reverse.

Is there a specific point or message concerning U.S. defense policy, or defense policy in general, you want your readership to take away from your other new book The Short American Century?

The new book is a collection of essays in which distinguished scholars reflect on what the American Century was all about—a matter that falls within the purview of historians, since the American Century has ended. The views expressed vary greatly—that was my intent. As to what readers might take away from the book, I can only speak for myself.

I believe that the record of the American Century ought to teach us humility. Those who inhabit (or who seek) positions of power in Washington peddle the notion that history has a purpose and a destination and that Americans are called upon to guide—or, if need be, coerce—humanity toward that destination. It's all nonsense. In reality, if history has a purpose, we humans are incapable of divining it. The best we can do is to try to cope with whatever surprise lurks just around the corner.

The Affordable World Security Conference is designed to weigh competing priorities for future security policy. What do you think receives too little attention?

What receives too little attention is the imperative of putting our own house in order—economically, politically, culturally, and morally.

What emerging security issue—economic stability, environmental sustainability, cybersecurity, etc.—do you think poses the greatest challenge to the current world security structure?

Damage to the environment that stems from the universalization of American-style consumer culture.

The Israeli prime minister is invoking the lessons of history to make the strongest possible case against Iran, even if that means deliberately overstating the putative equivalency between that country and Nazi Germany. With President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's regime steadily moving closer to acquiring nuclear weapons while continuing to encourage its followers to chant "Death to Israel," Netanyahu can hardly be blamed for taking those threats seriously.

But what are the real lessons of history -- and what do they tell us about how we need to conduct ourselves today?

On that score, there's strong supporting evidence for Netanyahu's broader point about the dangers of underestimating the threat from regimes spouting radical rhetoric, but less than convincing evidence that history offers a clear guide to what constitutes a sensible course of action.

Although it seems incredible now, many people initially saw Hitler as a bizarre, effeminate politician who would never be in a position to inflict real harm -- or, later, as a pragmatic leader we could deal with.

This was true not just of the British and French leaders who signed the infamous Munich Pact of 1938, which led to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As I point out in my new bookHitlerland: American Eyewitnesses to the Nazi Rise to Power, it was also true of many Americans who lived and worked in Germany.

Dorothy Thompson, America's most famous woman foreign correspondent of that era, interviewed Hitler in November 1931, fourteen months before he became chancellor. She entered the room expecting to meet the future dictator of Germany, but "in something less than fifty seconds I was quite sure I was not," she wrote. Struck by the "startling insignificance of the man" who is "inconsequent and voluble, ill-poised, insecure," she predicted: "If Hitler comes into power, he will smite only the weakest of his enemies."

German politicians often made the same mistake. Franz von Papen, the vice chancellor who helped engineer Hitler's appointment to the top job, told his friends: "We have hired Hitler" -- in other words, he would be easily manipulated.

In many cases, even German Jews refused to take Hitler seriously. Paul Drey, a Bavarian from a distinguished Bavarian Jewish family who worked for the U.S. Consulate in Munich, wrote off the Nazis' early successes as "a temporary madness," insisting that Germans were "too intelligent to be taken in by such scamps." Drey would die in Dachau.

To be sure, there were those who sensed Hitler's dangerous potential right from the start. Captain Truman Smith, a junior U.S. military attaché, first met the little known Nazi leader in 1922, immediately warning that he was "a marvelous demagogue" who could go far. And along with many of her journalistic and diplomatic colleagues, Thompson radically revised her view of Hitler as soon as he seized dictatorial powers.

Still, when it came to resisting Hitler's expansionist aims, there was plenty of disagreement. Perceptive journalists like William Shirer of CBS despaired that visitors from Paris, London and New York took at face value Hitler's protestations that his intentions were peaceful. "Peace?" he wrote in his diary in 1937. "Read Mein Kampf, brothers."

But most outsiders didn't read Mein Kampf, and even among those who did there was no consensus on whether its vitriolic attacks on Jews, democracy and bolshevism, along with Hitler's stated ambitions to conquer vast territories in the east, should be taken literally or viewed as merely a cynical electoral ploy.

All of which, Netanyahu argues, stands as proof that the greatest danger is to discount the new threats of our era. But 1938 has been invoked before as justification for military action, at times with tragic results. As President Lyndon Johnson escalated the war in Vietnam, he claimed that he was seeking to avert another Munich. To this day, the country is split over whether the ensuing loss of American lives and treasure was justified at any point or a disaster from start to finish.

It isn't easy to determine which situations demand the kind of forceful action to stop a potential aggressor that was so woefully lacking in the 1930s. Netanyahu is right that history teaches us that we ignore the fiery rhetoric of radical regimes at our own peril. Unfortunately, though, history -- especially the history of the Nazi era -- doesn't offer many immediate lessons beyond that.

It certainly doesn't tell us what we really want to know: whether we are making the same mistake today with Iran -- or is the situation so different that a bigger mistake would be to overreact.

Andrew Nagorski, vice president and director of public policy at the EastWest Institute, is author of the forthcoming Hitlerland: American Eyewitnesses to the Nazi Rise to Power.

Click here to visit his website.

Click here to read this piece in The Huffington Post.

Moderated by EWI’s Andrew Nagorski, the conversation provided the audience a window into some of the previously unknown details of the Obama administration’s diplomatic outreach to Iran. With access to over 70 high-ranking officials from the U.S., Iran, Europe, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Brazil—including the top American and Iranian negotiators—Parsi explored the real reasons for the collapse of diplomatic efforts between the United States and Iran.

During his talk, Parsi laid out the series of events that unfolded in the first two years of the Obama presidency, starting with Obama’s offer, 12 minutes into his presidency, of the hand of American friendship to those willing to unclench their fist. However, the legacy of bitter distrust between Iran and the United States, and the skepticism of others that a deal could be negotiated, eroded any initial optimism.  As Parsi put it: “Many wished Obama well but few wished him success.”

Parsi pointed out that serious talks were delayed until after the 2009 Iranian presidential election. Then, when the widespread allegations of fraud triggered mass protests, it became increasingly difficult for Washington and Tehran to focus on the nuclear issue on its own terms.  For various reasons—including the continued technical progression of Iran’s enrichment capabilities and the hardening of attitudes towards Iran in the West—any deal needed to work right away. As a senior State Department official told Parsi, “Our Iran diplomacy was a gamble on a single roll of the dice.”

That roll of the dice came in the form of what was meant to be a confidence building measure, a nuclear fuel swap where Iran would ship out 1200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium (LEU) in return for fuel rods. The fuel rods were for its Tehran Research Reactor, which produces medical isotopes for Iran’s cancer patients.  The West and Iran could not come to terms, but then Brazil and Turkey stepped in to broker a deal they thought would be acceptable to both sides. By then, however, the facts on the ground had changed.  Iran had almost doubled its LEU since talks first began, and the U.S. had won international backing for strong sanctions. As Parsi explained, the Obama administration had opted for sanctions instead of a political deal because it believed diplomacy had failed.

Parsi argued that diplomacy was never pursued as far as it should have been, and unreasonably optimistic early expectations may have contributed to the failure of this effort. ”Negotiations such as these succeed not because the proposals are flawless or because both sides play fair, but because the many flaws associated with the talks are overcome by the political will to reach a solution,” he said.

With tensions and harsh rhetoric escalating on both sides amid increasing speculation about a possible Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, Parsi warned that sanctions could backfire. One result could be that Tehran would walk away from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since all of the current information the West knows about Iran’s nuclear program comes from IAEA inspections and reports, he added, this would create an even more dangerous situation where Washington and others would  be left guessing about what is really happening on the ground—and, in all likelihood, assuming the worst.

Click here to visit Trita Parsi's web site.

Firestein maintained that the U.S. welcomes China's rise, just as China welcomes the U.S.'s role as a contributor to peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, saying "I think those basic statements articulated in the joint statement between presidents Obama and Hu a year ago accurately capture the ways the two countries have viewed each other and the possiblities for cooperation."

The cover story, written by Ding Ying, reviews Xi Jinping's U.S. visit in the context of the U.S.-China relationship.

Click here to read the full article at Beijing Review.

Led by Prof. Michael F. Oppenheimer, the team presented its Pakistan 2020 report, which explores three possible future scenarios for the country.

The event connected participants in the United States, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Pakistan to weigh in on prospects for Pakistan’s future over the course of the next decade.

Oppenheimer’s colleagues included: Shamila Chaudhary, an analyst for Eurasia Group who served as the director for Pakistan and Afghanistan at the National Security Council from 2010-2011; Pakistan 2020 team lead for the CGA Scenarios Initiative Rorry Daniels; and Regina Joseph, who wrote up one of the scenarios for the report. The Carnegie Corporation-funded project was the result of NYU’s Pakistan Scenarios workshop held on April 29, 2011, which brought together 15 expert participants to develop three “plausible, distinct and consequential scenarios that merit the attention of U.S. foreign policy makers.”

Each scenario for Pakistan in 2020, though hypothetical, was designed to produce policy insights through considering potential futures.

The first hypothetical scenario, “radicalization,” envisions a Pakistan consumed by populist fervor as a result of “perceived military threats, spiraling economic losses and political infighting.” This results in the rise of a democratically elected conservative military officer who pursue a radical Islamic agenda for the country.

The second scenario, “fragmentation,” foresees economic instability as crippling the capacity of the state to govern, leading to a federally and regionally unstable Pakistan rife with insecure nuclear materials.

The third and most optimistic scenario, “reform,” sees a growing middle class fostering a centrist, economically oriented political movement. A political party born out of this movement then serves to displace much of the power currently held by political and military elites.

While the third scenario may be the least likely to occur, Oppenheimer said, “it is sufficiently plausible for the U.S. to try to work toward that scenario, in part because the other two … involve significant risks and damage to American interests and American security.”

Chaudhary argued that balkanization in Pakistan was unlikely. She maintained that Pakistan should instead be expected to “muddle through” current challenges. The first and third scenarios, both of which heavily rely upon the democratic process, would seem to support her view that Pakistan’s military, media, political parties and religious organizations are an example of “democracy at its best and at its worst.”

Najam Abbas, a senior fellow at the EastWest Institute who called in from London, commented that the situation requires a “macro-layer of analysis to probe the implications of Pakistan's 64-year-long [history of] a chaotic polity and shaky economy,” and aspects that “lead us to triggers that perpetuated strong individuals but weaker institutions.”

EWI Board Member Ikram Sehgal, speaking from Pakistan where he is chairman of a private security company, said pervasive corruption in Pakistan’s institutions was “the most important issue to the people of Pakistan” and a major cause of current instability.

German Ambassador Guenter Overfeld, EWI’s Vice President for Regional Security, calling in from Brussels, argued that corruption in Pakistan was in fact “a symptom of poor governance, not a cause.”

Pakistan 2020 is the seventh such report on potential futures for key countries conducted by the GCA Scenarios Initiative. Past reports have covered Iran, Iraq, China, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.

Click here to read the report in full.

Click here to access the CGA Scenarios blog.

For most Russians, the eight years of Putin’s Presidency (2000-2008) were the best years in Russian history. Living standards more than doubled and the economy—propelled by a massive devaluation in 1998 and rising oil prices after that—recovered to the level of 1990, before the decade-long depression triggered by Gorbachev and Yeltsin’ failed economic reforms. Moreover, Putin squirreled away enough of Russia’s oil revenues so that the country was able to survive the effects of the 2008-09 world economic crash. By contrast, neither the Gorbachev nor Yeltsin governments ever recovered from the collapse of world oil prices to $10-11 per barrel in 1986 and 1998, respectively.

In addition, the government’s control over the five national television stations means that political news is strictly controlled to prevent any “feeding frenzy” that might damage Putin’s standing, as nearly happened to him after the sinking of the nuclear submarine Kursk in August 2000. And just to take no chances, in recent days the government has moved to change the Board of Directors of the last major independent radio station, the Moscow Echo, which has been relentlessly critical of Putin.

Finally, none of the candidates nominally opposing Putin have the remotest chance of defeating him, or even coming close. The most popular, the communist Gennady Zyuganov, has been running for president fruitlessly for 20 years; the independent Levada polling institute in Moscow has projected that Zyuganov can achieve at most 15% of the vote. And out of an “abundance of caution,” as it were, Putin’s Central Electoral Commission at the last minute disallowed liberal economist Gregory Yavlinsky’s candidacy on patently trumped up claims of illegible signatures on petitions. What Putin feared was not Yavlinsky the candidate—who was unlikely to breach the 10% threshold—but that as a candidate Yavlinsky would have the legal right, which he was well prepared to exploit, to deploy election monitors throughout the country and thereby question the legitimacy of Putin’s announced victory.

The key issue is not whether Putin will win but how he reacts after winning to the growing signs of disagreement with his system of rule. Does he see the recent demonstrations as threatening a new “vacuum of power,” a specter that has haunted Putin since the collapse of the Berlin Wall? Or does he see them instead as foreshadowing the dangers if he does not fundamentally reform an authoritarian political machine that, whatever its genuine accomplishments, seems incapable of shaping Russia into a truly modern society?

Each choice carries its own risks. Without real political reform, Russia will be condemned to the status of a petroleum state and consigned to the margins of the world economy. But if Putin decides to broaden the base of his government, he would have to depend on those he does not really trust and at the same time wage a titanic war against his own loyalists, who control over 40% of Russia’s economic assets. History will judge Putin on how he makes and executes that choice.

The author is Director of Research, Center for International Studies and Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia. He is the author most recently of, Vladimir Putin and Russian Statecraft (Potomac Books, 2011). Between 1984-89 he worked as an analyst of Soviet affairs at the then Institute for East-West Security Studies.

Click here to watch Allen Lynch discuss his latest book on Youtube.

Click here to read this column in The News International.

One of the great tragedies to befall this country was the assassination of Punjab governor Salmaan Taseer by Mumtaz Qadri in Islamabad on Jan 4, 2011, bringing into sharp focus one of the important aspects of security that does not get the attention it should: fidelity.

A policeman in the security detail provided to Taseer by the Punjab Elite Police, Qadri readily confessed to killing the late governor because he disagreed with his opposition to the Blasphemy Law. Trust that must be inherent between a bodyguard and his ward was not sacrificed at the altar of material gain but for a more sinister reason, an extreme interpretation of ideology. Given that Qadri had already aroused suspicions among his superiors and colleagues, it is still unclear how he managed to get himself detailed in the squad protecting Salmaan Taseer in Islamabad.

What is far more mystifying (and a cause for real concern) is the role of the other Elite personnel in the security detail. Trained personnel are programmed to react instantaneously to danger. Their failure to take any action whatsoever to interdict Qadri while he was directing a burst of automatic gunfire at Taseer at point blank range put into contention their active (or at the least, passive) complicity.

One aspect has become terrifyingly clear in the aftermath of the Taseer assassination, how does one ascertain the fidelity of guards assigned to provide security to key personnel? This particular incident raises the serious question of infidelity on the basis of ideology. As a member of the provincial police force, and also part of the Elite Force, Taseer’s killer would normally have had his background checked many times, yet there seems to have been a dangerous chink in the vetting process that was not detected. It only requires one or two persons posted on duty at key places to cause mayhem. How good is our verification of antecedents and the physical vetting process?

The All-Pakistan Security Agencies Association (APSAA) insists upon its members not only doing a thorough vetting process but has institutionalised this process. However, given the Taseer assassination one shudders to think what the state of the private security services sector could be. With hundreds of private security services companies operating, a strict monitoring of the process of conducting background verification checks of their employees entrusted with guarding of the lives and property of their clients is necessary. It makes this the most critical aspect of guarding in Pakistan. APSAA members have been fighting a losing battle against the overwhelming perception among the populace that instead of preventing crimes they should (or could) have prevented, the guards themselves go about committing the crimes, or are involved in what at times are heinous crimes.

While this is not exactly true, there have been occasions when a private security guard who was hired to protect property steals it himself or with the help of his associates. This has been unfortunately played up by the media. The question about a guard’s fidelity or his honesty has become extremely important, especially today because we are dealing with cutting-edge terrorism.

All over the world security guards have to go through a mandatory verification process. In many countries background checks are conducted by the local police. Many times this is supplemented by scrutiny by other agencies mandated to do so. In the Netherlands, for example, security guards have to undergo a criminal background check by the local police department in the area where the private security company is located.

While there are similar laws in Pakistan, it costs money to have backgrounds verified electronically and physically. The issue of parliamentarians’ fake degree has clearly shown what a tedious, time-consuming task it is. Moreover, is it accurate? The common factor where security guards deputed to guard banks (or other large establishments) were themselves found involved in robberies, some were successful while some were not, was the false or doctored documents/information given by the security guards to their employers at the time of employment.

For example, the mobile telephone applications had false information and were not verified. Even fake computerised national identity cards (CNICs) were used to get employment. It is painfully obvious that lack of proper verification of antecedents and screening of background allowed the criminals to succeed. Despite the claims of Nadra, proper verification of antecedents or documents is not done. The result is that in many cases genuine Nadra card had fake information about the person! Given such glaring loopholes in the system, many people ask whether it is really difficult for terrorists or those with extremist agenda to infiltrate critical facilities by hiring on as security guards. That is not a frightening possibility, it is a reality.

What, then, should be done? Of course the laws are there, but implementation is very lax. This has to change. More often than not, everyone is content with looking the other way until after an incident occurs. It must be ensured without exception that all personnel who have unaccompanied (or accompanied) access to sensitive areas and who will perform guarding duties must go through extensive background checks. These checks must include criminal background checks, checks against terrorist watch lists as well as the usual verification of documents and antecedents provided by them.

The major problem is that clients are of two kinds: institutions or individuals. While individual clients have to depend upon the company’s statement of the guard’s fidelity, the institution employing their services have security managers to check this aspect out. Unfortunately, even MNCs sometimes do not give much the importance to background checks they deserve. Many security managers merely pay lip-service to completion of the documentation process and their corporate bosses gloss over this. Most fall back on the excuse that it adds to costs.

There is also the training aspect. Trained instructors can easily find out the inclination of various students by cleverly posing some pointed questions. To the credit of the APSAA they have training schools but even a cursory check will reveal that not all members avail of this facility.

Given the fact that organised crime has a nexus with terrorism and there is potential relationship between criminal history and terrorist activity, serious thought must be given to more extensive criminal background checks of employees in the private security services sector. All armed and unarmed guards must also undergo a stringent training programme. Because radical thinking has increasingly crept into mainstream society, criminals/extremists are able to infiltrate the ranks of law enforcement in Pakistan.

The federal ministry of interior does insist upon strict verification of individuals. The provincial home departments, whose job it is to actually monitor the private security companies, also do so. Unfortunately only lip-service is paid to monitoring. Only a far more extensive and exhaustive process carried out by third-party monitors will make this exercise effective. Funds must be specially allocated for this.

Given the possibility of infidelity, the ultimate question that a diligent security manager must answer is: is the vetting process credible? If not, who will monitor and guard the guards?

Rights groups are estimating that some 7,000 civilians have been killed in Syria since March 2011, and the regime’s military response has intensified even further following the Russian and Chinese veto in the U.N. Security Council of a resolution that backed an Arab peace plan aimed at stopping the violence. Assad’s latest call for a Feb. 26 national referendum on a new draft constitution that would end the Baath party’s monopoly on power was quickly dismissed by the Syrian opposition and Western powers alike. The window for a political settlement seems to be quickly closing, bringing Syria even deeper into a civil war and threatening to enflame an already tense neighborhood.

Fifty-two miles west of Damascus, the Lebanese government in Beirut is following these developments with interest and worry but has not joined the Arab League or Western states in calling for Assad to step down. Lebanese officials have made it clear that Lebanon could never support a U.N. resolution that would allow the international community to intervene to resolve the crisis in Syria, mostly for fear of negative repercussions this might have on Lebanon. In fact, when the Syrian question first came to the Security Council last year, Lebanon dissociated itself from the presidential statement condemning Syria and has followed suit in the Arab League as well.

Most recently, Lebanese Foreign Affairs Minister Adnan Mansour announced that Lebanon would not attend the “Friends of Syria” conference due to be held in the Tunisian capital Tunis on Feb. 24, stating: “in harmony with our decision to disassociate Lebanon from developments in Syria, we will not join the conference in Tunis.”

Long-standing, polarizing divisions between supporters and opponents of the Syrian regime have forced the government in Beirut to pursue this policy of “dissociation” from the turmoil next door. But as refugees cross the border to escape the violence and weapons and fighters pour freely through the smuggling routes that have long connected Lebanon with Syrian towns now at the center of conflict—such as Homs and Zabadani—the idea that Lebanon can dissociate itself from what is happening next door looks increasingly like wishful thinking.

What all political parties in Lebanon seem to agree on is that widespread instability in Syria—or worse, a sectarian civil war—poses the most significant threat to Lebanon. Lebanese actors across the sectarian spectrum share the perception that Syria’s potential descent into chaos would not be in their strategic interest and, by dissociating the country from the Syrian unrest, are seeking to insulate Lebanon from its neighbor’s instability. This view stems from the concern that massive unrest in Syria could spill over into Lebanon, disrupting the country’s fragile status quo by provoking widespread sectarian strife.

However, Lebanese consensus on core national interests vis-a-vis Syria does not go much further. As with most issues in Lebanon, Syria’s unrest is viewed through a sectarian lens, and significant differences characterize Lebanon’s key political actors and religious communities.

Relations With the Syrian Opposition

The differences were most visible on Jan. 25 when the opposition Syrian National Council issued an open letter to the Lebanese people, stressing that it seeks to establish strong ties between Syria and Lebanon that respect the sovereignty and independence of each country. In the letter, the group pledged to end the “security-intelligence role that has meddled in Lebanese affairs and to thwart the smuggling of arms across the border.” It also proposed the formation of a joint investigation committee that would tackle the case of Lebanese prisoners in Syrian jails, adding that “the Lebanese–Syrian Higher Council would be dissolved and agreements between the two countries would be revised.” The letter continued: “Democracy in Syria is the best support for Lebanon’s independence; it is an opportunity to put an end to the dark chapter of Lebanese–Syrian ties that have been marred by Syria’s dictatorial regime that has practiced the ugliest forms of meddling and hegemony.”

The letter addressed some of the most important issues that have plagued Syrian–Lebanese relations for decades and pledged to end the special relationship that has heavily favored Syria since the conclusion of the Taif Accord that ended the Lebanese civil war in 1989. It did not, however, generate the response that the Syrian National Council was hoping for. The Lebanese response predictably followed the lines of Lebanese politics set by the March 8 Alliance and the March 14 Alliance, respectively named after the dates of pro- and anti-Syrian demonstrations that followed the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, blamed by some on Damascus.

The opposition March 14 Alliance—led by former Prime Minister Saad Hariri, son of the slain former Premier Rafik Hariri and comprised of both Sunni and Christian elements—has reacted favorably to the council’s letter, calling it a “courageous step… that puts Lebanese–Syrian relations on the right political track.” The March 14 Alliance has also supported Syrian protestors’ calls for Assad to leave, though Saad Hariri’s Sunni Future Movement has carefully calibrated its opposition to Assad so as not to provoke retaliation should the regime survive.

However, while the Sunni elements of March 14 unequivocally support Assad’s ouster, their Christian allies are less certain about post-Assad Syria. Lebanon’s Maronite patriarch recently cited “transition” in Syria as a potential threat to Arab Christians across the region. He called for Assad to be given more leeway to implement reforms, sparking significant controversy within the Christian community.

The Role of Hezbollah

Hezbollah, on the other hand, maintains a key strategic alliance with Damascus, as its core interests lie in the Assad regime’s survival. Aside from the potential loss of a strategic ally, Hezbollah’s concerns over Syrian unrest also reflect the mounting threat to the organization’s credibility, both in Lebanon and the region. Increasingly, Hezbollah has been placed in the seemingly contradictory position of stridently supporting Arab uprisings elsewhere, but remaining conspicuously quiet on Syria. In recent speeches, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has tempered his support for the Syrian regime with tepid calls for reform and a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Nonetheless, Hezbollah’s double standard threatens real damage to its regional standing.

Hezbollah’s allies, including its Christian partners in the March 8 bloc, thus far share Hezbollah’s position on Syria. Indeed, Amal leader and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, has staked out an even tougher position than Hezbollah in support of Syria. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s Christian allies—namely General Michel Aoun—reflect deepening disquiet within the Christian community over the potential threat to their Syrian co-religionists posed by a post-Assad Syria.

The conflict in Syria can inflame inter-communal tensions in Lebanon, visible almost daily in pro- and anti-Assad rallies throughout the country. That was recently highlighted when two people were killed in the northern city of Tripoli during clashes between Jabal Mohsen, a predominantly Alawite neighborhood like the regime in Damascus, and Bab al-Tabbaneh, one which is Sunni Muslim, like the majority of Syria’s protest movement.

Lebanon’s fate is deeply intertwined with Syria’s ultimate destiny, and Syria’s endgame will have a decisive impact on Lebanon, potentially reconfiguring the balance of power between the two countries and reshaping the Lebanese political arena. For now, the Lebanese army has been quick to take action to prevent incidents like the Tripoli clashes from escalating further, reflecting a widespread desire inside the country to ensure security and stability. But, as Michael Williams, a fellow at Chatham House and former U.N. Special Coordinator for Lebanon recently put it: “The situation in Syria is deteriorating all the time, and there’s no way that Lebanon can be immune from that.” If Lebanese politicians want to ensure long term stability in the country, they urgently need to reach a consensus on how to deal with the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition going forward.

Raymond Karam is a program assistant for EWI's Regional Security Initiative.

Xi Jinping met with U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta on this trip. What can we expect for military-to-military relations between the two countries if Xi indeed takes the helm in China?

The military-to-military relationship between the United States and China has been one of the most vulnerable areas of the bilateral relationship and has often been disrupted over issues such as U.S. arms sales to Taiwan or clashes off China’s exclusive economic zone. Currently vice chairman of the CPC’s Central Military Commission (CMC)—China’s top military policy decision-making body—Xi Jinping is expected to assume the chairmanship of the commission after taking over from Hu Jintao as general secretary of the CPC. In that context, the meeting with Panetta, like other meetings in Washington, had the forward-looking purpose of setting the tone of future military-to-military relations between the two countries amid China’s political transition.

Both Xi and Panetta said all the right things, including calling for further exchanges between the two militaries and identifying specific areas of cooperation. At the same time, both alluded to growing challenges to U.S.-China military relations. China has concerns about the U.S. strategic shift to Asia and the strengthening of its security and military alliances in the region. The United States has concerns about China’s military buildup and cyber attacks allegedly originating from China.

Tensions over issues such as U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and U.S. military activities off China’s coast will persist. Also worth noting is the fact that as CMC chairman, Xi will be a civilian overseeing a commission of senior military officers, on whom he will have to rely heavily for the handling of defense and military policy matters. It is expected that the CMC itself will have seven of its current 10 military members replaced in the upcoming leadership transition. These add some uncertainty over the direction of Chinese military policy under the new generation of military leaders. At least in the near term, those leaders may turn to a more assertive military policy in an effort to consolidate their power and show strength.

What if anything is truly new from this visit? Has policy moved, or was it mostly a publicity show and get-to-know-you session?

This visit has not yielded anything truly new on the policy front, as can be expected from a visit by a leader-in-waiting who would find it in his best interests to toe the party line while his succession to his country’s top posts isn’t yet guaranteed.

Some objectives of the visit were: to promote economic cooperation between the two countries in order to help them address their respective domestic economic challenges; for Xi and his U.S. hosts to garner insights into their counterparts and their policy thinking; and to ensure continuity during China’s political transition and an important election year in the United States in one of the world’s most important bilateral relationships.

The red-carpet treatment accorded by the United States—a rarity for a visiting vice president—and the concerted efforts by the Chinese government to play down divisions between the two countries over Syria just before Xi’s visit show the importance that both countries ascribe to this visit.

What are the most acute challenges that Xi Jinping will face as the new president of China?

His most pressing challenges will lie in leading his country and his party to manage the gamut of domestic economic and social challenges, primarily through the implementation of China’s 12th Five-Year Plan. On the economic front, efforts include restructuring the economy—away from a reliance on exports and toward higher domestic consumption—to ensure sustained economic growth and development, and addressing other concerns such as inflation and bubbles in the housing and asset markets. Social challenges include bridging the rising income gap, especially between the rural and urban areas, building social safety nets, protecting migrant workers, and controlling the increasingly numerous incidents of unrest across the country.

On foreign policy, Xi will have to manage China’s desire for a more active global role, the responsibilities that come along with that role, and China’s need to assure the rest of the world—especially its neighbors—of its commitment to “peaceful development.”

Piin-Fen Kok is Senior Associate for the China Program at the EastWest Institute.