Strategic Trust-Building

Dr. Lora Saalman, vice president of EWI’s Asia-Pacific program, joined experts from over 30 countries in South Asia and Horn of Africa to moderate a workshop on the security implications of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Yangon, Myanmar.

The February 22-23 regional workshop was organized by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and co-hosted by the Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies (MISIS).

About the workshop series, Dr. Saalman noted, "The BRI is one of the most amorphous and yet, potentially, transformative concepts to emerge from China. It offers the tangibility that many previous Chinese initiatives have lacked, repackaging old and new infrastructure projects. And yet, the nascent BRI is marked by ambiguity in terms of its overall structure and longer-term aims.”

“Faced with this contradiction, regional stakeholders have begun to express concerns over unsustainable projects, debt-for-equity swaps, community backlash, ecological strains and exacerbated trafficking and ethnic issues. This series offers a platform for these countries to engage and to formulate their own takeaways in terms of regional cooperation and risk management," she added.

The Yangon workshop was part of a series organized by SIPRI and FES in China, Central Asia, Europe, Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Horn of Africa starting in 2016, to fill the gap in the under-researched security implications of the BRI. The deliberations will continue at a Shanghai workshop in March, with specific focus on the EU-China relations. For more information about the project, go here.

Photos from the event are by Minzayar Oo/FES

Banner photo: "Shwedagon Pagoda" (CC BY-ND 2.0) by tomyam93

On February 10, Abu Dhabi awarded an Indian consortium a 10 percent stake in one of its offshore oil concession areas. This announcement is significant as it marks India’s maiden entry into the Gulf’s upstream hydrocarbons sector.

The 600 million USD deal was facilitated by a recent upswing in political ties, following a spate of reciprocal visits by the UAE-Indian leadership and the consequent flow of bilateral ties.

In 2015, after becoming the first Indian Prime Minister to visit the UAE in 34 years, Narendra Modi returned on February 10-11 for the World Government Summit in Dubai.

In the meantime, the UAE’s de facto leader, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces H.H. Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, visited India in 2016 and 2017. 

This momentum in bilateral ties helped surpass the traditional areas of collaboration — oil, trade and expatriate workers. To tackle contemporary challenges of mutual interest, the two countries signed the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement” last year. This newfound government-to-government camaraderie and strengthening of ties allows the two countries to not only focus on new economic opportunities like food security and frontier science, but also helps them tackle their mutual security concerns in the Middle East and South Asia. 

This will be enabled through improved tactical defense cooperation, joint military exercises and training, naval collaboration, partnerships in defense production, and combined action against religious extremism. 

While this agenda will evolve over the next few years, it is worth exploring the possibility of converting the strategic bilateral association into tactical multilateral partnerships in certain economic and security domains.

In the current context, the rationale for multilateralism is that many of the UAE’s and India’s individual interests or joint concerns are unlikely to be optimally addressed by mere bilateral cooperation mechanisms.

While the immediate economic, political and strategic needs could be met by pursuing bilateral track, long-term interests – which often depend on a third country or more — this is best tackled through a multilateral strategy. Pooling of resources, ideas and efforts would not only be cost effective and efficient, but could possibly yield better results as well.

To this end, the UAE and India are engaged in separate multilateral partnerships with various countries. They are also part of several multilateral forums, but many are too global in nature to promote their common interests nearer to home.

Instead they could focus on collaborating in regional organizations to promote multilateral engagement, like the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. The IORA is crucial to promoting the economic interests of 21 member countries, including the UAE and India, and to safeguarding mercantile shipping lanes from piracy.

Such an association would gel with India’s vision of SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region). This promotes an ocean-based “blue economy,” wherein sustainable economic development is linked to security.

Another potential area is the defense sector. Both the UAE and India are negotiating with France to purchase Rafale fighter jets. This offers a chance for Paris-supervised regional manufacturing of spare parts and collaboration in aviation software technology that could be cost-effective for both.

Recently, New Delhi’s proactive diplomacy has sought to expand and intensify ties in South, West, East and Central Asia, which offers the UAE scope to enhance its own interests by teaming up with India. Opportunities include the following:

• The UAE considering investment in India’s North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC), a network of ship, rail, and road routes between India and Europe, via the Middle East, Central Asia and Russia. It links the Indian Ocean and Gulf with the Caspian Sea, making the current routes shorter and reducing transport costs. Either Afghanistan or Central Asian countries, where the UAE has stakes, could become potential venues for multilateral cooperation.

• Beyond the potential NSTC opportunity in Afghanistan, the UAE and India are also committed to the war-torn country’s stability and welfare, paving the way for cooperation on combatting terrorism and coordinating their development assistance and infrastructure projects, thus strengthening the Afghan government.

• The UAE and India could also team up in Africa by combining their strengths of wealth and technological expertise to augment, for example, telemedicine and food production and storage facilities, which have great potential to improve the quality of living in remote parts of the continent.

• India is also part of the Japan-promoted “Asia-Africa Growth Corridor” or “Freedom Corridor,” connecting the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea, a potential point of interest to the UAE given its recent focus on expanding business and strategic opportunities in Africa.

• India-Japan joint ventures also open the door for the UAE to promote and partake in engagements arising from the recent quadrilateral cooperation among the mainstream Indo-Pacific countries, including Australia and the United States.

Together, the quest to advance UAE-India bilateral ties through some of these partnerships also adds value to South-South cooperation and contributes to partially fulfilling the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.

Finally, there is also the opportunity for both countries to work with other like-minded countries to draw the contours of a more effective security architecture for the region.

UAE-India relations have a newfound level of strategic depth, and there remains enormous potential for collaboration on multilateral initiatives. While it is every country’s sovereign right to pursue the strategy that suits it best, there is little to argue against pooling of opportunities and resources, particularly when shared interests pave the way for discernible results.

There is an increasing mutual recognition between Abu Dhabi and New Delhi, who along with other strategic partners, are poised to leverage multilateralism to improve economic efficiency, enhance international cooperation and contribute to peace and security in the region. The effects are not instantaneous, but the two countries are demonstrating the value and benefit of an approach that focuses on commercial, military and diplomatic partnership supporting mutual interests and regional stability.

Dr. N. Janardhan is Senior Research Fellow, Gulf-Asia Programme, Emirates Diplomatic Academy, and Honorary Fellow, University of Exeter.  

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Abu_Dhabi_Skyline_from_Breakwaters_Marina.jpg

A focus on  zero-sum trade reciprocity and bilateralism risks undermining United States engagement in Asia

The new National Security Strategy (NSS), which the White House rolled out on December 18, is long on self-described realism but short on geo-economic strategy. Proclaiming a return to principled realism, the NSS defines the international system as one of great power competition in which China and Russia are revisionist powers challenging the status quo and strategic competitors to the United States. The NSS also lays the charge that for several decades U.S. foreign policy has been shaped by the misguided belief that “engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners.”

This realist conceptual framework is a welcomed and long overdue departure from previous and successive administrations. However, the NSS triumphantly kills some darlings of liberal internationalist foreign policy only to replace them with a few of its own making—economic nationalism with a singular if not myopic obsession with trade reciprocity and bilateral trade agreements. To be sure, the White House is correct to take a tougher approach toward China on unfair trade practices, particularly involving intellectual property rights and technology transfer, as well as enhanced scrutiny of Chinese investment in the United States. Also, greater trade reciprocity would strengthen the U.S. balance sheet vis-a-vis China on a bilateral basis.  

Such bilateral and retaliatory measures offer little in terms of challenging or offsetting China’s geoeconomic ground game in Asia. With only three years left in office, some of which will be focused on renegotiating NAFTA and KORUS, the administration will be hard pressed to negotiate enough bilateral FTAs in Asia to compensate for having withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). At a minimum, the White House would need to initiate and successfully conclude FTAs with Japan and Vietnam as well as resuscitate talks with the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. This is a moon shot considering that the zero-sum priority on lowering trade deficits is likely to complicate or derail FTA negotiations—if not overall relations—with regional allies and emerging security partners.

Conspicuously, the NSS makes no mention of China’s Belt and Road Initiative—the most ambitious and potentially transformational geo-strategic project in the world—or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which together offer a parallel Sino-centric order or sphere of influence. Neither does the NSS recognize efforts by Japan and the remaining TPP members to move forward without U.S. participation or even acknowledge other regional multilateral trade initiatives such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) which would exclude the United States. In short, the White House trade agenda risks setting up the U.S. to be caught on the outside of the trend in regional trade architecture to the benefit of China.

The strategic question for the White House is not simply whether its preferred trade and economic policies improve the U.S. balance sheet, but whether those policies will enable the U.S. and its allies to continue to write rules of global trade and finance and to compete with China at a geo-economic level. In this context, the NSS for all its hard-nosed and clear-eyed realism fails to lay out a coherent and comprehensive geo-economic road map that guides U.S. policy toward Asia while reassuring U.S allies and partners in the region.  

However, there is one bright spot that gets disjointed treatment within the document—promoting U.S. oil and LNG exports as well as high-quality infrastructure abroad. The White House should have highlighted the synergy derived from linking the two initiatives together and identified these areas as priority action items for the Indo-Pacific. The recently launched Japan–United States Strategic Energy Partnership that was accompanied by agreements by the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), to promote high-quality infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific, is a starting point for a much broader regional geo-economic strategy.  

In comparison, it is worth noting that in 2016 Japan pledged 200 billion USD over just five years to help finance its Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure, launched the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor with India in May 2017, and more recently announced a public-private initiative to provide 10 billion USD in financial support to build LNG and natural gas infrastructure in Asia.  

Going forward, the White House would be well advised to set aside its singular obsession with zero-sum trade reciprocity and the presumptive silver bullet of bilateralism to fully commit to a coherent and comprehensive geo-economic strategy with generously allocated resources if it wants to preserve the U.S. led rules-based order in Asia and counter China’s grand strategy to carve out a parallel Sino-centric order or sphere of influence. In other words, the United States needs to put money on the table now—even if it not reciprocated—or run the risk of “losing”  Asia in the long run.

Jeremy Maxie is an Associate at Strategika Group Asia Pacific. He tweets at @jeremy_maxie. 

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

"Globe" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by Berto Garcia

This year represents the centennial of the communist takeover of Russia, which indelibly marked the transition from Tsarist Empire to the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. was a menace not only to the free world, but also to its own people. Despite its collapse and Russia’s independence over 25 years ago, many in Washington still cannot allow themselves to imagine, let alone manifest, a productive relationship with Russia.

Prior to 1917, Russia was the only major power in the world with which the United States had neither a war, nor serious diplomatic dispute. It even supported and defended America during its formative and most vulnerable years—the American Revolution¹ and Civil War. Thus, President Jefferson declared, “Russia is the most cordially friendly to us of any power on earth” and President Lincoln’s Secretary of State stated, “[Russia] has our friendship, in preference to any other European power.”² Notwithstanding constitutional differences between the Russian monarchy and American democracy, their relationship blossomed.

In our current political climate, each nation blames the other for meddling in domestic and international affairs. Foreign malfeasance cannot be tolerated, but should the United States not seek bona fide deals with Russia for the sake of America’s national interests? Meanwhile, recurring sanctions against Russia have forced it to align with China versus the United States. Continued hostilities only increase the chances of direct confrontations—be they political, economic, cyber or nuclear. Arguably, America has more at stake in these scenarios long-term.

In addressing Washington and Moscow’s destiny, White House spokesperson Sarah Sanders opined, “I think a lot of that depends on Russia.” Yet, Russia has already made proposals to partner with America in business, anti-terrorism, and European security. Despite current turmoil, it is now incumbent on the U.S. to re-establish mutual respect and take Moscow up on its offers. Why? Because, history reveals and pragmatism dictates that constructive cooperation with Russia is in America’s best interests.

As the Russian Federation detoxes from its Soviet occupation, Washington should likewise cleanse itself of the biased disposition it has toward Moscow. The moment has come to shift U.S. foreign policy away from the obsolete Cold War paradigm and re-imagine a businesslike relationship with Russia.

Russia and America after the U.S.S.R

The emergence of Soviet communism in Russia led to a geopolitical and social calamity of immense proportions. This criminal regime, architected by Vladimir Lenin, relinquished moral authority by building its foundation on the bones of over 60 million of its own people whom it exterminated over several decades. During this era, the Soviets erased the bond America and Imperial Russia once shared.

The collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991 offered an unparalleled opportunity for the United States to re-establish a constructive relationship with a newly liberated Russia, which was distancing itself from its Soviet past, restoring traditional values, and seeking partnership with America. Unfortunately, some Beltway insiders stood in the way of this rekindling. But, why?

For its part, Russia has tried to engage the United States. In 2000, his first year in office, President Putin suggested joining NATO to President Clinton. In 2007, Putin offered President Bush a compromise on joint missile defense. After his election in 2008, President Medvedev proposed working together on several key initiatives, and President Obama committed to "resetting, but also broadening" ties. Regrettably, Russia’s propositions were not earnestly welcomed by the establishment.

After 9/11, Putin was the first world leader to call President Bush to offer sympathies. He even “coordinated with central Asian nations to allow U.S. forces… to use military bases of the former Soviet Union” and provided intelligence in support of America’s war in Afghanistan. These actions were unimaginable during the Cold War. Washington should have recognized Moscow’s gestures for what they were—the strongest indication of Russia’s sincere desire to partner with the U.S., engage constructively, and eschew Soviet ideological paradigms.

Russia’s efforts should have catalyzed a reassessment of its renewed potential as a strategic partner. But Washington failed to capitalize on this opportunity. Instead, it continued to treat Russia as the U.S.S.R (justifiably “America’s number one geopolitical foe” in a bygone era). This inability of the entrenched Cold War establishment to differentiate Russia from the Soviet Union plagues our relations to this day.

While Russia inherited certain Soviet attributes, including a seat on the UN Security Council, Soviet-era monuments, and commemorations of the Great Patriotic War for its defeat of Nazi Germany, it draws stark contrast from the communist regime—diplomatically, economically and ideologically. Thus, it is essential to recognize that Russia is not the holistic successor of the U.S.S.R., and being Russian is not the same as being Soviet—these identities embody two entirely different mindsets, values, and traditions.

Contextualizing Current Russo-American Relations

Despite media coverage that paints Russia as “the enemy and aggressor,” sober context helps one understand its actions as reactionary. For instance, regarding Crimea’s annexation, critics of Russia often fail to acknowledge the catalyzing event—a February 2014 coup d'état in Kiev that overthrew Ukraine’s president. This threatened Russia’s access to one of its few warm-water ports and its Black Sea Naval Fleet—established under Catherine the Great in 1783. While these aspects do not necessarily justify annexation, they do contextualize Moscow’s reaction to the political upheaval in Kiev. In covering suspected Russian interference in the 2016 American presidential election, commentators omit documented U.S. meddling in Russia’s internal affairs. Time Magazine memorialized one such intrusion with its July 15, 1996 cover-story featuring a cartoon of Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, waving an American flag—the caption reads: “Yanks to the Rescue: The Secret Story about how American advisers helped Yeltsin win.” Historical context does not defend electoral meddling, but helps one see these events as connected incidents, not isolated episodes.  

In dealing with Russia, certain politicians and pundits have practiced foreign policy by crayon—full of name calling and unproven accusations. Notwithstanding valid disagreements one may have with President Putin, he is an accomplished leader and should be treated accordingly. He guided his country’s turn-around from near ruin in 1999, carried approximately 30 million Russians out of poverty, and increased life expectancy from 65 years to 71.6 in a little over a decade.³ Russia is now a significant economic power and geopolitical force. Thus, the question arises: is America better-off insulting Russia with tired Cold War rhetoric or is a businesslike approach based on mutual interests worth a try?

Why Re-Imagine Russia Policy Now

U.S. sanctions on Russia have not had their intended effect and, instead, damaged America’s long-term economic interests. The 2014 sanctions necessitated Russia’s pivot to Asia away from the West. Research by Macro-Advisory Partners indicates a Russian recovery from prior sanctions—with GDP increasing to 1.4 percent in 2017 and 1.9 percent in 2018, and business confidence reaching pre-sanction levels.⁴ More worrisome for America, estimates now show trade between Russia and China growing to over 200 billion USD in a few years.⁵ By contrast, U.S. trade with Russia was a paltry 20.3 billion USD in 2016.

Since sanctions are self-defeating, perhaps pragmatic cooperation will be more productive. To this end, America cannot revert to Cold War habits. It must rebuild trust with a new cadre of diplomats and policymakers who seek commerce over conflict, and possess Russian cultural fluency. Why can this approach work? Many Americans who visit and work in today’s Russia are pleasantly surprised to find more areas of agreement with its people than typical stereotypes allow.

While the Soviet mentality lingers and will take time to dissipate, the new generation of Russians is very much like us and wants a positive relationship with America. I experienced these sentiments when meeting with President Medvedev, in both Moscow and Silicon Valley in 2010. While visiting San Francisco, he sent his first tweet, hung-out with Steve Jobs, and met entrepreneurs over coffee. This period was arguably the peak of Russian-American relations in the 21st century—full of promise. Unfortunately, old habits got in the way again—NATO incursions and regime change in Libya fractured this brief Russian-American détente and prevented more win-win opportunities.

There is an undeniable truth: Russian-American relations will outlast their current presidents. The U.S. needs to think practically and longer-term—recognizing the potential of a constructive relationship with Russia, a nation that was one of its strongest allies for nearly 150 years.

Even during Soviet times, with polar-opposite ideologies and far more subterfuge on both sides, open channels of communication were maintained through the height of the nuclear threat to elude mutually assured destruction. In the current cyber-age, effective negotiation, rules-of-engagement, and productive diplomacy are arguably even more critical to the preservation of national security.

Today’s Russia is not the Soviet Union. It offers the United States much to gain from a renewed positive relationship. Most young Russians are strikingly different from old Soviets. Thus, as Russia moves away from its Soviet past and embraces its seminal traditions, which are more aligned with classical Western values, perhaps it’s also time for American politicians and media elites to reconsider attitudes, policies and rhetoric entrenched in Cold War doctrine.

We need to find ways to encourage dialog, resolve conflicts, and do business. If not, then the U.S. may succeed in provoking new hostilities, ideologically “losing” the younger generation of Russians, and creating yet another enemy. Just as President Reagan “had the imagination to see beyond the ubiquitous Cold War stereotypes that seemed to be set in stone,” it’s time again to re-imagine the Russian-American relationship before it’s too late.

^{1. Frank A. Golder, "Catherine II. and the American Revolution," The American Historical Review (1915), 92.}

^{2. F. A. Golder, The Russian Fleet and the Civil War, The American Historical Review, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Jul.,1915), 811.}

^{3. Macro-Advisory Ltd., “July 2017 Macro Monthly,” 5.}

^{4. Macro-Advisory Ltd., “July 2017 Macro Monthly,” 1, 17.}

^{5. Macro-Advisory Ltd., “July 2017 Macro Monthly,” 50.}

P.N. Loukianoff is an American entrepreneur/investor with over 20 years experience in Russian-American ventures, and contributing author of Russia and the U.S.S.R: What They Never Tell You. Contributor: Michael Loginoff, an American graduate student at the University of Oxford in Russian & East European Studies.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the authors and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: "Sea ice off western Alaska" (CC BY 2.0) by NASA Goddard Photo and Video

On October 24, the Chinese Communist Party concluded its 19th Party Congress with the unveiling of the new leadership lineup, a cornerstone political event it has held every five years since the death of Mao Zedong. Prior to the Congress, there was a great deal of speculation concerning the composition of the Politburo Standing Committee – and to a lesser extent the Party’s Central Military Commission – with China observers watching for signs of Xi Jinping’s tightened grasp on China’s political system.

The evolving Party

The most anticipated act of this Congress was arguably a symbolic one: the codification of Xi’s “Thought” into the Party’s Constitution, specifically entering his name into the Constitution. The eventual product, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” is said to put Xi on the same level with Mao and above previous leaders Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin and even Deng Xiaoping. This it does, at least nominally. While this may change how Chinese officials speak of their leadership, it does not necessarily change their beliefs. One suspects there are a great many officials who still hold Deng’s bona fides in much higher regard. Also worth noting is that Xi has not placed himself above Mao, suggesting that this Daedalus respects an upper limit.

The 19th Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) appears to have consolidated Xi’s power as expected. It is still composed of seven leaders, including Xi and three close allies, but the three non-allies are said to be powerless. Add to that Xi’s establishment during his first term of a multitude of leading small groups, and we can see that effective control of the top leadership lies in his hands. Unlike Xi’s ascension during the 17th Party Congress in 2007, this session revealed no clear successor, leaving wide open the possibility that Xi will serve as China’s paramount leader beyond the 10-year precedent that his two most recent predecessors set.

Causing the greatest stir in Western media was Xi’s October 18 work report at the beginning of the Congress. Some analysts picked up on the theme of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” as “a new choice for other countries,” a not-too-subtle challenge to the U.S.-favored international system. Reinforcing this is the idea of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a project said to be filling in the leadership gap left by U.S. abandonment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The problem with these ideas is that China has yet to offer the world a sustainable alternative model of development, as for example in Ghana.

China’s immediate goal is simply to make the world safe for China’s Communist government. The text of the speech makes clear that the “new choice for other countries” is not Chinese socialism, but reliance on Chinese capital should one’s government prove unable to cooperate with the broader international system. If this mode of development does ultimately displace the status quo, it will surely be because America and its allies fail to muster the strength to stand up for their own values, not because of any challenge from China.

The PLA reformed

In his opening speech, Xi set out the benchmarks of “defense and military forces modernization” by 2035 and the “creation of a world-class military force” by mid-century. Although guessing the meaning of Party jargon can be hazardous, these two goals appear to indicate, respectively: (1) technological and organizational parity with other leading military powers; and (2) parity of combat power, meaning the ability to project force at will.

As for the Central Military Commission (CMC), we saw it shrink down to a manageable seven from its previous 11. Overall, this new structure is easier to understand:

(1) Xi is CMC chairman and commander in chief;

(2) On the second rung are two vice chairmen, Air Force hardliner Xu Qiliang and former equipment development chief Zhang Youxia; and

(3) Just below the vice chairs are four members: former missile force commander Wei Fenghe, former Army chief Li Zuocheng, former Navy political commissar Miao Hua, and corruption fighter Zhang Shenmin.

These vice chairs and members will each have designated portfolios, likely in line with their previous duties. Also notable is their truly joint backgrounds, with representatives of each of the four traditional PLA services. Below these lie a scrum of major department heads (in particular the Joint Staff Department), service chiefs and theater commanders.

When senior military leaders from the United States and other countries visit China, the PLA will likely designate a counterpart from the fourth tier (e.g. service chief for a service chief, regional commander for a regional commander, etc.) and possibly grant a meeting with the CMC vice chairman or member responsible for foreign military relations.

Regarding military-to-military relations, we should expect more of the same from China. Under Xi’s direction, U.S.-China mil-to-mil has expanded significantly in spite of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and other factors. Although there have been questions on the U.S. side concerning the value of these exchanges, the annual U.S. Department of Defense report to Congress on Chinese military affairs shows that military contacts have continued at a robust pace. It remains to be seen how the Trump administration will manage them in the future, although it may be that an overall decrease in mil-to-mil activity is offset by refocused cooperation on key issues.

At the next National People’s Congress (China’s national legislature, not to be confused with the Party Congress) in February or March 2018, we should see the designation of a new Minister of National Defense, which most expect to be one of the new CMC members. With his representatives fully in place, Xi will be able to claim a level of control over the PLA not seen since Deng pushed his military reforms through in the 1980s.

Overall, we see Xi in firm command of the government and military apparatuses. The ensconcement of his allies as civil and military officers and enshrinement of his name are as much reflections of his power as they are the means of keeping it. This Congress was thus an evolutionary step in Xi’s program of internal control, although we should not confuse this with the deliberate chaos of Mao’s Cultural Revolution. It should come as no surprise should Xi choose to stay beyond 10 years, and barring a serious setback, the decision may very well rest with Xi himself.

Ben Lowsen is a specialist in Chinese political and security affairs working as a program analyst for the U.S. Navy. He tweets at @lowsen88.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, U.S. Government, or EastWest Institute.

Photo: "07-11-2013 Em Pequim, o vice-presidente" (CC BY 2.0) by Michel Temer - Fotos livres, com o crédito.

The EastWest Institute brought together retired four-star generals and admirals from Japan and the United States for the inaugural “U.S.-Japan Military-to-Military Dialogue” on September 25-26, 2017 in Honolulu, Hawaii. The dialogue provided a high-level platform for both sides to collaboratively address issues of critical concern at a time of increased uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific region.

“The U.S.-Japanese alliance has long been a pillar of the United States’ Asia-Pacific strategy, and the countries maintain a close bilateral military relationship. However, recent developments on the Korean peninsula and the uncertainty of U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration have engendered concern about the resiliency of the alliance. Given the current security environment and political landscape, neither side can afford to be complacent. The two partners as well as the whole region have much to gain from innovative policy ideas that strengthen U.S.-Japan bilateral ties and policy coordination,” said General (ret) T. Michael Moseley, head of the U.S. delegation.

During the dialogue, delegates delved into a wide range of security issues within the U.S.-Japan relationship, the feasibility of further confidence building measures, as well as other regional and global security issues, particularly the strategic intentions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. These in-depth exchanges, in addition to separate meetings with senior Japanese diplomats and regional military officials, will serve as a platform for generating innovative solutions to strengthen bilateral cooperation. The outcomes of the dialogue will be used to formulate concrete policy recommendations for the governments in Washington and Tokyo, and will be shared among regional military commands. EWI plans to hold the dialogue biannually going forward.

Building on EWI’s track record in organizing Track 2 dialogues, the “U.S.-Japan Military-to-Military Dialogue” is a key piece of ongoing efforts to build trust and deliver solutions among the United States and critical players in the Asia-Pacific region. Since 2008, EWI has organized the annual Sanya Initiative that brings together retired military officials from China and the United States. Including and drawing on Japanese perspectives in such discussions will not only help bridge the gaps in tackling common challenges but also identify creative solutions to mitigate friction between key regional players and engage the whole Asia-Pacific region.

Download the report.