Conflict Prevention

Genscher notes that "We live in a globalized world and need the strength of all [countries] to solve the problems around us." Genscher suggests that Russia's activities in Crimea and Ukraine must be addressed, and that "If one wants to influence the other side, one has to talk to it. And, namely, without preconditions." 

For coverage of the interview published by Sputnik International, click here.

For details on the interview published by Süddeutsche Zeitung (German Edition), click here.

In the paper, Hassan notes that "The Kurdistan region enjoys more stability, economic development, and political pluralism than the rest of federal Iraq, as well as a greater margin of freedom for civil society. But the situation in the region itself is rapidly changing." He observes that "Initiating structural reforms and achieving tangible changes takes time and requires a stable social and political environment, which currently does not exist.

To read this paper published by Carnegie Middle East Center, click here.

To read a segment of this paper referenced in Foreign Policy, click here.

To read coverage of this paper in Alwasat News (Bahraini website), click here. 

To read a segment of this paper referenced in Alarab, click here. 

This August, in the dog days of summer, discussions about global affairs invariably focus on the unprecedented challenges of our time. “This is the most dangerous time in decades” one hears; or, “the extent of problems in the world is unprecedented,” the “most challenging since the end of the Cold War.”

Perhaps. Conflict in Ukraine, uncertainty on the Chinese stock market, disputes in the South China Sea, the fate of the Iran nuclear deal, understanding ISIS and Al-Qaeda, Greece or migration as threats to Europe’s vision of itself … the list goes on and on. While these and other challenges may have overloaded the capacity of traditional government-to-government diplomacy or the capacity of foreign policy experts to come up with responses, we can still address current challenges in other ways as well.

This is why I’m so excited to lead the EastWest Institute at this particular time. We’re a small organization with an admirable track record for building trust, recasting issues so as to bring about understanding and creative solutions. Most of all, we are looking not only for new ideas but involving new participants as we seek solutions to seemingly intractable problems—the ones that have the experts so alarmed, but are, in a very real sense, opportunities to redefine conflicts that have (because of repeated efforts to climb the same hill by the same path) eluded solution.

EastWest brings together a broad set of constituencies for change. In China, for example, we promote party-to-party talks; we sponsor very senior military-to-military talks; we bring together businesspeople with a variety of backgrounds and talents. Who better to assess China’s economic decisions and their impact on the West? Who better to take a hard look at military capacities and choices and the risks they create? Who better to judge the changing nature of political power in China and how it fits (or irritates) American political leaders?

Yes, of course, we admire the efforts that the P5+1 and Iran have made in traditional diplomacy to address the role of Iran in a tense Middle East. We intend to follow up to encourage other players in the region to work not just on security issues, but find other areas of common interest that can contribute to sustained stability and open the prospect of true progress, not only with Iran but with its neighbors, from Turkey and Kurdistan to the Gulf countries and beyond.

Yes, of course, we admire the efforts to reach a settlement in post-2014 Afghanistan, and we aspire to augment any such successes with our initiative to reconnect Afghanistan to its neighbors, most notably India and Pakistan, with economic and business experts leading this effort. Yes, of course, we admire efforts by international institutions to prevent the collapse of the Euro, and we’ll help that effort with our ability to bring senior business leaders to the region to look at the fundamentals of investment and growth, not just in Greece, but also in the various regions of Europe hit hard by the prospect of Greece’s crisis.

I don’t mean to say these “dangerous times” have simple solutions. Rather, I believe the solutions to these and other challenges will, in the 21st century, not be found in the same way. The solutions may not be as conceptually coherent as we’ve convinced ourselves they were in the past, and there will be a lot more participants who don’t come from the ranks of traditional foreign policy experts. Non-state actors of all sorts will be involved, and consensus among them may be tough to find, and yet, this breadth and diversity of opinions will spur the creativity these times require.

With its history of building bridges, promoting patience, respect, and understanding, and above all approaching problems with novel solutions, the EastWest Institute welcomes the opportunities these difficult times present.

Публикуемый в переводе на русский язык доклад «Афганский наркотрафик: сценарии развития ситуации после 2014 года» продолжает серию публикаций, отражающих анализ и рекомендации российско-американской Рабочей группы по проблеме афганского наркопотока, организованной Институтом Восток-Запад в 2011 году. С прекращением мандата Международных сил содействия безопасности (МССБ) и выводом из Афганистана значительной части иностранного военного контингента страна сталкивается с вызовами переходного периода, существенно повышающими риски военно-политической дестабилизации и роста производства опиатов.

Учитывая значительную степень неопределенности дальнейшего развития событий внутри и вокруг Афганистана, авторы доклада приняли за основу анализа сценарный подход, основанный на комбинации двух базовых факторов, определяющих уровень безопасности в стране и, соответственно, потенциал развития наркоэкономики как способа выживания в кризисных условиях: степень политического единства и уровень внешней поддержки (прежде всего в отношении Афганских сил национальной безопасности). Примечательно, что в рамках каждого из четырех получившихся сценариев, от более-менее оптимистичного до самого негативного, российские и американские эксперты находят возможности для развития сотрудничества России и США в борьбе с наркоугрозой. К сожалению, подготовка и выпуск доклада (оригинал на английском языке увидел свет в феврале 2015 года) совпали с периодом резкого обострения российско-американских отношений, вызванного украинским конфликтом, а также более глубокими расхождениями во взглядах на современный миропорядок между политическими элитами двух стран. Взаимодействие России и США в сфере противодействия афганской наркоугрозе стало одной из жертв этого обострения, оказавшись фактически замороженным в результате введенных Западом антироссийских санкций.

Однако к моменту выхода в свет русского текста доклада появились признаки растущего понимания руководителями обеих стран того факта, что для решения ряда приоритетных международных проблем сотрудничество России, США и их союзников является насущной необходимостью в интересах их обоюдной национальной и глобальной безопасности и должно быть защищено от влияния политических разногласий по другим вопросам. Так, в телефонном разговоре 15 июля 2015 года президенты В.Путин и Б.Обама выразили «взаимный настрой на продолжение совместной работы в интересах устойчивой реализации венских договорённостей [по иранскому ядерному досье], а также по некоторым другим актуальным международным темам, включая противодействие угрозе международного терроризма.» (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49999). Сотрудничество в борьбе с терроризмом и экстремизмом неизбежно создает предпосылки для возвращения к активному взаимодействию России и Запада в противодействии наркоугрозе, в частности в свете все более очевидных попыток ИГИЛ распространить свое влияние на Афганистан и другие страны центрально-азиатского региона. Как отмечалось в первом докладе Рабочей группы «Афганский наркотрафик: совместная оценка угрозы», «связи между наркотрафиком и организованным вооруженным насилием (и транснациональными сетями криминального и террористического толка) служат источником новых типов угроз безопасности на региональном и глобальном уровнях.» (http://www.ewi.info/idea/afghan-narcotrafficking-joint-threat-assessment-russian-edition). Более подробный анализ этой связи, в частности в сфере использования финансовых доходов от мировой торговли афганскими наркотиками, Рабочая группа планирует представить в одном из своих очередных докладов в 2016 году.

Afghan security forces are in one hell of a fight with Taliban insurgents this year. According to statistics compiled by an American-led coalition official in the country and seen by the New York Times, casualties rates are up 50 percent compared to the previous year.

So far 4,100 soldiers and police officers have been killed and about 7,800 wounded with months of heavy fighting still ahead. In comparison, in all of 2014 around 5,000 members of the Afghan security forces were killed battling the ongoing insurgency.

In March 2015, the commander of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, Gen. John F. Campbell, testified  in front of the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee on the war and combat readiness of Afghan security forces (see: “Quo Vadis Afghanistan: General Campbell Testifies on the Hill”), and also discussed Afghan losses:

A high ANDSF [Afghan National Defense and Security Forces] attrition rate, which accounts for casualties and all other losses to the force, has had an impact on combat readiness. If present rates continue, it will pose challenges to force development over time. The main causes of ANDSF attrition are assessed as poor leadership; high operational tempo; inadequate soldier/police care; and poor force management.

According to a retired Afghan general interviewed by the New York Times, the current casualty rates are, among other things, caused by the lack of an offensive spirit among troops. “We are in a passive defense mode — we are not chasing the enemy. Units get surrounded, and we don’t send them support, so they are killed,” he says.

The New York Times reports that Afghan security forces are struggling to maintain a military stalemate and are slowly losing ground to extremist forces in the country:

A range of interviews with army and police commanders and regional government officials in crucial battleground areas indicated that even though the Afghan forces have nominally met their goal of maintaining a presence in every city and all but a very few district centers, they are often functionally penned in by the Taliban, rarely mounting patrols, much less taking territory back.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that insurgent forces will be able to dislocate them from key geographical positions and major cities during this year’s fighting season.

The United States has so far spent $60.7 billion to train, equip and pay 195,000 members of the Afghan army and 157,000 members of the police force. However, as I reported before (see: “Taliban Onslaught: What Is Happening in Afghanistan?”) the number of troops and police is not reliable according to John Sopko, the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction (SIGAR).

Indeed, the United States and NATO have no clear idea how many Afghan soldiers and police are currently engaged in combating Taliban insurgents (see: “Pentagon Declassifies Information on Afghan Security Forces”). The New York Times reports that desertion remains a critical problem for government forces.

A June 2015 report by the U.S. Department of Defense discussing the progress of the war in Afghanistan admits that the performance of Afghan security forces “was uneven” during combat operations.  However, the paper also points out that government forces “continue to demonstrate that they are capable and can undertake relatively sophisticated operations with minimal coalition advice and assistance.”

Additionally, the report observes:

Overall, the ANDSF’s most critical gaps remain in aviation, intelligence, and special operations, all linked to the ANDSF’s targeting capability. These gaps will endure for some time, even with the addition of key enablers. 

Last, it predicts that casualty rates will “increase in the next several months.” It appears that Afghan security forces will have a tough fight ahead of them in the next couple of months.

To read this article published by The Diplomat, click here.

In the discussion of China’s intentions on its ocean frontier, little attention is paid to the evolution of the academic underpinnings of its policy, especially in the field of international law. When I was writing my 1998 book, China’s Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force, and National Development, there was really only one place to go ─ the State Oceanic Administration of China. That book pointed out that when China participated in the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea from 1973-1982, which resulted in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the country’s international law institutions were virtually non-existent. Most law schools had been closed during the Cultural Revolution that began in 1966 and did not reopen until after 1976.

Since the turn of the century, there has been a growth industry in China for the study of maritime law and policy. For example, the Journal of the Ocean University of China was launched in 2002. This was a product of the Ocean University of China, an institution with a long history after 1959, which has been upgraded several times, most recently in 2002.

There are now also several institutes specializing in the South China Sea. The most visible has been the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, set up as such in 2004, at its predecessor, the Hainan Research Institute of South China Sea, which was founded in 1996. This research center, based in Haikou, has produced a range of studies that are never too far from the government’s lines of policy. For example, its published research and occasional statements by its researchers have vacillated on the meaning of the nine-dashed line in the South China Sea, but most have leaned toward giving it some sort of legal effect. This reflects the unresolved ambivalence in the Chinese government to this line left over from history.

A more interesting organization may be the South China Sea Institute set up in 2012 in the Center for Oceans Law and Policy in Xiamen University.

Xiamen is one of the four original Special Economic Zones announced in 1979, but one which never took off in the same way that Shenzhen did. The main reason for the difference was that Shenzhen was designed to exploit its proximity to Hong Kong’s booming economy, while the Xiamen zone was aimed at exploiting its proximity to Taiwan. Though the latter had a booming economy as well, the evolution of the Xiamen zone remained hostage to the painfully slow development of direct contacts in cross-strait relations in the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, Hong Kong and Shenzhen remained the main transit point for Taiwan commerce into China for most of the time since 1979.

The rapid pick-up of direct links between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan in recent years has seen Xiamen boom. This progress, and its strategic significance, can be captured in an anecdotal way by the emergence in 2005 of the China Oceans Law Review, a typical academic research publication. What makes this law and policy journal special is that it is a collaborative effort between two mainland university centers (the Xiamen University Center for Oceans Policy and Law, and the Shanghai Jiao Tong University Center for Oceans Law and Policy), and centers from Taiwan (Sun Yat-sen University Institute of Marine Affairs), Hong Kong (the Polytechnic University C. Y. Tung International Center for Maritime Studies), and Macau (University of Macau Institute for Advanced Legal Studies). The journal is bi-lingual and is published in Hong Kong. A selection of 60 papers can be viewed here.

As might be expected from a more cosmopolitan enterprise, this journal reflects a certain maturing of the academic debate in China on matters of ocean policy and law. Several articles on the South China Sea are worth noting, including one by Shih-Ming Kao and Nathaniel S. Pearre (“Potential Alternatives to the Disputes in the South China Sea: An Analysis”, No.1, 2013, pp.262-290) and one by Zhao Wei (“Resolving Maritime Delimitation Disputes by Agreement: Practices of States Bordering the South China Sea and Their Implications for China”, No.1, 2013, pp.156-181).

In spite of the uncertainty created about possible new clashes in the South China Sea because of activities by claimants in the past five years, the maturing of Chinese views of ocean law is worth further study. A diplomatic source has suggested to the author that a new initiative by Indonesia, the sponsor of the first effective Track 2 process on the South China Sea beginning in 1990, which led to the 2002 Code of Conduct, may be about to bear fruit. One test of this will be the outcome of a Philippine case in the Permanent Court of Arbitration which convened last Friday, July 10, to deliberate the jurisdiction phase of a Philippines’ case against China’s declaration of its rights to the continental shelf in the South China Sea.

To read the article published by The Diplomat, click here.