Middle East & North Africa

As U.S. military strikes against the Syrian government become more likely, many in the West are worried about retaliatory cyber attacks of pro-Assad forces on critical information infrastructure in Europe and the United States. The Syrian Electronic Army and its recent activities of hacking various news websites and social media platforms, has especially caused ‘cyber angst’ among private-sector companies. However, while sophisticated cyber attacks are a possibility, the likelihood of severe disruptions is minimal to non-existing.

From all the open source intelligence gathered at this stage, Syria’s offensive cyber warfare capabilities are limited. While Iran, which boasts that it has "the fourth-largest cyber force in the world" is actively supporting the Assad regime, this effort, led by the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security, is largely focused on electronic surveillance and identifying members of the opposition. The Assad government’s principal focus in cyberspace is domestic.

The Syrian government has little incentive to pour precious resources into sophisticated offensive cyber weapons that will not influence the outcome on the battlefield in Syria. In this case bullets are beating bytes, or, as Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen put it succinctly in their book The New Digital Age: “You cannot storm an interior ministry by mobile phone.”

Consequently, pro-Assad cyber attacks have largely been conducted by proxy (cyber activists rather than government forces), with the result that attacks emerging from Syria or pro-Assad hackers in Iran and Russia have not been particularly sophisticated and consisted mostly of Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDOS). The attack on the New York Times was more elaborate, penetrating the Domain Name System—the "phone book" of the internet as it is often called—yet it also did little damage and was more of a cyber protest than an attack aimed at the destruction of networks and data.

Iran’s role

While Syria’s capabilities are limited, Iran and potentially Russia could lend Assad a hand and deploy their arsenal of cyber weapons in support of the Syrian government. This, however, will have to be preceded by a conscious decision of the Iranian government to escalate the level of conflict by launching sophisticated strikes on Western critical information structures such as SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems that monitor and control power grids. These sorts of attacks are hard to pull off, since they demand sophisticated knowledge, require layers of resources and are difficult to coordinate. Because of this, such complex attacks need some form of state sponsorship.

Cyber Deterrence

The current improbability of debilitating attacks by Iran or Syria is not so much a sign that they are deterred from acting because of the West’s asymmetric advantage in cyber capabilities, but rather of the domestic focus of Syria’s efforts in cyberspace.

Unlikely, however does not mean impossible. Steps have to be taken to convey to Iran, Syria and the world what the likely reaction to cyber strikes against Western targets will be in order to actively reduce the likelihood of debilitating attacks. Clearly, the West needs a strategy of cyber deterrence against Iran and Syria.

A combined Syrian-Iranian DDOS attack on a well-known Fortune 500 company—although probably fixed within a few hours—could trigger panic in global financial markets. The media is such that it can create cyber mountains out of cyber molehills. Cyber deterrence—unlike nuclear deterrence—is not meant to deter all cyber attacks. Its principal aim is to dissuade adversaries from engaging in debilitating cyber strikes.

At the lowest level, one way to increase the deterrence factor vis-à-vis adversaries is to have a more systematic public display of nation states’ cyber-war capabilities. This can have a greater deterrence effect on nonstate actors operating in the service of Iran and Syria, because they will have a clearer understanding of the forces arrayed against them. It can also make ‘signaling’—conveying the intentions of a state through a particular policy or move—easier, since a better understanding of capabilities reduces the likelihood of misguided policies.

Often, the media has been used to convey a country’s capabilities with strategic leaks of classified information (e.g. Stuxnet, Flame etc.) to some news outlets—this is part of a country’s cyber-deterrence strategy. It is likely that we will see such a strategic leak shortly before any air strikes. Whatever this leaked cyber asset may be, the ability to identify, defend and retaliate against any attack from the Middle East will be its key characteristics.

When it comes to cyber deterrence, the revolutionary idea for policy makers to get their heads around is that the public and private sector need to be better informed on discussions pertaining to a state’s cyber war capabilities. It is no longer enough to have a small clique of policymakers and the militaries on both sides know each other’s cyber arsenals. In order to deter nonstate actors and reduce uncertainty about the consequences of cyber attacks in the general public, a more open discourse on cyber capabilities—beyond Iran and Syria—will be needed in the future.

Click here to read the article in the National Interest. 

Click here for Gady's recent article "What Would Cyber-War With Syria Look Like?" in the U.S. News & World Report. 

COMBAT OUTPOST WILDERNESS, Afghanistan—For weeks, the fierce duel playing out in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan between U.S. and insurgent artillery crews had been decidedly one-sided—deadly only for the Taliban.

With better training and high-tech equipment, the Americans were so fast and accurate with return fire that shooting a mortar or rocket at them from the mountainsides overlooking their camp was practically suicidal.

The U.S. artillery platoon at Camp Wilderness killed 27 enemy fighters in the weeks before Aug. 11, while suffering no casualties of its own.

But a seemingly endless supply of insurgents replaced those they killed. The incoming fire continued. Finally a Taliban rocket found its mark.

Combat Outpost Wilderness sits in Paktia province in the heart of what the American military has dubbed the K-G Pass. It’s a gap in the rugged mountains of eastern Afghanistan that eases travel between Khost province and the Paktia capital, Gardez.

The area is home to several dozen U.S. soldiers of Gunfighter Company of the 1st Battalion of the 506th Regiment and a platoon of the 320th Field Artillery Regiment, all members of the 101st Airborne Division from Fort Campbell, Ky.

The pass has a dark history for foreign troops.

It was one of the most frequent sites of mujahedeen attacks on Soviet convoys during the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s. One of the most famous fights of that conflict, the Battle for Hill 3234, took place just a few miles away from Wilderness. All but five of the 39 men in a Soviet airborne unit were killed or wounded, though they held off an estimated 200-plus attackers, reputedly including Pakistani troops.

The spot is dangerous in the current war for some of the same reasons it was for the Soviets. It’s so close to the border that the Taliban can easily send in replacement fighters from refuges in nearby Pakistani cities and villages, making for a seemingly endless supply of reinforcements.

During a re-enlistment and awards ceremony Aug. 10, battalion Command Sgt. Maj. Franklin Velez warned the company what such a drawn-out duel could mean.

“You have been lucky so far,” he said. “But remember, it only takes one lucky round.”

Luck.

That’s what every soldier in Afghanistan thinks about while dashing for a bunker at the whistle of an incoming mortar round or the sizzle of a rocket.

Will my luck hold? What are my odds? Are the bad guys lucky this time?

Taliban “indirect fire”—rockets or mortar shells that arc to a target—is notoriously inaccurate. But enough rounds fall that eventually some find their mark, even among the most wildly fired salvos lobbed onto vast bases such as Bagram Airfield.

And they’d been hitting Combat Outpost Wilderness almost daily for a month, often several times a day.

The same day that Velez issued his warning, the commander of the artillery platoon, 1st Lt. John Orosz, 2nd Lt. Calen Lambert of Laurel, Miss., Staff Sgt. Octavio Herrera and several other soldiers hiked up a hill overlooking the camp for a lunch meeting with members of an Afghan National Army artillery unit.

The U.S. artillerymen had been training Afghans, and were proud of the results. The Americans brought sodas and water, the Afghans supplied traditional flatbread and tea. Together they talked about upcoming training sessions.

Herrera, a former field hand and United Parcel Service worker from Caldwell, Idaho, had two previous Afghan deployments under his belt. He pushed his sunglasses on top of his crew cut at a jaunty angle.

Just a year earlier, Lambert had been a college student studying abroad in Spain. Now he occupied a spot at the end of the makeshift table beside Herrera.

The mood was jovial.

“You don’t want to be near me when the rockets hit,” said one. “They usually land right next to me.”

“Yeah, don’t be near him when we have incoming,” said another. “For some reason, he always ends up exposed somewhere away from a bunker.”

Mostly, though, it had been the other way around. The Americans typically caught the insurgents in the open. In the previous weeks, the artillery platoon under Orosz’s command had fired more than 600 rounds at Taliban positions in the mountains surrounding the Wilderness outpost, killing their opposite numbers time and again.

In the company’s operations center, Sgt. Matthew Davidson watched video clips retrieved from the camera of an insurgent who’d been killed by indirect fire from Camp Wilderness. Taliban fighters slipping in from Pakistan often film their attacks so they can prove their deeds back home to get paid.

One clip showed the impact of the incoming American mortar rounds. As the insurgents are killed off-screen, the camera eerily continues rolling.

Yet another video left Davidson worried. It showed an insurgent calmly readjusting the sight and range of the mortar after each shot and jotting down notes.

The enemy, he saw, was learning.

American casualties have fallen to some of the lowest levels of the war as the U.S.-led coalition draws down in preparation for ending its combat mission next year.

The Afghan security forces are in the lead for combat nearly everywhere, and most American troops are now stationed on large, heavily fortified bases, training their Afghan counterparts and preparing to go home.

Last month, 14 U.S. service members were killed in action in the country. That was the lowest number for any July in eight years.

Wilderness, though, is one of the last places where U.S. troops engage directly with the insurgents. All that incoming fire means the American soldiers there face some of the highest remaining risks.

On Aug. 11, their streak of good luck ran out.

At 11:59 a.m., Staff Sgt. Daryl Cooper of Olive Branch, Miss., was in his barracks when he heard a distinctive buzzing noise that rapidly got louder. An incoming rocket.

Cooper slipped under his bunk and waited. Then came the sharp crack of the detonation in a riverbed near the camp. A miss.

That was Cooper’s signal. He jumped up and rushed to the command center, where he radioed for an airstrike from the U.S. jets circling the sky above eastern Afghanistan.

Most of the soldiers had run for the bunkers spread around the compound. Nearly everyone sought cover except the artillerymen. They sprinted to their guns, anticipating the computer-quick information from the team that handled targeting.

Some looked up at the mountainsides, where the insurgents very likely were preparing another rocket.

Within minutes, U.S. artillery units usually could locate the enemy position and retaliate with massive counter-fire. There are restrictions on firing into populated areas, but the brush-dappled mountainsides around the base had few buildings or homes. The targets were usually bushes where the enemy was hiding, which made it easier to give the go-ahead to fire quickly.

This time, however, the American guns stayed silent. Five minutes after the first rocket, a second one hissed out of the sky and smacked into a building where several artillerymen were calculating target locations.

It detonated with a muffled thud. The 26-year-old Herrera was killed instantly. Also dead was Spc. Keith E. Grace Jr., 26, of Baytown, Texas.

Grace, who’d been adopted and had overcome cancer as a child, had beaten tougher odds than rockets. But now he was gone.

Several other soldiers were badly wounded, including Orosz, Lambert and Sgt. Jamar A. Hicks, 22, of Little Rock, Ark., the father of a 1-year-old boy.

In an instant, nearly a third of the men in the long-lucky artillery platoon were down.

Civilian contractor Brad Riffel of Engineering Solutions and Products was responsible for surveillance of the terrain around the base found the enemy’s targeting spotter in the mountain range above Wilderness, but it was too late.

As Cooper coordinated the airstrike and Riffel kept searching the mountainsides with his high-tech equipment, 25-year-old Spc. Charles Lane, a combat medic from Christiana, Tenn., frantically went to work in the outpost’s tiny field clinic. He tried to stabilize the wounded men until a medevac chopper could arrive.

The wounded were quickly flown to the field hospital at massive Camp Salerno in neighboring Khost province. The dead followed in another helicopter.

After the choppers left, Lane was visibly exhausted, but calm.

“One soldier had a wound the size of a fist,” he said. “You do everything you can, but sometimes, someone out there on the other side says, ‘He is mine! I’m taking him now!’ ”

Later Lane, still pale, carried the belongings of one of the dead soldiers across the camp in a plastic bag.

At Salerno, Hicks died of his wounds. The others survived.

Four days later, Lambert had recovered enough to log in to his Facebook account, where he changed his cover picture to a somber shot of his three lost friends’ upright boots and rifles from the traditional unit memorial ceremony. He said by email that he expected to recover at Salerno and return to Wilderness.

After Cooper called in the airstrike it took only minutes for the planes to drop several 500-pound bombs on the suspected position of the shooters.

This time, though, there were no confirmed enemy dead. Just this once, the insurgents had won the duel.

That night, in a gesture of solidarity with the Americans, the Afghan artillery battery stationed near Wilderness fired round after round of artillery shells into the abandoned enemy position. The Afghans also sent combat patrols to hunt for additional enemy rocket teams as the Americans grieved.

“Thirty rockets in 30 days,” said Capt. Michael Finch, the commander of Gunfighter Company. “They were bound to hit something. The odds were simply against us.”

His soldiers and the others at Camp Wilderness most likely will be the last Americans stationed there. They’re scheduled to leave at the end of the year.

Until then, their deadly duel, one of America’s last in Afghanistan, is expected to continue.

Click here to read the article in McClatchy.

Click here to read Gady's piece, "Afghan Forces Not Worries about U.S. Departure," in The Diplomat. 

Click here to read Gady's account of talks between high-level Afghan security officials, who recently assumed control over the nation's national security, in World Policy Blog.

The Parliamentarians Network has developed into a unique actor of change in the international conflict prevention architecture. It has been policy relevant, as it engages decision makers, it has networked across institutions and continents, it has shared knowledge and experience, and it has led an action oriented dialogue on issues that have a bearing on stability and peace, locally, regionally, nationally and globally.

Conflict situations are usually characterized by stalemate at the strategic level, lack of political will for genuine dialogue at national and local levels, lack of societal desire for reconciliation, and all sides at all levels seek to attach political conditions to urgent humanitarian and development needs and activities. The onus is on the international community to take the initiative to make progress both on the ground and at the strategic level.

This shows: preventive diplomacy is a frustrating business to be in. But the Parliamentarians engaged in it are not wasting their time. Preventive diplomacy remains a moral imperative, an economic necessity, a humanitarian must, and a political obligation. The Parliamentarians Network drives this home to governments through its very existence on a daily basis.

In China, there is a story about a doctor, who always cured his patients shortly before they died. For this reason he was famous in the whole valley. There was another doctor, whose patients never fell ill in the first instance. This doctor was unknown. Which doctor do you think was the better one?

Conflicts are essential in order to foster societal change.The yardstick is whether societies manage their conflicts peacefully. Therefore, conflict prevention is not exclusively about preventing violence, it is also about channelling conflicts into peaceful procedures. So conflict prevention is a process rather than a policy.

There is no opposition to preventive diplomacy. In fact, there is a broad consensus about its importance. But experience has shown that rhetorical support for it does not always lead to appropriate action. And where the international community gets engaged, it focuses too much on crisis management and too little on preventive diplomacy; one of the reasons being that crisis management is visible, preventive diplomacy is not: it is quiet diplomacy, it cannot be conducted through the media.

There are two flaws in conflict prevention that the Parliamentarians Network has been trying to overcome: the lack of a prevention lobby in our societies and a lack of a top-down approach in governmental agencies. Remedying these deficits is part of the difficult domestic and international political will-building strategy the Network has been engaged in.

During the next years, tensions and conflicts over access to water and energy continue to endanger stability and security in many parts of the world. Also, the last undivided spaces of the earth: i.e. the cosmos, the oceans, and the cyber space, are likely to cause problems in the future. States with a global vision tend to spread out into these areas, as binding international agreements are lacking in order to regulate the competition here. Furthermore, religious rights of minorities are violated in many regions, especially in Northern Africa and the Middle East. This problem needs special attention, locally and internationally.

The Network should tackle all these challenges through institutionalised dialogue between all stakeholders and with a view to create win-win-situations for all.

Today, we find ourselves in a unique situation in that all decisive forces in world politics, including Russia, China, India and the Muslim world, share, objectively, common basic interests. This is a chance to work for the creation of a cooperative international order by reaching out to decision makers to sensitize them that conflict prevention needs to become part of their decision making. State borders and state power are no longer decisive reference points. Transnational problems require transnational solutions.

In the years to come, the Parliamentarians Network should lead the way in this direction, conscious of what Albert Einstein once said: “Peace cannot be kept by force; it can only be achieved by understanding.”

Click here to read the editorial on the Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention website. 

In 2014, power will be transferred to a new president in Afghanistan. The army of the United States of America will complete its withdrawal and the Afghan National Security Forces will assume responsibility for the country’s security. All these transitions seem precarious.

The new president will have to be a coalescing figure, a Pashtun with cross ethnic support, capable of providing leadership in exceedingly difficult domestic circumstances, and able to work smoothly with external partners—altogether a tall order.

The follow-up to the U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement—the bilateral security agreement defining the status of residual U.S. forces in Afghanistan—is facing hurdles. If the U.S. fails to secure a suitable agreement as in Iraq, it is threatening a “zero option,” which actually demonstrates how thin its options are.

The ANSF may have the numbers and may be performing well but that does not guarantee that it can control the post-U.S. withdrawal situation as a cohesive unit, especially if the U.S. departs under the shadow of a political discord with the Afghan government. The ANSF lacks heavy weaponry, air power and sophisticated intelligence capability.

The economic prospects are uncertain despite external pledges of aid. A potential zero military option would not be compatible with generous long-term economic support. Big investment plans in Afghanistan by regional countries will not only depend on internal stability but also long lead times would preclude any significant immediate impact.

General instability around Afghanistan vitiates prospects too. Pakistan’s internal situation remains fraught despite recent elections. Iran has a new president but the nuclear dossier and attendant sanctions create instability. The Arab world is in turmoil, with the so-called Arab Spring having withered very rapidly. Religious extremism is spreading, and it bolsters the forces at play in Afghanistan.

India is acting responsibly in Afghanistan, supporting the emergence of a sovereign, stable, democratic and prosperous nation where extremist forces are contained and human rights, especially those of women, are respected. India is not interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, arming any particular group, or providing safe havens for terrorists to carry out violent activities against the government.

We have legitimate interests in Afghanistan and every right to be present there. The international community must reject any curtailment of Afghan sovereignty by requiring the Afghan government to give precedence to the interests of any one country over another. It is for the Afghan government to take independent decisions in a responsible manner.

India has established a strategic relationship with Afghanistan that is anchored in a long-term bilateral and regional geo-political perspective. Afghanistan and Central Asia are landlocked, and this poses particularly difficult development challenges. The entire region needs the broadest possible choices for economic partnerships. As southern Asia‘s biggest economy, we can substantially contribute to regional development. Afghanistan has huge mineral resources that await exploitation. India is ready to make large investments in this sector, beginning with iron-ore extraction. This requires easier Indian access to Afghanistan, which Pakistan is as yet unwilling to provide.

India is investing in the Chabahar port in Iran for access to Afghanistan as well as in Central Asia. Sanctions by the U.S. and the European Union on Iran hinder such projects to give Afghanistan alternative options for trade routes and encourage foreign investment there. Indian investments in Iran, directed specifically at stimulating the Afghan economy, which are at present dependent on foreign assistance and income derived from foreign military presence on its soil, should not be opposed by the U.S. government. India took the initiative to organize a Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan in June 2012. India’s bilateral aid to Afghanistan has reached $2 billion. Some external critics see this as an effort to seek undue influence in Afghanistan. If we consider India’s overall foreign assistance program and the billions Indian companies are investing abroad, this is not too large a sum.

The U.S., Britain and other nations are reaching out to the Taliban in a troubling way. The red lines drawn up by the international community for a dialogue with the Taliban are being blurred by Nato’s anxiety to withdraw by 2014, whatever the ground situation. This strengthens the negotiating hands of the Taliban groups in Pakistan as they know time favors them.

The rhetoric remains that the reconciliation process should be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, but direct U.S. overtures to the Taliban discount this. Latest statements from the close circle of President Hamid Karzai express deep concern about potential U.S. understandings with Pakistan on Afghanistan and the possibility of south and eastern Afghanistan being handed over to the Taliban, leading to the country’s division and an all-out conflict.

The end-game in Afghanistan is being played out in an atmosphere of suspicion and bickering amongst the principal players. The manner of the opening of the Taliban’s Doha office has worsened matters. In declaring themselves the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the Taliban made their own end-game clear. The argument that the Taliban’s various currents, including ‘moderate’ ones eligible for accommodation, needs to be questioned after what has transpired in Egypt where the same arguments of distinguishing among the various strands in the Muslim Brotherhood and welcoming its assumption of power (an interim government is running the country now) have been proved wrong.

India does not want conditions of ethnic conflict to be created again in Afghanistan. The root of the problem is external support for Afghan extremists for attaining Pakistan’s military ambitions. So long as safe havens for extremists exist outside Afghanistan, the country will remain under the shadow of violence. It is a hugely perverse notion that the real problem in Afghanistan is the rivalry between India and Pakistan. Those failing in Afghanistan should not point the finger at India. India is not responsible for the rise of religious extremism in the region or the civil war in Afghanistan after the Soviet departure. It did not put the Taliban in power in Kabul or have a hand in sheltering Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. It bears no responsibility for the U.S./Nato military intervention in Afghanistan. The Taliban/Haqqani groups are not killing Nato soldiers at India’s behest. India is not the cause of U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan.

We are not seeking an exclusive relationship with Afghanistan and accept that it should have friendly relations with all its neighbors. India and China are now conversing on Afghanistan. India can discuss Afghanistan with Pakistan constructively, including the question of transit facilities. The new government in Pakistan should think along such lines, rather than allowing the nation’s policies to be guided by the ambitions of its armed forces. We have been constructive in our dealings with the U.S. on Afghanistan and mindful of its interests there, despite serious provocations from Pakistan, including the terrorist attack against our embassy in Kabul. The U.S. should not penalize India’s interests while according Pakistan an enhanced role in Afghanistan.

Apropos the dialogue with the Taliban, the U.S. special envoy for Afghanistan, James Dobbins, said that while the U.S. did not know how this dialogue would develop and whether it would lead to peace, it was worth trying. India would hardly find re-assuring such an uncertain strategy of talking to a retrograde force supported by a State whose truck with terrorism is well known and whose military is bent on advancing its disruptive strategic ambitions in the region. The attack on the consulate in Jalalabad validates our concerns.

Click here to read the article in The Telegraph. 

 

If the overthrow of President Mubarak by the mass of protestors in Tahrir Square in 2011 was a surprise, the ouster of President Morsi by even larger protests in Tahrir Square and across Egypt in recent days is equally dramatic.

Mubarak was in power for 30 years. The people, tired of his repressive and corrupt rule, wanted change. Morsi, in power for only a year, has alienated the people extraordinarily quickly, forcing a regime change.

Morsi, elected as President through a tortuous but reasonably credible democratic process, differed from the manner in which Mubarak assumed and retained power. Those young, social media activists who sought regime change in 2011 may not have intended power to be transferred to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), with the Salafists in tow. But the MB being far more organized and embedded at the grass root level than the more liberal and secular forces responsible for expelling the Mubarak regime, won the election and acquired political legitimacy. Now they have been ousted by what is effectively a military coup.

BROTHERHOOD

This unforeseen development in a country that is the political and cultural heartland of the Arab world cautions against interpreting the nature of forces at play in the Arab world from narrow, self-serving political perspectives.

When political change occurred in Tunisia and Egypt through street protests against dictatorial regimes, it was pre-maturely hailed as the Arab Spring by the West. The Arab world, it was claimed, was moving towards democracy, refuting a widely-held view that Islam and democracy cannot cohabit.

The entry of MB into electoral politics was welcomed as a sign of maturing democratic impulses sweeping the Arab populace. Fine tuned analysis to disarm fears about the implications of this long-banned organization joining politics and aspiring for state power were offered. The MB comprised of various political currents, it was said, with moderates in the ascendant. “Political Islam”, which the MB represented, was seen as the only way that democracy could be ushered into the Arab world. Seen as a hostile force after the Iranian revolution, “political Islam” became a viable and acceptable instrument to promote America’s vocational attachment to the international spread of western style democracy.

Reservations about Morsi were held in abeyance, believing that he could successfully make the transition from military rule to democracy in Egypt. Morsi, in fact, made a fairly positive impression after assuming power, at least externally. He seemed intent on restoring Egypt’s political role in the region, reaching out to Iran, reducing the heavy weight of America on Egypt’s foreign policy, courting China, renewing relations with nonaligned friends of the past like India.

India received him in March this year, signalling our positive view of the political change in Egypt and acceptance of the moderate credentials of the MB. Surprisingly, we found common language on Syria as well as on terrorism in our joint declaration with him.

REVOLT

However, perceived inadequately in their acuteness by the outside world because of tailored international media coverage, serious tensions have apparently been brewing in Egypt because of Morsi government’s policies to islamicize Egyptian institutions and society through appointments and educational and cultural initiatives. With the failure to improve economic conditions, with poverty and unemployment rampant and sectarian strife targeting the Coptic community, public grievance against the Morsi government has been escalating.

Protests against Morsi's Policies - Talaat Harb Square

It did not seem, however, that matters had reached such a dangerous tipping point. Could such truly massive demonstrations that require huge resources, remarkable coordination skills and identifiable leadership occur spontaneously or erupt primarily through the use of social media, especially in an inadequately wired society? Individuals like El Baradei and Amr Moussa, with limited public following, have emerged as the political face of the popular revolt, which leaves many questions unanswered.

COUP

The U.S. seems to have been egging Morsi to bridge growing domestic political differences, with Secretary Kerry, during his March visit to Cairo, while pledging additional aid, calling for restoration of “unity, political stability and economic health to Egypt." Kerry spoke about the “deep concern about the political course of their country, the need to strengthen human rights protections, justice and the rule of law, and their fundamental anxiety about the economic future of Egypt" that political and business leaders conveyed to him. The U.S. Congress reacted sharply in June to the repression of NGO workers—Egyptian and American—assisting Egypt “as it moves down the path towards democracy, democratic training, the building of civil society, and the establishment of the rule of law.”

The Arab Spring has withered at its roots. The political judgment that MB had evolved into a moderate force has proved faulty. That “political Islam” could usher in democracy in the Islamic world has proved to be wrong. Ironically, opening the doors for more democracy in Egypt allowed conservative Islam to walk in and thwart the wishes of a large section of the population.

If the revolt against MB rule in Egypt will reverse the rising tide of conservative Islam in the Arab world on the strength of Gulf wealth and Turkish ambiguities, it would be a welcome development. The immediate prospects in Egypt are, however, bleak as a legitimately elected government has been ousted by the military and the erstwhile President confined. The West is refraining from describing this as a coup, which it is as the Constitution does not empower the Egyptian armed forces to be political arbiters in a crisis, however serious.

The Egyptian military, supposedly trusted by society, is now being castigated by MB activists, as is the U.S. So much for the Arab Spring and Egypt’s much-lauded experiment with democracy with Islamists in charge. The last word to be said may well be a bloody one! 

Click here to read this article in the Daily Mail. 

As part of their “Women, Peace and Security” partnership, EWI’s Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention and Women’s Action for New Directions (WAND) brought together U.S. state legislators and international parliamentarians in Ankara on May 28-30. The purpose of this meeting was to help participants learn from the experiences of Turkish women leaders, and explore ways in which women leaders can better support one another globally. Women in Turkey have successfully gained a place at the highest levels of government.

"We struggle in a different way, but we struggle with the same issues" responded one of the U.S. legislators upon hearing accounts of the difficulties women have in countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan. One of the positive outcomes of this meeting was that members of the U.S. delegation committed to take up the issue of the security needs of women with their respective members in Congress.

Ten U.S. state legislators and six participants hailing from Afghanistan, Morocco, Pakistan and Tunisia gathered for a series of dialogues with Deputy Minister for Family and Social Policy Dr. Aşkın Asan as well as with Turkish parliamentary committees. The aim of the partnership is to create better understanding between these female legislators, to forge personal ties and to educate them on various models and tools available to increase the role each of these women can play in their respective security debates.

The delegation was briefed on the developments in Morocco, which largely escaped the massive demonstrations that the MENA region experienced throughout the Arab Awakening. All eyes are now on Tunisia, which will be voting on its new constitution in a few weeks. The outcome of this process will be pivotal in determining the success of the regional revolution.

In debating the barriers to women reaching the higher levels of policy making, the delegation quizzed Deputy Minister Asan. Particularly, they wanted to know what steps the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) is taking to promote the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, adopted in 2000. The resolution requires United Nations member states to incorporate women into peace processes and negotiations.

A conference held in Istanbul two years ago entitled “Change in Muslim Societies and the Role of Women” produced an agreement on the establishment of a gender-equality institute, but unfortunately the rhetorical support for the creation of this institute has not been followed up by concrete steps. The partnership will seek to further press governments on the implementation of this agreement and will seek to establish a relationship with the Parliamentary Union of the OIC member States (PUIC) to further engage women in the vital debates on conflict prevention, peace and security.

Click here to read a write-up by one of the event's participants, in the Georgia Senate Press. 

  

Visiting China is a never-ending revelation; the amazing 7.7 percent growth rate in a sluggish global economy is considered ‘disappointing’ there. Of China’s 31 provinces, Guangdong has the highest GDP – US$960 billion with a growth rate of 8.2 percent – while Tibet is lowest with 12 percent growth rate and a GDP of US$11 billion.

The Guizhou province has the highest growth rate (12 percent). Xinjiang, bordering Pakistan and vastly underdeveloped, is 25th with US$121 billion and a 12 percent growth rate. The expanse of the two bustling ever-growing mega cities of Beijing or Shanghai is truly outstanding with enormous public infrastructure delivering efficient services to its citizens.

An early morning (7:15am) extempore briefing by CH Tung at the EastWest Institute’s 2013 ‘spring’ board meeting in Beijing from May 15 to May 17 was a treat. The shipping magnate became Hong Kong’s chief executive in 1999 when the city was handed back to China by the UK. Born on July 8, 1937 – the day Japan and China went to war – Tung gave an insightful historical and cultural perspective into China describing the determined mindset influencing China’s drive to soon become the most prosperous country in the world.

Certainly important to peace and prosperity in the world, the US-China competition is presently peaceful but has ominous military overtones because of the growing number of flashpoints on China’s periphery. The US is mired in Cold War relationships that it cannot seem to shed. Of greater concern to us are Pakistan’s present and future ties with China.

China’s only opening to the world was symbolised best by Pakistan facilitating its first top-level contact with the US – Henry Kissinger’s famous secret trip to China in July 1971 changed the strategic dynamics of the world. Chinese PM Chou En-Lai reportedly told Kissinger, “Do not forget the bridge (meaning Pakistan) you have used, you may have to use it again.” Unfortunately our record with the US is spotty, every ten years or so Pakistan goes from being a ‘cornerstone’ to a ‘gravestone’.

The Chinese leaders from the 1970s are retired octogenarians now. However, China has not forgotten the ‘bridge’ that Pakistan is, at least at the strategic level. The proposed Pak-China economic corridor linking Gwadar Port with Xinjiang and other parts of China will involve both road and rail links, with both optic fibre and oil pipelines for boosting energy, trade and transport between the two countries. Initially investing over US$20 billion creating a ‘Special Economic Zone’ in Xinjiang, China’s keenness to have another trade outlet to the Indian Ocean is cementing its historic ties with Pakistan.

The transit time will be reduced from weeks and months to three to four days only, creating an economic windfall for Pakistan, particularly in less developed Balochistan. Pakistan’s salvation requires major investment in infrastructure. With the US pulling out of Afghanistan by 2014, the Afghan economy will go into a tailspin. Only an economic overdrive can contain the spill over of the desperate poverty. Militarily we will be hard-pressed, force-multiplied further if we fail to create economic opportunities for our people as well as the Afghans.

The high point of my current visit to China was meeting up with retired ambassador Zhang Chun Xiang. Four decades ago he was an interpreter with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) divisions constructing the tremendous Karakoram Highway (KKH) in the highest mountains in the world. Pakistan Army Aviation’s KKH Flight was in support with two Aloutte-3 helicopters.

Ambassador Zhang speaks fluent Urdu and is not averse to choice Punjabi expletives if and when the need arises. He served as the Chinese consul general in Houston, retiring as China’s ambassador to Hungary. His 23 years of service in Pakistan includes stints with the Chinese consulate general in Karachi and the Chinese embassy in Islamabad. His last posting in Pakistan was as ambassador. Now in an advisory capacity with major Chinese technological group Huawei, Zhang still advises on Chinese policies in South Asia.

The EastWest Institute honoured Ambassador Zhang by his brief presence at the EWI Board meeting. People like Zhang have kept the friendship alive not only between individuals but countries, our mutual association being highly symbolic of the continuing friendship between China and Pakistan. Emotions and feelings will always drive relationships between nations. And, more importantly, core interests must coincide – and better still, not diverge.

The disappointment in Pakistan that Chinese PM Li Keqiang chose India as his first stop as prime minister (with Islamabad to follow later) is more perception than fact. We should not be apprehensive of China-India relations; they will have no negative consequences for Pakistan. Similarly we cannot condition our ties with the US on its ties with India – the dynamics are different particularly given the economic connotations. Our ties with China will become stronger as mutual economic initiatives increasingly dovetail into their geo-political compulsions. Take India’s questioning of the Chinese policy of issuing stapled visas to residents of Indian-occupied Kashmir in contrast to giving normal visas to citizens of the Pakistan-administered side. India says China is taking Pakistan’s side in the dispute. That is true!

India’s trade with China exceeds US$66 billion but unresolved border disputes remain. Historically China is a restraining factor to India’s normal aggressive posture vis-à-vis Pakistan. India’s apprehensions about Gwadar are neither justified nor warranted. The Chinese PM will possibly underscore the port’s importance to China, not as a forward military base but an energy and trade junction providing a vital economic outlet for the country. Regional peace and stability requires we address contentious issues that bedevil relations, like Kashmir, between India and Pakistan. Given that we can never come to an agreement over Kashmir, what is stopping us from coming to an arrangement?

To quote Director Sun Shi-Lai of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences “Pakistan can cast great influence on Islamic countries and serve as a bridge between China and the Middle East.” Fortunately China’s self-interest and our national interest coincide, reinforcing mutual commitment as “all-weather” friends (to quote Chinese FM Wang Yi). Our friendship is definitely a ‘cornerstone’ of Chinese foreign policy. With over US$20 billion being invested in Xinjiang this year alone, China’s opening to the Indian Ocean is not only a dream of prosperity for China and Pakistan but a dire necessity.

The Chinese suffered many casualties during the construction of the KKH. As helicopter pilots it was our unpleasant duty to ferry the injured for medical aid – some of them with fatal injuries. For me personally at that time it was a road coming from nowhere and going nowhere. The proximity to blood and gore on a daily basis does get to you. After one particularly harrowing day I angrily asked Zhang, “What is with you Chinese? Why are you killing yourselves for this road?” His calm reply is forever etched in my memory, “You Pakistanis cannot think beyond 10 years, us Chinese dream beyond a 100 years!”

What stops us Pakistanis from dreaming too?

Ikram Sehgal is a security analyst and chairman of PATHFINDER GROUP.

To read full published article, click here.

Can you outline the basic tenets of the Arms Trade Treaty and discuss what it aims to accomplish?

Prior to the arms trade treaty, there was no real global set of rules governing the trade, export or transport of conventional weapons. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) sets up standards for the cross-border transfer of eight categories of weapons; tanks, combat vehicles, all the way down to small and light weapons. It seeks to curb the irresponsible and illegal trade of weapons and prevent their sale into illicit markets.

Prior to authorizing any sale of weapons, the exporter has to assess whether the transfer is going to be used to facilitate or commit genocide, crimes against humanity, or other international humanitarian laws. If there is a known risk, they are prohibited from making that sale or transfer. Countries will then be held accountable through annual reporting requirements on arms transfers.

What are some objections to the treaty? Can you summarize the treaty’s main limitations?

The three countries that objected to the treaty are North Korea, Iran and Syria. I should say that the objections that these three countries held were echoed by a number of other countries. North Korea didn’t like the idea that exporters would be judging the humanitarian rights record of the importing countries. Iran, for their part, said that, “they didn’t approve of the transfer of conventional arms to foreign occupiers,” which is a thinly veiled reference to Israel. Syria objected because they didn’t like the fact that transfers or exports to armed groups or non-state actors (e.g. rebels in Syria) were not covered.

The treaty is also criticized for its relatively narrow scope; it doesn’t cover gifts and loans, which is a significant loophole. Furthermore, there’s no enforcement mechanism – that’s left to states to resolve.

Though the United States, the world's biggest arms exporter, voted yes on Tuesday, what are the chances of the U.S. ratifying the treaty? There’s stiff resistance from the National Rifle Association and conservatives in the Senate, where it needs a two-thirds majority to win ratification.

The focus of this treaty is entirely on the international trade and transfer of conventional weapons. The preamble of the ATT explicitly acknowledges that states retain their sovereignty and their authority to regulate the internal transfer and internal domestic possession of conventional weapons. It no way infringes upon private ownership. In fact, the American Bar Association was commissioned to do an analysis of the ATT and they found that the treaty is entirely consistent with the Second Amendment.

In the short term, there will definitely be opposition to the treaty in the U.S. The New York Times reports that over 50 senators are against it. So I don’t think this is going to happen anytime soon. But in the long term, the position of the NRA and other treaty opponents will likely be undermined. The current gun safety debate in the U.S., triggered by the Newtown massacre, weakens their position. And considering the fact that the only three countries that currently oppose the treaty are Iran, Syria and the North Korea, the NRA’s alignment with that trio certainly does not put them in a good light.

Why have Russia and China, two leading sellers of conventional weapons, abstained from voting? What does this mean for export control?

In short, China was opposed to the fact that the treaty was approved in a setting that did not allow every state veto power. It was previously negotiated at the UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, but consensus was blocked by opposition from Iran, North Korea and Syria. The ATT was then moved to the UN General Assembly, which requires only a simple majority to adopt a treaty. Wary of establishing a precedent, China argued that this move weakened the treaty.

Russia, for its part, felt that a number of the definitions, such as the term “genocide,” were not sufficiently clarified. Should these definitions be more appropriately defined, I believe it would be more acceptable to the Russians.

Russia is the second largest exporter of conventional weapons and China the fifth largest. The fact that these two countries did not approve the treaty outright obviously does not bode well for its implementation.

Anna MacDonald, the head of arms control for Oxfam International, has said, “This treaty won’t solve the problems of Syria overnight…but it will help to prevent future Syrias.” How might this treaty affect the current situation in Syria, if it were to be ratified today, and how might it prevent armed violence in the future?

Even by the most optimistic estimates, we are still one to two years away from this treaty’s ratification and entry into force. If it did enter into force today, it would make Russian sales of weapons to Syria much more difficult. Eventually, post-ratification, this will develop into an international norm. This is what happened with nuclear weapons, biological weapons and chemical weapons. It takes years, but eventually, it will develop into a norm, and this will raise political costs for countries that contravene the norm.

Another thing that the treaty will do is publicly name violators, ostracizing these countries within the international community. In terms of preventing future Syrias, the treaty will fill gaps that currently exist in the global arms trade. Only about 50 countries currently have related laws on the books, so once this treaty is approved with broad support from the international community, it will serve to diminish the now flourishing illicit market for these weapons.

What challenges will stand in the way of effective enforcement of this treaty?

It remains to be seen if countries are willing to subordinate their economic interests to fulfill their obligations under this treaty, so it’s entirely likely that countries will enact laws on the books without enforcing them. We saw this with China’s national export control system in the 90s and well into 2000s; they had laws on the books but they lacked the will or the capacity to enforce many of them. As a result, Chinese missile and nuclear weapons technology found its way into illicit markets.

It’s going to take some significant work on the part of the international community to push countries to actively enforce this treaty and fill these gaps. The ATT is a good start, but it’s a framework for international export control systems; more work needs to be done to build a robust regime that prevents these guns and weapons from falling into the wrong hands.

EastWest Direct is an ongoing series of interviews with EWI experts tied to breaking news stories.