Politics and Governance

The “are you better off” question is more complicated when it comes to foreign policy, however. Are U.S. national interests more secure than they were four years ago?  At the Democratic convention in Charlotte, party leaders were quick to trumpet the killing of Osama bin Laden as compelling evidence that the country is safer than when President Obama took office. But U.S. national security and foreign policy concerns cannot be reduced merely to measuring the relative strength or weakness of al Qaeda.

Last week we looked at the Romney campaign’s foreign policy platform, which, his opponents charge, fails to offer specific alternatives to Obama’s positions. But if Romney’s lack of a track record on foreign policy may be an exploitable vulnerability, the current administration’s four-year policy record also provides a clear target for the Republicans.  While there is no doubt domestic economic factors will dominate the campaign and some of the disagreements on foreign policy between the two camps may be deliberately overdrawn, Obama and Romney are likely to spar repeatedly on these issues.

Recent polling data confirms that Obama is viewed as strong on foreign policy/national security. August polls from CNN, Fox News, and Washington Post-ABC show Obama with a significant advantage over Romney (51 percent to 44 percent, 51 percent to 38 percent, and 48 percent to 37 percent, respectively) when Americans are asked who they  trust to handle foreign policy better. This is a unique position for a Democrat to be in; traditionally, Republicans have been seen as stronger on the foreign policy/national security front. With Obama and Romney still deadlocked in the race for the White House, the Obama campaign can be expected to expend considerable energy highlighting the gap between Obama’s and Romney’s foreign policy credentials—and the Romney camp will continue to attack the administration’s record.

Below, we review the Obama administration’s foreign policy record and positions, an examination that closely corresponds to our look at the Romney camp’s views on foreign policy during the Republican convention last week.

China

Candidate Obama’s tough talk on China was quickly tempered by geopolitical and geoeconomic realities once he assumed office. There has been plenty of dialogue: Obama and China’s President Hu Jintao have met a dozen times, and countless meetings of officials and experts have attempted to nurture more collaborative ties. Still, the plain truth is that the relationship continues to be racked by tension and conflicting interests.

One of the major hallmarks of Obama’s first term was the “pivot” to Asia as the United States grapples with China’s unabated economic and military rise. This pivot has included the deployment of Marines to Australia, and the United States pushing China, unsuccessfully thus far, to defuse the South China Sea territorial disputes with its neighbors. This issue continues to be a source of significant tension in the region and also provokes fears of disruption of major shipping lanes. Then, too, there are the perennial disputes about the status of Taiwan and congressionally-mandated arms shipments.

Although Beijing has reacted negatively to Romney’s statements on China, Obama’s policies also continue to spark widespread criticism. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton embarked on what will likely be her last official visit to China, the Chinese government called on Washington to observe “the trends of our current era and the general wish of countries in the region.” With regards to the South China Sea, the United States is not directly concerned and thus should not be involved in the dispute, according to Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi. And on Syria, China refuses to budge. In short, the ongoing dialogues with Chinese officials have not produced breakthroughs.

There is, in short, no shortage of frustration in the relationship. Syria, Taiwan, the South China Sea, human rights, and concerns over currency manipulation will continue to be issues that shape the direction of this critical bilateral relationship. Obama will likely continue his current policy of engaging the Chinese government in dialogue while also confronting concerns over economic policies (by, for example, continuing to use WTO dispute mechanisms to address concerns over unfair trade practices); he will also increase the U.S.’s military presence in Asia and strengthen bilateral relationships in the region to counter Chinese influence.

Russia

Although frustrated by the Russian government’s crackdown on dissent at home, its blocking of international action on Syria, and its propensity to complicate U.S. policies on Iran, the Obama administration does not see Russia as the geopolitical threat that Mitt Romney apparently does. After all, it was thanks to Russia—and 13 Republicans in the Senate—that Obama could claim one of his major foreign policy successes: the negotiating and signing of the new START treaty.

The Obama team denies the Romney camp’s claims that the “reset” with Russia has been a failure, and they can point to Russia’s long-awaited entry into the World Trade Organization as one sign of genuine progress. But whatever accomplishments there have been, they are most likely a first-term phenomenon. Although Obama has signaled his willingness to constructively engage the Russia more than Romney would, the “easy” issues in the relationship have been resolved—and none of them were actually easy. There is room in the relationship for greater engagement in the economic sphere, especially if the U.S. Congress repeals the Jackson-Vanik amendment and grants Russia permanent normal trade relations. But human rights, missile defense, Syria, lingering Russian bitterness over Libya, and Iran will complicate the bilateral relationship, no matter who is in the White House.

Afghanistan

The Obama campaign repeatedly hits at the fact that when Obama took office in 2009, the United States was involved in two long-term wars and now it is out of Iraq and drawing down in Afghanistan. Both actions have been largely popular with the American people. Romney failed to mention Afghanistan in his speech at the Republican National Convention—a curious oversight given that he is seen as weaker on this issue than Obama (but he did address the issue the day before in a speech to the American Legion in Indiana). The Obama campaign promptly pounced, highlighting the decimation of al Qaeda’s top leadership, the success of the surge, and the Strategic Partnership, which provides for a limited U.S. military presence in Afghanistan for the next decade.  

The administration is committed to adhering to the 2014 drawdown timeline and transitioning from an active combat mission to eliminate al Qaeda to a train-and-assist mission to ensure that Afghan forces can provide long-term security. Despite the spate of green-on-blue attacks that are tragically grabbing headlines, Obama is likely to maintain the drawdown timetable.

Iran

A nuclear Iran is a prospect that no U.S. president wants to face. Candidate Obama declared that he would try to negotiate with Iran. Once again, geopolitical realities tempered optimism that such negotiations could succeed. Obama moved to continue to sanction the Iranian government, managing to get Russia and China to approve harsher sanctions in 2010. Yet despite multiple rounds of sanctions, there is mounting concern about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and possible nuclear program. And while the administration says the door is always open for engagement, the military option is being discussed in a way that it has not before.

The focus on the possibility of military action is driven in part by the Romney camp’s declared willingness to use force in response to Iranian nuclear capability, as well as by Israel’s growing unease with what it sees as Iran’s growing nuclear potential. This highlights what the real difference is between Romney and Obama on Iran: Romney has called Iranian nuclear capability, short of actual possession of a nuclear weapon, a threat.  This may lower the threshold for U.S. military action.

Syria

Given the relative success of NATO action in Libya, which resulted in the overthrow and death of Muammar Gaddafi, there have been calls in the United States to undertake similar actions in Syria. Obama has thus far rejected U.S. military involvement in Syria, and he has also said no to arming the Syrian opposition—a proposal Romney has supported. In part, the Obama administration’s position may be influenced by the near certainty that China and Russia would veto any U.N. Security Council actions that call for armed intervention; both governments have already vetoed economic sanctions against the Bashar al- Assad regime for its brutal crackdown. But Obama has warned Assad against moving or using Syria’s chemical weapons, declaring this a red line for the United States.

Defense spending

As the United States moves to further decrease its military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama administration is focusing on the size of defense spending and its contribution to the ever-growing national debt. The administration is confident that defense spending can be slowed down without impairing U.S. military capabilities—a notion that Romney and many Republicans reject outright. Rather than hold defense spending as sacrosanct, Obama has said that “the size and the structure of our military and defense budgets have to be driven by a strategy, not the other way around."

The administration released a defense strategy document  that “transitions our Defense enterprise from an emphasis on today's wars to preparing for future challenges, protects the broad range of U.S. national security interests, advances the Department's efforts to rebalance and reform, and supports the national security imperative of deficit reduction through a lower level of defense spending.” Romney has attacked Obama for hollowing out the military and has called for increased defense spending.

Obama is not proposing cuts to the defense budget but slowing the rate of growth of the defense budget, which has nearly doubled since 2001. The Pentagon’s five-year budget limits the rate of growth of the defense budget to the inflation rate. But even Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and some other officials in the administration seem to agree with Republicans that sequestration, which would mandate $600 billion in across-the-board spending cuts in the Pentagon over ten years, is a bad idea. Obama signed the legislation mandating sequestration if Congress does not come up with alternative spending cuts, which may make him vulnerable on that score. But this could be neutralized by the fact that Paul Ryan, Romney’s running mate, voted for the measure.

Cybersecurity

Calling cybersecurity “one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face,” Obama ordered an assessment U.S. cybersecurity policies and structures. The resulting Cyberspace Policy Review recognized that the United States was not organized to deal with threats in cyberspace and adopted an action plan so that the government could better coordinate its defense of cyberspace. What Obama undertook in his first term is thus remarkably similar to the Romney plan to undertake a full interagency initiative to develop a national cyber strategy.

Jacqueline McLaren Miller is a Senior Associate in EWI's Strategic Trust-Building Initiative, where she runs the U.S. program. Thomas Cuffe provided research for this report.

URUZGAN, Afghanistan—Two days before Afghanistan’s election in September 2010, some 1,200 Afghans stormed a NATO coalition outpost named Firebase Mirwais on a hillside outside Chora in the central province of Uruzgan, where I was the senior military commander. Inside were 200 Afghan soldiers, supported by 60 Australian soldiers and a U.S.–Australian team devoted to reconstruction and development in the province. Soldiers watched from guard towers as the crowd breached the first of two 15-foot adobe walls, opened a storage container, and set fire to a stash of U.S. and coalition military uniforms.

A young American soldier manning a guard tower on the inner wall spotted one of the attackers with an AK-47 assault rifle. After gaining permission from his sergeant to engage the enemy threatening the base, he fired two shots, killing the assailant. Incensed, some in the crowd charged the inner gate. If the central areas of the base were breached, there could have been an enormous loss of life. The coalition soldiers would have been forced to defend themselves and prevent the protesters from seizing NATO weapons. But before that could happen, an Australian soldier fired several rounds at the gate with a .50-caliber machine gun. The crowd saw the sparks fly off the metal gate and heard the deafening report of the coalition’s most powerful machine gun. They immediately retreated and dispersed.

The crowd regrouped outside the military camp and headed for the Chora district central office a half-mile away. Mohammad Dawood Kahan, the district chief, was in his compound guarded by Afghan police. There, two or three other protesters were killed by Afghan officers as they tried to breach the governor’s walls. The crowd disbanded and went home soon after the fight. This ended the demonstrations for that day, but insurgent leaders were able to feed off the unrest and reassemble the following day.

Although some Taliban were present in Chora, most of the crowd consisted of local citizens who had been convinced by insurgents and local leaders that coalition soldiers were infidels who had no respect for their religion and beliefs. More than 7,500 miles away two months earlier, Terry Jones, an obscure pastor with a tiny congregation in Gainesville, Florida, declared he would burn dozens of Qurans to commemorate the ninth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. In Afghanistan, that news emboldened local insurgents in a way that not only cost the lives of civilians in Chora but also threatened to derail plans for peaceful elections.

Elections in 2010 were actually conducted in a much smoother fashion than those in 2009. This was the result of improved capability of the Afghan Security Force, more trust between Afghan Security and coalition forces, and the general population’s feeling of security as they went to their polling stations. With the next national election due in 2014, the challenge is for Afghan authorities to plan, prepare, and conduct the balloting largely on their own. Coalition forces will only provide support from afar. This will not be easy. The first elections after the majority of our combat forces have gone will be the ultimate test of our success in planting a democratic system that can flourish in some quite fallow ground.

Click here to read the rest of this piece at the World Policy Journal.

Romney won the Republican nomination without strong foreign policy credentials, but this did not hamper the campaigns of Bill Clinton or George W. Bush, who took office with a similar paucity of international experience. Romney’s forays into foreign policy issues thus far have already led to a few stumbles, with the candidate facing criticism for overblown rhetoric—such as labeling Russia the United States’ primary geopolitical foe. Romney also faces tensions within the Republican Party between Tea Party acolytes with isolationist propensities and those who propound “American exceptionalism,” arguing for a greater U.S. push for human rights and democracy across the globe.

Will Romney opt for a more active and aggressive foreign policy in defense of human rights and democracy promotion, which could further undermine relations with China and Russia, or will concerns over budget cuts and overreach force a retrenchment of U.S. power, as his running mate Paul Ryan has advocated? And then there is this to consider: regardless of what Romney says on the campaign trail, geopolitical realities will necessarily temper what a Romney administration would be able to do once in office, as they did when Barack Obama assumed office.

By reviewing speeches, interviews and public documents, we offer below a summary of the positions the Romney campaign has staked on some of the major foreign policy issues that EWI follows closely. In most instances, the Romney campaign has yet to articulate a clear alternative to the Obama administration’s foreign policy positions, preferring instead to criticize current policies and a perceived lack of leadership. Condoleezza Rice and John McCain’s speeches in Tampa followed this pattern—lambasting the Obama administration for “leading from behind,” for failing to prioritize human rights, and for sowing confusion among America’s allies and partners as to what are the U.S.’s core interests.

This overview can offer a glimpse into the prevailing thinking in the Romney campaign, but it is not necessarily a foreign policy blueprint for a Romney administration. Overall, though, the Romney campaign appears to be staking out a more assertive foreign policy that, if implemented, would bring the United States into sharper confrontation with China, Russia, Syria, and Iran. 

Next week during the Democratic convention, we will offer a similar examination of the Obama administration’s foreign policy positions.

 

China

The Romney campaign labels China as a state (along with Russia) with “rising ambitions.” From trade to human rights to Taiwan to the South China Sea, the Romney campaign promises a more forceful U.S. policy to counter Chinese efforts at regional hegemony. It also promises to pressure China to become a “responsible partner in the international system.” This push would include labeling China a currency manipulator, increasing arms sales to Taiwan, and building up the U.S. military presence in the region in part to guarantee open trade routes and prevent the South China Sea from becoming a “Chinese lake.” On human rights, Romney’s platform seeks to encourage China to become more politically open and democratic—but offers few specifics on how it would do this beyond offering to “support and engage civil society groups within China that are promoting democratic reform, anti-corruption efforts, religious freedom, and women’s and minority rights.”

An editorial in the China Daily warned that Romney’s stance on China “will only lead to head-on confrontation between the two countries.” The editorial shows a good understanding of U.S. domestic politics when it notes that “politicians tend to go back on their words after being elected, and it has become usual for U.S. politicians to play the China card in an election year.” President Obama was similarly critical of China in his 2008 campaign, promising to “use all diplomatic means at his disposal to achieve change in China's manipulation of the value of its currency.” Political realities tempered Obama’s desire to push China hard on the currency issue and it is reasonable to expect that, in practice, a Romney administration would be similarly constrained. While noting the gap between campaign rhetoric and actual policies, the editorial noted: “Romney's stance on China is still worrying, as it could poison the friendly atmosphere necessary to develop Sino-US relations.”

 

Russia

Romney and his surrogates continue to view Russia as a threat to the United States. And instead of backing away from his statement in which he labeled Russia as the U.S.’s main geopolitical foe, the campaign seems to have decided to double-down on Russia as a threat. Recent events in Russia may have played into this decision, as the administration of President Vladimir Putin continues to stonewall U.N. action in Syria and pursues its domestic opponents with zeal. Romney advisor Richard Williamson addressed Romney’s views on Russia, saying "They are our foe. They have chosen a path of confrontation, not cooperation, and I think the governor was correct in that…”

A Romney administration, then, would seek to reset the “reset.” This would include a review of the New START treaty, which Romney labeled in 2010 as Obama’s worst foreign policy mistake. The United States could withdraw from the treaty by invoking the “supreme national interest” clause. Such a move, however, would have serious consequences beyond the U.S.-Russia relationship as the global non-proliferation and arms control movements would be inevitably weakened.

The Romney campaign further highlights European dependence on Russian energy, Russia’s ambitions to its south, and its authoritarian practices as particular areas of concern. But it has offered little by way of concrete proposals on how it would confront these issues differently than the Obama administration.

 

Afghanistan

The degree to which Afghanistan is not a significant campaign issue is surprising. U.S. troops (and their NATO partners) are still engaged in the longest war that the United States has fought. Romney has criticized Obama for announcing his deadline for bringing most of U.S. troops home, but not the idea of bringing them home. The purpose of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, according to the Romney website, is to “eliminate al Qaeda from the region and degrade the Taliban and other insurgent groups to the point where they are not existential threats to the Afghan government and do not destabilize Pakistan.”

Romney advisor Robert O'Brien and Romney himself have criticized Obama for not appearing regularly before the American people to explain “why we’re in Afghanistan, why it’s important to us, what our strategy is, and rallying support for our young men and women in uniform who are fighting there.” Defending Romney’s Afghanistan policy, which has undergone some significant revision, O’Brien explained “So I think the first thing Governor Romney will do is convey to folks, the American people, as president, what his vision is for Afghanistan.” Given that Obama has a tremendous advantage over Romney in who is seen as better able to handle Afghanistan (43 to 27 percent according to a July NBC-WSJ poll), it would be a useful exercise if this was done before the election.

 

Iran

The United States, regardless of which administration is in power, will continue to be deeply concerned about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Romney has tried to draw the starkest differences between his position and Obama’s on this issue. “Look, one thing you can know, and that is if we reelect Barack Obama, Iran will have a nuclear weapon,” he declared. “And if we elect Mitt Romney, if you elect me as the next president, they will not have a nuclear weapon.” And at his recent speech in Indiana to the American Legion, Romney stated that Iran “is drawing close to nuclear weapons capability,” even though that is in dispute.

The Romney campaign’s objectives vis-à-vis Iran are to “end Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon, eliminate the threat of Iranian nuclear terrorism against the United States and our allies, and prevent nuclear proliferation across the Middle East.” The differences between Romney and Obama here are nonexistent.

Romney and his surrogates have also criticized the president for missing, in Senator John McCain’s words, an historic opportunity to support an Iranian revolution that would overthrow the current regime. Romney advisor Williamson has maintained that Romney would implement “crushing, strong sanctions” (without necessarily seeking U.N. Security Council support, given China and Russia’s recalcitrance on Iran sanctions) and would seek a total suspension of enrichment.

Obama has preferred to exhaust diplomatic means to address the concerns over Iran’s nuclear ambitions while the Romney campaign has offered much tougher rhetoric. As a result Obama has felt compelled to toughen his position by publicly stating that the military option remains on the table for dealing with Iran, a sentiment that the Romney campaign certainly echoes.

 

Syria

The Republicans are split on how to respond to Bashar Al Assad’s brutal military action. Romney has rejected the call of John McCain and others to intervene militarily in the conflict by instituting a no-fly zone, but he has called for arming the Syrian opposition. Overall, there does not appear to be significant daylight between Romney and Obama on Syria. The Romney campaign calls for pursuing a “strategy of isolating and pressuring the regime to increase [the] likelihood of a peaceful transition to a legitimate government. We should redouble our push for the UN Security Council to live up to its responsibilities and impose sanctions. … And we should make clear that the United States and our allies will support the Syrian opposition when the time comes for them to forge a post-Assad government.”

 

Defense Spending

Romney has signaled a major difference with Obama on the automatic across-the-board defense cuts that are scheduled to take effect on January 1 as part of the 2012 Budget Control Act. Despite having voted in support of the measure, Paul Ryan now criticizes sequestration and has suggested that a Romney administration could undo sequestration “retroactively.” Ryan has joined other Romney surrogates in arguing that sequestration would do irreparable harm to the military and “impair our ability to meet and deter threats.”

 

Cybersecurity

The fear of U.S. vulnerability—military and civilian—to cyber attacks is shared by both candidates and Romney’s campaign does not offer significant contrasts to the Obama administration. As Senate minority leader Mitch McConnell recently noted: “We all recognize the problem. That’s not the issue here.” A Romney administration would, in its first 100 days, “order a full interagency initiative to formulate a unified national strategy to deter and defend against the growing threats of militarized cyber-attacks, cyber-terrorism, cyber-espionage, and private-sector intellectual property theft. U.S. defense and intelligence resources must be fully engaged in this critical aspect of national defense.”

It is not clear that a Romney administration would have greater success than an Obama administration in getting key cyber legislation passed. The efforts to improve information sharing between the public and private sectors and set minimum cyber infrastructure requirements foundered recently when the Senate failed to pass the 2012 Cybersecurity Act.

Jacqueline McLaren Miller is a Senior Associate in EWI's Strategic Trust-Building Initiative, where she runs the U.S. program. Thomas Cuffe provided research for this report.

A new debate has started on the nature of a redefined Indian foreign policy that takes into account the country’s transformed relations with the United States of America. The latter is openly seeking a close political, economic and security relationship with India. The rhetoric is at times high-flown, calling US ties with India indispensable for the 21st century and describing India as a lynchpin of America’s ‘re-balancing’ towards the Asia-Pacific region.

Some experts would prefer a ‘non-alignment 2.0’ policy for India to deal with the reconfiguration of geo-politics caused by the relative decline of the US and the West and the rise of China. While this nomenclature may arouse misgivings in some quarters because of its ideological overtones and, more so, its political irrelevance in a world no longer divided into rival alliances, in reality the authors of this concept propose issue-based collaboration with diverse partners depending on the confluence of interests. This seems pragmatic and non-ideological.

Many advocate a foreign policy of ‘strategic autonomy’ for India. This implies that India retain its independence in foreign policy making, and not be obliged to follow any powerful actor or a set of actors in any course of action that does not conform to its long term national interest. Rather than be caught in strategic rivalries between countries that are hurtful to its interests, it should have the freedom to engage with opposing sides if that is useful.

This debate would suggest that India’s foreign policy remains in a fluid state and is seeking to discover its moorings, with the implication that India has not yet come to terms with the radically altered global situation of today. It carries the nuance that India is under pressure to tilt towards one side (the US), which India should not succumb to.

In reality, there should be no need to define Indian foreign policy in core conceptual terms. Defining it thus does not give it a coherence, a sense of purpose and clarity that might be otherwise missing. The big powers do not seem to need to define their foreign policies for conceptual clarity. They just conduct their foreign affairs, based on certain broad principles and practical considerations. An analysis of their positions on a range of international issues would bring out the prominent features of the policies they pursue, but encapsulating them in one or two words would hardly be enlightening.

How would one, in any case, define US or Chinese foreign policies? No single-word definition is possible. US foreign policy, for instance, is full of contradictions. It is supposedly anchored in the promotion of democracy worldwide but it supports some of the most anti-democratic regimes in the world. Military intervention to support human rights in one country is contradicted by military protection to other countries that suppress the fundamental human rights of their population. Religious extremism is fought on the one hand and promoted on the other. Overdependence on China is coupled with hedging strategies against its rise that is seen as adversarial.

China claims that its rise is not a threat, that it wants a peaceful periphery, yet it is developing powerful military capabilities, asserting extensive land and maritime claims in the South China Sea, thriving on Japanese investments but has a visceral hatred of Japan, it is benefiting hugely from its partnership with the US even as in East Asia it is US power that it principally confronts. In other words, it, too, manages contradictions.

In this background, only confusion is caused by seeking to define in political shorthand India’s foreign policy as non-alignment 2.0 or strategic autonomy. India’s foreign policy can simply be loosely described as protecting its national interests as effectively as possible in a globalized world that demands cooperative solutions and a competitive world that demands management of conflicting interests without confrontation. This would eliminate the implicit intrusion of the US factor in explaining the core of our foreign policy objectives. In a situation where India can, by skilful handling, gain much from its improved relations with the US, it would be undesirable to frame its foreign policy objectives in terms of the strategic distance it wants to maintain from the US.

In actual fact, this debate about strategic autonomy is behind the times. India’s post Cold War policies testify to its desire to maintain ‘strategic autonomy’ in a situation of strategic shifts in global power equations. India, for example, has established strategic partnerships with several countries that include, besides the US, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Japan and so on. It has a strategic dialogue even with China, its principal geo-political adversary. By establishing such partnerships with countries with key differences and conflicting interests amongst themselves, India is, in fact, expanding its strategic room for manoeuvre.

India is member of the Russia-India-China or RIC dialogue, with member countries opposing regime change policies and interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries, and supporting multipolarity. It is member of BRICS, which, by including Brazil and South Africa, extends strategic understandings on some basic norms of international conduct to key countries in South America and Africa. India supports the US led Community of Democracies, capitalizing on its democratic credentials, even if the sense of the grouping is directed against countries like China and even Russia. India has agreed to a trilateral US-India-Japan dialogue, including naval exercises, with its anti-Chinese thrust quite clear although officially denied. The intensive US-India naval exercises in the Indian Ocean have a China related strategic purpose, even as India is open to maritime cooperation with China in the Indian Ocean area. India cooperates with China in the climate change and World Trade Organization negotiations because it serves a common purpose of countering the US/European attempts to avoid equity in agreements.

India respects Russia’s special interests in Central Asia but is open to US strategic moves to promote strategic energy links between Central Asia and South Asia. It is willing to strengthen its role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization even if the US sees it as an arrangement to limit US influence in Central Asia. India supports an extended US presence in Afghanistan even though Iran is opposed to it. India is avoiding getting caught in the Shia (Iran)-Sunni (Saudi Arabia) conflict building up in the Gulf. It successfully resisted Western pressures to reduce its engagement with Myanmar.

India’s independent posture explains why it has obtained support for its Security Council permanent membership from both the West and Russia. Russia’s position as India’s biggest partner for defence supplies has not prevented India from now expanding its defence ties with the US. The US seems reconciled that India will not be an ally and will want to retain its independence in foreign policy decisions. It will nevertheless seek to tie India closer to itself in a way that India’s pragmatic choices will pull India in that direction. If India continues to have a clear-sighted view of its longer term interests, it will be able to balance its relationship with all the major players in a constructive way. But without a domestic defence manufacturing base, high rates of economic growth and improvement in decision-making, our independent foreign policy will always have weak foundations.

 

Photo: "Indian Flag - The Mall - Shimla - Himach" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by Adam Jones, Ph.D. - Global Photo Archive

Some of these tensions are directly related to Russia’s WTO membership application. Now that Russia has joined the WTO, the United States finds itself in violation of WTO rules that require an unconditioned trade relationship. Back in 1974, Congress passed the Jackson-Vanik amendment that tied free trade to free emigration in non-market economies as a means of pressuring the Kremlin to allow Soviet Jews to emigrate. Russian officials have pointed out for years that this is an anarchic piece of legislation since Russia is neither a non-market economy nor does it restrict emigration. Yet despite the efforts of successive U.S. presidential administrations to graduate Russia from the Jackson-Vanik amendment, Congress has thus far refused to act. In part, this is because many members of Congress continued to view Russia through a Cold War prism.

Now that Russia has joined the WTO, such attitudes are changing—up to a point. Both the House and the Senate are considering bills that would graduate Russia from Jackson-Vanik and grant permanent normal trade relations (PNTR). There is a possibility—although far from assured—that Congress could act when it returns from the August recess. The price, however, will be tying PNTR to passage of the Magnitsky bill, which focuses on human rights abuses by government officials in Russia. These human rights objections are not as easily dismissed as those rooted in outdated Cold War thinking.

The Obama administration has sought to delink Magnitsky and human rights issues from PNTR, but Russia’s recent increasingly heavy-handed treatment of political dissenters has undercut those efforts. Congressional and other critics of its human rights record point to the recent trial and two-year jail sentence for the punk band Pussy Riot, opposition leader Garry Kasparov’s arrest, the relentless pursuit of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, the efforts to undermine non-governmental organizations that receive foreign funding by subjecting them to frequent audits and labeling them as “foreign agents,” and increased penalties for protestors.

Those same critics argue that the Obama administration has turned its head as the Russian government moves backwards on human rights with such actions. Such criticism is not entirely fair. The administration has imposed visa bans on officials linked to the Magnitsky case (the Magnitsky bill seeks to do something similar, but on a broader scale) and has used official channels to quietly press the Kremlin on human rights. The problem, however, is that the Obama administration has not been able to engage the Putin administration on these issues. The Russian government rejects all such criticisms of its human rights practices, calling them an intolerable meddling in its domestic affairs.

So the bilateral relationship is dealing with—or, perhaps more accurately, not dealing with—several significant stressors. And the U.S. presidential contest is certain to shine an uncomfortable spotlight on the strained relationship as the Romney team seeks to undermine any foreign policy successes that the Obama administration claims, such as New START and Russia’s WTO accession. Mitt Romney already launched one broadside against Russia, calling it the “greatest geopolitical foe.” While the Republican candidate has quietly dropped such inflated rhetoric, he is unlikely to soften his overall tone. And given Putin’s tough measures against dissenters and his policy on Syria that is widely seen as obstructionist, even Obama is likely to feel compelled to distance himself from Russia’s actions at home and abroad. For now, the once-touted notion of a “strategic partnership” between Russia and the United States is, at the very least, on hold. It would take some major course corrections to give it a new push.

 

Jacqueline McLaren Miller is a Senior Associate in EWI's Strategic Trust-Building Initiative, where she runs the U.S. program.

Diplomatic tensions between China and its neighbors have been rising in recent months, reaching a new high when China announced on June 21, 2012 that it had formally approved the establishment of a prefecture level administration, called Sanshashi in Chinese, for disputed territories in the South China Sea. The fear in neighboring countries is that China’s growing naval power is emboldening it to become more aggressive. The United States released an official statement on August 3 criticizing China’s new administrative measures, prompting an angry response from Beijing.   

EWI Professorial Fellow Greg Austin, who is the author of China’s Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force and National Development (1998), offers some essential background on this dispute and then comments on two key questions: What is China’s intent with the Sansha City announcement, and what are the implications of Washington’s reaction to it?

Islands or Rocks?

There is an important distinction to be made between the Paracel Islands in the north and the Spratly Islands in the south. The Paracel Islands include some relatively big islands that can naturally support at least minimal human habitation (one of the tests whether they qualify for an economic zone). For this reason, they are susceptible to administrative actions or human activities, like guano collection, that might allow a state to claim to have exercised sovereignty over the land in the past. If a settlement could be reached between two states (China and Vietnam) over sovereignty, few other states would object to the sovereign state from extending an exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from these islands. China has controlled the Paracel Islands completely since  it evicted military forces of South Vietnam from them in 1974. In 1958, the government of North Vietnam had recognized Chinese claims to the Paracel Islands and had made no claim of its own until after the unification of Vietnam. (The Vietnamese claim relies in part on acts by France as a colonial power in Vietnam prior to 1954.)

The Spratly Islands present a very different picture from the Paracel group. Those islands are not really a distinct group that might be accorded consideration as a single administrative unit under the international law of territorial acquisition. It is an agglomeration of reefs and rocks with a spread from end to end of around one thousand kilometers, including a handful of very small, scattered islands. Chinese sources have identified 193 named reefs, shoals, submerged reefs or hidden shoals. Western charts recognise as many as twelve distinct island groups; Chinese terminology refers to at least five separate groups as well as numerous individual islands not associated with the five groups There are so many claimants to all or some of these islands that it is almost impossible to envision any meaningful legal settlement between the parties that would serve as the basis for determining an EEZ boundary. 

All of the features occupied by China in the Spratly Islands are in fact submerged reefs or rocks that have been built up with concrete to enable a handful of military personnel to be stationed there. China has had few other options because other claimants have occupied all of the natural islands and China has chosen not to try to evict them. This set of circumstances is very important. China and other claimants will probably only reach a settlement on maritime boundaries in the vicinity of the Spratly Islands that ignores them as base points for devising EEZ boundaries. China might negotiate away its claim to this or that reef or rock in the Spratly Islands, as it has given away small amounts of territory in settlements of border disputes with contiguous states on its land borders. China is unlikely ever to negotiate away its claim to the Paracel Islands, for reasons outlined in my book, China’s Ocean Frontier.

 

The Taiwan Connection

China’s policy in the South China Sea island disputes is intimately connected with the Taiwan issue. Taiwan claims the same island groups claimed by China. In fact, when the Chinese government in Beijing came to power in 1949 it inherited the claims from the Republic of China.  Taiwan was the first government to send military forces to occupy islands in the Spratly group, first in 1946 and then again in 1956. Taiwan has maintained a small military unit or administrative presence on one island in the Spratly group continuously since 1956. China was so circumspect about this situation in the Spratly Islands that it waited until 1988 to station any military personnel on the small number of reefs and rocks it occupies. The Chinese military forces have avoided any clash with Taiwanese counterparts in the island group. As long as Taiwan maintains a full claim to all of the islands on behalf of a unitary China, it will be impossible for the Chinese government in Beijing to negotiate any settlement. For third parties there is also a complicating factor to the Taiwan claim. Under international law, Taiwan can probably not be accorded any standing since it is not recognized by states committed to the “one China” policy.

 

What is China doing with the Sansha City announcement and related PLA move?

On July 21, 2012, China’s State Council announced the establishment of the prefectural-level administration, Sanshashi (which has been translated by numerous sources as Sansha City) to administer island groups that it claims in the South China Sea. The government seat will be stationed on Woody Island, part of the Paracel group. This upgraded the level of administration from that announced in 1988, when China set up the county-level Administrative Office for the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, and Macclesfield Bank (a wholly submerged marine feature). On July 23, the PLA announced that it would set up a new garrison level command of ground force personnel responsible for managing the city's national defence mobilization, military reserves and carrying out military operations, with subsequent information that the garrison would be led by a senior colonel.

According to Chinese sources, the moves were in retaliation for administrative measures taken by two rival claimants, Vietnam and the Philippines, in recent years. In 2009, the Philippines issued a new law on its territorial sea which reiterated its claim to part of the Spratly group. At that time, a Chinese military analyst was cited by a pro-China Hong Kong paper, Ta kung pao, as advocating three measures in response:

• speeding up the process of demarcating the baselines of China's territorial waters;
• tightening up effective administrative management and control of the islands; and
• intensifying readiness for naval operations, such as training with operating weaponry.

On June 21, 2012, Vietnam passed a new law on its maritime jurisdiction, including a reiteration of its claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands. The anticipated passing of that law was the subject of an official meeting between Chinese and Vietnamese officials in October 2011. China’s failure to convince Vietnam to change course in those talks prompted it to take two of the measures foreshadowed by the military commentator in 2009 as mentioned above. (In fact, the Sansha City announcement was foreshadowed in December 2007, but shelved after street demonstrations in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City against China that led to consultations a month later between the two countries. According to a Chinese official statement, the two countries agreed then to settle the “maritime” disputes by dialogue and consultation. Both sides refuse to negotiate on the territorial disputes.)

The new moves announced by China are largely symbolic in character and will not alter China’s calculation about the use of force. Since moving its units into the Spratly Islands in 1988 when there was a minor clash with Vietnamese forces, China has avoided combat operations. It has engaged in a range of other pressure tactics, as have other claimants. The new army garrison is small, administrative in character and not likely to affect any military balance in the South China Sea. It is on an island in the Paracel islands at least 400 nautical miles away from any island where rival claimants have military units. According to an Associated Press report of August 3 2012, the responsibility for triggering the latest round of tensions between China and the Philippines “began after Chinese fishing boats were stopped by Philippine vessels.” The A.P. dispatch then described the following sequence of events: “Manila deployed a navy ship, supplied by the U.S. the previous year, leading China to send more vessels of its own and quarantine Philippine fruit exports to China. Manila says Beijing has not fully complied with a June agreement, supported by the U.S., for a mutual withdrawal and has used barriers to block Philippine access to the reef.”

China has promoted cooperative measures to protect international merchant shipping at the global level, and at the regional level in supporting anti-piracy measures. As a trade-dependent economy, China has very strong vested interests in protecting sea-borne trade. China does have naval and air forces based on or near Hainan Island that could interfere with international merchant shipping, but it has fewer submarines in its entire navy in 2012 (46) than the 47 that were lost by Germany in just the month of May 1943 at the height of the war on shipping in the Atlantic in World War II. Moreover, the naval balance of power, like the overall military balance in the maritime regions of the Western Pacific, is very heavily tilted in favor of the United States and its allies, including Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. China could try to disrupt shipping, but the United States and its allies have made plain their very strong intention to oppose, with force if necessary, any such action.

China’s official claims to the geographic extent of its maritime jurisdiction (territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf) conform to the letter of international law. The possible exception is that official Chinese maps of the South China Sea show a dotted line that encompasses the entire South China Sea. This line first appeared in maps released by the Republic of China in 1946 and has been interpreted by many observers to imply a territorial waters claim to the entire South China Sea. The People’s Republic of China has never officially asserted such a claim, and it has made declarations and passed laws which suggest that it has no such claim. The United States and other countries have called on China to clarify its view on this dotted line in the South China Sea.

 

What are the implications of the United States official reaction?

On August 3, 2012, the U.S. Department of State reacted to the news with a statement that called on all parties to settle their disputes, singling out China for its Sansha City announcements. The statement said: “Recent developments include an uptick in confrontational rhetoric, disagreements over resource exploitation, coercive economic actions, and the incidents around the Scarborough Reef, including the use of barriers to deny access. In particular, China's upgrading of the administrative level of Sansha City and establishment of a new military garrison there covering disputed areas of the South China Sea run counter to collaborative diplomatic efforts to resolve differences and risk further escalating tensions in the region.” This statement marked a clear departure by the United States in singling out one of the parties for escalating tensions through a direct challenge of domestic legislation and a minor deployment of troops.

For its part, China demanded to know why the United States had singled it out: “Why has the United States chosen to turn a blind eye to the acts of some country marking out a large number of oil and gas blocks in the South China Sea and making domestic legislation claiming as its own China's islands, reefs and waters? Why has the United States chosen on the one hand not to mention the acts of some country using naval vessel to threaten Chinese fishermen?” China went on to charge that the U.S. statement “showed total disregard of facts, confounded right and wrong, and sent a seriously wrong message. It is not conducive to efforts by the parties concerned to uphold peace and stability in the South China Sea and the Asia-Pacific region at large. The Chinese side expresses strong dissatisfaction of and firm opposition to it.” These views were conveyed by the Chinese government a day earlier when it summoned U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission, Robert Wang, to the Foreign Ministry in Beijing,

 

What Next?

The pressure on China to be less adamant about its claims in the Spratly Islands is mounting. China does have an obligation under international law to try to settle disputes peacefully, but since that applies to all parties, China is unlikely to back down without some equivalent gesture from other claimants. In the Spratly Islands, China will continue to avoid combat operations because a number of larger interests would be adversely affected for no significant gain. But it will retaliate with military force if attacked. A minor skirmish with loss of life cannot be ruled out. Trying to keep the dispute at a low level, China has so far avoided drawing any baselines around the Spratly Islands. In the Paracel Islands, which China has controlled fully since 1974, the situation is very different. For China, this dispute is definitively over and settled. China has drawn baselines around the Paracel Islands. Since Vietnam is the only other recognized claimant to the Paracels, China feels that it has a very strong hand, much stronger than in the sprawling and dispersed Spratly Islands where some 40 islands, rocks and reefs are occupied by three other states – and one is occupied by Taiwan.

 

 

 

中国在南中国海的城市?*

近几个月来，中国和其邻国间的外交关系日益紧张起来，达到一个新的高度。2012年6月21日，中国宣布它已正式批准在南中国海有争议的领土成立地级行政管理机构——三沙市。周边国家的恐惧在于中国日益增长的海军力量使中国更加强悍。八月三日，美国发布官方声明批评中国的新的行政措施，促使北京方面的情绪非常愤怒。

重要智库——东西方研究所教授级研究员格雷戈·奥斯汀，他是《中国海洋边界：国际法，军事力量和国家发展（1998）》一书的作者，为此提供了关于此争议的一些必要背景，然后在两个关键问题做出评论：1.中国设立三沙市的公告究竟有何意味？2.华盛顿对此通告的反应又有何暗示？

一、岛屿或者岩石？

在位于北部的西沙群岛和位于南部的南沙群岛之间有一个重要的区别。西沙群岛包括一些相对较大的岛屿，自然可以支持至少最低限度的人类居住（借此可以测试一下他们是否有资格享受经济区）。出于这个原因，它们很容易发起行政行为或人类活动，比如上岛收集粪类，这可能使一个国家声称在过去就对这块土地行使主权。如果有方案可以达成，以解决两国（中国和越南）对这块土地的主权问题，也就不会有其他国家反对其主权国从这些岛屿延伸200海里专属经济区。中国控制了西沙群岛，完全因它在1974年将南越军事力量从这些岛屿驱逐出去。1958年，北越政府已经认识到中国声称对西沙群岛拥有主权，而它是在越南统一以后才发出自己的主权声明。（越南声明的理由部分在于法国制定的法律里，法国是1954年前在越南的殖民力量。）

南沙群岛呈现出和西沙群岛完全不同的面貌。这些岛屿都不是真正的一个确切的群体，在领土确认国际法下，这些岛屿不会被认定为一个单一的行政单位。这里积聚了一些礁石与岩石，两端长约为一千公里，包括一些很小的分散的岛屿。中国已确定并命名了193处暗礁、礁石、浅滩。西方图表识别了多达十二个不同的岛群；中国术语则是指称至少五个不同的岛群，以及与他们不相关联的不计其数的单个的小岛。有那么多方面对所有这些岛屿或其中部分岛屿宣称主权，要在相关各方间设想一种有意义的合法的解决方案，作为界定专属经济区边界的基础，这几乎是不可能的。

中国占领南沙群岛的所有特征在于，礁石或岩石上用混凝土修建了设施，使少数军事人员驻扎在这里。中国很少有其他选择，因为其他主权宣示方已经占据了所有的天然岛屿，中国选择了不试图驱逐他们。这一系列情况是非常重要的。中国和其他主权宣示方可能只会达成南沙群岛附近的海上边界的和解，而忽略他们作为主权宣示方专属经济区界限的设计基点。中国可能在谈判中对南沙群岛中的这个或那个暗礁或岩石放弃主权，正如它在与陆上毗连的国家解决边界争端时舍弃极少部分领土一样。基于我在1998年的《中国的海洋边界》一书中的理由，中国是永远不可能放弃西沙群岛的主权的。

二、链接台湾

中国在南中国海岛屿争端的政策是与台湾问题密切联系在一起的。台湾就中国所宣称主权的同一岛屿群体也宣称主权。事实上，当北京的中国政府在1949年掌权，它就从中华民国继承了主权宣示。台湾是第一个派遣军队占领南沙群岛的政府，第一次是1946年，然后是1956年。从1956年以来，台湾在南沙群岛一直维持一个较小的军事单位或行政存在。中国对于南沙群岛这种情况非常慎重，直到1988年才开始在它所占领的少数礁石与岩石上驻扎了军事人员。中国的军事力量避免在这些群岛上与台湾同行产生任何冲突。只要台湾代表一个统一的中国，对所有这些岛屿保持主权宣示，北京的中国政府就不可能商谈任何解决方式。对于台湾的主权声明，任何第三方也必须面对这种复杂的因素。根据国际法，台湾将不会被给予任何主权国家地位，因为它是不被信守“一个中国”政策的国家所承认的。

三、中国成立三沙市及其相关的军事部署，意欲何为？

2012年7月21日，中国国务院宣布成立三沙市，以管理它在南中国海宣示主权的群岛。市政府将选址建立在西沙群岛中的一部分永兴岛上，这是对中国在1988年对西沙、南沙、中沙群岛建立县级管理办事处的一次管理规格的升级。7月23日，中国人民解放军宣布将成立一支新水平的地面力量的守备部队司令部，负责管理国防动员、军事储备和实施军事行动。后续信息表明这支队伍将由一名大校领导。根据中国的文献，此举是为了应对越南和菲律宾两个对手近年来所采取的行政举措。2009年，菲律宾就其领海颁布了新的法律，重申其对南沙群岛部分岛屿的主权。当时一个中国的军事分析家提到了力挺中国的香港大公报的三条应对建议：1.加快划分中国领海基线的进程；2.对岛屿加强有效的行政管理和控制；3.加紧准备海上作战，如培训武器使用。

2012年6月21日，越南对其海事管辖权通过新的法律，包括重申其对西沙群岛和南沙群岛的主权。这部法律的预期通过是中越两国官员在2011年官方会谈的一个主题。在这些会谈中，中国未能说服越南改变颁布新法的进程，促使中国采取了上述军事评论员在2009年提到的两条措施。（事实上，三沙市的成立在2007年12月就已经预示了，但当时由于河内和胡志明市举行了反对中国的街头示威而搁置了。这次示威导致了一个月以后两国的磋商。根据中国官方声明，两国同意随后通过对话和磋商解决海上争议，双方都拒绝就领土争端进行谈判。）

中国所宣告的这些新举措在很大程度上是如所预料的象征性的动作，将不会改变中国动用武力的打算。中国自1988年其行政机构入驻南沙群岛以来，除去当时与越南军队有一个小的冲突以外，已经避免了较大作战行动。中国在应用其他较多的策略应对压力，正如其他相关各方一样。新的守备部队驻防规模较小，更多是行政性质，不可能影响南中国海的任何军事平衡。它驻扎在西沙群岛的一个岛上，距离任何一个对手的岛上驻军都至少在400海里以外。据美联社2012年8月3日报道，新一轮中菲间紧张关系的触发开始于中国渔船被菲律宾船只逼停。美联社然后描述了下列事件：“马尼拉方面部署了前一年由美国提供的海军船队，这导致中国派遣出更多船只应对并加强了对菲律宾出口到中国水果的检疫。马尼拉方面说北京没有完全遵守美国支持的要求双边撤退的六月协议反而设置障碍，阻止菲方接近这些礁石。”

中国在全球范围内促进了合作措施以保护国际商业船运，而且在区域层面支持反盗版措施。作为一个以贸易为主的经济体，中国在保护海上贸易上有很大的既得利益。中国在海南或者海南附近确实拥有海军和空军力量，这些力量足可以干扰国际商业船运，但它的整个海军到2012年只拥有较少的潜艇，46艘，这比德国在1943年5月份二战当中大西洋航运之战高潮时仅仅一个月损失的总量47艘还少。此外，海军力量的平衡，如西太平洋地区的海上整体军事实力平衡，是非常严重倾向于美国及其盟友的力量，包括台湾、日本和韩国。中国可以尝试破坏航运，但美国及其盟友已将反对意图表露无遗，如果必要将采用武力等诸如此类行动。

中国官方声称的海事管辖权的地理范围（领海、毗连区、专属经济区和大陆架）符合国际法的字面意义。可能的例外是，中国南中国海的官方地图显示出一条虚线，这条虚线的范围涵盖了整个南中国海。这条虚线首次出现在中华人民共和国1946年发布的地图，许多观察家把它解读为中国暗示其领海主权适用于整个南中国海。中国人民共和国从未正式提出这样的要求，它所通过的声明和法律也没有暗示这样的要求。美国和其他国家呼吁中国阐明其在南中国海地图上这条虚线的真实意义。

四、美国官方反应有何意味？

2012年8月3日，美国国务院对中国成立三沙市这则新闻的反应是发表了一条声明，呼吁各方针对中国关于成立三沙市的公告解决纠纷。声明说：“最近的时局进展包括对抗性辩论的升级，资源开发上的分歧，经济胁迫措施的出台，斯卡伯勒礁周边的事故，包括使用障碍拒绝接近。特别是，中国升格三沙市的行政管理级别和建立一个新的军事守备部队，覆盖南中国海有争议地区，违背了通过外交合作解决分歧和风险的努力，进一步加剧该地区的紧张局势。”这段声明是美国针对当事一方通过直接挑战国内立法和小规模部队部署而使得局势紧张的情况所做出的分道扬镳的明确表态。

就中国而言，中国要求知道为什么美国那么针对它：“为什么美国对有些国家在南中国海标记出大量的石油和天然气区域以及制定国内立法将中国的岛屿、暗礁和水域宣布为它自己所有的行为视而不见？另一方面为什么美国并没有提到一些国家使用舰艇威胁中国渔民的行为呢？”中国继续指责美国的声明：“美国声明完全不顾事实、混淆正确和错误、并传递了一个严重的错误信息。这不利于通过各方努力维护南中国海乃至亚太地区的和平与稳定，中方对此表示强烈不满和坚决反对。”北京的外交部在前一天召见美国公使王晓岷时把中国政府的这些意见转达给了美方。

五、下一步呢？

对于中国在南中国海不顽固坚持主张的压力在增加。中国确有义务根据国际法努力和平解决争端，但由于这些基本原则适用于相关各方，如果其他各方没有对应的姿态，中国是不可能退让的。在南沙群岛，中国将继续避免作战，因为没有明显的收获，就会对许多较大的利益产生不利影响。但如果遭受攻击，中方将武力报复，一场小的冲突与生命的损失将不能排除。为了试图将争议维持在低水平，中国到目前为止避免在南沙群岛周边划定基线。在西沙群岛，中国自1974年就已经完全控制，情况是非常不同的。对于中国，关于西沙群岛的争议已经确定过去并解决好了。中国已经在西沙群岛周边划定了基线。由于越南只是唯一被认可的对西沙群岛宣示主权的另外一方，因而中国认为它自己在西沙群岛拥有强大实力，远远强于它在庞大而又分散的南沙群岛上的情形。在那里，大约40个岛屿，岩石和珊瑚礁被其他三个国家或者地区占领——其中一个就是台湾。

 

 

The Cybersecurity Act of 2012 (CSA), the most significant legislative undertaking on cybersecurity issues in the United States to date, was blocked from proceeding to a vote in the Senate on August 2. The CSA is now left to languish as members of Congress return to their districts to prepare for the fall campaign.

In a July 19th Wall Street Journal op-ed supporting the bill, President Barack Obama maintained that “the cyber threat to our nation is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face.”  

On that point, members of both parties and most of the policy community agree—but on little else. Critics of the recent bill, which changed substantially from its original form, raised objections to the bill’s implications for both privacy and government regulation of businesses.

Civil liberties groups raised an outcry over provisions in the bill that called for increased information sharing between businesses and government. Warning of the potential for misuse of personal information especially by defense-related organizations, the American Civil Liberties Union claimed that an early version of the bill would “unnecessarily threaten our privacy.”

A group of Republicans, led by Senator John McCain of Arizona, voiced opposition to the original CSA provision allowing the government to enforce minimum standards on critical infrastructure services such as power plants and dams. Charging that this part of the law imposes new regulatory burdens on businesses, McCain said in a statement that the solution isn’t “adding more bureaucrats or forcing industries to comply with government red tape.”

Both of these concerns were addressed in a later version of the CSA. The mandatory standards were changed to optional recommendations, and the information-sharing provisions were made fully transparent and revised to exclude non-civilian agencies. The result is a bill that partially addresses a number of major concerns, but fails to update the country’s infrastructure to adequately face the consequences of an attack.

To address cyber threats, any future bill must impose substantive changes to infrastructure management while simultaneously satisfying the concerns of pro-business and civil liberties groups. Unfortunately, given the heightened polarization of today’s Congress, such an outcome appears unlikely.

Now that the bill has failed, there are a number of options the Obama administration can consider. In an interview with BankInfoSecurity.com, EWI Board Member Melissa Hathaway explained that the president could engage with existing advisory panels as well as “industry leaders and/or key companies that have been breached” to galvanize voluntary reforms.

Additionally, in a recent statement that fueled speculation about an impending executive order, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney said that the president “is determined to do absolutely everything we can to better protect our nation against today’s cyber threats.”

Whatever unfolds legislatively, it is becoming increasingly clear that new measures are needed to ensure the security of critical infrastructure—and that a crisis situation in one country is more than likely to reverberate elsewhere. Much as the recent blackouts in India had unprecedented international repercussions, a cyber attack on the United States would severely impact the global economy. The price for inaction could be very high.

For further information on how the global community can co-create solutions to these challenges, visit the website for the EastWest Institute’s 3rd Worldwide Cybersecurity Summit in New Delhi, to be held on October 30-31, 2012.

What inspired you to establish the Arab International Women’s Forum (AIWF)?

While living in London, I found that there was a lot of stereotyping of Arab women. And, so, after becoming the president of the Federation of International Women’s Associations in London, I began inviting Arab women leaders to speak. Eventually, I fully realized the richness of the women that we have in the Arab region and how more of them needed to appear on an international scale. So, with a few of the Arab women that came to London and with some others whom I was currently working with, we decided to start a non-profit, non-governmental, non-political organization based in London that links Arab women both with each other and with the international community. We believed in two things when we established the forum: One, there is no economic and social development without women playing a role. Two, we are living in a world without borders, and the Arab world is a part of that global community.

Click here to read the rest of the interview at Living Well Magazine.