Politics and Governance

The meeting could not have been more timely, following on the heels of the recently concluded NATO summit in Chicago, which took place without a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council. At the heart of the issue is a deep divide between the United States and Russia over what a cooperative BMD program should look like. The Russian government has concerns that the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) could eventually be directed against Russian ballistic missiles and is insisting on a legal guarantee that NATO's BMD system will not be used against Russia. The United States has repeatedly stated that it understands Russian concerns but that the EPAA will not be directed against Russia .The United States is willing to offer political guarantees matched by cooperative confidence-building actions but that it is unable to provide Russia with legally binding statements. Signaling its frustration with the United States over BMD, Russia did not participate at a high level in the NATO summit. And, as expected, NATO announced at the summit that the EPAA had reached interim operational capacity.

Rose focused his comments on the details and goals of NATO's EPAA plan and the future of U.S.-Russian cooperation on BMD. After his presentation, participants inquired about the divergence between Russian and U.S. assessments of the threat emanating from Iran. Another attendee asked about the political environments in both countries and whether political factors are driving their respective positions. Others focused their questions on the future of the EPAA considering the ever-changing international security concerns.

Separately, Rose offered these on-the-record responses to questions posed by EWI’s Thomas Lynch: 

To what extent does the notion of mutually assured destruction factor into current tensions on ballistic missile defense? Additionally, how can NATO and Russia overcome their differences vis-a-vis addressing today's nuclear challenges (e.g. Iran, North Korea, Pakistan)?

Cooperation on missile defense would be a game changer and the next step in expanding U.S.-Russia cooperation.  It would give us the chance to build a true strategic partnership and help us move away from Mutually Assured Destruction toward Mutually Assured Stability.

President Obama has said on many occasions that the United States is committed to finding a mutually acceptable approach to missile defense cooperation with Russia.   Such cooperation can enhance the security of the United States, our allies in Europe, and Russia.

The best assurances for Russia that the U.S. and NATO missile defenses in Europe do not undermine its strategic deterrent would be achieved through close cooperation with the United States and NATO. 

Through this cooperation Russia would see firsthand that this system is designed and capable of defending against missiles originating from the Middle East and is not designed for or capable of undermining the Russian strategic deterrent.  Cooperation can be difficult, but it will bring benefits to both sides.  We know because cooperation in other areas is producing positive results.  We are successfully implementing the New START Treaty, moving materials to and from Afghanistan and stopping drug traffickers and terrorists.  Our track record with the Russian Government on New START and other issues demonstrates that we can come to agreement on complex issues. We look forward to continuing our dialogue with the Russian government on this issue.

What are the best means of addressing the trust deficit between Russia and NATO on BMD issues?

Let me start on the progress we have made with Russia under this Administration.  I'd point to Russian support of U.N. Security Council resolutions that included the toughest sanctions ever on North Korea and Iran, our work together on the New START Treaty, and our work to open up the Northern Distribution Network to get critical supplies to troops in Afghanistan, to name a few.

We are working together to implement a landmark agreement that calls for each side to dispose of 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium, in total enough material for about 17,000 nuclear weapons.  The United States and Russia have also partnered successfully to remove unneeded highly enriched uranium from several central and eastern European countries, former Soviet republics, Vietnam and Libya, reducing the risk that terrorists could get their hands on dangerous nuclear materials.

There are obviously areas where we've disagreed, but Russia is a committed member of the international nonproliferation community and we will continue to work with Russia and other partners on nonproliferation challenges.

Trying to muddle way out of another unpopular war and loath to concede defeat, US and NATO have been racing against time to build an Afghan army able to fend for itself after 130,000 US and ISAF troops pull out in 2014. The final transition phase, involving the handing over of responsibility for provinces and districts to Afghan authorities, will start from “mid-2013,” Nato secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen said. A number of areas and towns have already been handed over since the transition started a year ago. Incidents of Afghan soldiers turning on Nato troops cause apprehension of increased Taliban infiltration of the Afghan police and army.

Nato initially planned to expand Afghan Security Forces to over 350,000. Defining the 2014 exit strategy the Chicago summit set the size and scope after 2014 to be much smaller, roughly 230,000 troops. Without scaling down the future security needs, it simply reflected prevailing economic realities in an era of austerity budgets and defence cutbacks. The US and Nato require $4.1 billion a year to maintain the Afghan military, far less than the cost of maintaining foreign forces in Afghanistan and also, and more importantly, easier for the economically suffering and war-weary US and European publics to sustain.

In keeping with his campaign pledge, incoming French president Francois Hollande said France will withdraw its own forces by the end of 2012. Along with Britain, Germany and Italy, France is among the top five troop-contributing nations with about 3,600 soldiers, dwarfed by the 90,000-strong US force. The 9,500 British forces in Afghanistan since the US-led invasion in 2001 will be reduced by 500 soldiers this year. Two hundred members of Britain’s Special Forces will stay on after 2014 to help combat terrorism in Afghanistan.

As Afghanistan’s largest patron, the US is supposed to share about 25 percent of the cost after 2014 in support of the present Afghan regime for at least a decade (or more), but could well conceivably bear more than half the cost. The recent Obama-Karzai strategic partnership covers everything from security to economic development, to building a functional Afghan government. US special operations forces will have to stay to “mentor the Afghan National Security Force,” says Marine Corps Maj Gen John Toolan, who commanded Nato forces in Afghanistan’s volatile southwest. US gunships and air-to-ground assault planes will continue supporting ground forces. The fledgling Afghan air force which in 2015 will still be unable to do so. The US will also continue maintaining a fleet of intelligence-gathering and surveillance aircraft, Heritage Foundation’s Lisa Curtis claims that “it spells out an important US red line to the Taliban, who have long called for expelling all foreign forces from the country.”

All said and done, will the Afghan Army fight? With a track record over centuries of deserting on masse to whosoever controls Kabul and the treasury, it did not fight for the Soviets against the Mujhahideen, nor for the US and Nato against the Taliban.

President Zardari faced studied but polite cold-shouldering in Chicago. On the one hand are the economic and geo-political considerations of far-reaching consequences for the destiny of the nation, on the other an enraged populace burning with anger against the drone strikes and the US failure to render an apology over Salala. A predator nation that has lived off the Indus Valley for centuries, Afghanistan will continue to live off Pakistan for centuries more.

Commenting on Abid Latif Sindhu’s article “Necessary Roughness – endgame in Afghanistan,” Brig Usman Khalid concludes: (1) The endgame will effect the world balance of power because Pakistan has a crucial role to play. It borders China, is a gateway to Central Asia and is situated on the Western part of the Arabian Sea. This part controls a chokepoint – the Strait of Hormuz, which joins the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf-and not too far to the south is the Gulf of Aden, which leads to the Red Sea via the still narrower Bab el-Mandeb Strait; (2) Pakistan has shown “necessary roughness,” which is a prerequisite for playing its role in the new narrative that would unfold after the exit of NATO from Afghanistan in 2014. Brig Usman Khalid further notes: “It is in Pakistan’s interest to facilitate the withdrawal of Nato forces by the end of 2014 and logistical support until then. The reopening of the supply line to Afghanistan is no longer an issue. Pakistan does not and cannot support the overall design of the US which is now being made in consultation with India. Pakistan-US relations will move along a rough and bumpy road. If Pakistan maintains its strategic cooperation with Saudi Arabia and its warm relations with China, the cost of travelling this bumpy road would be bearable and diplomatic isolation avoided.” The Nato supply line through Pakistan needs resolution but will have emotional ramifications among a populace no longer patient with putting issues on the backburner.

The presence of American “experts” after 2014 with US bases operational at Bagram, Kandahar and Kabul has made the endgame more complex. According to Sindhu, “Pakistan has just shown necessary roughness while dealing with the USA in retaliation for its bashing; it was never an act of defiance. It is precisely what is required in any relationship, may it be one between husband and wife or Hillary’s favourite mother-in-law analogy. So it should be taken in the right context. Pakistan is not a rentier state; the state policy could be lopsided but it does exist. It is both a victim and the player of the new great game with a status of the regional middle kingdom. Afghanistan endgame is being played by increasing the numbers of players in its final hour; this has made the phenomenon global in nature and multidimensional in its texture.”

Sindhu asks whether Pakistan can be ignored with its unique connectivity matrix when Pakistan is fighting an extended insurgency in all of the tribal areas? In essence, he says, “globalism has come face to face with tribalism, one using technology as the main driver and later using the simplicity as the sine qua non for its existence and survival. International conferences, moots and summits without reality checks would be a futile exercise perpetuating the Afghan ordeal. Pakistan, Afghanistan and the USA have to reach an operational consensus respecting each other’s sensitivities.” Sindhu left out an inconvenient truth which the West well knows, the best bet against future conflict is not going to be the well-funded ceremonials of the Afghan army but the motivated, battle-hardened disciplined soldiers of the Pakistan Army.

The Chicago Summit recognised the home truth about Pakistan’s being not only critical but central to an Afghan solution. To quote Rasmussen, “there can be no large drawdown of troops from Afghanistan without Pakistan’s help.” President Obama said: “It is in our interest to see a successful, stable Pakistan and it is in Pakistan’s interest to have stable relationship with us.” Meeting Zardari briefly, he expressed the desire to stay engaged despite differences. “The US did not want Pakistan to be consumed by its own extremism.”

Beyond Chicago, Pakistan can only hope it will not be consumed by extreme views from the West which fail to recognise the relevance of the Taliban ground reality.

Writing for Pakistan's The News International, EWI board member Ikram Sehgal, a security analyst, examines the implications of the French election on prospects for economic recovery and stability in Southwest Asia.

Click here to read this column in Pakistan's The News International.

Writing for India Today, EWI board member Kanwal Sibal, former foreign secretary of India, assesses the likely impact of Hollande's administration on the Franco-Indian relationship.

Click here to read this column in India Today.

The film is written, directed, and produced by the award-winning brothers Marc and Nick Francis. Their inspiration for the film came from meeting Chinese workers during their previous work in Ethiopia. “That image [of Chinese workers in Africa] sparked our curiosity. We wanted to dig a bit deeper and then start to explore what does that mean,” Nick explained. He added that they wanted “to tell a story about China and the world and [China’s] impact on the world.”

The film focuses on Zambia, not Ethiopia, because of China’s long relationship with that country, dating back to Zambia’s declaration of independence from the United Kingdom in 1964.  Today, China invests heavily in Zambia’s copper mines, which provide vital raw materials for its booming manufacturing sector.  However, the film’s primary focus is on the human dimension: how the Chinese interact with Zambian workers on these projects.

It’s not just the big Chinese companies that are sending their people to Zambia and other African countries. Many Chinese citizens are moving to Africa to seek new opportunities to prosper, typically investing in low-cost businesses. For example, some Chinese immigrants buy land for chicken farms and have steadily expanded their operations.

The story of Mr. Liu, one of three main characters in the film, demonstrates the immediate changes in Africa arising from a growing Chinese presence. Mr. Liu is a prosperous entrepreneur who purchased four chicken farms. He comments that his move to Africa from China has transformed him from an “employee to [an] employer,” a drastic and important change in his life. It was clear he felt a sense of purpose and success as the boss of many local employees. Mr. Liu is one of thousands of Chinese entrepreneurs in Zambia who came in search of  better opportunities.  All of which raises questions about the impact that Chinese immigration will have on the culture of the continent. Will the cultures mix and intermarry? If so, which country and society will the children identify themselves with the most? It is too soon to be able to truly gauge the impact of this new wave of immigration, but clearly Africa will undergo significant economic change as a result.

Along with the immigrants, Chinese contract workers living temporarily in Zambia add to the complexity of the Sino-African relationship. Chinese firms have been contracted to provide a wide range of services throughout the continent. The film observed the interaction between the Zambian government and Chinese professionals working on a road, clearly illustrating the difficulties.

The exchanges between the two parties illustrate mounting tensions. The Chinese employ the Zambians for manual labor and closely supervise their work. In one case where there were 62 Chinese supervisors for 855 Zambian workers the atmosphere of distrust between them was almost palpable. In the film, the Zambians complain about a lack of respect on the part of their Chinese colleagues and argue that they are not treated humanely.  Some of the friction may be the result of inevitable misunderstandings.  “Linguistic-cultural differences are vast,” explained Nick Francis.  Since the contract workers are on relatively short assignments, there often isn’t much effort to provide training that might alleviate some of these tensions. Once their projects are completed, the contract workers return to China.

In the film, Chinese officials describe their country’s relationship with Africa as "win-win" with both sides benefiting from the exchange of money and material. This relationship has also led to the use of Chinese currency, the yuan, within Zambia. As a result of China’s heightened presence, the Chinese media now cover far more news about the region than before. However, partnerships are rarely completely equal and Africans are beginning to question China’s increased involvement. Last year the Zambians elected President Michael Sata, who has taken a tougher stance on Chinese investment projects than his predecessor, Rapiah Banda. Sata has promised to demand project permits, labor rights, limitations on the number of expatriates and improved safety standards. He also may crack down on unregistered Chinese laborers. The harshest critics of the partnership charge that Chinese investments are another form of neocolonialism.

But others see real mutual benefits flowing from the growing Chinese presence. Africa is motivated to develop quickly in an attempt to mimic China’s stellar rise. As of April 2012, China had invested $2.1 billion in business projects and infrastructure, creating over 50,000 jobs.  In 2011, trade between China and Zambia totaled $3.4 billion. Nick Francis maintained that China’s current involvements in Africa are “just the tip of the iceberg;” more projects are certain to come. He added that the West should take note of this trend, and should “renegotiate its relationship with Africa” to avoid becoming irrelevant to its development. That would mean dispensing with old paternalistic assumptions about the continent, he concluded.

When China Met Africa provides revealing insights into the expanding role of Chinese investments in Africa. Westerners can learn a lot from it, while Chinese officials and businessmen should ponder its lesson as well. As a rising global power, China needs to understand how it is perceived in regions where its economic activity is on the rise. In Africa and elsewhere, the challenge will be to ensure that the Chinese presence is understood and valued by both sides.

Eirëne, a New York-based start-up focused on for-profit development projects, convened a group of young leaders to speak with Mroz about the state of international politics and the many obstacles to development initiatives.

“Through our Center for Purpose, we host dialogues that allow us to learn, innovate, and collaborate,” said John Kluge, co-creator and managing partner of Eirëne. “They create context for how we build purpose-driven ventures and how we can make them better. No one can solve billion person problems alone, hence the need for cross-sector, cross-generational partnerships and exchanges.”

Mroz’s presentation, titled “Stepping Up to the New Global Realities,” identified the rise of the global middle class as a major security test, citing the strain such growth places on vital resources, especially food, water and energy.

Expert predictions estimate today’s energy infrastructure can sustain a global middle class population of about one billion, but the current number is more than twice that already. Mroz also stressed the interdependence of food security and water security, lamenting the fact that key food and water players rarely interact with each other in beleaguered regions like the Horn of Africa.

In looking at the impact of resource scarcity on the ground, Mroz cited the polling firm Gallup’s means of testing for unrest among a populace. The results of this test, which consists of four questions, is termed a “deadly cocktail” when all responses reflect dissatisfaction. The answers to these questions, which touch on employment, corruption, and food availability, can give an early warning to revolutionary activities; negative responses to these queries spiked immediately prior to last year’s uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia.

Click here to watch Gallup Chairman Jim Clifton discuss the “deadly cocktail” and other issues at EWI’s Affordable World Security Conference.

The means of effectively mobilizing for security, Mroz added, have changed dramatically over the past 30 years. “Partnership models once consisted solely of the business and policy communities,” he explained, “but today’s development challenges demand additional participation from the technology, legal, and investment sectors.” It is also necessary to capitalize on the untapped potential of “under-30 policy and business influencers” as well as “the power of women,” two demographics largely absent from today’s political institutions. 

The off-the-record portion of the consultation touched on political tensions in Southwest Asia, especially Iran and Syria, as well as major threats to international cybersecurity.

If enacted, the bill would impose financial and visa restrictions on Russian officials who have been linked to the criminal prosecution of hermitage capital lawyer Sergey Magnitsky.

Miller held that, "much as the Jackson-Vanik amendment did in 1975, I think this would be yet another source of tension in the bilateral relationship."

Click here to listen to the full interview at Voice of Russia.

This visit builds on an ongoing two-year effort of EWI’s Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention to strengthen the role of women in political life, and in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Afghanistan in particular.

Over the course of two days the  parliamentarians, led by Shahnaz Wazir Ali, Member of Pakistan's National Assembly and Special Assistant to the Prime Minister,  discussed issues related to reconciliation with the Taliban and regional economic cooperation with Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Masoom Stanikzai, Advisor to the President on Internal Security and Head of the Secretariat for Afghanistan's High Peace Council, Zalmai Rassoul, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, Haji Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, the Speaker of the Lower House, and members of the Wolesi Jirga Commission on Women’s Affairs, Civil Society and Human Rights.

Though Afghan women parliamentarians make up nearly a third of seats in parliament, they struggle to make their voices heard in a male-dominated environment. Pakistani women parliamentarians work in a similar cultural, religious, and social context, yet they have made  far more political headway. Afghan women parliamentarians have called for more support from their colleagues in the region, and EWI’s Parliamentarians Network has facilitated a series of dialogues to answer that call.

This delegation is the first step in implementing the Islamabad Action Plan, a set of commitments outlined by Afghan and Pakistani women parliamentarians during their previous meeting in Islamabad in June 2011, which was also facilitated by EWI.

In the meeting with President Karzai, the Afghan leader declared: “This initiative is of immense importance to both countries and a great sign of a better future.” He called for more contacts between women parliamentarians in both countries, saying that such visits are “instrumental in strengthening of trust-building between the two nations.”

Women are critical players in the ongoing peace and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, often serving as agents of positive change in the region.  “Without women, no progress can be made in society,” Stanikzai added. Participants strongly endorsed the recommendation to ensure greater representation of women in all tracks of diplomacy.

Joint challenges, from extremism and terrorism to economic underdevelopment, should be addressed by joint efforts, according to the participants. The Taliban attacks on Kabul during the parliamentary visit served as a stark reminder of the work that remains to be done. These attacks, the Taliban’s broadest assault on Kabul in more than a decade, fired at the Afghan parliament only hours after the meeting came to a close.

As the international military presence winds down and Afghanistan sets to assume responsibility over its security in 2014, many – including participants in the meetings – fear a return to Taliban rule, and a subsequent retraction of women’s rights. While emphasizing the importance of engaging with those Taliban who are willing to negotiate and constructively discuss a peaceful resolution, Rassoul and Stanikzai both emphasized that the Taliban must accept the 2004 Afghan constitution which recognizes that women and men have equal rights and responsibilities under the law.

Participants suggested that an inclusive forum where Afghan women parliamentarians can develop a common agenda and work jointly, such as a women’s parliamentary caucus, would enable them to maximize their influence. “Only if women work together will they have their voices heard and safeguard their rights,” one participant said.

The Commission on Women’s Affairs, Civil Society and Human Rights, one of eighteen permanent commissions of the Afghan parliament, has made impressive strides – most notably, by its recent successful push for a decree on combating violence against women. But because of the way parliamentary groups are structured, not all women parliamentarians are able to participate in such efforts.  To help change that, participants committed to taking steps towards the creation of an inclusive women’s group in the Afghan parliament, an initiative that has the backing of President Karzai. Participants speaking for Pakistan’s WPC pledged their ongoing support to their Afghan colleagues and invited them to Islamabad for an EWI-facilitated follow-up visit later this year.

Tell us about the World Economic Forum.

The World Economic Forum is an independent international organization committed to improving the state of the world by engaging business, industry, political and other leaders of the society to shape the global agenda. It was founded by Professor Klaus Schwab 42 years ago.

You were nominated as the first Ethiopian Young Global Leader (YGL) in 2009; tell us a bit about the Young Global Leaders.

The YGL is a unique multi-stakeholder community of young leaders within the WEF community who, when nominated, are under the age of 40, coming from all regions of the world and representing business, government, civil society, arts and culture, academia and media, and social entrepreneurs. We meet several times a year to convene, catalyze and positively impact the global agenda through community initiatives and task forces. We try to work on some of the major challenges we face in the 21st century.

World Economic Forum for Africa will soon be held in Ethiopia. I know that you were one of the people that helped make this happen. How was this initiative started?

South West Energy is the only Ethiopian company which is a member of the World Economic Forum even till now, and we hope that this will change in the near future. So when I got involved in the World Economic Forum community a lot of people were not familiar with Ethiopia or about the potential we have. I tried to spend a lot of time working on this fact both within the WEF and YGL communities. The WEF Africa Forum usually takes place in Cape Town. A few years ago there was a decision to hold the Forum every other year in another African city. When the time came to select a choice for the 2012 Summit, working closely with the Africa team we helped the WEF in selecting Addis Ababa as the venue for 2012.

Finishing this well-intentioned and important project, which had stalled due to a cumbersome bureaucracy, poor contracting procedures, high leadership turn-over, and a lack of proper supervision, became one of my top priorities.

When I relinquished command and left Afghanistan about a year later, the project was back on track but still incomplete, despite three years of frustrating effort. Next door to the police headquarters, meanwhile, my Australian friends and counterparts had quickly transformed a vacant lot into a gleaming, functioning school for girls – all within a single calendar year.

Though we were successful in some other important development projects, the challenges we faced in bringing this single U.S. project to fruition, and the strategies that allowed other NATO nations to move more quickly, symbolize many of the challenges faced and lessons learned by U.S. and NATO personnel in Afghanistan. These lessons also highlight how outside help, if offered and managed with an awareness of local cultural sensitivities, can help transform whole communities for the better in a much shorter period of time.

Route to Command

I reported to the International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan on June 27, 2009. As the lead planner on the newly established ISAF Joint Command (IJC) run by both Americans and Afghans, I supervised planning for the security of Afghanistan, including the role of the 30,000-soldier U.S. “surge,” and the corresponding 10,000 increase in NATO forces.

After a year, planning included how to replace the Dutch when they departed Uruzgan, a province about 100 miles north of Kandahar. The plan called for a NATO command called “Combined Team Uruzgan” (CTU) to take control of Uruzgan from the Dutch. The new team would consist primarily of U.S. and Australian forces and be commanded by a U.S. colonel—in this case me.

When I arrived in Uruzgan as the new commander, I had about a month to meet, train, and prepare my largely ad hoc Australian and U.S. staff for combat. The lessons I learned as a planner in Kabul were essential to preparing my command to conduct counterinsurgency operations. These lessons focused on building solid relationships with Afghans and coalition forces; helping the Afghans build better governance systems; completing development projects; developing the Afghan National Security Forces; and expanding security in the province. Consequently, my first battlefield circulation patrols were intended to determine the status of existing development projects in Uruzgan’s capital city of Tarin Kowt.

The need for the police station

Police in Tarin Kowt clearly needed better facilities if they were to play a major role in an Afghan-led security effort after NATO forces depart in 2014. The Combined Security Transition Command (Afghanistan) and the Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs decided the police headquarters in Tarin Kowt was a high-priority project. They tasked the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers with its construction.

The project, which included four major buildings and several outbuildings, was 70 percent done when the Afghan contractors from Kabul and Kandahar stopped paying their subcontractors and fled the area, taking with them what was left of the money they received to complete the project. Having spent the budgeted funds on the project without completing it, the Corps of Engineers struck a deal with Matiullah Khan, a local warlord. Matiullah also happened to be the commander of the local militia, the Kandak-e Amniat-e Uruzgan (KAU), and a colonel in the Afghan National Police (ANP). The idea was that he would keep the site secure indefinitely.

The previous Dutch commanders viewed the headquarters as a U.S. project and let it sit unfinished. They also chose not to deal with the local police chief, who, although corrupt, was able to secure the population by resolving conflicts and expanding police presence throughout the province in a professional manner. The lack of ownership, change-over in coalition leaders, and distrust of local officials created a situation where there was no one who felt responsible for the half-completed project. In fact, when I returned to base after my initial reconnaissance patrol and made inquires as to the status of the project, it took several weeks to find documentation on the project and determine exactly how it had come to fail.

A lot can go wrong in Afghanistan, and in the scheme of things you could argue this project was a drop in the bucket. Our frustrated attempts to get the project restarted so that it could be completed are symbolic of the seemingly dysfunctional process the United States has created, making building trust—and constructing buildings—as difficult as possible. The four-acre compound stood as a monument to the coalition’s ineptitude.

Bringing it back on line

To get the project on track, we had to find “back pay” for security services that for two years had guarded the partially built but unoccupied police headquarters. The Corps of Engineers had a dilemma: The original contract was cancelled, but all funds had been paid to the original contractor who left the area. There was no money remaining on the original contract to pay the guards. Even if there were additional construction funds available, the Corps could not pay the guards, as to do so would have violated U.S. regulations on how construction funds can be expended. The Corps tried to solve this problem by initiating a new contract, but it still could not include back pay for two years of security. It took seven months to get the exceptions and authorizations needed for the guards to receive their back pay. The final solution to pay the guards included a deal coordinated with Matiullah, the local warlord.

After two years of inactivity, the contractors were ready to finish the job, but again the Corps of Engineers stepped in and stopped any effort. In Afghanistan, the Corps is required to adhere to certain specifications on construction projects, so parts of the plan had to be redesigned. This continued for several months, with the project commencing in fits and starts.

Then there were the multiple regulations clearly designed for the United States but blindly transferred to such projects in Afghanistan. When hand rails and wheelchair ramps did not meet U.S. codes, the contractors had to stop their work. Accessibility is important, but we lost another two months reworking the plans. Afghan contractors were not prepared to meet the requirements of U.S. plumbing and electric codes either. Insisting on adherence to Western plumbing standards hardly made sense, since most Afghans did not use Western facilities and often ruined the plumbing soon after installation.

Finally, there were the myriad rules and regulations that required Afghan companies to fill out mountains of paperwork, which they simply were not prepared for. After 11 frustrating months, and intervention at the flag officer level, the project had barely restarted and was still several months from completion when I departed in June 2011.

Lessons Learned

Compare the police headquarters with the beautiful school next door, where girls were already getting an education. Without many of the road-blocks that the U.S. experienced, the Australian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team was able to build their school in under a year. The Australians tracked the progress with regular check-ins and aggressive quality assurance while coordinating their activity with AusAID (the equivalent to USAID). The U.S. experience with absconding contractors would have been detected quickly. Moreover, unlike the U.S. practice of paying contractors up front, they dispensed funds in phases throughout construction. Finally, they did not face the road-block of construction regulations built for their home country; they constructed their projects in accordance with Afghan standards.

Completing the police headquarters is important not only for the effectiveness of the police, but for gaining the respect for the local government and the Afghan national government. When NATO or the United States promises to make improvements in cooperation with the Afghan government, the people see a more effective, more trustworthy government. When we fail the government, the government fails the people. The success of counterinsurgency operations is contingent on assisting the local government in earning the trust of its people.

I worked with a remarkable multinational group of soldiers and civilians. We worked together across cultures and regulatory structures. Though it was no small task, the group divided labor, and I believe we made a real difference in securing and building infrastructure in Uruzgan by expanding security to new areas and building roads that cut regional travel time dramatically.

The U.S. Army’s obstacles are often self-inflicted. Problems with contracting and money disbursement in Iraq and other theaters are directly related to the massive bureaucracy associated with contracting today. In my opinion, we have gone too far in regulating projects, to the point where we are wasting time and money due largely to our own inefficiency. The U.S. has committed to too many projects to manage and complete effectively given the massive regulatory requirements and turnover of coalition forces. The United States should take the spirit of cooperation in the coalition one step further and learn from the efficient operations of some of our partners.

James L. Creighton served as a commissioned officer in the U.S. Army for 30 years, including as commander of Combined Team Uruzgan. He is chief of staff of the EastWest Institute in New York.

Image Credit: Australian Department of Defense

Click here to read an AAP write-up of this article in The West Australian.