Austrian Neutrality: A Model for Ukraine

The crisis in Ukraine is spinning slowly out of control. An aggressive Russia under the leadership of a man who once deemed the end of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century” is pursuing a neo-Soviet foreign policy for Ukraine to remain firmly in Russia’s orbit—an effort doomed to fail due to the deep political rift dividing the country. Consequently, given this neo-Soviet style of Realpolitik, it may be wise to examine the history of Soviet foreign policy under ostensibly similar circumstances in Europe to inform the present day debate surrounding Ukraine.

The most obvious scenario is the Allied-Soviet negotiations between 1945-1955 over the fate of Austria, which eventually concluded with Austria’s declaration of “perpetual neutrality,” the departure of all Soviet and Allied military forces from Austrian soil in 1955, and the ratification of the Austrian Independence Treaty in the same year. Likewise, neutrality also may be Ukraine’s most viable option. In fact, the now discredited Viktor Yanukovich stated in his inauguration 2010 “challenges that the international community face mean we have to join together in a larger format. We are ready to participate in this process as a European, non-aligned state.”[1] Indeed in the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, passed on July 1, 1990, it says that Ukraine has the “intention of becoming a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs and adheres to three nuclear free principles…”[2] To this date, however, no further steps have been taken towards Ukrainian neutrality.

After Austria’s defeat as part of the Third Reich (1938-1945) in the Second World War, Austria roughly faced five distinct potential futures.

First, the country could become another European “People’s Democracy” dominated by the Soviet Union. However, the U.S. Marshall plan beginning in the summer of 1947 and the fact that only parts of Austria were under direct Soviet control made this an unviable option for Soviet leadership.

Second, Austria could have turned entirely towards the West. Some influential Austrian politicians advocated NATO membership as early as 1949, yet the Soviet Union was opposed to such an endeavor for obvious reasons and would not withdraw its troops, knowing Austria would join the Western alliance.

Third, Austria could have been divided on the lines of occupied Germany as two separate states. This fear was especially acute during the years of the West Berlin blockade (1948-1949). A split-up, however, was not in the Soviet Union’s interest since the strategically important Western half of Austria quickly would have joined NATO.

Fourth, Austria could have remained permanently occupied by Allied and Soviet forces if no political solution was found, which was not a farfetched scenario given the occupation and breakup of Germany during the Cold War.

Last and the most relevant to Ukraine, Austria could have opted to become another buffer state between the East and West—a “second Switzerland”—and declare its neutrality.

Ukraine today faces similar options as Russian troops settle into Crimea: side with the “East”, side with the “West”, break up the country, or restore territorial integrity in exchange for neutrality. Of the four options, neutrality appears to be the most viable scenario. A closer look at the Soviet position in 1955 vis-à-vis Austria is warranted.

Two factors made the Soviet Union agree to the withdrawal from Austrian soil in April 1955—economic concessions and the guarantee that Austria would remain militarily neutral during the ongoing Cold War.

The Soviet Union had economic interests in both oil fields in lower Austria as well as Austrian-based German companies seized by the Soviets after the war. The Soviets only eventually conceded to a withdrawal based on a rigorous reparation and compensation plan proposed by a French official called the “Cherrière-Plan”.

On the national-security front, Austria agreed to remain neutral in the ongoing Cold War by not joining either of the two military alliances or allowing the stationing of foreign troops on Austrian soil.

Other issues that ultimately were resolved during negotiations were the status of the Croatian and Slovene minorities in the country, the prohibition of another “Anschluss” with Germany, and the role of former Nazis in Austrian politics.

All of this, next to other external political developments, cleared the way for the Austrian Independence Treaty of May 15, 1955, making Austria a de facto buffer state between East and West. De jure neutrality was guaranteed by the enshrinement of a “perpetual neutrality” clause in the constitution of the Austrian Second Republic in October of the same year.

As Victoria Potapkina points out in a paper discussing Ukraine neutrality and using Austria as a case study: “The key country to Austria’s situation was the Soviet Union (USSR) toward which it had to pledge not only military, but also ideological neutrality.”

This has two implications for the current political crisis in Ukraine.

First, the economic interests of Russia must be satisfied in order for her to save face. For example, a symbolic short-term guarantee that Ukraine will remain dependent on Russian oil and gas in the intermediate term by stalling drilling concessions to Western oil companies such as the Exxon Mobile Corp. and Royal Dutch Shell in exchange for nonintervention in Ukrainian domestic affairs could be a start. (In return Putin will certainly have to say goodbye to Ukraine joining his Eurasian Union, which at this stage is no longer a real option in any case.) Also, perhaps the heavy industry sites in eastern Ukraine could be declared special economic zones (SEZ). From the side of the IMF and the West, this must be matched with substantial financial aid (The country owes $13 billion in debt this year) over a short amount of time—a “Ukrainian Marshall Plan”—to ensure Ukrainian economic development and alleviate any public outcry such concessions most likely would cause. The European Union has already pledged a $15 billion USD aid package, which is a step in the right direction. In the long term the Ukrainian economy will need to diversify, and the United States has promised aid to that effect in the amount of a $1 billion USD loan guarantee (Trade with Russia is already in decline. Less than 6 percent of Russia’s foreign trade is going to Ukraine).

Second, Russia’s security concerns must be alleviated. Multilateral negotiations (perhaps under the auspices of the UN or OSCE) should be initiated immediately to outline a nonaligned, perpetually neutral Ukraine in Kiev, Moscow, Washington, and Brussels. As Mykola Sungurovskiy from the Razumkov Center points out: “Presence of militarily mighty neighbours involves the need of reliable external guarantees of neutrality.”[3] Ukraine neutrality will only be an option if a binding agreement with the European Union, Russia and the United States as guarantors can be signed. As the case of the “Budapest Memorandum”[4] shows, nothing short of a formal treaty will do in this case. As in Austria and Switzerland, the added benefit of this on the domestic front could be the forging of a new Ukrainian national identity based on a perception of neither being in the “Eastern” or “Western” camp.

Austria sacrificed the province of Southern Tyrol to gain full independence; Ukraine will, in all likelihood, have to concede the Crimea, if not additional territories in the East. In addition, a host of internal issues still must be resolved in a neutral Ukraine: ethnic tensions, ultranationalism, the membership of Ukraine in the Commonwealth of Independent States and other international organizations, a viable economic strategy, a plan to diminish the influence of the oligarchs and a strategy to fight corruption, among others.

A further breakup or military conflict in Ukraine is in no one’s interest, and space still remains for maneuvering. The geographic proximity to Russia and Ukraine’s energy dependence will certainly show the limits of genuine Ukraine neutrality. Still, a diplomatic dialogue among all key actors involved on the subject may have a defusing impact. As the I.R. scholar Viktoria Potapkina concludes in a paper entitled “Ukraine’s Neutrality: A Myth or Reality” in 2010: “Neutrality can be considered as one of the main feasible solutions to certain ongoing problems in Ukraine.” Ukrainian neutrality appears to be the least conflict-prone choice; therefore, diplomats carefully should study the negotiation process leading to the Austrian State Treaty of 1955. Despite various differences, it is a unique case study of the establishment of a buffer state in a much-contested geographic region, including how it maintained its territorial integrity and its political independence.

Franz-Stefan Gady is a senior fellow at the EastWest Institute, where he was a program associate and founding member of the Worldwide Cybersecurity Initiative. 

Photo Credit: Valerii9116

Russia’s Naval Dream

With immaculate timing, given the crisis in Crimea and the rest of Ukraine, Russia last week announced plans to rebuild a global naval presence. This follows an announcement in January that the navy will take delivery of 40 new ships and other vessels this year (though most are smaller ship classes). 

One of the new units to be commissioned this year is a ballistic missile nuclear-powered submarine named for the ruler of Kievan Rus’ in the 11th and 12th centuries, known now in Russian as Vladimir Monomakh. One millennium later, another Vladimir, this one a Putin, sees the history of Russia as inextricably tied to and deriving from that state of Rus’, first established in Kyiv (Kiev). For him the chain of political association is unbroken, notwithstanding the the break-up of the Soviet Union. In 2005, Putin declared this to be “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century.

Putin has masterminded a naval renaissance in his country beginning in the middle of the last decade. He knows he cannot reverse the catastrophe, but he is determined to redress its effects as best he can, and this includes maintaining intimate political relations with Ukraine. The task remains not only incomplete but is now in serious crisis.

On 26 February, the Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu, declared his country’s plans to establish a number of new foreign naval bases and to set up access rights elsewhere. His list includes Vietnam, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, the Seychelles and Singapore. By October 2103, Russian port visits that year were up 35 percent compared with the previous year, according to Tom Fedyszyn writing in The National Interest in December. This plan for a global naval presence gives a clear pointer to the continuing high priority that Russia places on control of the naval base in Sevastopol in Crimea.  

The naval renaissance also includes an expansion of Russian naval basing and maritime air patrols in the Arctic, measures which were also announced in January this year. The move was a response to an order from President Putin in December 2013. One week after that order, the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for defence industry, Dmitry Rogozin, announced plans to expand ship-building capabilities in the Russian Far East city of Khabarovsk. He said that Russia had a geopolitical duty to respond to discussions in NATO beginning in 2009 to beef up its Arctic naval presence.   

As Fedyszyn notes, the naval expansion is not without its growing pains, and the Russian navy remains a pale imitation of the Soviet navy in its 1980s heyday. But Russia is not counting on matching US naval capability any time soon. It is intent on a return to classic geopolitics.  The naval expansion is just one sign of the intent. 

Analysts in China understand this well. Writing in Global Times on 1 August 2013, Retired Rear Admiral Yang Yi made a plea for Chinese naval development to be based on a benchmark of the naval power of Russia. He said that Russia has the second largest navy in the world and China should aspire to emulate it.   

Russia, like China, and possibly relying in part on the latter’s naval power, believes that it can gain new geopolitical leverage from its own maritime renaissance. More importantly, Russia, like China, is determined to press for new geopolitical power. This is not the diplomacy of peaceful coexistence or common security. It is a return to zero-sum politics. This new Russian vision may be a pipe-dream, but we have to accept that this is how Russia’s leaders are thinking. However the Ukraine crisis plays out, Russia will not be abandoning its new “naval dream” anytime soon. Sevastopol is part of that dream.

Photo Credit: Official U.S. Navy Imagery

In June 2011, President Obama announced the withdrawal of most American troops in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. NATO made the same decision in 2011, reducing its current force of some 100,000 military to 8,000–12,000 troops in 2014, in a new non-combat mission, to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces.

When the West has mostly departed from Afghanistan after 2014, the East, i.e. Russia and its allies, will have to continue to cope with the Afghan security situation and its overflow to the Central Asian region. Russia, although not directly adjacent to Afghanistan, is affected by Afghan narcotics and terrorism. Afghanistan borders China and the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. These states, as well as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are partners of Russia, bilateral but also multilateral, as members of the military alliance Collective Security Treaty Organization CSTO and/or the regional organization Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Much has already been said about post-2014 Afghanistan, but not enough about the consequences for Russia and its allies. This work deals with that largely untouched area, by explaining the security challenges; the mind-set of the Kremlin towards Afghanistan; the statements of CSTO and SCO on Afghanistan; the views of NATO and the EU on cooperating with these Eastern institutions; as well as the policy action towards post-2014 by Eastern and Western actors.

In preparation for post-2014 Afghanistan, different parties have different approaches. Russia, China and CSTO have no wish to deploy armed forces in Afghanistan. Russia is expanding its military presence in Central Asia (bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan); strengthening the borders with Afghanistan of the states with a fragile security, i.e. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; as well as supplying CSTO with modern weapons and equipment, hence reinforcing its rapid reaction force. These actions are taken to counter terrorism and drugs trafficking. The Central Asian states give priority to strengthening border security.

Furthermore, in addition to their military cooperation with Russia (bilateral and through CSTO), these states have also demonstrated—to the dissatisfaction of Moscow—an interest in military cooperation with the West, by obtaining arms and equipment, which the U.S. and NATO intend to leave behind after their retreat. Regarding direct aid to Afghanistan, Moscow’s assistance lies mainly in the military realm, by supplying arms and training. China mostly cooperates economically with Kabul, with financial aid and investments, especially in mineral exploitation.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the strongest Central Asian states, are also involved in bilateral military and socio-economic cooperation with Afghanistan. CSTO supports Afghanistan by training its military and law enforcement agencies and by realizing socio-economic projects. The SCO lacks joint actions, such as CSTO’s collective counter-narcotics operations, but primarily supports the actions of its individual members. The U.S. financially supports reinforcement of the border security capacity of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition to the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) -projects like counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian personnel, the (Afghan air force) Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund, and the Action Plan on Terrorism, NATO has mainly concentrated on the reverse transit route through Central Asia and Russia, to get its arms and equipment out of Afghanistan.

With regard to post-2014, the lack of cohesion of the mentioned parties is particularly stunning. A deficiency of unity, consistency and cooperation is visible, within the East (Russia, China, Central Asia, CSTO, SCO) and West (U.S., NATO, EU). Each of these actors has its own national or organizational objectives and corresponding agenda. However, time is running out. The East and West face the same threats: terrorism by the Taliban and Al Qaida, as well as drugs production and trafficking. Both sides will remain involved in and around Afghanistan after 2014, hence, cooperation is essential.

After its formal declaration rejecting Moscow’s alleged privileged interests in Central Asia, NATO has the possibility of opening a path to engage in joint action with CSTO/SCO. A division of labor could be established whereby CSTO and NATO carry out military and security teamwork and SCO and the EU handle socio-economic cooperation. CSTO-NATO military cooperation could entail exchanging liaison officers between their headquarters; information sharing by military intelligence services of both sides; joint CSTO-NATO-NRC training of Afghan (and Central Asian) law enforcement officers; border guards and military; coordinated delivery of weapons and maintenance to the Afghan army; as well as Russian-US-CSTO strengthening of border security capacities of the Central Asian states. Socio-economic cooperation by the EU and the SCO could be conducted in areas such as direct relief and assistance (water and food supplies), good governance, state-building, police training and reconstruction projects (building schools, hospitals, roads, railways, bridges, etc.). Such a mutual East-West approach would benefit all parties.