Strategic Trust-Building

Dr. William J. Parker appeared on Fox Business on May 25 to discuss the latest developments in efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, after U.S. President Donald Trump surprisingly canceled his planned meeting with North Korea's Kim Jong-un. The summit may reportedly still take place.

"These are very normal procedures for these types of negotiation," said Dr. Parker. "(North Korea) realized that (President Trump) is unpredictable and that is good when you're dealing with countries like North Korea."

President Trump, he added, also "is willing to leave all of the instruments of national power on the table and that's different from what we've seen in the past—diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement."

Watch the May 25 interview.

On May 29, Dr. Parker joined the show again to discuss the topic further. The meeting is not the end game, he said. "This is a step towards denuclearization. I think this is the opportunity, though, to define what denuclearization is."

Watch the May 29 interview.

"North Korea - Pyongyang" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by Roman Harak

Dr. William J. Parker appeared on the David Webb radio show on May 25 to discuss the latest developments in efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, after U.S. President Donald Trump canceled his planned meeting with North Korea's Kim Jong-un.

Dr. Parker underlined that such a meeting is not the end game and it would take a long time before unification is possible.

"I think there are three steps over a decade or a couple of decades process. First is stabilization, second is democracy and then the third is unification. And I think it's important that they go in that order," said Dr. Parker.

Click here to listen to the interview. 

Photo: "US-Korea Training" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by #PACOM

“It ain’t over ’til it’s over” when it involves North Korea. It is worse when the unpredictability of Kim Jong-un is pitted against that of U.S. President Donald Trump. This leaves not just the outcome of the U.S.-North Korea summit in doubt, but even the proposed Kim-Trump meeting on June 12—for several reasons—till it actually takes place.

First, there is a history of failures with the Koreas summits. Both the 2000 and 2007 Sunshine Policy efforts were aborted due to intransigence on several fronts.

Second, it was only in January that Kim threatened that his nuclear launch button was “always on the table.” In response, Trump boasted that his nuclear button was “much bigger” and “more powerful” than Kim’s.

From such hawkish outbursts to a complete turnaround in favor of negotiations indicates that there is room for yet another reversal from either of the leaders. The two leaders’ egos were also evident when each claimed playing a bigger role than the other in making the Koreas summit a reality.

Third, the unpredictability was evident when North Korea threatened last week to pull out of the talks if the United States insists on the precondition that Pyongyang completely give up its nuclear weapons.

Pointing its ire at National Security Adviser John Bolton, who favours replicating the Libya model, North Korea said that if Washington “corners us and unilaterally demands we give up nuclear weapons we will no longer have an interest in talks” and “will have to reconsider” attending the Singapore summit.

While Washington cites the Libya model as a good precedent for talks, Pyongyang views it negatively. North Korea is worried that Kim might face the same fate as Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, who was ousted and killed by Western-aided rebels in 2011, after the 2003 denuclearization-for-economic aid deal neutralized the deterrence factor.

This, along with the endgame of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, means Pyongyang might only agree to cap its nuclear program in return for aid.

Many observers argue that Trump may have complicated the situation further while contradicting Bolton. Issuing a veiled threat, he said: “That (Libya) model…was total decimation. That model would take place if we don’t make a deal.”

According to Stratfor analyst Evan Rees: “The phrasing of the Panmunjom Declaration refers to denuclearization of the peninsula, which could mean movement of U.S. strategic assets, and a phased, rather than rapid denuclearization—which is against what the United States has called for.”

This leaves us wondering about other models that could be used as templates. For example, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus model is similar to Libya, except that none of them had a threat perception or feared actual regime change.

Another example is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action involving Iran and ongoing relations with the West – defined as Iran curbing its nuclear advancement program in return for economic benefits, but continue with its atomic program for peaceful purposes. However, after President Trump walked out of the deal, even this model is unviable.

North Korea claims it has already demonstrated its commitment by suspending all missile tests, holding peace talks with South Korea and releasing three American detainees. It also claims committing to denuclearising the Korean peninsula after the April summit. Though it is still unclear what this entails, it has invited the foreign media to witness this month’s dismantling process of its main nuclear test site.

And to this unfolding scenario we can add a fourth reason for skepticism—despite the Koreas summit, Pyongyang pulled out of last week’s meeting with Seoul after objecting to U.S.-South Korea joint military drills. While it had initially given its consent to the exercise, it later termed it “a provocative military ruckus” and a non-diplomatic move.

Ultimately, this is not just about the Koreas or a U.S.-North Korea issue. It is a multi-layered game of wits that also involves China (and Japan too).

Beijing holds the cards to either play the role of a facilitator or spoiler depending on whether it wants to cooperate or compete with the United States for future global leadership.

However, current China-North Korea ties are far from favorable. Though China has made little headlines beyond two meetings between Kim and President Xi Jinping in April and May, it will be impossible to make progress on denuclearization without

Beijing guaranteeing Pyongyang the incentives to give up its weapons, especially protection against a military offensive or any attempts to topple the regime.

Thus, while the “Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification on the Korean Peninsula” is high on rhetoric and low on specifics, its future and the future of U.S.-North Korea talks are mired in a competition of egos, policy differences and global leadership.

Any outcome of the proposed Trump-Kim summit may be okay for Washington, including failure. If some progress is achieved, it boosts President Trump’s political and diplomatic credentials. If it fails, Trump will get an opportunity to showcase his tough side and mount pressure on Kim. Both would further Trump’s and his party’s case in the Congressional midterm elections in November.

Similarly, any outcome is okay for Kim too. At its best, it would yield some economic relief and/or political and security-related guarantees, which would be along the lines of the 2013 “Byungjin” or Parallel Development policy of economy and nuclear weapons. At its worst, it serves as an ideal opportunity to recalibrate its ties with China, which again would fall within the realm of the Byungjin strategy.

Both would make North Korea feel like it has punched above its weight.

Dr. N. Janardhan is Senior Research Fellow, Gulf-Asia Programme, Emirates Diplomatic Academy, Abu Dhabi.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: "North Korea — Pyongyang" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by (stephan)

On May 10, the EastWest Institute co-hosted with Japan Society a discussion on how Japan, the world's third-largest economy by GDP, views the emerging issue of Korean Peninsula diplomacy and the latest developments on denuclearization.  

Tokyo-based Jonathan Miller, senior visiting fellow with the Japan Institute of International Affairs and distinguished fellow with the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada, led the discussion and offered viewpoints in the lead up to the potential summit between President Donald Trump and his North Korean counterpart, Kim Jong-un. The session also delved into the current state of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Participants included Professor Robert Dujarric, director of the Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies at Temple University in Tokyo, as well as other Asia-Pacific analysts.

Banner photo: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korea

Dr. William J. Parker III talks about negotiating with North Korea on TEDTalk-o-matic — "an innovation in media that allows 60-second ideas to come to life."

Watch here.

Photo: "North Korea — Pyongyang, Arirang (Mass" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by (stephan)

Much has been written since U.S. President Donald Trump surprisingly announced on March 8 that he was willing to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. In general, even critics of the president have noted that dialogue is better than insults or threats of war. There is a sense of expectation that the president is now getting his opportunity to show, in fact, whether he truly can introduce a paradigm shift in the way international relations operate and apply his oft-stated ability to close a deal to address a problem that has vexed his predecessors since the end of the Cold War.

The president appears intent on forging his own path on this issue, challenging traditional norms of diplomacy and negotiation. However, diplomatic negotiation is composed of many specific elements, with most practitioners emphasizing two fundamental measures. First, both sides (or all sides, as the case may be) in a negotiation must agree to the terms of the discussions; that is, they must agree exactly about what they're talking about. Should they come to terms, those terms have to mean the same thing to all involved. There can be no gray areas.

Second, the details of implementation must be as clear as possible. 

Access the full commentary here.

Photo: "North Korea Victory Day 100" (CC BY 2.0) by rapidtravelchai

Vladimir Putin has won re-election as president of Russia, by a wide margin. According to news reports, he received over 70 percent of the votes cast, with an estimated 60 percent of voters taking part. Despite allegations of irregularities and criticisms that authorities kept legitimate opposition to the incumbent president off the ballot, Putin has achieved what he set out to achieve: a clear mandate for the next six years.

But what is that mandate? And what are we to expect from Russia in the global arena?

Context is important. Putin's last election, in 2012, came on the heels of significant public dissatisfaction (which led to mass protests the Russian president claims were orchestrated by foreign interests). This year's election was in part an attempt to "put to rest ghosts of the past" by preventing displays of public discontent and demonstrating to audiences — domestic and foreign — a sense of order, continuity and strength. The strategy proved successful. 

Putin's campaign also pointed to other signs of stability: In spite of low oil prices, most economic indicators in Russia, including wages, unemployment and gross domestic product growth, are stable. None of the metrics is necessarily exemplary, and Russia's poverty rate is still high, but the Kremlin is portraying its economic management as controlled and effective. Its efforts had a powerful psychological effect on the majority of the electorate. As Russians told me on my most recent visit, it could be a lot worse.

Read the full commentary here.

Photo: "Russia_President_Putin_Korea_Visiting_01" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by KOREA.NET - Official page of the Republic of Korea

As the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) shapes itself into a “world-class force,” it is also modernizing its nuclear weapons stockpile. Keeping one’s nuclear deterrent in good repair, maintaining strict control, and clearly communicating its purpose is the mark of a responsible actor. China, however, is doing much, much more while keeping the rest of the world in the dark. Now, some observers even suggest China may abandon its longstanding “No First Use” (NFU) nuclear policy, which would signal China’s intent to stand alongside the United States and Russia as a nuclear power capable of inflicting destruction beyond ordinary catastrophe.

During the September 2015 World War II Victory Parade in Beijing, the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) unveiled China’s DF-26 intermediate range ballistic missile, capable of delivering both nuclear and conventional payloads throughout the western Pacific. The PLA is further continuing to develop its DF-41 ICBM, which Western analysts suspect may carry multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).

Furthermore, China is developing a sea-based nuclear deterrent with its Jin class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (Type 094 SSBN). The PLA will begin building a new class of SSBN in the early 2020s: Type 096, equipped with the JL-3 next-generation submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

China’s nuclear deterrent is also increasing in size: between 2015 and 2016, the U.S. Department of Defense reported an increase in China’s ICBM force from between 50 and 60 missiles to between 75 and 100. Xinhua in 2010 and again in 2013 reported China’s first successful tests of missile defense technology under what it calls Project 863. Although China’s air expeditionary capabilities currently lag those at sea, one wonders whether an air-based nuclear deterrent can be far behind.

Although these advances are significant, particularly in light of stagnant U.S. defense spending, most striking is China’s de facto acknowledgment that its DF-5C missile is equipped with MIRVs, as reported by China’s official military newspaper. If China’s nuclear force remains the “countervalue” force that it claims — possessing only the capability to deliver a punitive second strike after another power has struck it - it has yet to explain why it is increasingly taking on the profile of a great nuclear power.

Is it possible that China is simply modernizing its arsenal while upholding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s stated goals of “cessation of the nuclear arms race” and undertaking “effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament?”

Some Chinese scholars still recommend NFU as a policy not just for China, but for all nuclear powers to follow. Zhou Bo of the PLA Academy of Military Science states: “China is not the strongest power either in nuclear weapons or in conventional weapons. If China can make such a commitment [to No First Use], why can’t the U.S., Russia, Britain and France do the same? It is a shame for the strongest military powers with superiority in conventional weapons to talk about using nuclear weapons first.”

But veteran security commentator Nan Li of the National University of Singapore notes that “it is evident that as China modernizes its nuclear forces, it is also debating a shift in strategy, including the abandonment of its No First Use (NFU) policy.” He continues: “One view is that NFU may impose certain limitations on the strategic use of China’s Rocket Force, implying reduced crisis response flexibility due to the highly centralized decision-making in employing nuclear weapons. Moreover, some believe that NFU reduces the credibility of China’s already small nuclear forces, and that abandoning NFU may enhance China’s nuclear deterrent.”

According to Li, some Chinese strategists envision first use of nuclear weapons in certain situations: Taiwanese independence, attacks targeting China’s nuclear weapons or nuclear command and control, a conventional attack with force equivalent to a nuclear attack, and of course if faced with regime change.

But are these questions particularly new or serious? I do not think so. Rather they reflect the ongoing internal debate about long-term issues. A good example of such a debate is China’s stance on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. China-DPRK relations were once those of normal allies. When China normalized diplomatic and economic relations with South Korea in the 1990s, however, it was only natural for some to wonder about China’s commitment to its ally. But it wasn’t until North Korea smashed the nuclear status quo on the peninsula that China brought this dispute out in the open, culminating in China’s willingness to punish North Korea.

In contrast, China’s NFU policy is still in the second stage of questioning: the development of new technology is providing China some incentives to abandon the policy, but there has not been a crisis comparable to North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons to shift the debate in China. Until it occurs, I do not believe China will abandon its policy.

Particularly operative in this respect is the fact that China is free at any time to abandon its policy and use nuclear weapons. Thus, unless it saw some indispensable deterrent effect of jettisoning NFU - for example to keep Taiwan from declaring independence, or to prevent the U.S. from supporting Taiwanese independence — China is unlikely to alter its commitment to NFU.

China is, however, entering the realm of the nuclear great powers, previously limited to the United States and Russia, without the attendant controls, especially the MRBM treaty. As long as China refuses to take on the responsibilities of a great nuclear power — or make clear its status as a lesser nuclear power — its opaque policies will strain the status quo and become yet another area in which China has chosen to disrupt the international system.

Ben Lowsen is a specialist in Chinese political and security affairs working as a China advisor for the U.S. Air Force’s Checkmate office. He tweets at @lowsen88.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, U.S. Government, or EastWest Institute. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Photo: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DF-5B_intercontinental_ballistic_missiles_during_2015_China_Victory_Day_parade.jpg