Middle East & North Africa

Meeting participants called for President Hamid Karzai’s government and the Taliban leadership to commit to unconditional talks in a trusted environment, ideally in a ceasefire zone with a mediator from a neutral country. Participants also recommended making talks more inclusive, saying that the engagement of tribal leaders along the border is “vital to the success of reconciliation.”

To improve the Afghanistan and Pakistan relationship, meeting participants suggested a “mechanism for a regular and genuine information exchange and cooperation,” such as an Afghanistan-Pakistan Jirga process.

Participants also recommended that to decrease the trust deficit between Pakistan and Afghanistan, both countries should address the role of India in Afghanistan in a frank and transparent manner.

The meeting was also a step towards building person-to-person trust between Pakistani and Afghan leaders, according to Ambassador Overfeld: “To the participants’ credit, palpable tensions gradually gave way to a constructive spirit -- a real determination to bring sustainable development and peace to the region.”

Bringing together Afghan and Pakistani politicians, diplomats, scholars and former military officials, the meetings seek to build confidence, ensure stability, and enhance regional development.

“There is no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan.  A dialogue leading to political settlement should therefore begin soon,” the report concludes.

Among the report's key recommendations: the use of open dialogue to solve the conflict in Afghanistan, rather than the use of military force; the active pursuit of delisting selected Taliban leaders; the continuation of the Abu Dhabi Process to help build trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan and create strategies towards a political settlement.

The report points out the need to address the bilateral trust deficit at three levels: senior government, the wider bureaucracy and civil society: “Both Afghanistan and Pakistan may wish to consider the appointment of a respected personality from each country to a senior position solely dedicated to the bilateral relationship.”

"The quality of the Afghan-Pakistani relationship is a decisive factor for political reconciliation in Afghanistan and stability and development in the region," added Guenter Overfeld, EWI Vice President and Director of Regional Security. "A fundamental lack of trust has persisted and has prevented substantive cooperation and collaboration."

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Indeed, most outside experts told us that the task was impossible. Relations between Russia and the United States had deteriorated to a nadir not seen in decades. Among the major causes for the severe decline were the rushed ballistic missile defense agreements between the United States and Poland and between the United States and the Czech Republic to deploy assets in these European countries to counter a potential Iranian nuclear and missile threat. The United States government viewed this as a defensive move. Was Iran developing a capacity to hit Europe? How long would it take? The Russian government countered that the ballistic missile defense deployment near its borders was surely directed against Russia—an offensive move. Russian leaders and experts dismissed the idea that Iran currently possessed an offensive ballistic missile program capable of striking Europe. The sixteen Americans and Russians who sat around that Track 2 table back in 2007 in Moscow could have stopped at that impasse—but they did not. They agreed that the heart of the issue did not start with either the United States or with Russia but rather with the need to decipher the threat—what were Iran’s technical capabilities? Could the two sides analyze and come to an agreement on the nature of the threat through a joint threat assessment?

Russia and the United States have been in dispute over the timeframe involved for Iran to acquire nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, on the means needed to prevent that from happening, and—in the worst case that it cannot be prevented—the military operational responses available to both sides to defend against Iran’s potential use of nuclear armed missiles. It was agreed that only after capabilities are ascertained can productive political conversations about motives and policy responses follow. Therein lay the mandate for the two teams of scientists, who worked independently and in a series of joint meetings that more often than not lasted well into the night.

Though the Iranian nuclear program has been the subject of detailed forensic public analyses, much less detailed attention has been paid, in public at least, to the Iranian missile program. Claims and counterclaims abound and defy easy understanding by the non-specialist. This report aims to fill that gap by providing a detailed examination of Iranian nuclear and missile capabilities. When might Iran be capable of deploying nuclear warheads? Assuming that Iran can develop that capability, would the proposed missile defenses be able intercept Iranian missiles? What are the possibilities of U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area? These are the vital questions that this report examines and makes its assessments.

The EastWest Institute, for thirty years a bridge in U.S.-Russian and earlier, U.S.-Soviet relations, is proud to present the product of this remarkable team of Russian and American scientists and experts on the subject. That compelling gap—both in terms of independent analysis and in confidence building on Iran’s weapons programs— now has its first bridging document. That it deals successfully with a joint assessment on such an important issue as Iran’s nuclear and missile potential is a tribute to its authors and to the willingness of both governments to enable their scientific communities to cooperate.

EWI worked closely with partner organizations in both Russia and the United States: the Russian Committee of Scientists for Global Security and Arms Control; The Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Program in Science, Technology, and Society; and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University—all of which offered vital support and leadership. This Track 2 effort by prominent American and Russian specialists should provide a way out of the counter-productive and unnecessary friction that has arisen over Iran’s nuclear military potential and responses to it. After all, as both sides have taken pains to point out, a nuclear Iran is in neither state’s interest.

For more than a year, intense discussions have taken place on this first bilateral JTA between Russian and U.S. scientists, some of whom are close advisors to high-level government officials. The drafting of this report was a unique experience of building trust between experts who shape future strategic decisions. We all have learned important lessons through this experience and the EastWest Institute is keen to actively rely on them to expand the model of joint independent expert groups to contribute to finding solutions to pressing threats around the globe. Additional JTAs will be undertaken. To operationalize the findings of this JTA, we are preparing to launch a Joint U.S.-Russia Policy Assessment, as suggested by William Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (and formerly the U.S. ambassador to Russia). Such a study would offer consensus recommendations on the policy options available to the United States and Russia on the potential Iranian nuclear and missile threat as well as suggest a global regime for dealing with ballistic missile proliferation.

In February 2009, key conclusions of the study were presented to the U.S. National Security Advisor James Jones, Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov, and Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolay Patrushev. The first reaction to the draft report from both U.S. and Russian government officials was positive, and provides the basis for hope that both countries will be able to develop constructive policies of cooperation in addressing existing nuclear and missile threats. We are pleased that in recent bilateral meetings between Secretary Clinton and Minister Lavrov the importance of doing joint U.S.-Russia threat assessments has been recognized.

EWI’s mission is to forge collective action for a safer and better world—this joint threat assessment gives policymakers the ability to do just that. We are grateful for the dedicated eff orts by those involved on both the U.S. and Russian sides, who put politics and other commitments aside to off er their impressive analytical skills to this venture. As well as being scientists they were diplomats and skilled negotiators as they worked together to produce this consensus document. Special thanks and recognition are due to David Holloway and Leonid Ryabikhin, who led the U.S. and Russian sides, respectively, in this unique endeavor. A complete listing of scientists and experts engaged in this process is found on the list of contributors. We thank each of them for their diligent work and contributions. It is in no small measure thanks to the patient and determined leadership of Professor Holloway and Dr. Ryabikhin that the diverse teams were able to prepare and present the consensus document that follows. I would also like to extend a special thanks and recognition to Greg Austin, Vice President of Policy Innovation, who began the initial joint threat assessment process at EWI.

Executive Summary

The almost total absence of bilateral or regional cooperation on water between Afghanistan and its neighbors is a serious threat to sustainable development and security in the region. The ever-increasing demand for water, the unpredictable availability of water, and the inefficient management of water resources combine to form a complex but solvable challenge to regional security and development. Currently there are hardly any spaces in which to cooperatively address trans-boundary water issues. There are hardly any forums for dialogue or bilateral or multilateral agreements, and possibilities for data sharing or joint action are limited.

The EWI’s consultations made abundantly clear that the regional nature and importance of water cooperation is fully recognized by all stakeholders. However, stark differences in capacity, combined with contextual issues such as historic mistrust and competing regional security priorities (in particular from the international community), have kept stakeholders from engaging in a process of dialogue on water cooperation.

This paper outlines current challenges to effective and sustainable cross-border cooperation on water and makes the following recommendations to overcome them.

• Cross-border data-sharing schemes should be examined to improve the hydro-meteorological knowledge base in Afghanistan and the region. Afghanistan’s water sector has suffered immensely from decades of conflict and needs significant improvement. Exchange of hydrological data between Afghanistan and its neighbors would speed up that process and may be done through a shared, transparent repository of scientific hydrological data on each of Afghanistan’s trans-boundary river basins. Data sharing would need to be a joint effort of Afghanistan and its neighbors, with assistance from the international community.
• Building on eventual successes of data-sharing schemes, regional stakeholders should regularly exchange their water policies, thus building trust across borders.
• Assistance from the international community to Afghanistan’s water sector should adopt a regionally sensitive approach rather than one focused on individual states. Donors have not yet made the regional dimension a priority in their assistance policies.
• Assistance from the international community to Afghanistan’s water sector needs to be coordinated. Afghanistan’s water sector should be strengthened to bring it in line with the capabilities of its neighbors by coordinating resources and targeting them on building the human, financial, and technical capacity necessary to help Afghanistan take a full part in regional initiatives.
• As a first step toward shared hydrological data and a needs assessment for the sharing of national water policy plans, senior water experts from the region should meet regularly. In light of the geographic and political specifics of each of the river basins, these meetings should be river-basin based.

Executive Summary

While President Karzai promises economic opportunities for the Taliban, Afghanistan remains heavily dependent on foreign aid and has few sources of income generation for the government or the people. There is certainly potential for advances in these areas in Afghanistan, in agriculture or mining for example, but it will take time to develop them and make them sustainable. In the short term, no significant improvements are expected in the labor market. Achieving some progress and stability in Afghanistan, however, is time-critical. Dwindling support for international engagement in the country highlights this urgency.

In light of this situation, the international community should focus on developing Afghanistan’s migrant labor capacity in a targeted and systematic way in order to increase the prospects for income generation in the form of remittances. The development of semi-skilled and skilled vocational sectors in line with forecast requirements of employment markets, targeting the GCC member states, could provide a near-term solution to Afghanistan’s limited economic prospects.

• The potential of remittances to enhance economic development in poor developing nations is highlighted by the many successful examples of remittance flows to Asian countries, whose workers are based in member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In that context, the volume of remittances sent home is, for many developing countries, the largest source by far of external capital. In many cases migrant labor contributes considerably to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of recipient countries.
• Despite the financial crisis and subsequent economic problems, economic growth prospects in GCC countries and the need for migrant labor appears to be strong over the coming decade due to large scale infrastructure projects in Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. in particular.
• The increasing jobless rate among nationals of GCC member countries in coming years is not likely to negatively affect migration flows from the Asian countries as the greatest need remains blue collar unskilled and low-skilled labor. Nationals of GCC countries generally target junior and senior white collar jobs.
• Currently, the numbers of Afghan migrant laborers in GCC countries are relatively small. Afghan migrant labor has so far (often illegally) targeted the neighboring countries of Iran and Pakistan. Due to their own demographic situation and economic difficulties, both countries, however, will not be able to continue to accommodate significant numbers of Afghan migrant laborers. They are, on the contrary, in the process of returning Afghan nationals back to Afghanistan and implementing significant refugee return programs.
• A coordinated approach by GCC countries in line with expected labor requirements would considerably enhance the stability of Afghanistan via remittances. Historically, GCC member states have shown a strong commitment to supporting Afghanistan. With the expected economic growth in GCC countries, there is the further potential for a considerable strengthening of bilateral relations and an increase in the numbers of Afghan migrant laborers to GCC countries. Such a move would quickly result in external income for Afghanistan and contribute to its economic development.
• The large numbers of Pakistani migrant laborers in GCC countries and the role their remittances play in the Pakistani economy may lead to friction with Afghanistan if Afghan laborers in GCC countries are perceived as a competition harmful to Pakistan’s economy. A possibility to avoid such situation would be a cooperative approach based on a quota system that allows Afghanistan to profit from the increase in labor demand expected over the next years in a predictable and agreed-upon way.
• Many international donors have given their support to the Kabul government, actively promoting vocational education and training in the context of their development programs. The next logical step is to strengthen these programs in line with needs of migrant labor markets to qualify unskilled Afghan labor force for employment opportunities.
• Cooperation between GCC countries and the international community’s training programs in Afghanistan would help deliver migrant labor programs in a targeted and economically viable manner.

К сожалению, реальность такова, что уровень доверия как между элитами, так и между более широкими общественными группами наших двух стран чрезвычайно низок. Чтобы добиться сближения, необходимо преодолеть себя и поверить в то, что мы можем совместно работать над самыми трудными задачами. Именно решимость преодолеть непонимание в очень болезненном вопросе стала движущим мотивом, побудившим группу занимающих высокие посты американцев и русских встретиться в 2007 году в Москве. Собравшаяся по инициативе Института Восток-Запад (ИВЗ), эта группа задалась целью изучить возможности сотрудничества по вопросу об иранской ракетно-ядерной программе. В результате острой, но вместе с тем уважительной приватной дискуссии, участники – в число которых входили, с американской стороны, генерал в отставке Джеймс Л. Джонс, посол Генри Крамптон и генерал в отставке Лэнс Лорд, а с российской стороны – высокопоставленные официальные лица во главе с представителем президента Российской Федерации послом Анатолием Сафоновым, договорились о целесообразности создания Институтом Восток-Запад рабочей группы, которая объединила бы ведущих ученых обеих стран для изучения иранского вопроса и подготовки первого исследования по совместной оценке угроз. Этот опыт был призван установить на практике, смогут ли ученые и эксперты двух стран прийти к единому мнению относительно характера угрозы, связанной с реализацией иранской ракетно-ядерной программы. Дебаты, имевшие место во время московской встречи, показали, что достичь согласия относительно понимания намерений Ирана будет нелегко. Сознание политических сообществ обеих стран затмилось клубами «дыма», представлявшего собой смесь эмоций и ни- чем не подкрепленных сообщений с реальными фактами и политическими выкладками. Никакого диалога не происходило. Проблема порождала только разрозненные монологи, основанные на подозрениях и недоверии. Решение перейти к практическим шагам по совместной оценке угроз было рискованным. Не было гарантий, что эта работа увенчается успехом.

На самом деле, большинство внешних экспертов, к которым мы обратились, сказали, что задача невыполнима. Отношения между Россией и Соединенными Штатами Америки дошли до самой низкой точки за последние десятилетия. Одной из важнейших причин столь серьезного ухудшения стало скоропалительное заключение между США и Польшей, а также между США и Чешской Республикой договоров по ПРО, которыми предусматривалось развертывание в этих европейских странах объектов, призванных противостоять потенциальной ракетно-ядерной угрозе со стороны Ирана. Правительство США рассматривало этот шаг как оборонительный. Действительно ли Иран накапливает потен- циал для нанесения удара по Европе? Сколько времени может занять этот процесс? Российское правительство выступило с возражениями против размещения системы ПРО возле своих границ, заявив, что этот шаг был бы направлен против России и носил бы наступательный характер. Российские руководители и эксперты отвергли идею о наличии у Ирана в настоящее время таких наступательных возможностей, которые позволили бы ему нанести удар по Европе с применением баллистических ракет. Столкнувшись с этой тупиковой ситуацией, шестнадцать американских и российских участников кругло- го стола, состоявшегося в 2007 году в Москве в рамках диалога на неправительственном уровне, вполне могли остановиться, но они поступили иначе. Было достигнуто понимание, что корень проблемы следовало искать не в США и не в России, но в расшифровке самой угрозы: какими реальными техническими возможностями располагает Иран? Могут ли две стороны проанализировать ситуацию и прийти к согласию относительно характера угрозы по итогам совместного исследования?

Россия и США спорили по поводу сроков, необходимых Ирану для создания ядерных боеголовок и балли- стических ракет, способов предотвращения такого развития событий, а также – если предотвратить наихудший сценарий окажется невозможным – оперативных мер военного характера, которые обе страны могли бы применить в целях защиты от потенциального использования Ираном ракет с ядерными боезарядами. Участники круглого стола согласились с тем, что продуктивный политический диалог относительно мотивов и ответных мер политического характера мог начаться только после оценки возможностей Ирана. Именно в этом две группы ученых из наших стран увидели свою задачу и приступили к работе – как индивидуальной, так и совместной, проходившей в форме коллективных обсуждений, которые зачастую затягивались далеко за полночь.

В то время как иранская ядерная программа не раз становилась предметом подробного публичного анализа, гораздо меньше внимания уделялось, по крайней мере публично, ракетной программе Ирана. Огромное количество самых разных утверждений и опровержений затрудняет понимание проблемы неспециалистом. Задача настоящего доклада состоит в том, чтобы заполнить этот пробел, предложив читателю подробное исследование иранского ракетно-ядерного потенциала. Когда предположительно Иран будет способен развернуть ядерные боеголовки? Будут ли предлагаемые элементы системы ПРО в состоянии перехватить иранские ракеты в случае, если допустить, что Иран произведет их запуск? Каковы возможности российско-американского сотрудничества в этой области? Таковы наиболее актуальные вопросы, которые были исследованы в настоящем докладе и в связи с которыми в нем высказываются экспертные оценки.

Институт Восток-Запад, вот уже тридцать лет играющий роль связующего звена в российско-американских, а до этого – в советско-американских отношениях, с заслуженной гордостью представляет результат труда замечательной команды ученых и экспертов из России и США по заявленной теме. Подготовленный ими документ стал первым мостиком, перекинутым над про- пастью, казавшейся ранее непреодолимой – как из-за отсутствия независимого анализа, так и из-за дефицита доверия в отношении оценки иранской оружейной программы. Своим успешным завершением совместное исследование по такому важному вопросу, как оценка иранского ракетно-ядерного потенциала, обязано усилиям авторов, а также готовности правительств обеих стран создать возможности для сотрудничества между нашими научными сообществами.

ИВЗ работал в тесном контакте с партнерскими организациями как в России, так и в Соединенных Штатах Америки: с российским Комитетом ученых за глобальную безопасность и контроль над вооружениями, программой в области естественных наук, технологий и общества Массачусетского технологического института, Центром международной безопасности и сотрудничества Стэнфордского университета. Все они оказали большое содействие и сыграли ведущую роль в реализации проекта. Мы надеемся на то, что работа, проделанная выдающимися американскими и российскими специалистами благодаря установившимся между ними неформальным контактам, укажет выход из контрпродуктивного и ненужного противостояния, которое возникло по поводу иранского военного ядерного потенциала и возможных ответных мер, направленных на его нейтрализацию. В конечном итоге, обе стороны – в результате непростого процесса согласования – указали на то, что превращение Ирана в ядерную державу не отвечает интересам ни США, ни России.

Более года между российскими и американскими учеными, некоторые из которых являются близкими советниками высокопоставленных государственных деятелей, происходили напряженные дискуссии в связи с подготовкой первой совместной оценки угроз. Работа над проектом настоящего доклада была сама по себе уникальным опытом установления доверия между экспертами, которые формируют будущие стратегические решения. Все мы многому научились благодаря этому опыту, опираясь на который Институт Восток-Запад планирует более широко и активно использовать модель совместных независимых экспертных групп как инструмента в поиске ответов на различные существующие в мире угрозы. Мы проведем дополнительные исследования по совместной оценке угроз. Для того чтобы придать импульс процессу практического использования выводов настоящего доклада, мы предполагаем приступить к совместной российско-американской оценке политических решений, как было предложено Уильямом Бернсом (William Burns), заместителем государственного секретаря по политическим вопросам (ранее занимавшим пост посла США в России). Это новое исследование помогло бы выработать, на основе консенсуса, рекомендации относительно возможных политических путей урегулирования Соединенными Штатами Америки и Россией проблем, связанных с потенциальной ракетно-ядерной угрозой со стороны Ирана, а также предложить глобальный механизм недопущения распространения баллистических ракет.

В феврале 2009 года основные выводы исследования были представлены советнику по вопросам национальной безопасности США Джеймсу Джонсу, российскому министру иностранных дел Сергею Лаврову и секретарю Совета безопасности Российской Федерации Николаю Патрушеву. Первая реакция на проект доклада как от американских, так и от российских официальных лиц была позитивной и позволяет надеяться на то, что обе страны смогут конструктивно сотрудничать в противостоянии существующим ракетно-ядерным угрозам. Мы рады тому, что важность совместных российскоамериканских исследований по оценке угроз была признана в ходе недавних двусторонних встреч между госсекретарем Клинтон и министром Лавровым.

ИВЗ видит свою задачу в объединении усилий ради достижения более безопасного и совершенного мира, и содержащаяся в настоящем докладе совместная оценка угроз предоставляет лицам, определяющим политический курс, возможность внести свой конкретный вклад в это дело. Мы благодарны за самоотверженные усилия тем участникам проекта как с американской, так и с российской стороны, которые оставили в стороне политическую полемику и пожертвовали другими обязательствами ради того, чтобы обогатить настоящее исследование своими глубокими знаниями и навыками в области анализа. В процессе работы над предлагаемым вниманию публики согласованным документом они выступили не только как ученые, но и как дипломаты и опытные переговорщики. Выражаем особую благодарность и признательность Дэвиду Холловею и Леониду Рябихину, которые возглавили работу американских и российских участников этого уникального проекта, соответственно. Полный список ученых и экспертов, принимавших участие в исследовании, приведен выше. Мы благодарим каждого из них за труд и предоставленные материалы. Вместе с тем, своим успешным завершением и публикацией приводимый ниже согласованный документ во многом обязан именно профессору Холловею и доктору Рябихину, которые проявили себя как терпеливые, но решительные руководители. Я хотел бы также выразить особую благодарность и признательность Грегу Остину, вице-президенту по инновациям в области политики, который положил начало исследованиям по совместной оценке угроз в Институте Восток-Запад.

Джон Эдвин Мроз, президент и главный исполнительный директор Института Восток-Запад. Из предисловия к докладу "Ядерный и ракетный потенциал Ирана: совместная техническая оценка угроз экспертами из США и России"

Introduction

In his inaugural address, U.S. President Barack Obama told the Muslim world they would be judged by what they build, not what they destroy. But even if those who build far outnumber those who destroy, many governments and societies will continue to be confronted by the specter of violent extremism. The challenge they face is how to devise effective strategies to counter the extremists and encourage long-term solutions that go beyond merely containing the problem to addressing its root causes. This is the challenge we posed to a wide variety of participants in the EastWest Institute’s Countering Violent Extremism Initiative.

In 2008, EWI’s Countering Violent Extremism initiative began a concerted effort to engage youth, advocacy groups, religious organizations, and local religious leadership to gauge their understanding of violent extremism and to learn what they believe should be done to counter it. Throughout the course of the year, we received a wealth of information, opinions and advice that extends far beyond this report. Further study is needed, but is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this EWI initiative.

As is all too well known, violent extremism is a longstanding and long-studied phenomenon in human history. There are few things that have not been said already. There is, however, a significant gap between what is being said and what is being done. This paper will show that violent extremism is a symptom of a much larger set of problems where solutions must come from concerted efforts by governments and societies worldwide. In order to set the stage, this report will first briefly review what policy experts have said and then review the feedback from people of faith and young people as to how, from their perspectives, solutions can be achieved.

Each specific case of violent extremism arises from a variety of unique factors. A review of cases would require voluminous study. Instead, we are focusing here on recommendations for governments and civil society that will help them work toward a better and safer world. Arguments from civil society and governments bear certain key similarities — both seek to enhance their own security and their own interests. This paper presents an overview of the “rationale” for violent extremism as presented by extremists and terrorists and civil societies’ reactions to such explanations. It also explores what can be done about violent extremism, given that it cannot be easily defined, cannot only be combated ideologically, and cannot be combated through the use of force alone in any sort of sustainable way.

Among the major issues addressed in the book and the presentation were:

• Energy security is a core part of national sovereignty for many states.
• There is a need to depoliticize and to de-securitize energy.
• All actors concerned—whether energy-exporting or energy-importing—are interested in a stable and predictable energy markets and physical continuity of energy flows.
• All parties concerned should work on resolving the overall general sense of insecurity and correct the misperceptions about the real intentions of the major global energy actors.
• Transit and importing countries consider energy as an issue of strategic importance. For example, not only Turkey wants to be a major West Asia’s energy hub, Ankara also sees itself as a rising global energy player. Similar to Turkey, India does not hide its ambitions to become South Asia’s top energy actor.
• Closer cooperation between different international and regional energy regimes is essential. The United Nations can play a more significant role in fostering trust and cooperation in this matter.
• In Europe, the trend towards a common energy policy lies in intense consultations between member states. National governments and not EU institutions should have a decisive influence on the development of EU’s common energy vision.

The Lindh Programme book was able to delve in more depth into some specific threats to the global energy security. Among the most pressing issues are:

• Internal unrest/instability in the energy-producing and the transit countries—especially Iraq and Iran;
• Intra-state tensions on the global scale and the energy-producing and transit regions;
• Terrorist attacks against energy installations, pipelines and maritime energy routes;
• Political and diplomatic mistrust between energy exporters, energy importers, and transit countries;
• Real and perceived scarcity of the hydrocarbon resources;
• Rarity of new large-scale discoveries;
• Territorial disputes;
• Use of energy as a political tool;
• Selection of the transport corridors and conflicts between importers, exporters and transit countries.

To address these very real threats to global energy security, governments, international organizations, the private sector, and civil society should work together to mitigate existing threats and prevent the emergence of new challenges. These actors should use multilateral frameworks, preferably under UN auspices, with a number of binding rules, and take into account the interests of all stakeholders involved. This universal framework should also integrate all positive results achieved by existing global and regional energy institutions such as the Energy Charter Treaty, the International Energy Agency, and the International Energy Forum.

Among the next steps that concerned energy stakeholders should undertake include:

• Diversifying energy systems on the global, national, and regional levels;
• Developing and implementing advanced energy saving and energy efficiency measures;
• Build up of emergency fuel stocks;
• Promotion of R&D activities to spread efficient and environment-friendly technological options;
• Development of traditional and new domestic energy sources;
• Strengthen multilateral energy cooperation;
• Promote an institute of ‘energy diplomats’ on the global and regional levels.

EWI will continue to undertake research and develop recommendations on the pressing issue of global energy security through its work in energy and conflict prevention, including planned work in 2008 on integrating Iran in binding regional frameworks through energy cooperation.

It contends that the role of governments in preventing violent religious extremism is limited. Religious leaders, faith communities and civil society must do the heavy lifting to counter this threat. The report, based on research and analysis, and the convening of experts with leading persons of faith, offers specific policy recommendations to combat violent extremism. It was launched at an event in New York attended by leaders from government, media, and civil society.