Strategic Trust-Building

People-to-People Relations: The Achilles’ Heel of China’s Soft Power Projection

BY: PATRIK K. MEYER

China has been a socioeconomic and political success since the Chinese economic reform in the late 1970s. This success results from the combination of its hard-working and disciplined people, and robust Communist Party of China (CPC) leadership that has been willing to reinvent itself by learning from its own the mistakes and successes, as well as those of other countries. In the last decade, the CPC has been carefully assessing foreign economic, political, technological and social approaches and innovations, and skillfully adapting them to China’s unique context and needs; i.e. modify them to have Chinese characteristics.

As most countries, China wants to “strengthen its position and prestige in the international arena, as well as to create favorable conditions for its long-term socio-economic development,”1 for which it uses hard and soft power strategies, the latter being described by Professor Joseph Nye as “getting others to want what you want.” China’s growing global strategy has been marked by Beijing’s political, military and economic non-interference, and respectful relations with other governments. This is particularly the case when it comes to bilateral relations with governments from developing countries that depend on Beijing to build their infrastructure as, in turn, China depends on them for their natural resources and markets. And while China is becoming increasingly assertive and willing to use its growing hard power on issues such as its territorial integrity and role in the international financial markets, Beijing is investing massive human and financial resources to develop its soft power.

Beijing is making significant efforts to expand its soft power, for example, by building constructive relations with governments, promoting Chinese culture across its hundreds of Confucius Institutes around the globe and facilitating necessary financing and know-how for large infrastructure projects in the developing world. While Beijing’s efforts have contributed to improving China’s image, state sponsored initiatives, foreign policies, and diplomacy alone are not enough to grow the country’s soft power. Generating soft power also depends on numerous non-state actors, such as entertainment and news outlets, consumer brands, NGOs, and, particularly in China’s case, people-to-people relations internationally.

Interpersonal relations between Chinese citizens in foreign countries and the local populations are increasingly fundamental to generate and preserve China’s soft power, owing to the large number of Chinese projects and businesses using Chinese labor in developing countries. When western countries establish projects in developing countries, they only send a few of their own citizens to the host country, mostly employed in managerial positions, resulting in very limited interactions with the local citizens. Unlike western countries, China sends large numbers of blue-collar workers to host countries (a contentious issue in itself), who interact extensively with the local population, both on and off the construction sites where they work.

As a result, Chinese white-collar and blue-collar workers become China’s unwitting sociocultural ambassadors and play a fundamental role in building or—more importantly—potentially undermining China’s soft power. So far, it seems that Beijing has underestimated the crucial role that interpersonal relations between its citizens and the local populations play in building and maintaining China’s image and influence. Arguably, poor interpersonal relations are undermining China’s efforts, resulting in host country populations viewing China and the Chinese with dislike, suspicion and even fear.

This is the case in numerous developing countries, primarily in Central and Southeast Asia, as well as in Africa. In a previous article “Could Han Chauvinism Turn the ‘Chinese Dream’ into a ‘Chinese Nightmare’?,” I discussed the increasing interpersonal tensions and disputes between Chinese businessmen and the local populations in Central Asian countries that resulted from ignoring local traditions and values. As a result, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Tajiks feel anxious about the increasing Chinese presence and influence in their respective countries.

China is also “carelessly losing its soft power battle” in the cases of Indonesia and Angola because of poor interpersonal relations, resulting in locals feeling discriminated against when Chinese undertake large development projects and conduct business. Specifically, both Angolans and Indonesians feel that Chinese management and workers do not respect local cultures and values, and that they are hired predominantly for unskilled labor, paid much lower wages than Chinese workers doing the same work and do not receive benefits that Chinese workers get, such as high-quality meals, insurance or even a work contract. The outcome: local populations increasingly adopt a negative image of Chinese companies and China, despite China’s significant contributions to help these nations develop their economy, technology and infrastructure.

Beijing’s failure to guide its citizens in building respectful and constructive interpersonal relations has resulted in host communities becoming increasingly anxious about China’s intentions to the point that there have been numerous violent attacks against Chinese citizens and property. Recent cases include the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Kyrgyzstan and the killing of two Chinese citizens in Pakistan.

To prevent poor interpersonal relations from being the Achilles’ heel of an otherwise robust projection of Chinese soft power in developing countries, the CPC must make a concerted effort to equip Chinese citizens with the necessary sociocultural tools to build respectful and long-term people-to-people relations. This could be achieved, for example, by providing basic cultural and language training to workers/executives based in target countries, underlining respect of local traditions. This training should emphasize that each Chinese individual working abroad is, in fact, a de facto ambassador of China and must safeguard China’s interests in the region. Additionally, to avoid repeating the same mistakes, it is necessary to encourage site managers to record and report disputes.

Better interpersonal relations between Chinese citizens and local populations in developing nations will create synergy that is fundamental for China’s long-term positive standing in the world.

1.  Nye, J. (2009).p. 7  Smart Power, New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 26, İssue 2, s. 7-9

 

Patrik K. Meyer holds a Ph.D. in International Studies from the University of Cambridge and currently a Visiting Professor at Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta and a New America Security Fellow.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

China and the “Rogues”

BY: DANIEL JOHANSON

Whenever there is an international security issue that merits the attention of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), China’s intentions are often questioned. Is China willing to work and solve crises within the international order or is it intent on replacing them? While China was once excluded from this order, it is now truly enmeshed in it.

Looking at China’s interactions with international security concerns—particularly with regard to “Rogue” states—can give us some answers. In any society, members are socialized to rules and they either adapt or get shunned. Likewise, states must observe key norms and values or be characterized as an outcast.

While there is no exact definition of a rogue state, it usually refers to a nation that is or has been a cause of regional/international instability, a target of UNSC action, an experienced internal disorder, a member of the developing world with an authoritarian ruler/group of rulers, and a state sponsor of terror. With these actors, numerous norms are at play. China’s interpretation of its role in international institutions, conceptualization of non-intervention/sovereignty, and non-proliferation play a major part in its interactions. Sudan, Iran and North Korea are perfect examples to illustrate China’s various responses. Each is a textbook rogue state, but for different reasons.

North Korea

China’s relationship with North Korea is complicated. While China is perceived to have significant influence over the nation, the reality is more complex. China maintains relations with Pyongyang to somewhat preserve stability. During the first Nuclear Crisis, China left the U.S. to deal with the Koreas. The U.S. had wanted  China’s help, but North Korea did not want them involved.

China’s more active role began after North Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Talk in 2003, starting the second crisis. China predominantly limited itself to mediation or facilitation. North Korea’s nuclear test—and its abrupt notification to China—drastically changed the situation. China issued a harsh condemnation and allowed sanctions. Each subsequent test resulted in harsher sanctions and calls for talks. For Xi Jinping, China’s president, relations with North Korea started off on the wrong foot. In the short time between Xi becoming General Secretary and President, North Korea conducted a satellite launch and its third nuclear test, clearly a provocation. As a result, China supported further sanctions.

North Korea has continually ignored China’s calls for restraint. North Korea’s two nuclear tests last year further strained relations. In response to those tests, the U.S. and China worked together to strengthen UNSC sanctions. China even worked with the U.S. to maximize the impact of these new sanctions, having either vetoed or watered down the previous ones. As North Korea continues to be an issue, China will further enforce sanctions and call for restraint.

Iran

Dealing with Iran shows gradual but noticeable change in China’s approach. Iran’s quest to build a nuclear weapon, combined with its connections to terrorist groups, defines its status as a rogue. In the 1980s-1990s, much of the China-Iran relationship revolved around the sale of weapons and weapons technology. However, prioritizing relations with the U.S., China canceled weapons sales and nuclear assistance. This underscored that Iran was purely business.

Continuing into the 2000s, China viewed a nuclear Iran as a bilateral problem between the U.S. and Iran. China delayed referrals to the IAEA and the UNSC—giving Iran a chance to prove its peaceful intentions. When that failed, China pushed for Presidential Statements, then lighter resolutions, until Iran’s non-compliance could no longer be ignored.  China continually called for mediation and publically called for cooperation.

As Iran repeatedly failed to comply with international requests, sanctions grew harsher. China remained active in Iran, but allowed for sanctions. UNSCR 1929 in 2010 paved the way for unilateral sanctions, and while China did not publicly agree, they privately instructed some companies to observe them. This helped bring Iran back to the table for the negotiations that would become the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Here, China was viewed as a key mediator. China was said to have persuaded Iranian leadership of the benefits of the deal and became more actively involved.

Sudan

Sudan shows a clear evolution of China’s adaptation to unexpected circumstances. Initially, Sudan earned its rogue moniker through its 1990s connections with Al-Qaeda and the crisis in Darfur.  China’s relationship with Sudan was initially based out of mutual necessity—Sudan needed trading partners and China needed oil. China continued this “business is business” approach up until the peak of the Darfur crisis. International attention focused on the conflict and pulled China—and the 2008 Olympics—into the discussion. As China wanted to look like a responsible power, they had little choice but to act.

While dragging their feet in the UNSC, China appointed a diplomat to specifically deal with the crisis and sent high-level officials to Khartoum to obtain Omar al-Bashir’s compliance. These efforts broke past precedent and clearly indicated a shift in how China interpreted non-intervention/sovereignty. The referendum for South Sudanese independence continued this trend—from non-involvement in the peace agreement to active acceptance and support of UN efforts to ensure a fair vote. Shortly after independence, South Sudan fell into civil war, further intensifying China's role. China acted as a mediator, but after initial failed attempts, finally sent their first ever battalion of UN military peacekeepers. This emphasized how it viewed its role and further muddied China's definition of non-interference.

Constructive Engagement

Each example shows that, while imperfect in implementation, China understands the role it should take in international affairs and increasingly acts in such a way. China’s inaction was a result of not viewing issues as their concern. However, as their interests and roles within the international community grew, China became more involved in searching for solutions. This role has intensified with a willingness to address issues in their own way. China began addressing these cases through mediation, and while this is still a preference, its toolbox has expanded to include influence, peacekeeping and even sanctions.  

China’s role has moved beyond a strict definition of non-interference and sovereignty to a more “constructive engagement" that understands the values of upholding international norms. Their actions now more accurately reflect its presence in international affairs and are conducted in the interest of maintaining stability and ensuring peaceful resolution. This clearly shows that China’s membership in the international system has resulted in an internalization of values and norms and that China has chosen to stay within the international community rather than go outside it.  

 

Daniel Johanson is a Ph.D. candidate at King’s College London focusing on Chinese foreign policy towards North Korea, Iran and Sudan.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Miller Unpacks U.S.-South Korean Relations

In an article for Al Jazeera, EWI Senior Fellow Jonathan Berkshire Miller weighed in on the state of South Korea-U.S. relations ahead of U.S. President Trump's meeting with South Korean President Moon Jae-in later this week in Washington. 

The geopolitical backdrop of Moon's visit is framed around an increasingly provocative regime in North Korea and an administration in the U.S. that seems focused on forcibly changing the calculus of Pyongyang's decision to develop and maintain a nuclear weapons program. The stakes will be especially high because Moon—a progressive with dovish tendencies towards Pyongyang—is looking to demonstrate unity with President Trump without sacrificing his own policy goals of engaging the North diplomatically. There are also valid concerns in Seoul on Trump's protectionist rhetoric and his desire to amend—or maybe even withdraw from—the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement.

During Moon's election campaign, his rivals from both the conservative and progressive sides launched salvos at him outlining his dubious approach to dealing with North Korea and his sceptical take on the U.S.-South Korea alliance remaining at the core of Seoul's security ethos. They questioned Moon's flip-flopping on the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system in South Korea and his pledge to "review" the decision.

Despite THAAD being already deployed and operational, Moon has now made good in some sense on that pledge through his suspension—pending a probe's findings—on the deployment of an additional four missile launchers (there are already two launchers active and operational).

Washington's position, before the Moon-Trump meeting, is that Seoul's change of heart on THAAD is not only upsetting the operational effectiveness of the missile defence system (which is aimed to both defend South Korea and the more than 30,000 US troops in the country) but also is simultaneously weakening the credibility of the deterrence value of the US-Korea alliance. Moreover, some reports have indicated that Trump himself is "furious" over Moon's decision to suspend the full deployment of the launchers.

Read the full article here at Al Jazeera.

Munter Talks China-Afghanistan Partnership

In an interview with the South China Morning Post, Cameron Munter, President and CEO of the EastWest Institute, said that China's trade push in Afghanistan would "make an enormous change in the way countries in the region see one another."

Munter was speaking during an international symposium in Beijing last week, which was co-organized by EWI's Afghanistan Reconnected Process. The conference—the first one dedicated specifically to the trade plan between Afghanistan and Beijing—focused on ways to unlock both Afghanistan's and the broader region's economic potential during a vital time of transition as well as on on fresh opportunities provided by China's Belt and Road Initiative. 

Click here to access the article at the South China Morning Post. 

“Alternative” Strategic Perceptions in U.S.-China Relations

The EastWest Institute has released a new report on U.S.-China relations—"Alternative” Strategic Perceptions in U.S.-China Relations.

The report lays out the differing strategic perceptions of the United States and China with respect to some of the most topical and challenging issues on the U.S.-China agenda today. These starkly differing perceptions inform and exacerbate actual policy and fuel mistrust and broad mutual strategic suspicion.

By exposing the diverging perceptions of the two countries and bringing those perceptions into the fabric of bilateral discourse more explicitly and honestly, this report creates the basis for a more honest, substantive, constructive, fruitful and mutually beneficial dialogue.

Background:

In the first hundred days of his tenure in the White House, President Donald Trump has had to devote considerable attention to the United States’ single most consequential bilateral partner:  China. 

The issues currently on the U.S.-China agenda share several commonalities: they are top-tier issues that garner presidential attention in both the United States and China; they are contentious, in the U.S.-China context, to the point of raising the prospect of direct conflict (e.g., a hot war or a “trade war”) between the United States and China; and they represent enduring, and seemingly intractable, challenges. These issues also share another less obvious commonality: they are issues where the U.S.-China perceptual divide is as much a part of the problem as the actual interests or policies in question. 

Key Issues Addressed:

  • The U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific 
  • The stability of the Korean peninsula, including specifically, the deployment of the THAAD system
  • U.S. reconnaissance operations in the Asia-Pacific region
  • Disputes in the East and South China Seas
  • Cross-strait relations
  • Cybersecurity 

The full report is available here.

 

Dialogue on U.S.-China Infrastructure Cooperation

On March 13, 2017, the EastWest Institute (EWI), in concert with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), convened the first ever conference on prospects for infrastructure cooperation between the United States and China. This conference, held in Beijing, brought together a U.S. delegation comprising investment and infrastructure experts—some of whom have advised the Trump administration on infrastructure—with Chinese counterparts from a number of private sector and state-owned enterprises. Discussion throughout the conference focused on the policy priorities of the Trump Administration; the Trump administration’s vision for the development of U.S. infrastructure; the current state of U.S.-China relations; and opportunities, challenges and recommendations for U.S.-China infrastructure cooperation.

While in Beijing, the U.S. delegation also met with senior representatives from the Communist Party of China and officials from a number of Chinese governmental ministries and agencies involved in infrastructure, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Commerce; the Ministry of Finance; and the National Development and Reform Commission. The delegation also met with officials from the Embassy of the United States in Beijing to share key outcomes from the meetings with Chinese officials. Throughout both the conference and official meetings, the delegates raised a number of proposals and recommendations for the Trump-Xi presidential summit at Mar-a-Lago in April.

The conference highlighted various opportunities for cooperation between the two countries, including Chinese investment in U.S. infrastructure projects and potential U.S.-China infrastructure cooperation in third-country (and especially emerging) markets. Participants from the two sides agreed that both the Trump administration’s prioritization of revitalizing U.S. infrastructure as well as the opportunities for Chinese investment in U.S. infrastructure create the potential for enhanced, mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries.


Discussion session at CICIR.

Click here to download event report. 

Photos: From top, left to right

Anthony W. Parker (left) and Da Wei; Qian Liwei (left) and Norman F. Anderson; Wayne Silby (left) and Zhang Yuncheng; Yuan Peng (left) and David J. Firestein; Sun Chenghao, Ji Zhiye and Andrew Charlesworth and Norman F. Anderson; Daniel M. Slane (left) and IDCPC Vice Minister Guo Yezhou; Wayne Silby (left), Alan Wong and Bai Wei; Anthony W. Parker (left), David J. Firestein, Wayne Silby, Norman F. Anderson and Euhwa Tran; Andy Pan (left) and Andrew Charlesworth; Zhang Fang (left) and David J. Firestein; Yuan Peng (left), David J. Firestein and Andy Pan; Timothy P. Stratford (left), Fu Mengzi, Anthony W. Parker, Cui Liru and Norman F. Anderson; Anthony W. Parker (left), Timothy P. Stratford, Wayne Silby, Andrew Charlesworth and MFA Director General Cong Peiwu; Daniel M. Slane (left) and Wang Rongjun.

Photo credit: Aurelien Foucault

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