Politics and Governance

A Bold, Dramatic Step

Pope Benedict XVI's papacy has not been known for stellar moments, yet he is ending it with a stellar action. By surprising not just his Catholic brethren but the whole world with his resignation—something that no pope has done since Gregory XII stepped down in 1415—the 85-year-old Benedict has instantly assured himself an elevated place in history. This fundamentally conservative pope has taken a bold step that is truly exemplary. Not only his successors but any number of religious and secular leaders would do well to keep his precedent in mind as they contemplate how long they should stay in office.

It is impossible to view Benedict's decision in isolation from the waning years of his predecessor, John Paul II. Unlike Benedict, who was 78 when he was elected, the Polish pope took office in 1978 at the sprightly age of 58, allowing him to continue skiing, swimming and hiking—and to break all travel records with his 104 foreign trips. But during the last years of his papacy, John Paul was so weakened by his assorted ailments that his public appearances were often painful to watch. Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, the future pope who was right by his side, observed his physical decline on a daily basis.

As Cardinal Stanislaw Dziwisz, who served as the Polish pope's private secretary, revealed in his memoirs in 2007, John Paul considered resigning in 2000. But that was a largely taboo subject at the time. In a 2002 article for Newsweek, I argued that the Polish pope should take this unprecedented step, explaining that it would only add to his remarkable accomplishments that I had been privileged to cover during the early years of his papacy. The Vatican dismissed any such suggestion. Yet clearly Benedict has had plenty of time to reflect on the virtues of deciding when to end a papacy.

Benedict's reign was never expected to be groundbreaking. He certainly realized that he could not aspire to play the same historic role as his predecessor, who was a key player in the collapse of communism in his native Poland and elsewhere, and whose charisma and seemingly boundless energy broadened the church's appeal far beyond the traditional Christian Western world and to young people everywhere.

In many ways Benedict lived up—or down—to expectations, and his reign of less than eight years will be seen mostly as a bridge between the electrifying John Paul and whomever is elected to the papacy next month. His doctrinal conservatism was no surprise on issues like gay marriage, but his harsh rebukes of those who were perceived to have strayed did startle and alienate some of his followers, especially in the United States. The Vatican's report last year denouncing American nuns for promoting "radical feminist themes incompatible with the Catholic faith" went beyond the general protection of orthodoxy to a frontal attack.

Yet it would be a mistake to view Benedict as only clinging to dogmas many Catholics no longer can fully accept. Despite the church's dismal record of covering up child abuse by priests, and recent questions about the future pontiff's opposition to defrocking one such priest in 1985, Benedict was the first pope to both recognize the damage of this procession of scandals and to apologize for them, meeting with victims and introducing new procedures. This was hardly enough to satisfy the need for a full accounting, but it was an important first step nonetheless.

Benedict also built on his predecessor's accomplishments. He displayed as much sensitivity as John Paul famously did in reaching out to the victims of the Holocaust. On a visit to Auschwitz in 2006, Benedict agonized aloud about the difficulty of saying the right thing: "To speak in this place of horror, in this place where unprecedented mass crimes were committed against God and man, is almost impossible—and it is particularly difficult and troubling for a Christian, for a Pope from Germany." He was acutely conscious of the fact that, as he put it, he was "a son of the German people."

In terms of travel, Benedict did more than expected, embarking on 24 foreign trips, touching down in countries as disparate as the U.S., Brazil, Cameroon, Lebanon and Israel. In 2006, he provoked a backlash with a highly academic speech on Christianity and Islam, which quoted a Byzantine Christian emperor's remarks declaring: "Show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached."

The Vatican quickly pointed out that Benedict wasn't endorsing those statements but making "a clear and radical rejection of the religious motivation for violence, from whatever side it may come." Given the hypersensitivities of our era, there is no doubt that the pope could have done a better job explaining that in his speech—but his underlying message was right on target.

Overshadowed by his predecessor in so many ways, Benedict often failed to get credit for the fact that he, too, could handle several languages comfortably—and deliver papal greetings in many more. Just this past October in Rome, he offered brief greetings from St. Peter's in Arabic for the first time. Of course, the step was largely symbolic, as were some of his other attempts to show his ability to change with the times. Since the Vatican announced a Twitter account in his name two months ago, @Pontifex has generated all of 34 tweets—but garnered more than 1.5 million followers.

Benedict's papacy never shook the perception that he was presiding over an unremarkable period in the life of the church. Now, though, with one dramatic decision he has changed his place in history—and perhaps he will change how those who hold high office without term limits see their own futures. It's worth remembering that in 1966 Pope Paul VI introduced a retirement age of 75 for bishops and archbishops. If the U.S. Senate had a similar rule, 10 of its current members would have retired by now.

By stepping down, Benedict is teaching us all about recognizing one's own limits at a time when more people than ever are living to a very old age. It isn't the number of years that matters as much as the energy and capabilities each of us has left. And there can be no greater tribute to the institution a leader serves than recognizing when the moment to step down is here. That's exactly what Benedict will be remembered for.

Photo credit: Catholic Church (England and Wales)

U.S.-Russia: Bye Bye Reset

When Barack Obama took the oath of office in January 2009, he promised to make a dramatic improvement in U.S.-Russia relations a top priority. And by announcing the now-famous “reset,” his administration delivered a strong signal of his desire to make good on that promise—to the delight of the Kremlin. But now at the start of Obama’s second term, his administration is hardly bothering to mask its growing frustration with Vladimir Putin—and the Russian president is responding more than in kind. As a result, relations are distinctly chilly. In fact, in discussions about Washington’s current foreign policy agenda, Russia is notably absent, much less a top priority.

What went wrong? Predictably, the two sides blame each other. But, without a doubt, the trigger for the now seemingly endless exchange of mutual recriminations and tit-for-tat punitive measures were two key events: the U.S. Congress’s passage of the Magnitsky Act, despite efforts by the administration to prevent such an outcome, and Putin’s continued crackdown on dissent at home.

All of which is already making people forget that the reset was far from a complete failure. The policy was effective in improving the tone of discourse and widening the areas on which U.S. and Russian policymakers met and talked regularly, especially through the mechanism of the Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC). Both the United States and Russia could point to some significant accomplishments. Obama got New START, cooperation on Afghanistan, and initial if fleeting cooperation on Iran. Russia got its long sought-after WTO accession, graduation from Jackson-Vanik, the 123 agreement on civil nuclear cooperation, and the foreign policy attention that it thought it deserved.

The price the U.S. Congress imposed for graduating Russia from Jackson-Vanik and granting permanent normal trade relations was the Magnitsky Act. The Russian Duma responded with the Dima Yakovlev Act, which barred the adoption of Russian children by U.S. citizens. The linkage by the U.S. Congress of the economic relationship to human rights was, for some, “weird,” as U.S. Ambassador Michael McFaul described it. It was not, however, unprecedented as the Jackson-Vanik amendment made the same linkage.

But linking the fate of Russian children stuck in orphanages to the overall bilateral relationship was a new twist, which critics claimed was unusually cruel. The Yakovlev Act is named after a Russian child adopted by American parents and forgotten in a car for hours—an absolute tragedy. But the parents in this case, and the parents in the other cases where adopted Russian children have been abused and mistreated, were not government officials. Many Russian protesters charge that the Yakovlev Act is a desperate and cynical ploy, as were Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s tweets about child abuse in the United States.

Even before the Magnitsky Act was passed, the Kremlin had extended its domestic crackdown to any groups with foreign ties. NGOs that accept foreign funding are now required to register as foreign agents, a loaded term in Russia; USAID was expelled from Russia; and the International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute are moving their staffs out as well. In utter frustration at the fragile state of civil rights and liberties in Russia, the United States recently pulled out of the Civil Society Working Group of the BPC.

The policy repercussions of the weakening bilateral relationship have extended beyond the human rights sphere: Russia recently declined to renew Nunn-Lugar and halted some counternarcotics cooperation governed by a 2002 agreement (although other avenues of counternarcotics cooperation, especially in regard to Afghanistan, are ongoing).

There still are areas where both sides can continue cooperative efforts. Arms control, nonproliferation, narcotrafficking, and expanding bilateral economic ties are all areas where there was good cooperation in the first term and overlapping interests going forward. But in Washington, the view that Russia is simply not serious about being constructive in the international arena seems to be gaining more traction and policymakers are finding it impossible to overlook Russia’s domestic politics.

If Russia continues respond to U.S. “meddling” in Russian domestic affairs by targeting NGOs, opposition leaders and orphans, it is hard to see how the relationship can return to the effective working relationship of Obama’s first term. At that time, Washington and Moscow agreed to effectively disagree on some issues while pursuing cooperative policies on others where their interests coincided. But Putin may not want to return to the same level of cooperation. The United States’ policy responses have become a convenient rallying cry for trying to build support for continued tough measures against domestic opposition forces, invoking the classic claim that Russia must defend itself against its external enemies.

Four years ago, the reset was supposed to ensure that Russia returned to what it saw as its rightful place as a key concern of U.S. foreign policy. Today, the domestic circumstances in Russia have changed significantly and so has the mood in Washington. Neither Russia nor the United States looks either willing or able to invest in a vigorous bilateral relationship at the official level.

UK Parliamentarian Meg Munn Visits EWI's Brussels Center

Meg Munn, parliamentarian from the United Kingdom, traveled to EWI's Brussels office to discuss the work of the Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention.

A member of the institute's international network for two years, Munn met with Vice President Amb. Beate Maeder-Metcalf and Program Coordinator Agnes Venema to discuss progress in the institute's work on advancing the rights of women in Afghanistan.

Speaking about the program, Munn said she was "encouraged that the conference I attended has led to positive outcomes for women MPs in countries that are experiencing conflict and terrorism."

Click here to read about this event at Munn's web site.

Click here to learn more about the Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention.

East Africa's "Emerging Resource Bonanza"

On January 31st, a panel session hosted by the EastWest Institute and Gallup in Washington, DC assessed the many challenges and opportunities presented by recent discoveries of oil and gas deposits in East Africa. According to the panel members, it is becoming evident that this region will soon be the site of an energy boom. Chinese companies are already playing a major role, and companies like ExxonMobil, Shell, and Statoil have arrived to explore an area encompassing parts of Ethiopia, the southern tip of Madagascar, and much of the territory in between.

EWI Board Member Tewodros Ashenafi—Chairman and CEO of Southwest Energy, the first Ethiopian oil and gas exploration company—maintained that the “emerging resource bonanza” will transform the region dramatically. "The gas that is being discovered in Mozambique is really awe-inspiring,” he declared. “It has the opportunity to be the next Qatar."

In addition to the potential dividends for corporations and governments, Ashenafi pointed out that the regional cooperation needed to fully make use of oil fields and gas deposits would provide an opportunity for a “prosper-thy-neighbor instead of beggar-thy-neighbor approach.”

But the region still faces major challenges, which could impede development. Raymond Gilpin, director of the United States Institute of Peace’s Center for Sustainable Economies, cautioned that some projections about the time required to get new projects going may be too optimistic due to security and political obstacles. Many of the deposits “just happen to be in contested areas,” he noted. “You only prosper thy neighbor if you work with your neighbor.”

Unresolved territorial disputes have often stalled oil production in East Africa. For example, the oil fields in newly-established South Sudan were a major point of contention following its secession from Sudan in 2011.

An additional obstacle: many resource-rich countries in the region lack basic infrastructure, like pipelines and refineries for oil production. Cross-border collaboration could reduce costs for all stakeholders. The construction of secure pipelines would allow landlocked oil-producing countries like Uganda, for example, to export oil to Indian Ocean ports via Kenya.

Gilpin agreed that recent and future energy discoveries in the region could provide a “fiscal boon for African countries.” However, he also spoke of the “need to manage expectations.” The potential was significant, he continued, “but not like Saudi Arabia.”

Jon Clifton, a partner at Gallup Government Group, presented data on East African countries taken from the Gallup World Poll, a survey of local opinion on a number of issues, including corruption , well-being and how safe average citizens feel walking the streets. He also stressed the need to manage expectations, pointing out that public sentiment needs to be carefully monitored along with traditional metrics like GDP. A nation’s rising GDP, Clifton noted, “doesn’t mean that their well-being will rise in tandem.”

Abdeta Beyene, the former director general of African Affairs at the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, concurred that “East Africa is a resource-rich opportunity.” One of the most important facts to consider in looking at the potential of these discoveries, he noted, is that “the Horn of Africa is changing in terms of security.” Security remains a serious concern, but the panelists agreed that recent more positive trends are still often not recognized by outsiders. While Chinese companies haven’t hesitated to rush into the region to exploit the new opportunities, many Western companies are still vacillating.

Providing security concerns are addressed, oil and gas revenue could enable governments to develop domestic infrastructure—roads, schools, hospitals, sewage systems—promoting sustainable employment in rural areas and improving access to quality healthcare.

In order for these resources to be utilized in a beneficial manner, the panelists argued that there is an urgent need to develop the appropriate training and infrastructure, effective private-public partnerships, and for governments to adhere to existing international standards.

Ashenafi rejected that notion that a so-called “resource curse” may threaten East Africa. “I don’t think oil is a curse,” he said. “It’s like a knife: it depends what you do with it. It’s how these resources are organized.”

Friendly Handshake

Writing for India's The Telegraph, former Foreign Secretary of India and EWI Board Member Kanwal Sibal discusses the India-U.S. relationship over the next four years. Sibal predicts that the relationship will not change significantly in key areas, but it will remain steady as each country is preoccupied with its own domestic agenda. Yet, Sibal points out, “India-U.S. relations are now stable, with a remarkably rich bilateral agenda whose implementation will occupy both sides in the years ahead.”

Click here to read this article in The Telegraph.

Looking ahead, what could President Barack Obama’s second term mean for relations between India and the United States of America? Will the relationship stay more or less at the level that it has already reached or will it see a surge in the years ahead? Can it begin to wane?

There is no reason for the relationship to wilt, even if it has not lived up to its promise in the eyes of some Americans. India’s nuclear liability law and the ouster of US suppliers from the 126 fighter aircraft deal are cited as evidence. The other areas of disappointment are the lack of convergence in views on developments in the Gulf and West Asia, India’s reluctance to accept burden-sharing in upholding the international order as it is obliged to do by its rising global status, as well as its inadequate bureaucratic expertise and capacity to deal with the expanded scope of the India-US engagement.

A less transactional assessment of the state of relations would highlight the great shift in Indian perceptions about relations with the US—from strategic distrust to strategic cooperation. This is best manifested in the $9 billion worth of defense contracts won by the US in the last seven years, with more to come as India diversifies its sources of supplies, as well as the numerous joint military exercises conducted with strategic objectives in view. Counter-terrorism cooperation is acknowledgedly much better than before, as is the quality of exchange of views on regional and global issues. India-US relations are now stable, with a remarkably rich bilateral agenda whose implementation will occupy both sides in the years ahead.

The chance of any dramatic upswing in relations in the next four years, however, seems unlikely. For one, the economic backdrop is not very favourable. With US economic recovery still sluggish, unemployment high and the debt problem unresolved, Obama will remain preoccupied with the domestic agenda. He is anyway not seen as a ‘foreign policy’ president temperamentally. In India, too, growth rates have fallen and investor sentiment, both domestic and foreign, remains unenthusiastic in spite of some reform measures by the government. Regulatory, taxation, environmental, land acquisition, and implementational issues in general remain to be addressed. With growth rates high, market sentiment buoyant and optimism in the air, countries can deal with each other in a more positive spirit than when they are preoccupied with protecting their own interests first — and those of others become even more secondary.

This means that on issues of concern to us relating to the hike in visa fees and the denial of visas to our information technology professionals, making US companies which outsource work ineligible for federal government grants and loans and the totalization agreement that would address the problem of Indian professionals in the US having to compulsorily contribute to social security, the US, already unresponsive, is unlikely to give us satisfaction. Apart from the populism of opposing outsourcing at a time of high domestic unemployment, Obama seems to have an ideological bias against the transfer of jobs abroad even if that improves the competitiveness of US firms.

India-US economic ties are not as dynamic as some may suppose. In the last three to four years our negotiators feel that we have not been able to secure any tangible concessions from the US for our merchandize and services exports. The Trade Policy Forum has not met for two years, although it should do so in a couple of months. The US has dropped to third place as our trading partner, down from 17 per cent to a 10 per cent share of our trade. Investment levels are also low. The US Consumer Protection Act, the extension of the US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act of 2009 to foreign companies currently under Congressional consideration, the foreign manufacturers liability bill, the ‘Buy America’ campaign and so on are all potential hurdles for building a stronger trade partnership with the US.

Some US trade initiatives would need to be watched closely for their impact on India. The Trans-Pacific Partnership that the US is promoting does not include India, or, for that matter, China and Japan. India’s focus is on the East Asia-centred Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. The contemplated trans-Atlantic free trade area between the US and Europe, if established, will affect Indian interests. Bilaterally, regulatory issues on our side need resolution for allowing trade in US agricultural products. In the education sector there are complementarities but legislation on foreign universities operating in India is languishing in Parliament. The stipulation of local content in the solar power and telecommunications sectors has raised US objections. Internet governance is a contentious issue ahead. Our energy dialogue continues, with India hoping to obtain exemption for importing liquefied natural gas from the US. If that happens on a significant scale, it can change India’s energy equations and concomitant strategic calculations. The ambitious goal ahead is to finalize a bilateral investment treaty with the US, the prominent sticking issues being US demands on intellectual property rights (India is on the US watchlist on IPRs), environmental and labour issues and pre-establishment rules. In our strategy, an India-US FTA, for which we discern no appetite in the US as of now, should follow the BIT. All said and done, in spite of issues, it is well to keep in mind that our economic cooperation with the US generally builds our strategic capacities whereas that with China erodes them.

The US envisages a key Indian role in its pivot towards Asia, but we are not clear about its scope given the complex texture of trade and financial interdependence between the US and China. Moreover, the US financial downturn will inevitably lead to a reduction of the country’s defence budgets, whereas any credible pivot will require enhanced US military presence in Asia with a concomitant increase in defence outlays. Obama’s domestic priorities could also over-ride any robust Asia pivot. India is already distancing itself from the pivot by the notable friendly discourse towards China by the foreign minister, Salman Khurshid. During the Australian foreign minister’s recent visit, both countries poured cold water on the idea of a trilateral India-Australia-Japan dialogue, not to mention any quadrilateral dialogue involving the US in addition.

The contours of Obama’s policy towards Afghanistan turning on the accelerated and effectively complete withdrawal of troops, the offer of a share in power to the Taliban, the use of Pakistan as a facilitator — entailing greater deference to its ambitions in Afghanistan — are all causing concern in India. India could be pushed into an opposing axis in Afghanistan. India and the US will need, therefore, to reconcile their respective visions of Afghanistan’s future in the period ahead. Pakistan’s renewed agressiveness towards India is complicating the situation further.

There are some question marks in New Delhi about the new team in Washington, especially with regard to the naming of the senator, John Kerry, as secretary of state because of his perceived softness towards Pakistan and the expected departure of some India-friendly state department officials. The changes in the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency, however, are not causing any particular unease. How much attention Obama pays personally to the India-relationship, which is fundamentally on track, is open to question too.

All in all, therefore, India and the US will neither enter into an embrace nor disengage; they will continue to shake friendly hands as Obama’s second term unfolds.

The U.S.-China Agenda for Obama’s Second Term

As President Obama embarks on his second term and China completes its leadership transition in March, EWI’s Senior Associates Jacqueline McLaren Miller and Piin-Fen Kok discuss the prospects for dealing with the continuing tensions in U.S.-China relations—and what can be done to overcome the distrust between these two key players that remains all too visible.

1. What were the successes and challenges in the first term in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship?

Miller:

After four years, we’re actually hard pressed to find concrete successes in the vital U.S.-China relationship. Perhaps the best that can be said is that the relationship did not deteriorate further, which is actually no small achievement. The few concrete successes have done little to overcome the mutual mistrust that still prevails. That is the most enduring problem that President Obama will face in his second term.

During his 2008 campaign, Obama offered tough talk about China. Once he took office, he dramatically moderated his tone. His administration initially tried to accommodate Chinese concerns in the hopes of generating good will and greater cooperation in dealing with many of the most pressing bilateral and global challenges. They included the global financial crisis, the currency dispute with China, climate change, and Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programs.

But Obama’s efforts at partnership did not lead to the desired results: China was slow to address concerns over its currency and industrial policies; it snubbed Obama at the Copenhagen climate discussions; it was reluctant to apply pressure on North Korea; and it adopted more assertive regional policies. There was some progress on Iran as China supported UN sanctions in 2010, but then China refused to support new sanctions designed to undermine Iran’s continued progress on its nuclear program.

After the conciliatory approach produced little success—a charge critics were quick to make about Obama’s “soft” approach—the administration adopted a tougher stance toward China while continuing to seek expanded opportunities for dialogue. That’s the approach that is largely in place today.

Kok:

I agree that the biggest achievement was that both sides managed not to escalate tensions. Cool heads prevailed in managing the tense confrontation between the Impeccable, a U.S. Navy frigate, and Chinese ships in 2009, offering a stark contrast to the loudspeaker diplomacy and ensuing crisis following a collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3 aircraft and a Chinese fighter jet in 2001. And while China has blamed U.S. involvement for exacerbating its maritime disputes with its neighbors, both sides have urged restraint in dealing with the heightening tensions.

One of the successes was the U.S.-China Joint Statement issued by Obama and Hu on January 19, 2011, which defined the U.S.-China relationship in more specific terms than previous joint statements. By describing the relationship as “both vital and complex” and recognizing differences as well as common interests, the Joint Statement laid the foundation for developing the “new type of big-power relationship” that U.S. and Chinese leaders espoused in 2012.

Another significant development was the addition of cybersecurity—an area of growing mistrust between the two countries—to the U.S.-China Track 1 agenda. Also, kudos to the Chinese leadership for showing an increased maturity toward U.S.-China military-to-military relations by not cutting off those contacts in response to the Obama administration’s announcement of a $5.8 billion arms sales/upgrade package to Taiwan.

But there were still plenty of strains, whether over trade, human rights, or Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama in the White House.

2. What are the new Chinese leadership’s main priorities vis-à-vis the United States and vice versa?

Miller:

The U.S.-China agenda is as crowded in Obama’s second term as it was in the first: climate change, non-proliferation concerns in Iran and North Korea, China’s military modernization, the global economy, trade, industrial policies, human rights and increasing tensions in the South and East China Seas. The administration’s overarching priority is to put the relationship on a new footing—all while trying to manage the change in the Chinese leadership.

Kok:

China’s new leadership under Xi Jinping has stated its commitment to continuing a foreign policy of cooperative engagement with the United States. Some top priorities include:

• Persuading the U.S. to play a more constructive role in facilitating peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, instead of, advertently or not, pitting China’s neighbors against it. China may want to “rebalance” the U.S. strategy in Asia, shifting away from a military focus to an economic agenda.

• Working with the U.S. and other countries to ensure stability and peace in Afghanistan and its surrounding regions after the U.S. withdrawal in 2014.

• Urging the U.S. to get its fiscal house in order, and pushing for the de-politicization of economic relations (especially with regard to Chinese investment in the United States and U.S. trade complaints against China).

3. Is the U.S.’s “rebalancing” strategy in Asia sustainable in the second term given continuing unrest in the Middle East and North Africa? And is it clear to China what this policy is?

Miller:

This is not just a question of resources but of intentions. China views the rebalancing—with its concomitant expansion of the U.S. military presence in the region—as containment or military encirclement of China. The Obama administration argues that is not the case, but even a Department of Defense-commissioned assessment has pointed out that the strategy behind its force planning has not been “adequately articulated.” This has certainly contributed to Chinese unease about the rebalancing. But despite the lack of clarity about its intentions and questions about resource constraints, the United States recognizes that its long-term strategic challenges and opportunities will be in Asia: military, foreign, and economic policy will continue to reflect this.

Kok:

If China ever needed additional fuel to fan the already vibrant flames of suspicion over U.S. intentions, the “rebalancing” strategy was it. Chinese officials and experts have been particularly concerned about the U.S.’s moves to strengthen its security and military alliances in the region, despite the U.S.’s explanations that the “rebalancing” isn’t purely military but also encompasses diplomatic, political and economic policies. While I don’t think that anything the U.S. says or does will fully dispel the notion among the Chinese that the U.S. is out to contain them, the U.S. could do a better job of explaining itself.

The turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa will test Washington’s ability to effectively draw down its resources in that region, which is a prerequisite for the “rebalancing” strategy in Asia. That being said, I believe the “rebalancing” strategy in Asia will continue, since the U.S. needs to send a strong signal to its allies in the region—and to China—about its commitments to them.

4. What issues challenge the bilateral relationship most?

Miller:

It depends on who you ask. The Pentagon has serious concerns about China’s growing military capabilities that could threaten U.S. force projection capabilities in the region. Congress, which has become quite effective at inserting itself into foreign policy, would like to see more attention paid to Chinese human rights violations and to China’s currency and industrial policies. Human rights issues are one of the few areas where members of Congress have found common ground. And, of course, members of Congress will continue to press the administration on Chinese currency, trade, and industrial policies—an area where the administration also has significant concerns.

But the fundamental challenge to the relationship lies in the lack of trust on both sides—and this complicates efforts to address U.S. concerns vis-à-vis China. Whether dealing with Taiwan, China’s rapid military expansion and modernization, human rights abuses, the growing use of cyber weapons, intensifying territorial and maritime disputes, nuclear nonproliferation or Syria, the trust deficit undermines the ability of U.S. and Chinese leaders to make significant progress, whether in a bilateral or multilateral setting.

Kok:

Aside from China’s continuing concerns about the U.S.’s “rebalancing” strategy in Asia at a time of maritime tensions in the region, the other challenges will include U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. More specifically, the question is whether the Obama administration will announce more sales during the second term and, if so, how it will affect U.S.-China military-to-military relations. Trade, currency, and human rights concerns will continue to surface.

While not bilateral issues per se, the tensions over North Korea, Iran and Syria—and, in all probability, new hotspots in the Middle East and North Africa— will test the ability of the U.S, China and the international community to find common ground. With climate change back on Obama’s agenda, it will also be interesting to see how these two countries manage it—especially at the multilateral level—and avoid a repeat of Copenhagen.

5. Does the new Chinese leadership team offer a new chance to make progress on dealing with key irritants?

Miller:

The new team will not fundamentally alter China’s strategic priorities and concerns, so I don’t see this as a big new opportunity. Xi’s primary focus, like Obama’s, will be on meeting domestic challenges. Yes, Xi, like his predecessors, has noted the need for the U.S. and China to develop a strong cooperative relationship—comments echoed by Obama and his predecessors. But the challenges continue to grow.

Kok:

Xi has expressed a willingness, in principle, to develop relations with the U.S. in a positive and transformative way. However, this willingness is conditioned on China’s expectation that Washington respects its core interests and its status. Like Obama, Xi also faces domestic pressures. These emanate from nationalistic segments of the population, and competing political interests between China’s various policy bureaucracies and within the central leadership. He and his leadership team will feel the need to respond to any U.S. actions that may be seen as jeopardizing China’s domestic stability and territorial integrity.

6. What is the single biggest move that Obama or Xi could make to fundamentally improve the relationship? How likely is that to happen?

Miller:

If we’re dreaming big and thinking of transformative moves, China’s willingness to moderate its actions on the territorial and maritime conflicts in which it is currently embroiled would be a remarkable step in the U.S.-China relationship and regional security as a whole. China will never abandon its claims outright and the United States should not expect it to. But if China agreed to try to resolve these disputes within a multilateral setting rather than bilaterally, which gives China the upper hand, that could do a lot to stabilize the situation and lessen U.S. concerns about Chinese ambitions. I am not convinced another statement or communiqué could have a transformative effect, but it certainly would help to strike a more cooperative tone at this time of increasing tension in the region.

Kok:

In light of the ongoing tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, Obama and Xi might wish to consider signing a joint statement or even a joint communiqué on U.S.-China peaceful relations in that region. Both sides could reaffirm their commitment to peace, security, stability and development in the region; articulate their respective strategic interests and objectives; and outline principles for cooperation and open communication. While it will not eradicate the deep-rooted mistrust between the countries, such a move by the Asia-Pacific’s two largest powers would be a signal of assurance toward each other and to the rest of the region.

Visiting Bangladesh

Writing for Pakistan's The News International, EWI board member Ikram Sehgal compares the politics and economies of Bangaldesh and Pakistan.

Shrugging off its traditional reliance for foreign-exchange earnings on jute goods and tea, Bangladesh has economically made giant strides, with home remittances and garment manufacturing giving momentum to a whole basket of non-traditional exports. But a cursory visit there is enough to dispel the general perception in Pakistan that Bangladesh is doing economically far better than Pakistan.

Despite multiple crises compounded by rampant corruption and a terror-driven law-and-order situation, Pakistan’s economy is far more resilient and multifaceted, notwithstanding the fact that the Bangladeshi taka is performing better than the Pakistani rupee. The pervasive mass poverty in Bangladesh far outstrips the comparable percentage of poverty in Pakistan. The focus of Bangladesh’s economy seems to be the city of Dhaka, with high-rise buildings mushrooming on scarce land with greater value than almost any other capital city in the world. Traffic jams are endemic. There is one thing in common to the two democracies – rampant nepotism and corruption – and these put them increasingly under threat, which is force-multiplied by the widening rich-poor gap and inflation triggering a mass upsurge.

To quote Khadimal Hasan in New Age: “Promises made by the Awami League during the 2008 general elections remain unfulfilled, good governance has remained elusive, the rule of law is yet to be established and human rights violation continues to be rampant.” Despite the Awami League government’s many failings, the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) could not play any significant role inside and outside parliament in projecting people’s concerns. The BNP has concentrated its anger on partisan issues, such as the “eviction of party chairperson Khaleda Zia from her Dhaka Cantonment House and the cases filed against her and her two sons for corruption taking precedence over pressing public concerns.”

Like in Pakistan, without political consensus about elections under a genuinely neutral caretaker government, the atmosphere in Bangladesh is charged with politics of confrontation. Fearing overturn of their present overwhelming mandate, the Awami League government forced an amendment through parliament abolishing the concept of caretaker governments. This could lead to a rerun of 2005 when the BNP, as the ruling party then, tried to engineer the vote. Street agitation for installation of a non-partisan government to conduct polls created a situation for an army-dictated superior judiciary-supported caretaker administration of technocrats taking power. Free and fair elections were ultimately held in 2008.

The ‘Bangladeshi Model’ failed when, within one year, the army forgot its resolve to stay away from politics. Armies can intervene for course corrections but are not equipped to run governments. At most they can run people who run governments, and that too for a short time.

Dr Debapriya Bhattacharya of the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) observed that the country’s economy was approaching lower-level equilibrium in 2013, short of the GDP growth target of 7.2 percent, failing to reach even six percent, compared to the record 6.32 percent of the 2011-2012 financial year. With the CPD projecting that revenues collection will fall short of target, an additional TK100 billion will be needed to meet budgetary allocations. Remittance inflows of over $12 billion were a bright spot, with the budget deficit and balance of payments remaining in the safe zone.

Political uncertainty could destabilise Bangladesh’s macroeconomic stability, having a serious impact on the economy. To quote Abul Kalam Azad and Sharier Khan in The Daily Star: “A series of mega projects aimed at revolutionising communications, ports and energy sectors were rolled out, but due to weak governance, indecision, an inability to execute plans, corruption, fund shortages and donors’ conditions affected the progress of most of them.”

Nevertheless, given the prevailing recession in the developed world, it is not a bad performance. With some headway in projects in the power sector, one must commend the tremendous initiative of the present government for a ‘digital’ nation by 2020, the progress matching India in quality, if not in quantum. An 18 percent interest on loans to the manufacturing sector, rising to more than 20 percent for small businesses, almost double that in India, is pushing up production costs and adversely affecting people’s purchasing power. To its credit, the Bangladesh Bank kept a cap of seven percent for export financing and 13 percent for farm loans when withdrawing the cap on rates imposed in 2008 to help businesses cope with world recession.

The campaign in Assam against Bangladeshi settlers and the water issue will adversely impact India-Bangladesh relations. Expert Mohammad Khaliquzaman said that the entire northern area was turning into a desert due to lack of water, with India releasing 20 percent less water in the past five years than that stipulated for Farakka Barrage in the Farakka Water Treaty. The Indian intention to unilaterally build other dams upstream, including one at Tipaimukh, is alarming. Construction of dams is not needed for saving rivers but to save the lives of people. 

The ugly controversy over how many people died during the 1971 civil war is politically motivated to vitiate the congenial atmosphere developing between peoples of Pakistan and Bangladesh. The truth is not something to be proud of. While nowhere near the quantum being propagated, the three-million figure is ingrained in the Bangladeshi national psyche. The local population did suffer mass atrocities at the hands of elements of the Pakistani army. However, in many isolated places non-Bengalis were massacred by mob action. There were targeted killings and rapes. In her book Dead Reckoning, Sarmila Bose, granddaughter of Indian revolutionary Subhas Chandra Bose, dismissed the allegations of ethnic-cleansing, rape and killings against the Pakistani army as highly exaggerated. Commensurate atrocities carried out against the non-Bengali population, especially the Biharis, were never documented.

The driving force in the arguments, in her words, is “bitter emotional partisanship.” With both sides remaining in absolute denial of truth, instead of reconciling fact with fiction, there is no closure in sight. Pakistan should request the UN to commission professional verification of the claims of Bengalis and non-Bengalis perishing in this horrific civil war, offering to pay for the services of internationally renowned independent auditors. It will be money well spent.

Another thing common in Pakistan and Bangladesh is widespread resentment against what is perceived as Indian arrogance by the intelligentsia and the masses. This is much less so in Pakistan then in Bangladesh, where the generally held belief is that the Indian government dictates everything to the Bangladeshi government. PCB chairman Zaka Ashraf was either dangerously naive or plain ignorant in fantasising that India would ever allow the Bangladeshi cricket team to tour Pakistan. Neither Pakistanis nor Bangladeshis (as opposed to their present government) like a master-slave relationship. India’s image of a bully is not conducive to a future common market in South Asia.

The inland transit facilities demanded by India highlight an important geopolitical home truth. Bangladesh’s pivotal economic location is extraordinary. Surrounded by West Bengal and the impoverished ‘Seven Sisters’ states of northeast India, Bangladesh’s two bustling ports make for an economic centre of a possible Association of Eastern States of South Asia. The AESSA concept means an economic (if not political) confederation of almost 400 million people. Standing on a failsafe line of destiny with corrupt governance alternating between the two badly polarised ladies, Bangladesh desperately needs an honest, competent government truly dedicated to the people.

Click here to read this column at The News International.

U.S.-China Military-to-Military Dialogue

On December 20, 2012, a delegation of retired U.S. generals met with two members of China’s newly-appointed Central Military Commission (CMC) in Beijing. CMC Vice Chairman, General Xu Qiliang, and Head of the General Political Department, General Zhang Yang, met with General Peter Pace, Admiral William Owens, General T. Michael Moseley and General Kevin Chilton.

The event was part of the U.S.-China Sanya Initiative, hosted by China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC) and facilitated by the EastWest Institute, bringing together retired U.S. and Chinese retired military officers. This was the first delegation from the United States to meet with CMC leaders since their selection in November.
 
EWI President John Mroz, Vice President David Firestein and Senior Associate Piin-Fen Kok were part of the U.S. delegation.  CAIFC senior representatives were also in attendance.  
 
The retired U.S. generals who participated in the meetings included:
  • General Peter Pace, Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
  • Admiral William Owens, Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and member of EWI’s Board of Directors
  • General T. Michael Moseley, Former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force and member of EWI’s Board of Directors
  • General Kevin Chilton, Former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command
The retired Chinese generals who participated were:
  • General Li Qianyuan, former Commander of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Lanzhou Military Region
  • Admiral Hu Yanlin, former Political Commissar of PLA Navy
  • General Zheng Shenxia, former President of the Academy of Military Sciences
  • Lieutenant General Wang Liangwang, former Deputy Commander of PLA Air Force
  • Lieutenant General Zhao Xijun, former Deputy Commander of the PLA Second Artillery Force
 
General Xu met with the delegates at the Bayi Building for 75 minutes. Following that, General Zhang met with the group and hosted them to dinner at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse. During both meetings, the Chinese and U.S. sides reaffirmed the importance of strengthening U.S.-China military-to-military relations, and of building strategic trust between the two countries and their militaries.
 
Before arriving in Beijing, the retired U.S. and Chinese generals, EWI and CAIFC visited Xiamen, where they held two days of plenary discussions on a range of issues affecting the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship, including: Assessments of China’s new CMC and U.S. defense policy under a second Obama administration; the South and East China Seas; Taiwan; cybersecurity; and prospects for a regional mechanism focused on addressing the myriad security challenges in Northeast Asia. The delegates also met with Xiamen Mayor Liu Keqing.
 
Read more on the meetings with General Xu Qiliang and General Zhang Yang on China’s Ministry of National Defense website. 

 

Pages

Subscribe to RSS - Politics and Governance