Middle East & North Africa

Recently, there has been a rather tense dialogue between the Afghan government and the U.S. administration on creating a force at the village level, which can help in bringing peace and security. Creating such a force is one of the key pillars of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan in tackling al Qaeda and the Taliban, an experiment some claim succeeded in Iraq. On the contrary, Afghans are quite worried about this development because of previous experiences and the conviction that such efforts are only short-term solutions and not a real exercise in achieving lasting peace and stability.

Experience of the Past

One of the darkest eras in Afghan history was the early ’90s. After the Soviet withdrawal, and without any serious international support, many of the resistance groups turned against each other. As a result, Afghanistan was divided into personal fiefdoms of the commanders, and there were several parallel competing militias. The holy Jihad was forgotten and a very destructive power struggle emerged. Anarchy prevailed and major Afghan cities, which were safe until the Soviet withdrawal, were destroyed. Multiple currencies were enforced into circulation by different power brokers, which saw people carrying several currencies when traveling from one region to another.

Kabul was one of the most charming cities in South Asia, but it became a ghost town in a bid for power.  Various militias controlled different parts of the city, while others bombed it to the Stone Age. In one instance, more than four hundred rockets were fired on Kabul, killing hundreds of innocent civilians within an hour. Because of the chaos and lawlessness, the Taliban prevailed, and in a very short period of time, controlled a significant area of country. One of the key reasons the Taliban succeeded in their efforts was due to the fact that they had a monopoly on forces, unlike today’s government.

The Various Approaches after 9/11

Frankly, the U.S. did not come to Afghanistan to make things right for the Afghans or learn from the lessons that emerged out of the ’80s when Afghanistan was abandoned.  Instead, the key purpose and objective was revenge against those responsible for the 9/11 attacks. As a consequence, state building was never a key priority. The light footprint approach was not what Afghans expected, and, unfortunately, the U.S. strategy resulted in the empowerment of the same people that had initially created the foundation upon which the Taliban had emerged.  

Various donors tried, half-heartedly, to establish different sectors of the Afghan security sector. In particular, the Afghan National Police was never given the necessary resources or the leadership, which was desperately needed to succeed. Since problems emerged at the outset with the police, creative ideas of parallel structures surfaced.

Several local defense programs have been tried, and, sadly, their impact has been insignificant. First, the Afghan National Auxiliary Police was established in 2006, but after two years, it was quietly brought to an end. Second, the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) was established in Wardak province, but, according to senior officials, it is not being replicated anywhere else, a clear implication of disappointment. Third, in mid-2009 the U.S. Special Forces created a Local Defense Initiative, now known as the Village Stability Program that plans to “secure local communities through development so they no longer provide support to the insurgents.” The objective of the program is to work with the community and not individuals separate of the community.

While each of the above programs was designed differently, at the end, they run into serious challenges of vetting, command and control and most importantly questionable loyalty.

Moving Forward

Afghanistan at this time is the longest war in the history of the United States. Many of the same problems have emerged because the West has not been able to treat the disease and instead has always found quick fixes for the symptoms. 

The objective of the United States is very clear to the Afghans: disrupt, dismantle and destroy al Qaeda. However, the only way to achieve this objective is to strengthen Afghan security institutions that will make sure Afghanistan does not become the hub of international terrorism, once again. 

In conclusion, the village force that is being debated must be part of a broader long-term stability program and has to be associated with an official entity. Alternatively, it will undermine the entire efforts of the exercise in Afghanistan, and it will further perpetuate the culture of lawlessness.

Most importantly, with a force that is a potential threat to the Afghan and international community, the U.S. objective will not be achieved.

The discussion touched upon:

• United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929, the June 2010 resolution imposing new sanctions on Iran, as the basis of new coordinated national and international measures;
• The impact of the Iran's recent agreement with Brazil and Turkey and its effect on international efforts to engage Iran; and
• The potential role of missile defense systems in the context of Iran’s evolving missile program.

Karokhail shared her thoughts in an interview with EWI.

PN: There is also an upcoming peace jirga scheduled to take place on May 29, 2010. Are female MPs involved?

SK: There will be women MPs and there will also be a few women representatives coming from the provincial councils. The civil society has also allocated seats for women and we will try to bring around fifteen women. Number-wise it’s not very bad, but we are very much concerned with the way women will be chosen to participate to the peace jirga. My suggestion, for which I was strongly advocating, was that women should be chosen by women and not by governmental organizations. If women are chosen by the government, then they will speak government‘s language and not women’s language. We cannot just send any woman to the peace jirga! What kind of woman is going to sit in the council is very important, as well as how she should speak and how she should advocate women’s rights. The final statement of the council is very important for women and we should not do something that will badly affect our achievements.

PN: Could you maybe explain to our readers what are the challenges that female MPs face in Afghanistan?

SK: The main challenge for women MPs is their lack of independence. It is very difficult to be independent, because of the many social norms and traditions that a woman has to respect. And if a woman wants to be totally independent and make decisions by herself, there is always something to remind her that as a woman she is not very respected. For example, whenever a woman had a suggestion for ministerial positions, the Commission gave much more value to men’s suggestions and just shut down women MPs.

The Afghan parliamentary system is dominated by men and they will only give support to those women that are obedient or belong to their party or fraction. Most of the time women like to be independent and have their own agenda, because we are committed not only to the Afghan people but also to women issues. But the heads of the Commissions are mostly men and they tend to work with other men and do not include women nor do they give them equal opportunities.
On the financial side also women lack independence, and this situation limits them greatly. Men MPs usually have businesses that allow them to finance their campaign and to have private security. Women don’t have this kind of facilities and this situation limits their movement. Most of the women cannot travel because of the security situation, so they are not able to campaign properly.

Another problem women MPs have is within the Parliament and amongst women themselves. Because Afghan women are new to the parliamentary rules of procedure, they lack political insight. On the contrary, men are experienced; they know how to coordinate their efforts properly or to organize their own caucuses. This is something that women should also learn: to support each other and to bridge the political divides. I truly believe that those women that will understand this will be very successful.

PN: You have spoken about security problems that female MPs face. During the elections in 2009 most of the female candidates have had serious security problems and, because of this, there were regions where there were not enough women running for seats allocated to women. Do you think that things will be different in the upcoming parliamentary elections?

SK: As mentioned, the security situation greatly affects women’s movement. But one positive change is the recent decree that President Karzai approved. The decree clearly stipulates that if women's seats get vacant, for whatever reason, then the Commission will find a mechanism to fill these seats with women candidates. The article clearly stipulates that the seats will be filled “by the same sex”, which means “women”. This situation may not be the ideal one, but this allows us to keep the quota of female MPs in the parliament unchanged.

PN: This is very good news I believe. One last question: how do you think parliamentarians around the world can mobilize their efforts to support female MPs in Afghanistan?

SK: Well, definitely there are a lot of ways in which parliamentarians around the world can support our work. I had a meeting today with a few friends from civil societies, and we all agreed that we have to support some of the women running for Parliament. Female candidates lack the necessary material for campaigning and they lack the necessary know-how to develop their speeches. The best way to help female MPs is to target them and provide them with the type of support they need.

What I have understood after four and a half years in the parliament is that the number is not important, but rather the quality of the person we are bringing in the parliament. I am convinced that ten strong women will achieve much more than fifty-eight inefficient ones. Of course if anyone needs more information about this issue, they can contact me via email.

PN: Thank you very much for taking your time to speak with us.

Writing for his fortnightly column on livemint.com, Sidhu describes two views on the recent nuclear deal. One, popular in the global South sees a new, more assertive role for successful developing countries, and the other, popular among the developed world, that sees the deal as naïve and unrealistic. The reality, he suggests, is somewhere in between.

"While it is true that both Brazil and Turkey have been more assertive in the international arena on issues well beyond their borders … they have also been cautious in their approach and have sought to work closely with the P5," he writes." The Tehran agreement is not a radical new proposal and resembles the earlier agreement that Iran has discussed with the Vienna group since October 2009."

Sidhu argues that the limited scope of the agreement highlights this deference to the five permanent members of the Security Council. "Had there been an anti-Western sentiment, the contours of the Tehran deal would have looked very different," he suggests. "Brazil might have offered to supply the enriched uranium directly, instead of reiterating that it be supplied by the Vienna group (as was envisaged in the original agreement discussed between Iran and the Vienna group)."

But despite Brazil and Turkey's efforts to accommodate the P5, the P5 has responded with its own draft resolution in the UN Security Council with a new round of sanctions against Iran. Sidhu considers this response disappointing, calling it short-sighted and indicative of "an anti-South attitude." Further, he suggests that the new resolution is unlikely to be effective. Competing demands from the U.S., China and Russia have watered it down, and, because Brazil, Turkey and Lebanon are unlikely to support the resolution, it will not be unanimous. "In this light, a resolution passed by the majority will lack credibility," Sidhu suggests. "The failure to effectively impose these sanctions will only further signal the growing weakness of the P-5 in UNSC."

Sidhu concludes with a call for a united effort. "What is abundantly clear is that to effectively address the crucial issue of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, there will have to be a combined effort of the West and key non-Western powers," he writes. "Neither one can be successful on its own."

Click here to read Sidhu's article on livemint.com

In an interview on Fox News, EWI Senior Fellow Hekmat Karzai says that despite technical problems, Afghanistan’s elections were “a success for the Afghan people.”

Karzai further suggests that military means alone cannot bring peace to Afghanistan, and that the political process must also engage the Taliban.

European Energy Review features State-Owned vs. Multinational Oil: New Rules for Market Intervention, a policy paper by EWI Senior Fellow Angelica Austin.

Click here to read the coverage on European Energy Review

Click here to view the policy paper by Angelica Austin

Iran test-fired a medium-range ballistic missile yesterday which Western analysts believe is capable of hitting targets in Israel, as well as southern Europe and U.S. bases in the Middle East.

Ahmadinejad told the cheering crowd that he had been informed by the country's Defense Minister of the launch. He described the test as successful, and said the new missile, Sejil 2, contains "advanced technology," "precision guidance," and that it is able to exit the atmosphere before reentering to strike "precisely on target." Meanwhile, a joint U.S.-Russian report by the EastWest Institute said yesterday that Iran may be one to three years away from developing a nuclear weapon, and commented on Tehran's significant advance in ballistic missile technology. The report said Iran is six to eight years away from developing a ballistic missile capable of carrying a 900 kilogram nuclear warhead.

WASHINGTON — Iran test-fired a new missile Wednesday with a range capable of reaching Israel and U.S. military bases in the Middle East. The missile test came at a time when President Obama is trying to reach out to the Iranian regime and stop it from building a nuclear weapon. USA TODAY's international affairs correspondent Ken Dilanian answers questions about the launch and what it means for the U.S... A report by the EastWest Institute, a think tank, said that Iran could produce a simple nuclear device within one to three years, and could develop a nuclear warhead for ballistic missiles in six to eight years...

A group of 12 prominent Russian and US scientists concluded that Iran would need six to eight years to develop a ballistic missile that could carry a 1,000kg payload 2,000km. The unprecedented study was commissioned as tensions between Washington and Moscow grew amid George W. Bush’s plan to install a missile defence shield in Europe. Retired General James Jones, now the US national security adviser, was one of the leading proponents of the study before he entered the government.