South Asia

India has enjoyed a long period of primacy in Afghanistan but a growing Chinese interest in the war-ridden country is poised to upset that delicate arrangement. China and India’s acrimonious border disputes epitomize their ongoing strategic rivalry but inadequately reflect the nature of their coexistence in a third country like Afghanistan. Investing in development projects on increased connectivity and trade to stabilize Afghanistan―also to fill the gap given the potential U.S. exit―makes economic and strategic sense for both countries, which have their respective objectives, and also provides opportunities for a deepened cooperation. As the China-India competitive dynamics play out elsewhere, Afghanistan presents an opportunity for those dynamics to fluidly and seamlessly switch between cooperation and competition.

The China-India competition has many of the smaller neighboring countries in the region concerned about getting caught between the two Asian giants. The 2017 Dolkam standoff exemplified the predicament for countries like Bhutan, which became the site of a conflict beyond its control. Even absent direct confrontation, India has been suspicious of any Chinese presence in its immediate vicinity, such as its presence in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and, likewise, Beijing has been intently watching the growing India-Japan rapprochement through joint projects and defense cooperation. However, there has been a recent effort from both sides to strike a more cooperative tone even amid mutual suspicion and rivalry, and Afghanistan is well-positioned to benefit from this sentiment.

Click here to read the full article on The National Interest.

Blood over Different Shades of Green—based on both published and unpublished memories of the activists of 1971—critically assesses the catastrophic developments leading to the separation of East Pakistan. Through the analysis, the authors uncover critical lessons learned that apply to today's Pakistan. 

"Ikram had a front row seat to this important moment in the history of South Asia and together with co-author, Dr. Robotka, he has provided a candid, honest and factual account of the events, factors and causes that led to the split," says EWI President and CEO Dr. William J. Parker. 

"This book, bringing together both military and civil perspectives, also provides thoughtful guidance for the present and future lessons that can be learned from history and how diplomatic mistakes can be avoided and military action can be contained." 

Click here for coverage from the launch event. 

Click here for more information on Blood over Different Shades of Green.

On November 14^th 2019, the EastWest Institute convened a roundtable discussion entitled “The Results of the Afghanistan Elections: Consequences for the Peace Process and Future EU Policy.” As the title suggests, the discussion was set to address the electoral results of September 28, Afghanistan’s fourth presidential election since 2001. In a change of events, the discussion took place against the backdrop of another delay in the results, as announced just a day before by Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission (IEC).

The results had actually been delayed once before and were set to be announced on the day of EWI’s roundtable until the IEC postponed them once again until further notice. This sense of confusion surrounding the election, its results, and its implications for the peace process became the dominant theme of the discussion as the guest speakers – Ambassador Nazifullah Salarzai of the Embassy and Mission of Afghanistan to the Kingdom of Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the EU and NATO and Ambassador Roland Kobia, EU Special Envoy for Afghanistan for the European External Action Service (EEAS) – presented their perspectives.

Following the two insightful presentations and dialogue among participants, it became abundantly clear to everyone in attendance that the final election results being announced are linked to the future viability of the peace process. While continuing delay affirms the fact that the IEC has taken all candidates’ concerns into consideration, any further delay also risks undermining the legitimacy of Afghanistan’s democracy; feeding into the Taliban narrative that the political class in Kabul is ineffective.

Throughout the discussion, participants reiterated the need for the Afghan people to have clarity so their elected representatives can move forward with trying to bring forty years of violence to an end. The case of the 2014 election, whereby then U.S. secretary of State John Kerry managed to strike a power-sharing agreement between sitting President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah to form the current National Unity Government, was not seen as an ideal model to resolve any tensions that could emerge from the September election. It was seen as important for Afghanistan to own its own political destiny and not rely on continued external influence to resolve its internal political debates and governance. Emphasis was thus placed on Afghan politicians to produce a legitimate winner to the election on their own terms.

Given the multiple overlapping issues which have plagued the election – from threats of violence at polling stations, to accusations of fraud and complications with a new biometric system; or from U.S. President Trump’s tweets announcing the cancelation of peace talks with the Taliban at Camp David to further delays of the election result – a poignant theme of the roundtable discussion was the ease by which conversations on Afghanistan can too often focus solely on the negativities surrounding the country.

A key positive indicator is that despite the low voter turnout for the September election, those individuals that did turn out to cast their ballot demonstrated astonishing courage. The fact the election took place illustrates a certain degree of respect for the country’s constitution, and in turn solidifies its importance and centrality to overall governance.

It is often said that donor fatigue has set in across the west when it comes to Afghanistan, with donors and governments alike beginning to lose interest in the country and writing it off as a lost cause. However, if any number of ordinary Afghans, no matter how small, are willing to place themselves in danger to actively participate in a democratic process, then it should be recognized that these votes legitimize the institutional functionality of democracy. As a result, they are immensely significant and should be nurtured as much as possible. To shun these achievements and focus solely on the negatives would be a great disservice to the bravery and fortitude of the Afghan electorate. 

Dr. Wolfgang Klapper, Annie Cowan

Prime Minister Modi’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Kyrgyzstan on June 13 and 14 was his first multilateral engagement after a massive electoral mandate that boosts his international standing. The SCO presents India with diplomatic challenges different from those of 2017 when it obtained full membership. Changed political equations within the SCO and at the international level have bearings on our diplomacy within the organisation.

China dominates the SCO even more than before because of its economic muscle and growing all-round power. Central Asia is the principal axis of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is connecting this region durably to China through infrastructure and oil and gas pipelines. Russia backs the BRI for attracting more Chinese investments in its infrastructure, as well as to balance China’s commanding role and influence decisions on regional projects by seeking alignment of projects between the SCO and the Moscow-initiated Eurasian Economic Union.

Russia’s relations with America have effectively broken down. To counter western pressures it is strengthening strategic understandings with China. Now that America has launched a trade and technology war against China, forging a common front with Russia against America serves China’s interests more than before. For India, more coordination in Russian and Chinese policies reduces our diplomatic space within the SCO and outside.

China had insisted on Pakistan joining the SCO as full member along with India. It has become Beijing’s geopolitical tool all the more with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Russia-Pakistan ties have improved. A gap has developed between our views and those of Russia on the Taliban’s future role in Afghanistan. While China protects Pakistan on the issue of terrorism, Russia too resists any direct reference to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism against India. Contrary to our efforts to isolate Pakistan diplomatically, the SCO is seen as a platform for encouraging an India-Pakistan dialogue.

Even as Russia and China- the SCO’s mainstays- have been declared as America’s strategic adversaries, India has forged increased strategic understandings with America. Russia has concerns about India’s improved ties with the US being at its expense, especially in the defence area. It has reservations not only about our opposition to the BRI, but also about the Indo-Pacific concept.

But then India too has come under unreasonable pressure from America on defence ties with Russia and energy ties with Iran under its CAATSA legislation, and on bilateral trade ties as well, with America focusing narrowly on our high tariffs (WTO compliant) on some products and its trade deficit (limited) with negative consequences for our developing strategic partnership that will be tested during Secretary of State Pompeo’s imminent visit to India.

India’s stakes in Central Asian states are important in the context of their interest in greater involvement of a rising India in their development, the stability of the region threatened by terrorism and extremist ideologies, the potential fall-out a Taliban take-over in Afghanistan on the secular polity of these states, Pakistan’s efforts to keep us out, and so on.

At the summit, India’s focus on our priority interests remained razor sharp. Modi refused to engage with Imran Khan. That Xi Jinping chose to raise the dialogue issue with him knowing that China underwrites Pakistan’s hostility towards India and protects it on terrorism internationally was surprising. Xi was rightly told that India-Pakistan issues had to be dealt with bilaterally and that for a dialogue Pakistan had to create an atmosphere free of terrorist violence.

Modi raised India’s concerns about terrorism frontally at Bishkek, asking for accountability of countries responsible for supporting and providing financial assistance to terrorists, knowing that his remarks would be understood as targeting Pakistan. He called for an international conference to combat the scourge of terrorism. 

India refused to join other SCO countries in supporting China’s BRI. His formal remarks that respect for sovereignty, regional integrity, good governance, transparency, practicality and reliability should be the basis of connectivity initiatives implicitly faulted the BRI, even as he projected India’s commitment to improved connectivity in mentioning the International North South Transport Corridor, Chabahar Port, Ashgabat Agreement, and the Air Freight Corridor with Afghanistan since 2017.

With the Afghanistan peace process becoming a US-Pakistan-Taliban affair, Modi emphasised that India supported an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled inclusive peace process. He spoke against protectionism and for a WTO-focused rule-based and transparent multilateral trading system, joining wider concerns. On Climate Change he highlighted India’s accomplishments in renewable energy and solar power, including the launch of the International Solar Alliance. His comprehensive template for SCO cooperation encapsulated by the word HEALTH for healthcare, economic, alternate energy, literature and culture, terrorism free society and humanitarian cooperation, was eye-catching.

The political blandness of the Bishkek Declaration and some of its formulations are striking. It advocates strengthening the UN Security Council’s role but omits mentioning its expansion and UN reforms. It notes the candidatures of SCO countries to various UN bodies without offering mutual support. On the Iran nuclear deal, without lending clear support to Iran or criticising America for repudiating it and threatening military action, it calls ‘on all the participants to strictly fulfil their obligations for the comprehensive and effective implementation of the document”. While confirming commitment to its fundamental principles, clearly in response to US pressure it supports the idea of making the WTO more “efficient”.

This article was originally published here on Mail Today. 

The latest round of talks held in the second week of May 2019 between the United States (U.S.) and Taliban left US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad expressing frustration about the “slow progress” of the peace talks, even as dead bodies continued to pile up high. This was the sixth such meeting between the two sides since the process commenced in October 2018, and there have also been secret meetings before the engagement turned overt and high-level. The six rounds of peace talks have yielded a tentative “draft agreement” on two issues: first, Taliban’s primary concern with withdrawal of “Foreign Forces”; and second, on assurances that Afghan territory will not become a base for use by international terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS), to hurt the US or any other country.

In theory, a conflict is ripe for resolution if a "mutually hurting stalemate" prevails, at which stage the conflict is essentially deadlocked, and no actor can unilaterally “escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal degree or for the same reasons), they seek an alternative policy or way out.” The important condition here is not the existence of an objective mutually hurting stalemate, but rather that both sides perceive it as such, regardless of what the objective state of the conflict is.

The evidence from the conflict in Afghanistan demonstrates that the current peace process does not satisfy the criteria for the existence of a mutually hurting stalemate. This is because the conflict is not militarily in a static state, and because the stalemate is not perceived to be mutually hurting by Taliban. Indeed, the Taliban not only view the current state of conflict as a stage from where they can escalate to a position of strength, but also as one where the stalemate is not necessarily damaging to their position in the battlefield or on the negotiating table.

Crucially, the Taliban’s assurances belie facts on the ground. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) Project, during the first four months of 2019, the Taliban military offensive increased in the month of March, even as offensive operations by the state decreased. This was followed by the official announcement of the spring offensive by the Taliban on April 12, 2019, after which Taliban-led attacks spiked sharply. This is corroborated further by SIGAR’s April Quarterly Report, which says that the average monthly enemy-initiated attacks have risen by 19% from November 2018 to January 2019.

Read the full article on the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EastWest Institute