Strategic Trust-Building

Speaking in Mandarin, Firestein analyzed the unique dynamics shaping this campaign, including the increasing success of non-traditional candidates such as Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders. One Chinese media commentator characterized Firestein’s presentation as “probably the most comprehensive, thoughtful and articulate original Chinese-language analysis of the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign available to mainland Chinese readers to date.”

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Click here to watch David Firestein discuss the 2016 Taiwanese presidential election results on Voice of America (VOA) Mandarin Service.

Tensions in the South China Sea have been in the international spotlight over the past few months. In Japan, there has been significant debate over the country's potential role as a U.S. regional ally in ensuring freedom of navigation and the promotion of a rules-based order in the region. But while the South China Sea continues to be an important regional issue, the potential for increased tensions in the East China Sea remains the most important security challenge for Japan.

Last year witnessed a small improvement in the strained relationship between Japan and China. Following an "ice-breaker" meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in November 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met in Jakarta in April during another international meeting. These bilateral meetings were followed by the official resumption of the Trilateral Leaders' Summit, which also involves South Korea. During the Trilateral meeting, Abe and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang made time to meet on bilateral issues.

These high-level encounters have broken the deadlock between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. At a practical level, the meetings have resulted in high-level commitments by Tokyo and Beijing to push forward the implementation of a crisis management mechanism in the East China Sea to avoid unintended clashes, either in the sea or the skies above. This was agreed during the Abe-Xi meeting in November 2014 and has been reinforced by several working-level meetings since that time. High-level maritime talks have resumed and both sides have re-engaged in a bilateral security dialogue.

To read the entire article on Nikkei Asian Review, click here. 

On January 16, 2016, EastWest Institute Perot Fellow and Vice President David Firestein appeared on Voice of America (VOA) Mandarin Service to comment on the 2016 Taiwanese presidential elections, which resulted in the election of Taiwan's first-ever female president. He addressed the implications of Democratic Progressive Party leader Tsai Ing-Wen's landslide victory on cross-Strait and U.S.-China relations and discussed its ramifications for the ongoing U.S. presidential election campaign. 

On Tsai Ing-wen’s victory, commitment to “status quo” and impact on relations between Taipei, Beijing and Washington, DC:

Firestein argued that Tsai Ing-wen recognizes the importance of cross-Strait stability for Taiwan, the mainland and the United States. Firestein noted that the U.S. was unsurprised by the results of the election and that U.S. policy towards Taiwan generally remains unchanged regardless of which party governs Taiwan. In Firestein’s view, maintaining the imperfect status quo in terms of both Taiwan’s status and relations between Washington, Beijing and Taipei is currently the only tenable arrangement. Tsai has already promised to be communicative with the mainland in order to maintain stability, and although the mainland would have preferred a Kuomintang victory, it is also painfully aware of the negative consequences of interfering too deeply in Taiwan’s affairs. If both the mainland leadership and Tsai can continue to show restraint and move forward cautiously, cross-Strait relations can remain stable. To this end, the U.S. will continue to pursue “dual deterrence”—pressing both sides to show restraint in order to maintain peace.

On the U.S. response to the outcome of the election:

Firestein believes that the election will not change the United States’ existing policy toward Taiwan, which is codified in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the 1982 Six Assurances and the Joint Communiqué of August 17, 1982. Furthermore, in Firestein’s view, Tsai has internalized some important lessons from previous DPP President Chen Shui-bian’s handling of cross-Strait relations and relations with the United States as evidenced by her strong pledge to maintain stability in cross-Strait affairs and by her stated focus on improving the livelihood of ordinary people. Firestein believes that former Deputy Secretary of State William Burns and current Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visits to Taipei and Beijing, respectively, in the wake of the election are not acts of preventive diplomacy per se, but rather are intended to affirm the continuity of longstanding U.S. policy toward Taiwan.

On the timing of the latest U.S. arms sale package to Taiwan:

Firestein states that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan remain a sore point for U.S.-China relations; he also notes that the four-year gap between the previous arms sales package to Taiwan and the latest package (2011 to 2015) is the longest a U.S. administration has gone without notifying Congress of its intent to sell arms to Taiwan since the arms sales first began. Firestein noted the Obama Administration’s efforts to limit the scope of the latest arms sale package relative to recent past packages and to execute the notification as discreetly as possible; by announcing the arms sale just before Christmas, a typically quiet part of the year, the administration was able to minimize fanfare surrounding the announcement. Firestein noted that the announcement attracted some criticism from the DPP as it was seen by some as potentially bolstering the Kuomintang in the election, but as evidenced by the landslide DPP victory, it ultimately had little effect on the election’s outcome.

On 2016 U.S. presidential candidates’ views on Taiwan:

Firestein noted that although China has been discussed in the ongoing U.S. presidential campaign, the Taiwan issue has not been mentioned by any of the candidates in either party. With the attention of U.S. foreign policy mostly focused on other issues such as the Islamic State, terrorism, the Middle East, Russia and North Korea, Taiwan is not considered a top-priority issue. He stated that most Americans do not think of Taiwan as a place where conflict will occur. Firestein also stated that all of the major U.S. presidential candidates hold relatively mainstream views of China. The China-related rhetoric that has been heard in the campaign have largely concerned trade, the exchange rate of China’s currency and other such issues that have dominated the U.S. policy debate on China in recent years.

Recommendations on managing cross-Strait relations:

Firestein emphasized that the U.S. need not change its policy on the Taiwan issue. On the contrary, with respect to the specific issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Firestein noted that the U.S. should adhere to its existing laws and policy commitments, including the Joint Communiqué of August 17, 1982. Looking at the Chinese side of the equation, Firestein suggested that China reduce the number of ballistic missiles in southeastern China currently aimed at Taiwan as a good-faith confidence-building measure. He expressed the view that if China could moderate its stance on Taiwan, doing so would likely help China achieve its own aims, while also creating a climate more conducive to continued peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

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Click here to watch the interview.

Click here to watch David Firestein discuss the 2016 U.S. presidential election in Mandarin.

Senior retired flag officers of the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force traveled to Beijing, China to meet with retired flag officers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to discuss critical issues in the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship. The delegations spent one-and-a-half days in off-the-record dialogue and also met with sitting members of China’s Central Military Commission.

The dialogue sessions covered a range of topics of importance to the United States and China. Discussion focused on Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the United States; measures for building trust between the U.S. and Chinese militaries; maritime issues in the South and East China Seas; and other issues of mutual interest such as U.S.-China relations under the next U.S. presidential administration, North Korea and counterterrorism. Both sides agreed that cultivating communication and mutual understanding between the militaries of the United States and China is essential for fostering the cooperation necessary to address the world’s most difficult issues.

Since 2008, the Sanya Initiative has regularly brought together retired American and Chinese generals and admirals in order to build stronger military-to-military ties between the United States and China.

Click here to download the report. 

On Saturday, Jan. 16, Taiwan will hold a critical election that is likely to see the country vote in its first female president, Tsai Ing-wen. If elected, Tsai, who currently holds a double-digit lead in most polls, would herald a new era of politics in Taiwan and establish only the second government led by the liberal Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), after more than seven decades of political dominance by the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) party.

Adding to the intrigue is the race between the DPP and the KMT for the legislature, known as the Legislative Yuan. The KMT currently has 64 of its 113 seats, all of which are being contested in Saturday’s election. If Tsai’s party wins the Legislative Yuan as well as the presidency, it would give the DPP an unprecedented amount of authority to rule—and it would mean the KMT losing control of the legislature for the first time in Taiwan’s history. An outright DPP legislative victory is less certain than the results of the presidential election, but most polls are currently predicting a DPP majority there.

The election in Taiwan will be closely watched in the region, especially in China, which fears that ties with Taiwan, which were warming under the tenure of the current president, Ma Ying-jeou, may cool with Tsai in office. But it isn’t just Beijing. Other countries in the region will also be monitoring the results, in particular Japan. Tokyo’s relationship with Taipei is complex and suffers from many of the same historical legacies and grievances that continue to inhibit Japan’s relations with other neighbors, including China and South Korea—although ties with the latter did improve last month with a deal over the painful issue of “comfort women” during World War II. Despite their differences, Japan and Taiwan have largely been able to transcend them and focus more on a stable strategic relationship, buttressed by trade and common values, such as democracy and the rule of law. 

To read the article in its entirety on World Politics Review, click here. 

Firestein was quoted in VOA on January 13. The article is published in Russian.

As quoted in this article: It was a compelling speech that served as an effective ‘closing argument’ for his two-term presidency. Obama laid out the key themes of his presidency and addressed, in a pretty direct way, the critiques that have been leveled on his policies and leadership style over the past seven years. Whether one accepts his arguments or not, I thought they were put forward skillfully and persuasively – and, indeed, with a disarming sense of humor in a number of instances.

To read the full article at Voice of America, click here. (In Russian)

The new year has not started off well at all for China, what with its stock market plunge and the latest provocation by not-so-neighborly North Korea. Regardless of its veracity, the announcement of a hydrogen bomb test constitutes a major dis to China, especially in light of recent efforts by China to improve ties between the two sides.

I agree that China can play a significant role in exerting more pressure on North Korea, including through its economic leverage and support of U.N. sanctions. However, expectations of what China can or cannot do to elicit a positive change in North Korea’s behavior need to be tempered against the fact that relations between these two countries have changed under their current leaders.

Kim Jong-un’s actions, including this week’s announcement, indicate a desire for North Korea to be respected as a nuclear power and an unwillingness to be a junior partner to China. Chinese president Xi Jinping has moved away from his predecessors’ practice of staunchly standing by North Korea as an historical ally; three years into his term as Chinese Communist Party general secretary, he has not yet met with Kim, opting instead to foster closer ties with South Korea.

China’s open criticisms of North Korea’s actions, especially the latter’s repeated nuclear tests, reflect not only thinning patience over North Korea but also frustration over a diminishing ability to gain accurate insights into Kim’s motivations.

The North Korea nuclear issue is also a prime example of a “cooperation conundrum” for China and the United States. Both share a common interest and goal in seeking denuclearization of North Korea and the Korean peninsula. But their approaches have differed, largely due to diverging strategic concerns.

U.S. concerns about the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea to its Asia allies—especially Japan and South Korea—and to U.S. soil have been a key driver behind efforts to strengthen security cooperation, such as the recently revised U.S.-Japan defense guidelines (reflecting Japan’s more proactive defense posture) and a possible U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea. These developments have left China jittery about their effects on its security and strategic deterrence.

China itself faces a delicate balancing act. Repeated brinksmanship by Kim may encourage China to undertake or support a further mix of incentives (e.g. diplomacy) and especially disincentives (e.g. sanctions) to rein in North Korea. Yet, it may still hold back, due to worries about overplaying its hand and forcing North Korea into a corner, eliciting instability on China’s border, and possibly leading to eventual Korean reunification and a U.S. ally on China’s doorstep.

Any discussions between the U.S. and China on coordinating efforts to stem the North Korea nuclear problem will need to take those concerns into account. Another question for the U.S., China and the international community is whether North Korea denuclearization is still a realistic goal in the foreseeable future. With this latest nuclear test—North Korea’s fourth—Kim appears to have answered with a resounding “no.”

To read this article on China File, click here.