Middle East & North Africa

First, Libya is the seventeenth-largest nation in the world. Its expanses and its desert leave military forces vulnerable and often draw them into overextending their advances; resupply, not terrain, limits military operations. Its coastline, 1770 km long, is the largest of any African country bordering the Mediterranean. The major Libyan highway runs in close proximity to this coast, affording sea access and baring exposure. One of the least forested countries in the world, it presents very few natural obstacles to military forces, a factor in the recurrent shifting of frontlines during the Libyan campaigns of the Second World War. News of rebel conquests and Qaddafi’s reconquests should therefore be treated with caution. The main questions will be: How long can any force hold ground and what are the source and delivery routes of supplies?

Second, Libya’s cities and oases are islands in a sea of sand and of pivotal importance as supply depots. When the Afrika Korps was advancing in April 1941 and a new frontline was established along the Libyan-Egyptian border, the city of Tobruk was left behind in the rear of the Axis advance. The town was besieged for 240 days until relieved by the British Counteroffensive Operation Crusader. It was again besieged the following year and fell during the battle of Gazala with 35,000 men of the British Empire taken prisoner. During the same battle, another siege of a small Free French garrison in defense of the remote oasis, Bir Hakeim, substantially slowed the Axis advance and cost the Germans and Italians dearly. The Axis powers could not replace their casualties for the crucial battle of El Alamein—the turning point of the war in North Africa. Today, rebels and troops loyal to Qaddafi are battling over control of various cities including the stronghold of Surt—“Qaddafi’s Tobruk.” Holding these towns dotted along the principal Libyan highway will be pivotal. Once the rebel army establishes clear leadership, a Rommel-like strategy, with a force surrounding Surt while a mobile column of troops heads to Tripoli, is not unimaginable. It all depends how quickly the rebels can organize and build momentum and whether Qaddafi has a Montgomery-like counterstrategy up his sleeve.

Third, the most important axis of operation, as during the Second World War, is the old colonial route Via Balbo, a highway running from east to west through all of Libya. Rebel and government forces are engaging along this route. Due to the exposing nature of the terrain, air power is critical in controlling this major artery. Erwin Rommel remarked about campaigning in Africa that, “Anyone who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against an enemy in complete command of the air, fights like a savage against modern European troops, under the same handicaps and with the same chances of success.” His adversary Berhard Montomery concurred: “If we lose the war in the air we lose the war and we lose it quickly.” During the North Africa campaign, whichever side had air superiority had the upper hand. The German position on the Libyan-Egyptian border became untenable in June 1941 because all the Luftwaffe squadrons but Fliegercorps X were transferred to the Russian front; this meant an end to close air support. When the Afrika Korps was pushed back to its defensive line around El Agheili—where rebels and Qaddafi loyalists are currently clashing—it was just in time for the German Luftwaffe to re-establish its air superiority. Hitler had ordered Fliegercorps VII to Sicily which provided the direct air-ground support needed to push back the British forces once again all the way to the Egyptian border. For the rebels, air superiority will be the key in massing enough ground forces to take the capital of Tripoli. For Qaddafi, it is the most lethal asset at his disposal to retain power.

The Libyan campaign of the Axis and Allies during the Second World War, with its rapid advances, retreats, sieges, overextended supply lines, and mobile maneuvers, illustrates the peculiar nature of warfare in Libya. Should the forces loyal to Qaddafi not disband themselves, a prolonged struggle featuring some aspects of the North African campaigns could ensue. The end of Qaddafi, however, is not likely to come as quickly as the end of the Panzer Armee Afrika in 1943. As Bernard Montgomery stated, “The defeat of the enemy in the Battle of El Alamein, the pursuit of his beaten army and the final capture of Tripoli . . . has all been accomplished in three months. This is probably without parallel in history.” A beaten dictator on holding on to his power, however, is a sight not uncommon in modern times.

Franz-Stefan Gady is a foreign policy analyst at the EastWest Institute.

Click here to read Gady's piece in The National Interest

"Not long ago at all, our partners came out actively for honest democratic elections in the Palestinian territories," Putin said. "Wonderful! Well done, lads! And it turns out Hamas wins, the same people you are calling a terrorist organization and have started to fight against." (Moscow Times).

At one level of politics, Putin’s analysis of Iran and Palestine is rational. On another level, there is a deep neuralgia in Russia about the Muslim world. Putin said that Russia was concerned about the consequences of the recent uprisings in Arab countries for Russian security. He also warned (correctly) that the events could have negative consequences for Europe. The underlying anxiety here is not unique to Mr Putin. He is showing a discomfort here many Western leaders share and that will only grow. 

The anxiety comes about because of shifting power relationships in many fields of national endeavor. On a much lower level, this was symbolized in a tantalizing way in the shock defeat of Russia by Iran (1-0) in a football friendly in Dubai on 9 February. Perhaps the patriotic, sports-loving Mr Putin was smarting from the defeat. The Dubai game, a warm-up for the Euro 2012 qualifiers, was only held in Dubai so that the Russian football federation could get the money from the TV rights involved in playing a team from the region.

More seriously though, the Putin visit to Brussels and the concerns he expressed reflect fundamental shifts in world power at a time when, with the uprisings, revolts and wars in the Muslim world, there is an historic shift under way in world politics. Russia’s relations with the European Union (EU) now look very different from three years ago. Russia has overtaken China as an economic partner of the EU and Putin is determined to make Russia and the EU partners in international security affairs as well.

At exactly the time when the world press was trumpeting the statistic that the Chinese economy had overtaken the Japanese economy, and would eventually surpass the American economy, a different data set from the IMF revealed another shift. The US economy was correctly reassigned to number two spot behind the European Union in GDP on a Purchasing Power Parity basis. And Indian GDP is within a whisker of Japan’s. The bargaining power relationships within the G20 and IMF are shifting and on the global stage have shifted in Europe’s favor.

So, the EU is not a country, some might say. Yes, but it is an “economy”, a single economy, in a world where, as a good Marxists might tell you, economics is in command. The Articles of Agreement of the IMF (Section XIII) dictate that “The principal office of the Fund shall be located in the territory of the member having the largest quota”. Well the European Union now has almost double the quota of the United States, around 30 per cent of the total for the EU compared with just over 17 per cent for the United States, and China’s un-naturally low 3.72 per cent. So the IMF headquarters really should move to Europe.

Journalistic flourishes aside, what does this growing list of re-alignments of politics and power mean? At the very least, in economic and social terms, it means that the initiative for change, the impulse for reform and the power for transformation are slipping even faster from American hands. Russia knows it and is looking for European partnership, especially to secure the southern flanks not just of Russia but of Europe as a whole.

Click here to read this piece in New Europe

The recent eruption of protests and violence in Egypt and the resignation of its President, Hosni Mubarak, lead some pundits to predict that the same movement will happen in China. However, China’s circumstances are entirely different and a similar outcome is unlikely.

Along with India and Greece, Egypt and China are two of the oldest civilizations in the world. However, both the Arab Republic of Egypt and the People’s Republic of China only established their current governments about 60 years ago. How did these two governments conduct their affairs? Why are the events that caused the collapse of the Mubarak regime not likely to happen in China?

The main issues that surrounded the downfall of the Mubarak regime appear to be the leadership and the economy.

In Egypt, Hosni Mubarak served as the only President of Egypt for over 30 years; yet in China, since Deng Xiaoping’s launch of the Open and Reform Policy in 1978, China has made orderly transitions through three generations of leaders.

The first generation had Mao Zedong at the core; the second generation from 1976 to 1992 had Deng Xiaoping ; the third generation from 1992 to 2003, had Jiang Zemin; and the fourth generation from 2003, has Hu Jintao as the core figure (General Secretary), with the prominent leaders include Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Jia Qinglin, Zeng Qinghong and Li Changchun. By 2012, the fifth generation of leaders will emerge, and the sixth generation of leaders is already being prepared.

In Egypt, the last three presidents - Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak - all came from military backgrounds. By contrast, Chinese leaders are mostly from civilian backgrounds, and many of them are in fact engineers. While many historical great leaders have come from military backgrounds, civilian leaders tend to seek non-military solutions, and they also have a broader vision for science, business, and society as a whole.

One of the rumors is that President Mubarak was plotting to let his son inherit his presidency, which upset a lot of people in Egypt, including the military council, and resulted in a forced resignation.

When we look at the history of the People’s Republic of China, no leader has ever been succeeded by their offspring. The orderly transition of leadership, a well-planned succession, and a merit based leadership selection process has resulted in maintaining China’s stability and progress.

On the economy, both Egypt and China face a daunting task to deal with a vast number of people that need education and employment.

In the last 30 years, the Egyptian government has reformed the highly centralized economy it inherited from President Nasser. The pace of structural reforms, including fiscal and monetary policies, privatization and new business legislations, helped Egypt to move towards a more market-oriented economy and prompted increased foreign investment. The reforms and policies have strengthened macroeconomic annual growth results which averaged 5% annually, but the government largely failed to curb the growing problem of unemployment and underemployment among youth under the age of 30 years.

In this period China has followed its own socialist market economy and become the world's fastest-growing developing country, with average growth rates of 10% for the past 30 years. China has lifted 300 million people, about four times the size of Egypt’s entire population, out of poverty.  Certainly, China still has a lot of work to do, but its amazing accomplishment is clear.

China’s success is largely due to its long term planning strategy-the Five Year Plans. Moreover, China is committed to stay on the course of its Five Year Plans and not by piecemeal legislation.

China's overall economic construction objectives were clearly stated in the Three Step Strategy set out in 1978:
Step One—double the 1980 GNP and to ensure that the people have enough food and clothing. This was attained by the end of the 1980s;
Step Two—quadruple the 1980 GNP by the end of the 20th century. This was achieved in 1995 ahead of schedule;
Step Three—increase per-capita GNP to the level of medium-developed countries by 2050, at which point the Chinese people will be fairly well-off and modernization will be basically realized.

The 12th Five Year Plan will be adopted in March 2011. Those who are interested in having a deeper understanding of China’s future direction should study the plan and watch the events unfold. China will stick to its plan.

In most democracies, the citizen’s trust and satisfaction with their own government is critical to the success of the nation, and China is no exception. Let us take a look at how most Chinese people view their government. According to 2010 Pew Survey, “China is clearly the most self-satisfied country. Nearly nine-in-ten Chinese are happy with the direction of their country (87%), feel good about the current state of their economy (91%) and are optimistic about China’s economic future (87%). Moreover, 64% of Chinese have a very favorable view of their own country, a self regard that exceeds that among Americans (48%), Russians (43%), Germans (12%) and Brazilians (31%).”

Citizen confidence leads to productivity, investments, and stability. When the citizens are satisfied, the government can conduct its functions; business can produce goods and services, and people can work and provide for their family.

For centuries, China has suffered from natural disasters, unwise policies, foreign intervention, and internal struggles, and there have been many lessons learned. However, today’s China is one that deals with its foreign relations in both diplomacy and defense; engages in the development of its business and scientific capability; protects and regulates the sustainable use of its natural resources; enforces and regulates fair and responsible business practices; determines and enforces civil laws of property and conduct; provides public goods and services for the well-being of the community as a whole, such as infrastructure, vaccination programs, disaster relief, basic healthcare, subsidized housing, public education and public utilities.

While there might be some similarities between Egypt and China in their long civilization, and the moving from a centralized economy to a market economy in the last 30 years, the difference is that China has maintained an orderly transition of leadership, and an economy planning process that is producing results. Most importantly, China’s people are satisfied with their own government.

Click here to read this article online

Majd is both an insider and outsider to the intricate political world of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The son of an Iranian diplomat under the Shah and grandson of a powerful ayatollah, Majd grew up mainly in the United States. Although he was openly linked with the reformists and translated for former Iranian President Mohammed Khatami (a relative by marriage), Majd also translated Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's infamous 2006 United Nations speech, an experience he wrote about for the New York Observer.

In The Ayatollah’s Democracy, Majd presents a nuanced view of the contested 2009 elections in Iran, arguing that despite the resulting violence, a group of influential ayatollahs—including a liberal opposition—still believe in the ideals of the Iranian Republic. For them, Majd writes, “green represents not a revolution but a civil rights movement, pushing the country toward democracy, albeit its own particular brand of ‘Islamic democracy.’”

Looking at the recent protests in Iran, Majd told EWI that the wave of uprisings in the Middle East has affected Iran, but not to the extent that some Western commentators believe.

Unlike the governments of Tunisia and Egypt, the Islamic Republic still enjoys wide support from its citizens. Why? According to Majd, Iran’s political system is not as dictatorial as some imagine; rather, it grants its citizens some basic freedoms and has no pervasive secret police. For another, the government is a significant benefactor, employing the biggest chunk of working Iranians and providing targeted subsidies to the needy. Majd added that Iranians are the most nationalistic people in the world.

“The idea of overturning the system is anathema to many,” said Majd.

He pointed out that the leaders of the Iranian reform movement are survivors of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and hence a part of the system. In 2009, they protested against the widespread alleged fraud surrounding the presidential elections – not to overthrow the regime. Now, their biggest concern is to make future elections fair and continue the fight for civil rights.

When asked about the role of the United States in Iran, Majd compared the State Department’s Twitter feed encouraging protests in Iran to its Arabic Twitter feed urging restraint in Egypt.
He said that the best way for the U.S.to help the Iranian opposition would be to engage with the Islamic Republic. Majd argued that normal relations between the U.S. and Iran would help remove the Islamic Republic’s leadership suspicions that the reformist movement is part of a U.S. drive to destabilize the Islamic Republic.

As Majd sees it, when the Islamic Republic’s leadership does not feel under threat, it will allow more space for reform.

Sehgal points out that new media – the use of internet, social media and television – has been a central actor in the unfolding revolutions.  The fact is, the use of media has allowed information to travel faster than the speed at which governments and government leaders can react, and, Sehgal writes, “the Arab regimes were not geared to cope with the blinding speed with which information dissemination acted in the upheavals.”

New media has given individuals a tremendous amount of power, allowing citizens to act as a governing entity.  Quoting Patrick Meier on Gowing, Sehgal writes that “this ’shifting of power from state to citizen is the new ‘civilian surge’ of growing digital empowerment forcing an enhanced level of accountability that is a ‘real change to democracy.’”

Sehgal says that the use of media in the recent Middle East fallout has been two-fold: the first has been the rousing of civil society; the second has been the exposure of lies within regimes.

Quoting Stephen Stern on Gowing, Sehgal writes that “the paradox at the heart of this exciting world is new technology.  We crave flexibility, connectivity, and speed, but we risk turning ourselves into busy fools, bamboozled by too much noise and information.”

Click here to read the full article in The News.

Many people heaved a sigh of relief when United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, cited to CNN on 12 January 2011 a statement of the outgoing head of Israeli intelligence that a “combination of sanctions and covert actions have significantly slowed down the Iranian [nuclear] program”. This appeared to take the much vaunted (possible) military strike by Israel and/or the United States off the table as a near term risk. Yet, the covert action has not eased tension in the strategic confrontation. Risks of escalation have increased.

There were probably several elements to the covert action. The most well known is that sometime before September 2010, a country or countries unknown attacked Iran’s uranium enrichment systems using a cyber “weapon” (Stuxnet) that rendered up to 30 percent of the centrifuges unusable.

The cyber attack was an act of sabotage across state borders and therefore it was – prima facie – a breach of international law. Even if this were a declared war, Iran would have the right of retaliation for self-defense under international law if it could determine which state actor or actors were involved in the attack. This right is not diminished because of the sanctions resolutions of the UN Security Council.

Those states which oppose Iran’s nuclear program could hardly argue that a military attack by Iran against them was imminent, thus giving them a right, based on the principle of their own self-defense, to attack Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. (The assumed position of the perpetrator state or states would be that the attack was a justifiable act since Iran cannot be trusted to keep nuclear weapons – if it had them – out of the hands of terrorists.)

In January 2010, Hillary Clinton, laid out her country’s position on the unlawfulness of cyber attacks: “Countries or individuals that engage in cyber-attacks should face consequences and international condemnation," she said.

So who will punish the perpetrator(s) of the cyber attack on Iran? What actions of cyber self-defense by Iran would be permissible under international law? Retaliation is a time honored convention and recognized as lawful in certain circumstances under customary international law. There is considerable debate about what form retaliation might take, but proportionality is one of the main considerations. There are other considerations, such as absence of recourse to other measures, last resort and, where it applies, “hot pursuit” of the attackers.

Law aside, it is not unreasonable to imagine that some in the Iranian government are arguing for a cyber retaliation. According to some sources, Iran’s cyber warfare capability is in the hands of the Revolutionary Guards. Will Iran retaliate? What form might a cyber response take? If there was retaliation, it could represent an escalation of cyber conflict, and possibly provoke military clashes between Iran and the assumed perpetrator(s).

At the least, this widely-publicized offensive use of the “Stuxnet” cyber weapon may represent a turning point – is the “genie out of the bottle”? Does the use of stuxnet herald a period of uncontrolled tit-for-tat offensive cyber strikes for sabotage and economic disruption in an environment where there are no common international understandings for regulating cyber conflict. This is no longer simply a debate about a gap in international law that needs to be addressed to control conflicts that might arise. Offensive cyber operations are already occurring and on a large scale.

Iran is developing cyber warfare capability, like other major powers. Is its capability good enough to mount a damaging cyber strike in response to the Stuxnet attack? The answer according to some sources is yes. We can only hope that Iran’s leaders lead by example here, exercise restraint and disavow a cyber retaliation, or any retaliation for that matter.

Click here to read Austin's piece online

Sehgal

Writing for The News, Ikram Sehgal discusses the inevitable challenges facing the new leadership in Egypt—and the possibility that more dominos will fall in the region.

Click here to read Sehgal's follow-up piece in The News

You can listen to this program or read the story here.

The first Arab Development Report (ADR) released in 2002 was a milestone toward the popular protests in Egypt of the last week. It was of course not the cause, but merely a reflection of the need.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) commissioned a group of Arab intellectuals to write the 2002 report, the first in an excellent series of five. The latest report (2009) assessed the significance of the first for its having identified three development “deficits” in the region – in the “acquisition of knowledge, political freedoms, and women’s rights”.

The most exciting aspect of the 2002 ADR was its authorship by critical thinkers from the region. As noted in the fifth report in 2009, the analysis of the earlier reports “resonated in Arab countries and around the world”. The contents were not revolutionary but it was fairly clear even in 2002 that the impact would be. The United Nations system had by some miraculous default staked out new ground on the political liberties and personal dignity of Arabs in a way that it had done for no other large multi-national population group ever before.

This was most notable for what it said about women. It called for “complete empowerment of Arab women, taking advantage of all opportunities to build their capabilities and to enable them to exercise those capabilities to the full.”

The indicators for Egypt in the 2002 report showed stark contrasts. It was the most scientifically advanced Arab country, but with a desperately low number of internet users. It had comparatively high life expectancies, but high infant mortality rates. It had a very low level of political participation. Egypt’s female work force figures were among the poorest in the Arab world, and labor productivity was low.

The national statistics for Egypt expressed in percentage terms or per capita are somewhat distorted either by the huge difference between Egypt’s total population (73 million in 2005) or by its demographics compared with those of other Arab countries. More than half of the Arab countries have populations less than ten million, and Egypt has a very different urban/rural balance than many wealthy Arab countries. But the sad fact is that life in Libya and Syria seems better than in Egypt, according to the Human Development Index.

By 2009, the ADR was taking a closer look at the balance between state power and individual development. It noted that there had been a tendency to “focus more on the security of the state than on the security of the people”. Noting that this had worked to ensure the “continuity of the state”, it had “also led to missed opportunities to ensure the security of the human person”. The result was the “bond between state and citizen” was “less strong” than it might otherwise be. Not only did this reduce tolerance and inclusiveness in these countries, but the result has been “an all-too-common sense of limited opportunities and personal insecurity, witnessed in the world’s highest levels of unemployment, deep and contentious patterns of exclusion, and, ultimately strong calls from within for reform.”

The undoing of the Mubarak government can be seen in the deterioration of Egypt’s standing against three key indicators between 1996 and 2007: government effectiveness, the rule of law, and control of corruption. Of some note is that while most Arab governments also showed weaker performance against these indicators in 2007 than a decade earlier, all of the Gulf states (not including Iraq) showed clear improvement.

The 2002 report called for “unleashing the innovative energies of all Arabs, in the context of an enabling social contract.” It said “Great goals require great acts”. We have seen great acts of revolt and defiance. Let us hope for the emergence of that empowering social contract in Egypt.

Click here to read Austin's piece online

“There are common problems that we need to face,” said Dr. Attiya Inayatullah, Former Minister of Women’s Development, Social Welfare and Special Education of Pakistan, identifying the need to challenge extremism for women to take a truly active role in government.