Strategic Trust-Building

Executive Summary

The Euro-Atlantic security scene is characterized by a loss of mutual confidence, renewed tensions, and serious disagreements regarding not only practices but principles. Those trends, if not corrected, will produce negative strategic consequences for the security of Europe. New opportunities have emerged today for rethinking the security situation in the Euro-Atlantic region, for strengthening confidence, changing mutual relations, and, if need be, institutions. A basis for this can be found in the hopes for improved U.S.-Russian relations expressed by U.S. President Barack Obama, in the initiative by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on reforming the European security architecture, as well as in the process of elaboration of the new NATO strategic concept.

The EastWest Institute, responding to requests by American and Russian officials, assembled an Experts Group to discuss conceptual and practical recommendations that could facilitate a much needed “grand debate” over security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region. This report is the result of that process. As part of this process, the EastWest Institute will convene two seminars, one in Brussels in cooperation with the Egmont Institute, and one in Moscow, organized with the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), in order to provide an opportunity for external stakeholders to respond to the conclusions presented in our report and to lend additional insights. Because of differences of views among the group on a number of issues, the report is not a consensus document, but rather a presentation of possible courses of action designed to stimulate this debate.

All members of the group did agree that despite such differences of opinion, states of the Euro-Atlantic region should embrace a common strategic vision of security issues. It should be based, inter alia, on the following principles:

• recognition of the pluralism of decision-making centers in the security sphere and the need for them to cooperate;
• preparedness to negotiate from a position of respect for the declared security interests of all states;
• the right of each state to determine its own security arrangements;
• striving to convert conflicts in the Euro-Atlantic security sphere into win-win situations;
• a commitment to confidence-building, especially to policies that would facilitate collective action for preventing, containing, or reversing unfolding crises.

The report presents three possible paths (scenarios) towards strengthening security on a cooperative basis in the Euro-Atlantic region. These paths represent the three main strands of opinion among the experts and can be summarized as follows:

Remedial Repair: institutional status quo; emphasis on removing mutual misperceptions and strengthening transparency and confi dence; identifying and pursuing common interests in the Euro-Atlantic zone;

Partial Reconstruction: identifying additional and creative political, legal, and military arrangements, possibly including overlapping security guarantees, that address potential security concerns of states in Central and Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region; pursuing common interests beyond the Euro-Atlantic zone;

Fundamental Transformation: reforming the overall architecture of Euro-Atlantic security by signing and bringing into force a European Security Treaty (EST); placing common security challenges as a higher priority than differences in the Euro-Atlantic zone.

For each path, there is a set of concrete proposals for further consideration to advance the agreed overall vision. These proposals are not necessarily mutually exclusive, nor do they necessarily represent the view of the group as whole. Some of the more challenging proposals include:

1. Russia, the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the United Nations (UN) should urgently negotiate coordinated measures to prevent another military crisis in or around Georgia.
2. Finding some “quick fix” measures that might promote mutual confidence (such as a political commitment to joint ballistic missile launch monitoring or to extend the geographical scope of the Cooperative Airspace Initiative).
3. NATO members and Russia should fully implement the Rome declaration of 2002 with its logic of joint decision-making on security matters of mutual concern. They need to make the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) a more productive forum by the time of the next NATO summit. All NRC participants should commit themselves to the principle that they will not block the functioning of its dialogue mechanisms during a crisis.
4. As an earnest display of shared commitment to indivisible security, leaders of the OSCE, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EU, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) should convene a summit on Afghanistan/Pakistan to agree on a common set of policies to combat arms smuggling, drug trafficking, recruitment of militants and violent extremism, and to assist in addressing the socio-economic problems of the two countries.
5. The United States and Russia should accelerate bilateral consultations for solving problems related to implementation of the adapted CFE treaty. The format of the consultation should be extended to other interested countries.
6. NATO, the EU, and Russia can together or in parallel provide mutual and overlapping security guarantees to countries that seek those guarantees (Georgia and Ukraine may be among them).
7. The leaders of Europe should convene a Group of Eminent Persons, composed of high ranking politicians, former diplomats, and military officials, to make recommendations on how to translate the new hopeful signs in United States-Russia relations to the Euro-Atlantic security scene, and to assess the Russian proposal for an EST and other similar initiatives.

In the coming months, before the next OSCE Ministerial Council (December 2009) and the next NATO summit, political leaders must aim for a roadmap to a strengthened security regime in the Euro-Atlantic region. Equal and indivisible security of all states should be translated from an attractive slogan into hard reality. Strategic reassurances at the rhetorical level without action and reform at the operational level are not just hollow. They may in the light of the last decade prove dangerous.

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Executive Summary

The future of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, widely considered to be the cornerstone of European security, was thrown into stark question when the Russian Federation announced in December 2007 that it would suspend its participation in the treaty. The 1990 treaty, considered the most ambitious and far ranging conventional arms control treaty in history, established limits on the numbers of conventional military hardware deployed in Europe, required substantial reductions in conventional arsenals, and created an intrusive regime of inspections and verification. In many ways, the treaty changed the face of European security by establishing new, cooperative political-military relationships.

It is critically important that a negotiated compromise is found that avoids the collapse of this “cornerstone,” which would have dramatic consequences for European security. The status quo is not sustainable. If Russia continues its suspension and efforts to resolve the issues that precipitated the Russian withdrawal remain deadlocked, the treaty will, over time, collapse. This would change the face of European security — and not for the better. There appear to be only three possibilities — and no easy way to reach critical political will on any of them:

First, Russia returns to the existing treaty regime and subsequently removes its forces from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as agreed by the Russian Federation originally at the signing of the adapted treaty in Istanbul and demanded by the states that have thus far refused to ratify the treaty.

Second, NATO agrees to address Russian CFE demands and ratifies the adapted treaty despite the continue presence of Russian forces in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Moldova.
Third, negotiators take the framework endorsed by NATO in the form of the parallel actions package and work the details. In this package, NATO has shifted its position on ratification, suggesting that countries can move forward with the ratification process in parallel with final resolution and implementation of the Istanbul commitments, as well as movement on other aspects of a package.

In all scenarios above, progress in the disputes in the Caucasus will make it easier to reach a better outcome with regards to the CFE. Furthermore, all parties would benefit from intensive negotiations to resolve the underlying disagreements between Russia and its North Caucasus neighbors in a fashion that allows the adapted treaty to be ratified.

There is, of course, a fourth possibility: maintenance of the status quo. In this scenario, the treaty over time will collapse, and with it the strong cooperative basis of the current Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Other states parties are unlikely to continue to implement a treaty in the face of Russia’s prolonged unilateral suspension.

A number of the core Russian concerns can best be addressed not by abandoning CFE but the opposite—through entry into force of the adapted treaty. The adapted treaty provides the means through which Russia can ensure predictability in the levels and locations of NATO forces, as well as a means of inspecting these forces against the information that NATO provides. Still, it is unclear whether all of the Russian concerns can be resolved within the context of the CFE treaty. Moscow has also recommended a new pan-European security agreement. Consequently, it would seem more likely that resolution of the disagreement over the CFE treaty might be a valuable precursor that would allow for serious negotiations on a number of European security issues to occur.

Executive Summary

Key Findings

In the face of domestic economic stagnation, widespread social apathy, and a widening technological gap vis-à-vis the West, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has undertaken the most far-reaching revamping of the Soviet system in over half a century. While the Soviet Union remains a closed communist society, Gorbachev has challenged a whole series of ingrained practices and attitudes, from strictly centralized economic management to an often militarized foreign policy, which has been the basis for Soviet policy since Stalin's time. In foreign affairs, he has introduced new concepts and new flexibility into Soviet diplomacy. Yet the West has not come to terms with these changes.

Balancing Soviet power and maintaining a strong Western alliance remain central to U.S. national interests. By the same token, the U.S. and its allies have a long-term interest in encouraging the moderation of Soviet power. Because the Soviet Union is a global power, Gorbachev's initiatives demand an active response by the United States and its Western allies. In many areas, from arms control to emigration, the Soviet Union has begun to make changes in directions long advocated by the West. While far from complete, these changes present new opportunities, and challenges, which the West should not ignore. The Task Force strongly recommends that the United States and its Western allies welcome the reformist tendencies that Gorbachev has set in motion and encourage those which promote a moderation of Soviet power. Toward that end; the U.S. and its allies should engage the Soviet Union in an effort to explore possibilities for agreement and resolve key points of tension.

A purely reactive Western approach in the face of the new Soviet policy is not an acceptable option, the Task Force believes. Western policies as well as Gorbachev's domestic policy priority are bound to affect Soviet foreign policy. There is considerable uncertainty about the long-term success of Gorbachev's reforms. Nevertheless, over time, the new course chosen by Gorbachev will affect the ways in which the Soviet Union carries out its role as a superpower. A more subtle and flexible Soviet diplomacy requires the West to develop a broader and more active policy toward the Soviet Union, including standards to define and meet common security requirements in a rapidly changing international environment. Failure to do so would sacrifice the diplomatic initiative to the Soviet Union as well as abdicate our responsibility to future generations to pursue prospects for substantially improving relations between East and West.

What is Changing in Soviet Foreign and Domestic Policy?

The West needs to think anew about specific changes the Soviet Union has made in its own policies. Many of these changes are only beginnings and ultimate Soviet intentions remain unclear, but it is important to note that some of them move toward long-standing Western preferences:

• Role of the Military - There has been a reduction in the Soviet military's role and influence in the highest policymaking councils, and Gorbachev has made clear to the military that they have to accept spending restraints and greater openness in the dissemination of military information.
• Arms Control - The USSR adopted the Western proposal of a zero option on the INF issue. In addition, the USSR has moved toward the Western positions on verification, including on-site inspection. It has also raised the prospect of asymmetrical conventional force reductions in central Europe. It has accepted the principle of deep reductions in offensive strategic weapons and proposed a concept of "sufficiency" in military forces.
• The International Economy - Gorbachev has placed special emphasis on reducing Soviet autarky by increasing trade, joint ventures, and expressing an interest in cooperating with such major international organizations as GAIT
• The Domestic Economy - Gorbachev has initiated a major decentralization of operational responsibility for the economy, and he clearly intends to move toward a more flexible, modern, and efficient economic planning and management. He has admitted the inadequacy of Soviet statistics and called for more accurate economic information.

• Human Rights - In the fields of culture and dissent, Gorbachev has displayed a degree of openness and toleration unthinkable just three years ago. In the area of emigration, the change has been less dramatic but Gorbachev has increased the emigration of Soviet Jews, Germans and other groups. While glasnost' has a long way to go, it has clearly led to progress on human rights, which has been a major concern of the West.

• Regional Issues - While Gorbachev has as yet made no significant effort to scale back existing Soviet global commitments, he has given a lower priority to the military expansion of Soviet interests in the Third World than his predecessors.
• Eastern Europe - While urging closer and more "efficient" economic integration, Gorbachev has permitted a somewhat more flexible expression of specific national interests in Eastern Europe than his predecessors.

Agenda for Action

These changes in Soviet policies and the prospect of a Soviet-American INF treaty and summit by the end of this year highlight the need to tackle a wide range of problems in East-West relations. The Task Force recommends that as first steps Western policy choices focus on five key areas:

• Security Issues -. The U.S. and its NATO allies should intensify talks with the Warsaw Pact aimed at reducing conventional forces and eliminating offensive strike potentials, particularly those designed for surprise attack. Given the geographical differences and existing force imbalances, new approaches must include asymmetrical reductions of forward-based armored units, which present the greatest threat of surprise attack.

  Both sides need to move rapidly to conclude an agreement on deep cuts in strategic offensive nuclear forces. These reductions should be designed to enhance strategic stability and eliminate the capacity to launch a crippling first strike. At the same time, both sides need to find ways to strengthen the ABM Treaty and to ensure that any research on strategic defensive systems is consistent with preservation of the Treaty.

  The West should push for a rapid conclusion of the global Geneva chemical weapons negotiations, including the establishment of an international verification regime. Such an agreement would help increase confidence in Europe at a time when some are concerned over the implications of the elimination of medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles from the continent.

• International Economic Issues - Except in a precisely defined area of strategic technologies, which entails tighter, more efficient COCOM regulations, expanded East-West trade is in our interest. The West should welcome Soviet efforts to develop the legal foundation for a system of equitable joint ventures. While Western governments should not subsidize credits, neither should they oppose the extension of private credit through normal commercial rates and practices to the Soviet Union. The prospect of observer status in the GATT and IMP should be used to encourage greater openness and information about the Soviet economy.

  If the Soviet Union demonstrates heightened respect for human rights, the U.S. government and Congress should consider bringing their policy in congruence with U.S. allies by reevaluating the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments restricting trade with and credit to the USSR. The West should aim to normalize the framework for trade with all Warsaw Treaty countries, on the basis of mutual and reciprocal interests.

  In addition, the U.S.-Soviet umbrella agreements on scientific and technological cooperation should be revived and expanded, on the basis of full reciprocity.

• Human Rights - The West should welcome increased glasnost' while continuing to make clear to the Soviet government that its observance of internationally recognized human rights is the mark of a civilized power and a condition for truly collaborative relations between the Soviet Union and the West. The West should insist that the Soviet Union fully live up to the commitments it undertook under the Helsinki Final Act to encourage the free movement of people, ideas, and information across international boundaries.

• Regional Issues - In Afghanistan, the West must continue to make clear that Soviet occupation of that country poses strict limits to genuine collaboration between the USSR and the West. Conversely, a rapid Soviet withdrawal, with sufficient international guarantees, would be a forceful demonstration that the "new political thinking" has specific policy implications.

  In other areas of conflict which could lead to possible superpower confrontation-such as Central America, southern Africa, and the Persian Gulf-the West should intensify discussions aimed at clarifying interests and creating conditions for greater stability. Within this framework, U.S.-Soviet meetings on regional issues should be upgraded as part of a regularized summit process. The purpose would be to seek solutions to these problems in conjunction with other concerned parties.

  In the Arab-Israeli dispute, the U.S. and USSR should work together to advance a peace process which guarantees the territorial integrity and interests of all states and parties.

• Political Dialogue – U.S.-Soviet summit meetings, as well as meetings at other governmental and non-governmental levels, should be held on a regular basis.

Conclusion

The West must have no illusions about the need to balance Soviet power, but neither should it overlook opportunities to encourage the Soviet Union to be a more responsible and integrated member of the international community. Although the long-term success of Gorbachev's policy remains uncertain, the process he has launched holds out a promise of a further moderation of Soviet power and an opportunity to develop and institutionalize areas of cooperation in the East-West relationship. Some in the West worry about giving the Soviet Union a "breathing spell." They fear that Gorbachev's economic reforms will simply strengthen the USSR in the long run. But Soviet economic and social problems will not be quickly solved. In the meantime, greater openness and pluralization should be welcomed for their own sake as well as for the effect they can have in moderating the way Soviet power is used.

In order to seize the opportunities offered by new Soviet policies, the U.S. and its allies need to respond creatively to Gorbachev's initiatives. In order to do that, the West must be clear about its own policy objectives and priorities. New political thinking in the East requires new policy thinking in the West.

Extremism in every form is a major concern for the global community. Though the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (also known as LTTE, or more commonly, as the Tamil Tigers) do not share the same religious motivations as the violent extremist groups that tend to garner the most interest today, they merit much greater attention from the international community. Their longevity, success, and tactics – their revival of suicide bombing in particular – render them a formidable foe. The protracted conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE offers several important lessons regarding effective strategies for combating violent extremism. These lessons hold – and indeed are all the more relevant – in the face of the recent military gains of government forces over the LTTE.

In recent years, the Sri Lankan government has pursued a predominantly military strategy against the well-armed Tamil Tigers. This policy has failed to eliminate the violence in the region and is unlikely to yield peace in the future, even in the face of current military successes by the government. The government’s vow to end the civil war, even if achieved sooner rather than later, would only be a temporary victory – one that might diminish the level of violence in the short term but is unlikely to end it permanently. Sheer force, with no regard for the motivations and objectives of the LTTE, will not create the conditions necessary for an enduring and sustainable resolution of the conflict. The roots of this longstanding conflict are in the political and economic marginalization felt by the Tamil minority. A military victory by the government will not address this. Damaging military operations against the LTTE have not yet resulted in the LTTE seeking to change its tactics – the violent approach of the LTTE has wavered little. Without a negotiated settlement, the two sides will continue to pursue strategies that rely on violence, pushing aside the political goals and objectives that could actually, if resolved, bring elusive peace to Sri Lanka.

Continued violence will only serve to strengthen the resolve and sense of victimization of both factions. The longer the violence ensues, the more likely it is that the regional and global Tamil communities will be drawn into the conflict, potentially sparking an international campaign. India’s close proximity to Sri Lanka, along with its 60 million strong Tamil community, puts the regional superpower in a precarious position. Should the extremism expand beyond Sri Lanka’s borders, it will become a matter of global security and the international community will be compelled to act. It would be far better for the international community to become involved now and offer whatever assistance it can to reach a conclusion in this long campaign, than to act when it has no choice and little leverage.

Given the prolonged military campaign against the LTTE, a growing death toll – especially among civilians – and the threat of a larger campaign spreading where there are large Tamil communities, the government of Sri Lanka would be advised to muster the political will to try to fi nd a solution that addresses the political demands of the LTTE within the framework of a sovereign Sri Lankan state. This is not a call for capitulation but a call for negotiation and accommodation by both sides, even as government forces rack up military victories against the Tamil extremists. Insurgent organizations can and do evolve. LTTE participation in the political processes of Sri Lanka could shift the LTTE away from its strategy of violence.

Key recommendations

For resolving the conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE 

• Abandon the predominantly military strategy adopted by both sides following the end of the ceasefire agreement in January 2008 in favor of a strategy that favors political accommodation. 
• Acknowledge the source of grievances on both sides as a starting point for negotiations.

For wider international efforts to counter violent extremism

• Major players – both global and regional – should work with the UN to appoint an internationally respected figure to mediate between the government and the LTTE. 
• Commit to a cooperative strategy that forgoes a military approach and engages insurgent groups. 
• Identify and acknowledge underlying political grievances as a starting point for negotiations. 
• Address human rights violations in military operations against all insurgents.

Prepared by EWI's EU-Ukraine interdisciplinary Expert Task Force this report reflects recommendations from Ukranian and European officials and experts for actions in the economy, political and security cooperation, and legal harmonization.

EWI's policy brief calls for new visa policies in South Eastern Europe

In November 2006, Russia will host the Global Forum for Partnerships between States and Businesses to Counter Terrorism. This event marks the completion of a successful year of international mobilization by Russia as President of the G8. The decision by the G8 countries in St. Petersburg in July of 2006 to support the Russian initiative in this field has been one of the most important decisions in the field of counter-terrorism in a long time. This decision gives further impetus to a number of pre-existing moves in the direction of establishing public-private partnerships to combat terrorism.

Media Coverage:

• 10-Feb-2007: CBS News: Persecuted Public, Tomorrow's Terrorists?
• 7- Feb- 2007: Reuters: Nuclear Terrorism Risk Seen as Growing

On April 25, 2007, EWI formally unveiled its three-year US-Russia Constructive Agenda Initiative with an inaugural roundtable discussion co-sponsored and hosted by the Kennan Institute. This discussion on the way forward for Russian-American relations took place on an auspicious date: 62 years ago to the day, Russian and American troops met and embraced on the Elbe, indicating clearly that the end to a bloody and vicious war was in sight. On a more somber note, the discussion was held on a national day of mourning in Russia occasioned by the funeral of Russia's first president, Boris Yeltsin.