Middle East & North Africa

Two years ago, EastWest Institute President John Edwin Mroz warned about the looming water crisis in the Republic of Yemen.  Unfortunately, little has improved.  Despite much international attention and a change in regime, Yemen remains in a dire situation, positioned as the first country to run out of water. Enormous consumption coupled with poor management and a growing population places a tremendous strain on already diminished water supplies.

Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the region with a nominal per capita GDP of 1460 USD and an annual growth rate of -2.5%. The low-income country is dependent on rapidly declining oil resources. Yemen’s unemployment rate is among the highest in the world, and economic insecurity is exacerbated by the high population growth rate. The vast majority of citizens are below the age of thirty.

The political and economic challenges of Yemen are compounded by a looming ecological disaster. Annual per capita water availability in Yemen is 115 m3; this is less than 10% of the regional average and 2% of the world average. In rural areas, only 38% of the people have access to safe water, and the corresponding figure for urban areas is 59%. With no permanent rivers, the country depends largely on groundwater extraction as well as rainfall and its diversion. Annual groundwater withdrawal (from wells and springs) exceeds recharge at an alarming rate. Approximately 90% of all water consumed is in the agricultural sector.   

To address concerns regarding dwindling water resources and its management, the government of Yemen established the National Water Resources Authority (NWRA) in 1995 and the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) in 2003. Following the creation of the MWE, the government developed the National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program, 2005-2009 (NWSSIP), which outlines objectives, policies and approaches as well as plans of action. In 2002, the House of Representatives accepted the Water Law, which describes a licensing procedure for wells.

Reducing the gap between consumption and available renewable resources is a governmental priority. One way is by increasing the efficiency of water use. Irrigation efficiency is as low as 30%. Several projects have sought to install more efficient localized irrigation systems, but the costs are high. To enhance water conveyance and distribution efficiency, the government has replaced traditional, earthen canals with PVC and GI pipes. The FAO estimates that irrigation efficiency could reach 60% by constructing a conveyance pipe system and over 80% by utilizing localized irrigation systems, which would further increase average yields of crops.

The government is already investing in groundwater recharge and harvesting techniques. Yemen also has the longest sea coasts, introducing the possibility of desalination as utilized in other Gulf countries, though transportation of water from the coastline to the highlands still poses a problem.

International donors have been active in Yemen, working closely with the government to achieve the goals of NWSSIP. Germany, the Netherlands and the World Bank are financing a number of projects as well as assisting in the development of comprehensive water policies;  other countries, such as Japan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, provide significant bilateral foreign aid for development projects and humanitarian needs. Established in January 2010, ‘Friends of Yemen’ recently met in Riyadh to reaffirm their commitment to the country. The group of forty countries and intergovernmental organizations pledged a total of 4 billion USD, 3.25 billion USD from the KSA alone. The United States government intends to provide at least 118 million USD in civilian assistance to Yemen this year.

Through the combined efforts of the international donor community and national agencies, there have been some notable changes in water management in Yemen. Decentralization of water management has led to the creation of Water User Groups (WUGs), Water Users Associations (WUAs) and Water User Ligaments (WULs). Such groups manage resources locally, concerning themselves with a broad range of measures like the location and depth of wells, recharge measures and management of reservoirs. Delegates from these institutions are then supposed to form larger committees at the basin level with government officials, creating a bridge between local and federal authorities.

Despite all these efforts, there are many obstacles to the adaption of an effective water management plan in Yemen. With the political unrest and the dire situation of the economy, the already weak government is more than stretched. As a new agency in the young state, the NWRA is still in the capacity-building stage. Despite formulating a comprehensive theoretical basis on water management and gaining support from the international community, the NWRA hasn’t been particularly effective to date. The overstaffed agency has yet to establish a presence in each of the twenty-two governorates or to demonstrate its overall competence. The Water Law of 2002 is not sufficiently monitored; violations, including unlicensed drilling, occur frequently. The agency is also weakened by the ongoing power struggle between the state and the tribal authorities, who often resist laws and regulations of the central government. 

Because agriculture accounts for the most water usage, the MWE must work closely with the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MAI). But the attempts to increase cooperation between the two ministries haven’t produced many tangible results. In late 2007, the Yemeni government formed an Inter Ministerial Committee (IMSC) to coordinate integrated water resource management between MWE, MAI, the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Ministry of Local Administration (MoLA), and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC). However, the IMSC has rarely convened, and when it has, it has been at the request of international donors.

Management of water resources ultimately is a Yemen livelihood issue, and thus ownership of the solution must come from within the state.  There remains a need for strong coordination between the various ministries involved. Water is a cross-cutting issue, and its management must be at the forefront of national policy. The international community--in particular, Saudi Arabia--should work closely with the Yemeni government to reevaluate current water policies. The need is both glaringly evident and long overdue.

His last post as part of the United States Forces—Iraq was as Director of Strategic Effects. In this capacity, he coordinated and implemented political, economic and communications activities on behalf of USF-I.

Though he could not be quoted directly, Buchanan offered a statement on his time in the country as well as his expectations for Iraq’s future:

As the USF-I Spokesman from 2010-2011, one of the most frequent questions I got was: “Was it worth it?”  I think that’s the wrong question because it’s such an individual question, and the answer depends entirely on an individual perspective.  I think that the more appropriate question is: ”Was it worthwhile?” The problem with that question is that I think it’s too early to properly answer it.  I think that it will take another five or ten years before we really know whether it was worthwhile or not.

The Iraqis now have a tremendous set of opportunities that they never had in the past. They have the opportunity to choose their own form of government, and for the first time in their history, the people have a real voice in their future. They have an opportunity to rejoin the region, and in a larger sense, all of the nations of the world. From that perspective, they can move from the isolated position they occupied in 2003—from that as an oppressive force to their neighbors—to a neighbor who helps solve rather than create problems.  They have an opportunity to develop and modernize their economy and use their resources for the betterment of all Iraqis, rather than to funnel those funds only to a corrupt political party.  They have the opportunity to have security forces that serve and protect the people and safeguard democracy rather than the Saddam’s forces who oppressed, gassed, and murdered their own citizens by the thousands.  The people also have the freedom to express themselves and demonstrate when they see injustice or a failure of the Iraqi systems, a right they never had in the past.

Perhaps most importantly, they now live in a growing democracy and have the real freedom to choose.  We don’t know, however, what choices they will make.  The positive changes in the growth of democratic values, maturation of the political process, the growth of industry and the economy, and the increase of security I’ve seen over the last nine years all combine to make me optimistic for the future.  The Iraqi people do not yet have what they deserve, but I think they’re headed in the right direction and I’m very hopeful about the future.  I don’t think we can really say whether it was all worthwhile, though, until we see what choices they make.

Lastly, I don’t think that any of us should forget about the incredible sacrifices made by both the Iraqi and American people to bring all of these changes, and in fact, opportunities, into reality.  The cost has been high and I hope that none of us ever forget that cost.  The best way that we can honor all of that sacrifice is to continue to make choices that are good for both Iraq and the United States.     

This visit builds on an ongoing two-year effort of EWI’s Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention to strengthen the role of women in political life, and in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Afghanistan in particular.

Over the course of two days the  parliamentarians, led by Shahnaz Wazir Ali, Member of Pakistan's National Assembly and Special Assistant to the Prime Minister,  discussed issues related to reconciliation with the Taliban and regional economic cooperation with Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Masoom Stanikzai, Advisor to the President on Internal Security and Head of the Secretariat for Afghanistan's High Peace Council, Zalmai Rassoul, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, Haji Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, the Speaker of the Lower House, and members of the Wolesi Jirga Commission on Women’s Affairs, Civil Society and Human Rights.

Though Afghan women parliamentarians make up nearly a third of seats in parliament, they struggle to make their voices heard in a male-dominated environment. Pakistani women parliamentarians work in a similar cultural, religious, and social context, yet they have made  far more political headway. Afghan women parliamentarians have called for more support from their colleagues in the region, and EWI’s Parliamentarians Network has facilitated a series of dialogues to answer that call.

This delegation is the first step in implementing the Islamabad Action Plan, a set of commitments outlined by Afghan and Pakistani women parliamentarians during their previous meeting in Islamabad in June 2011, which was also facilitated by EWI.

In the meeting with President Karzai, the Afghan leader declared: “This initiative is of immense importance to both countries and a great sign of a better future.” He called for more contacts between women parliamentarians in both countries, saying that such visits are “instrumental in strengthening of trust-building between the two nations.”

Women are critical players in the ongoing peace and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, often serving as agents of positive change in the region.  “Without women, no progress can be made in society,” Stanikzai added. Participants strongly endorsed the recommendation to ensure greater representation of women in all tracks of diplomacy.

Joint challenges, from extremism and terrorism to economic underdevelopment, should be addressed by joint efforts, according to the participants. The Taliban attacks on Kabul during the parliamentary visit served as a stark reminder of the work that remains to be done. These attacks, the Taliban’s broadest assault on Kabul in more than a decade, fired at the Afghan parliament only hours after the meeting came to a close.

As the international military presence winds down and Afghanistan sets to assume responsibility over its security in 2014, many – including participants in the meetings – fear a return to Taliban rule, and a subsequent retraction of women’s rights. While emphasizing the importance of engaging with those Taliban who are willing to negotiate and constructively discuss a peaceful resolution, Rassoul and Stanikzai both emphasized that the Taliban must accept the 2004 Afghan constitution which recognizes that women and men have equal rights and responsibilities under the law.

Participants suggested that an inclusive forum where Afghan women parliamentarians can develop a common agenda and work jointly, such as a women’s parliamentary caucus, would enable them to maximize their influence. “Only if women work together will they have their voices heard and safeguard their rights,” one participant said.

The Commission on Women’s Affairs, Civil Society and Human Rights, one of eighteen permanent commissions of the Afghan parliament, has made impressive strides – most notably, by its recent successful push for a decree on combating violence against women. But because of the way parliamentary groups are structured, not all women parliamentarians are able to participate in such efforts.  To help change that, participants committed to taking steps towards the creation of an inclusive women’s group in the Afghan parliament, an initiative that has the backing of President Karzai. Participants speaking for Pakistan’s WPC pledged their ongoing support to their Afghan colleagues and invited them to Islamabad for an EWI-facilitated follow-up visit later this year.

The nuclear disarmament consultation, convened by EWI, The Global Security Institute and the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies marked the third anniversary of Ban's speech at a similar meeting in 2008, in which he unveiled a plan for nuclear arms reduction worldwide.

The report includes a summary of the topics discussed and transcripts of remarks by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, among others.

Quoting from the synopsis:

Three years after launching his Five Point Proposal for the elimination of nuclear weapons, which included support for a nuclear weapons convention, the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, returned to the same forum on UN Day 2011 in UN headquarters in New York to observe that states have failed in their commitments. He observed: “Here we are. Tens of thousands of nuclear weapons remain. New ones are being designed and built every day. And to what purpose?” He went on to say, “As Secretary-General, I want to bring disarmament down to earth. Instead of hearing the word ‘disarmament’ floating in the air, I want to see disarmament facts on the ground. This is what inspired my five point plan for action.” 

When the street rose against the entrenched regimes of Tunisia and Egypt and toppled them there was enthusiastic references to an 'Arab Spring'.

The nature of the political upsurge in these two countries was defined by western observers from their perspective as a movement in favour of democratic change by the urban middle class youth mobilised through the social media, and this description was accepted by the rest of the world without making an independent judgment.

If it was the West that had long backed the old regimes, it was they again that interpreted for the rest the character of the popular revolt against them.

Click here to read the rest of Kanwal Sibal's column at MailOnline India.

The Israeli prime minister is invoking the lessons of history to make the strongest possible case against Iran, even if that means deliberately overstating the putative equivalency between that country and Nazi Germany. With President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's regime steadily moving closer to acquiring nuclear weapons while continuing to encourage its followers to chant "Death to Israel," Netanyahu can hardly be blamed for taking those threats seriously.

But what are the real lessons of history -- and what do they tell us about how we need to conduct ourselves today?

On that score, there's strong supporting evidence for Netanyahu's broader point about the dangers of underestimating the threat from regimes spouting radical rhetoric, but less than convincing evidence that history offers a clear guide to what constitutes a sensible course of action.

Although it seems incredible now, many people initially saw Hitler as a bizarre, effeminate politician who would never be in a position to inflict real harm -- or, later, as a pragmatic leader we could deal with.

This was true not just of the British and French leaders who signed the infamous Munich Pact of 1938, which led to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As I point out in my new bookHitlerland: American Eyewitnesses to the Nazi Rise to Power, it was also true of many Americans who lived and worked in Germany.

Dorothy Thompson, America's most famous woman foreign correspondent of that era, interviewed Hitler in November 1931, fourteen months before he became chancellor. She entered the room expecting to meet the future dictator of Germany, but "in something less than fifty seconds I was quite sure I was not," she wrote. Struck by the "startling insignificance of the man" who is "inconsequent and voluble, ill-poised, insecure," she predicted: "If Hitler comes into power, he will smite only the weakest of his enemies."

German politicians often made the same mistake. Franz von Papen, the vice chancellor who helped engineer Hitler's appointment to the top job, told his friends: "We have hired Hitler" -- in other words, he would be easily manipulated.

In many cases, even German Jews refused to take Hitler seriously. Paul Drey, a Bavarian from a distinguished Bavarian Jewish family who worked for the U.S. Consulate in Munich, wrote off the Nazis' early successes as "a temporary madness," insisting that Germans were "too intelligent to be taken in by such scamps." Drey would die in Dachau.

To be sure, there were those who sensed Hitler's dangerous potential right from the start. Captain Truman Smith, a junior U.S. military attaché, first met the little known Nazi leader in 1922, immediately warning that he was "a marvelous demagogue" who could go far. And along with many of her journalistic and diplomatic colleagues, Thompson radically revised her view of Hitler as soon as he seized dictatorial powers.

Still, when it came to resisting Hitler's expansionist aims, there was plenty of disagreement. Perceptive journalists like William Shirer of CBS despaired that visitors from Paris, London and New York took at face value Hitler's protestations that his intentions were peaceful. "Peace?" he wrote in his diary in 1937. "Read Mein Kampf, brothers."

But most outsiders didn't read Mein Kampf, and even among those who did there was no consensus on whether its vitriolic attacks on Jews, democracy and bolshevism, along with Hitler's stated ambitions to conquer vast territories in the east, should be taken literally or viewed as merely a cynical electoral ploy.

All of which, Netanyahu argues, stands as proof that the greatest danger is to discount the new threats of our era. But 1938 has been invoked before as justification for military action, at times with tragic results. As President Lyndon Johnson escalated the war in Vietnam, he claimed that he was seeking to avert another Munich. To this day, the country is split over whether the ensuing loss of American lives and treasure was justified at any point or a disaster from start to finish.

It isn't easy to determine which situations demand the kind of forceful action to stop a potential aggressor that was so woefully lacking in the 1930s. Netanyahu is right that history teaches us that we ignore the fiery rhetoric of radical regimes at our own peril. Unfortunately, though, history -- especially the history of the Nazi era -- doesn't offer many immediate lessons beyond that.

It certainly doesn't tell us what we really want to know: whether we are making the same mistake today with Iran -- or is the situation so different that a bigger mistake would be to overreact.

Andrew Nagorski, vice president and director of public policy at the EastWest Institute, is author of the forthcoming Hitlerland: American Eyewitnesses to the Nazi Rise to Power.

Click here to visit his website.

Click here to read this piece in The Huffington Post.

Moderated by EWI’s Andrew Nagorski, the conversation provided the audience a window into some of the previously unknown details of the Obama administration’s diplomatic outreach to Iran. With access to over 70 high-ranking officials from the U.S., Iran, Europe, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Brazil—including the top American and Iranian negotiators—Parsi explored the real reasons for the collapse of diplomatic efforts between the United States and Iran.

During his talk, Parsi laid out the series of events that unfolded in the first two years of the Obama presidency, starting with Obama’s offer, 12 minutes into his presidency, of the hand of American friendship to those willing to unclench their fist. However, the legacy of bitter distrust between Iran and the United States, and the skepticism of others that a deal could be negotiated, eroded any initial optimism.  As Parsi put it: “Many wished Obama well but few wished him success.”

Parsi pointed out that serious talks were delayed until after the 2009 Iranian presidential election. Then, when the widespread allegations of fraud triggered mass protests, it became increasingly difficult for Washington and Tehran to focus on the nuclear issue on its own terms.  For various reasons—including the continued technical progression of Iran’s enrichment capabilities and the hardening of attitudes towards Iran in the West—any deal needed to work right away. As a senior State Department official told Parsi, “Our Iran diplomacy was a gamble on a single roll of the dice.”

That roll of the dice came in the form of what was meant to be a confidence building measure, a nuclear fuel swap where Iran would ship out 1200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium (LEU) in return for fuel rods. The fuel rods were for its Tehran Research Reactor, which produces medical isotopes for Iran’s cancer patients.  The West and Iran could not come to terms, but then Brazil and Turkey stepped in to broker a deal they thought would be acceptable to both sides. By then, however, the facts on the ground had changed.  Iran had almost doubled its LEU since talks first began, and the U.S. had won international backing for strong sanctions. As Parsi explained, the Obama administration had opted for sanctions instead of a political deal because it believed diplomacy had failed.

Parsi argued that diplomacy was never pursued as far as it should have been, and unreasonably optimistic early expectations may have contributed to the failure of this effort. ”Negotiations such as these succeed not because the proposals are flawless or because both sides play fair, but because the many flaws associated with the talks are overcome by the political will to reach a solution,” he said.

With tensions and harsh rhetoric escalating on both sides amid increasing speculation about a possible Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, Parsi warned that sanctions could backfire. One result could be that Tehran would walk away from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since all of the current information the West knows about Iran’s nuclear program comes from IAEA inspections and reports, he added, this would create an even more dangerous situation where Washington and others would  be left guessing about what is really happening on the ground—and, in all likelihood, assuming the worst.

Click here to visit Trita Parsi's web site.

Rights groups are estimating that some 7,000 civilians have been killed in Syria since March 2011, and the regime’s military response has intensified even further following the Russian and Chinese veto in the U.N. Security Council of a resolution that backed an Arab peace plan aimed at stopping the violence. Assad’s latest call for a Feb. 26 national referendum on a new draft constitution that would end the Baath party’s monopoly on power was quickly dismissed by the Syrian opposition and Western powers alike. The window for a political settlement seems to be quickly closing, bringing Syria even deeper into a civil war and threatening to enflame an already tense neighborhood.

Fifty-two miles west of Damascus, the Lebanese government in Beirut is following these developments with interest and worry but has not joined the Arab League or Western states in calling for Assad to step down. Lebanese officials have made it clear that Lebanon could never support a U.N. resolution that would allow the international community to intervene to resolve the crisis in Syria, mostly for fear of negative repercussions this might have on Lebanon. In fact, when the Syrian question first came to the Security Council last year, Lebanon dissociated itself from the presidential statement condemning Syria and has followed suit in the Arab League as well.

Most recently, Lebanese Foreign Affairs Minister Adnan Mansour announced that Lebanon would not attend the “Friends of Syria” conference due to be held in the Tunisian capital Tunis on Feb. 24, stating: “in harmony with our decision to disassociate Lebanon from developments in Syria, we will not join the conference in Tunis.”

Long-standing, polarizing divisions between supporters and opponents of the Syrian regime have forced the government in Beirut to pursue this policy of “dissociation” from the turmoil next door. But as refugees cross the border to escape the violence and weapons and fighters pour freely through the smuggling routes that have long connected Lebanon with Syrian towns now at the center of conflict—such as Homs and Zabadani—the idea that Lebanon can dissociate itself from what is happening next door looks increasingly like wishful thinking.

What all political parties in Lebanon seem to agree on is that widespread instability in Syria—or worse, a sectarian civil war—poses the most significant threat to Lebanon. Lebanese actors across the sectarian spectrum share the perception that Syria’s potential descent into chaos would not be in their strategic interest and, by dissociating the country from the Syrian unrest, are seeking to insulate Lebanon from its neighbor’s instability. This view stems from the concern that massive unrest in Syria could spill over into Lebanon, disrupting the country’s fragile status quo by provoking widespread sectarian strife.

However, Lebanese consensus on core national interests vis-a-vis Syria does not go much further. As with most issues in Lebanon, Syria’s unrest is viewed through a sectarian lens, and significant differences characterize Lebanon’s key political actors and religious communities.

Relations With the Syrian Opposition

The differences were most visible on Jan. 25 when the opposition Syrian National Council issued an open letter to the Lebanese people, stressing that it seeks to establish strong ties between Syria and Lebanon that respect the sovereignty and independence of each country. In the letter, the group pledged to end the “security-intelligence role that has meddled in Lebanese affairs and to thwart the smuggling of arms across the border.” It also proposed the formation of a joint investigation committee that would tackle the case of Lebanese prisoners in Syrian jails, adding that “the Lebanese–Syrian Higher Council would be dissolved and agreements between the two countries would be revised.” The letter continued: “Democracy in Syria is the best support for Lebanon’s independence; it is an opportunity to put an end to the dark chapter of Lebanese–Syrian ties that have been marred by Syria’s dictatorial regime that has practiced the ugliest forms of meddling and hegemony.”

The letter addressed some of the most important issues that have plagued Syrian–Lebanese relations for decades and pledged to end the special relationship that has heavily favored Syria since the conclusion of the Taif Accord that ended the Lebanese civil war in 1989. It did not, however, generate the response that the Syrian National Council was hoping for. The Lebanese response predictably followed the lines of Lebanese politics set by the March 8 Alliance and the March 14 Alliance, respectively named after the dates of pro- and anti-Syrian demonstrations that followed the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, blamed by some on Damascus.

The opposition March 14 Alliance—led by former Prime Minister Saad Hariri, son of the slain former Premier Rafik Hariri and comprised of both Sunni and Christian elements—has reacted favorably to the council’s letter, calling it a “courageous step… that puts Lebanese–Syrian relations on the right political track.” The March 14 Alliance has also supported Syrian protestors’ calls for Assad to leave, though Saad Hariri’s Sunni Future Movement has carefully calibrated its opposition to Assad so as not to provoke retaliation should the regime survive.

However, while the Sunni elements of March 14 unequivocally support Assad’s ouster, their Christian allies are less certain about post-Assad Syria. Lebanon’s Maronite patriarch recently cited “transition” in Syria as a potential threat to Arab Christians across the region. He called for Assad to be given more leeway to implement reforms, sparking significant controversy within the Christian community.

The Role of Hezbollah

Hezbollah, on the other hand, maintains a key strategic alliance with Damascus, as its core interests lie in the Assad regime’s survival. Aside from the potential loss of a strategic ally, Hezbollah’s concerns over Syrian unrest also reflect the mounting threat to the organization’s credibility, both in Lebanon and the region. Increasingly, Hezbollah has been placed in the seemingly contradictory position of stridently supporting Arab uprisings elsewhere, but remaining conspicuously quiet on Syria. In recent speeches, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has tempered his support for the Syrian regime with tepid calls for reform and a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Nonetheless, Hezbollah’s double standard threatens real damage to its regional standing.

Hezbollah’s allies, including its Christian partners in the March 8 bloc, thus far share Hezbollah’s position on Syria. Indeed, Amal leader and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, has staked out an even tougher position than Hezbollah in support of Syria. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s Christian allies—namely General Michel Aoun—reflect deepening disquiet within the Christian community over the potential threat to their Syrian co-religionists posed by a post-Assad Syria.

The conflict in Syria can inflame inter-communal tensions in Lebanon, visible almost daily in pro- and anti-Assad rallies throughout the country. That was recently highlighted when two people were killed in the northern city of Tripoli during clashes between Jabal Mohsen, a predominantly Alawite neighborhood like the regime in Damascus, and Bab al-Tabbaneh, one which is Sunni Muslim, like the majority of Syria’s protest movement.

Lebanon’s fate is deeply intertwined with Syria’s ultimate destiny, and Syria’s endgame will have a decisive impact on Lebanon, potentially reconfiguring the balance of power between the two countries and reshaping the Lebanese political arena. For now, the Lebanese army has been quick to take action to prevent incidents like the Tripoli clashes from escalating further, reflecting a widespread desire inside the country to ensure security and stability. But, as Michael Williams, a fellow at Chatham House and former U.N. Special Coordinator for Lebanon recently put it: “The situation in Syria is deteriorating all the time, and there’s no way that Lebanon can be immune from that.” If Lebanese politicians want to ensure long term stability in the country, they urgently need to reach a consensus on how to deal with the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition going forward.

Raymond Karam is a program assistant for EWI's Regional Security Initiative.

At a meeting in Brussels on Jan. 23, EU foreign ministers, agreed on a ban on the transport, purchase and import into Europe of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products, and related finance and insurance. In a joint statement, British Prime Minister David Cameron, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel said Iran had “failed to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program.”

In order to provide struggling European economies enough time to find alternative suppliers, the agreement allows already concluded contracts to be executed until July 1, 2012. The measures will also be reviewed before May 1 to assess the impact of the embargo on countries such as Greece, which is facing financial collapse and has sought compensatory measures from the rest of the EU before agreeing to the embargo.

The sanctions ban the export of key technology for the energy sector and new investment in Iranian petrochemical firms and their joint ventures.

The EU also froze the assets of the Iran's central bank in the EU and banned trade in gold, precious metals and diamonds with Iranian public bodies and the central bank.

In addition, the sanctions bar the sale to Iran of more “sensitive dual use” goods—those that can have a military or security application. They add three people to a list of people targeted by asset freezes and visa bans, and freeze the assets of eight more companies. Details of the sanctions were published in the EU's Official Journal.

Reacting to the agreement, Mohammad Kossari, deputy head of the Iranian parliament's Foreign Affairs and National Security Committee, warned that “if any disruption happens regarding the sale of Iranian oil, the Strait of Hormuz will definitely be closed.” Ramin Mehmanparast, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman, told the state broadcaster that the “European Union sanctions on Iranian oil is psychological warfare.” He added, “imposing economic sanctions is illogical and unfair but will not stop our nation from obtaining its rights.”

In response, Ivo Daalder, the U.S. ambassador to NATO in Brussels, pledged that the United States and its allies would keep the waterway open to international shipping and the oil business. “The Strait of Hormuz needs to remain open and we need to maintain this as an international passageway. We will do what needs to be done to ensure that is the case.”

Oil prices reached nearly $100 per barrel on Jan. 23, reacting to the renewed Iranian threat.

Existing Sanctions

The oil embargo represents a leap in the sanctions regime against Iran, following four earlier rounds of escalating penalties. The EU had gradually imposed sanctions on Iran starting in 2007 as part of Western efforts to put pressure on Tehran over its nuclear work. Sanctions include those agreed upon by the United Nations and autonomous EU measures. Current EU sanctions include:

• A trade ban on arms and equipment that can be used for repression, and a ban on goods and technology related to nuclear enrichment or nuclear weapons systems, including nuclear materials and facilities, certain chemicals, electronics, sensors, lasers, navigation and avionics;
• A ban on investment by Iranian nationals and entities in uranium mining and production of nuclear material and technology within the EU;
• A ban on trade in dual-use goods and technology, for instance telecommunication systems and equipment; information security systems and equipment; and nuclear technology and low-enriched uranium;
• An export ban on key equipment and technology for the oil and gas industries (i.e. exploration and production of oil and natural gas, and refining and liquefaction of natural gas). There is also a ban on financial and technical assistance for such transactions. This includes geophysical survey equipment, drilling and production platforms for crude oil and natural gas, equipment for shipping terminals of liquefied gas, petrol pumps and storage tanks;
• A ban on investment in the Iranian oil and gas industries (exploration and production of oil and gas, refining and liquefaction of natural gas), meaning no credits, loans, new investment in and joint ventures with such companies in Iran;
• A ban on new medium- or long-term commitments by EU member states to offer financial support for trade with Iran, and restrictions on short-term commitments;
• A ban on EU governments extending grants and concessional loans to the Iranian government, or providing insurance and re-insurance to the Iranian government and Iranian entities (except health and travel insurance);
• A requirement for EU financial institutions to report to national authorities any transactions with Iranian banks they suspect could be financing nuclear activities, to report transfers above 10,000 Euros to national authorities, and to request prior authorization for transactions above 40,000 Euros (with humanitarian exemptions);
• A ban on Iranian banks opening branches and creating joint ventures in the EU, and on EU financial institutions opening branches or bank accounts in Iran;
• A ban on the issuance of and trade in Iranian government or public bonds with the Iranian government, central bank and Iranian banks;
• EU governments must require their nationals to exercise vigilance over businesses with entities incorporated in Iran, including those of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL);
• A declaration that national customs authorities must require prior information about all cargo to and from Iran and may inspect such cargo to ensure trade restrictions are respected;
• Cargo flights operated by Iranian carriers or coming from Iran may not have access to EU airports (except flights with both passengers and cargo). No maintenance services to Iranian cargo aircraft or servicing to Iranian vessels may be provided if there are suspicions that they carry prohibited goods;
• Visa bans are imposed on persons designated by the United Nations, associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and senior members of the IRGC. As of Jan. 22, visa bans and asset freezes apply to 113 people (41 designated by the United Nations and the rest by the EU); and
• An asset freeze on 433 entities associated with Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems and on senior members and entities of IRGC and the IRISL. U.N. designations cover 75 entities, including companies in banking and insurance sectors, the nuclear technology industry and in the fields of aviation, armament, electronics, shipping, chemical industry, metallurgy, oil and gas, and branches and subsidiaries of IRGC and IRISL.

Human Rights

In addition to the nuclear track, the EU has imposed travel bans and asset freezes on 61 Iranians seen as responsible for human rights violations.

Economic Relations

The EU had a free-trade agreement with Iran until 2005. Europe remains an important trade partner. Ninety percent of EU imports from Iran are either oil or oil-related products. In 2010, the EU imported 14.5 billion Euros worth of goods from Iran while exporting 11.3 billion Euros of goods to the country.

Raymond Karam is a program assistant for EWI's Regional Security Initiative.