Conflict Prevention

Professor Joseph Samuel Nye Jr. is the former Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He currently serves on the Harvard faculty as a University Distinguished Service Professor. Along with Robert Keohane, he founded the theory of “neo-liberalism” in international relations, and more recently coined the often-used phrases of “soft power” and “smart power”. He is one of the world’s foremost intellectuals in the fields of political science, diplomacy and international relations. A 2011 TRIP survey ranked him as the sixth most influential scholar in the field of international relations in the last twenty years, and in October 2014 he was appointed by the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to the Foreign Affairs Policy Board. 

A quarter century has passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall – November 1989. Many strategic analysts believe that the United States is still using the same pattern of collapse of communism in the East bloc to confront Iran. In the “Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics”, you have pointed to the American experience as well as the designation of the Marshall Plan as the means to undermine the Soviet soft power components. Do you believe that the same pattern can be adopted from the Cold War to undermine Iran’s soft power?

I do not think the situation of Iran today is like the Cold War. Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union collapsed from it own internal economic contradictions. The Marshall Plan was forty years earlier and designed to help West European economies recover from the devastation of World War II. The Soviet Union lost soft power after its invasions on Hungary and Czechoslovakia. If there is a lesson in this for Iran, it is to free up its markets and society, and beware of interventions in neighboring countries.

This rationale has major drawbacks: essentially because Soviet Russia and Iran are profoundly different in not just their ideological makeup but the nature of their soft power. Iran’s Islamic Republic draws its narrative from Shia Islam, while Soviet Russia was born from atheist Marxism. Several critics of the US actually believe the country has ignored those fundamental and philosophical differences which exist in between Iran and Soviet Russia. How do you understand Washington’s position vis-à-vis Iran and are we seeing a repeat of the Cold War strategy here? In which case can this approach really serve the US?

That is correct, but remember that Shia Islam is a minority and Iran should be wary of intervening in sectarian disputes. I do not see this as a repeat of a Cold War strategy. President Obama expressed an openness to dialogue right from the beginning of his presidency. Iran was initially reluctant to engage in that dialogue.

Although the Soviet Union collapsed and communism was to some degree defeated – Russia after all came to embrace capitalism, Moscow nevertheless preserved its political independence by remaining a non-aligned superpower. Is it not possible therefore to envisage that Iran will accomplish such feat – in that its goals might stray from the initial “revolutionary mindset” but still act an opposition to American imperialism? After all there are more than one way to resist and challenge.

Capitalism in Russia is highly distorted by corruption. As I show in my book, “Is the American Century Over?” Russia is heavily dependent on one “crop” (energy) for two thirds of its exports. It also faces a demographic decline. This is not good, because declining powers often take greater risks such as Putin engages in now in his invasion of Ukraine and his intervention in Syria. I have no idea what the future of Iran will be, but it would be a mistake to model it on Russia.

President Richard Nixon called the US’ negotiations with Soviet Russia a “victory without war”. What President Nixon introduced and President Ronald Reagan followed into was a series of non-military actions which led to the ‘internal collapse’ of a country.President Barack Obama alluded a similar strategy, when, in an interview he argued that the path taken by both Nixon and Reagan vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and China inspired his own policies. Taking into account that his comments were made on the wake of the Iranian nuclear deal do you think the US is looking for “containment” instead of a real rapprochement? Is Obama replicating a Cold War scenario?

As I said above, I do not think Obama is following a Cold War strategy. My personal view is that the Middle East is involved in decades long series of revolutions, primarily in Sunni areas, which outsiders like the United States have little capacity to control. In that sense, containing the spread of ISIS and its successors makes sense, but large scale intervention like the war in Iraq does not make sense. Where Iran will fit in all this will depend on Iran’s behavior.

Will this Iran nuclear deal lead to an increase of America’s footprint in the ME and therefore see Iran lose influence?

I do not think the Iran nuclear deal will increase the US footprint nor necessarily erode Iran’s influence. Much will depend on how Iran chooses to behave.

Do you think US’ efforts to increase its soft power and smart power in Iran will lead to a change in narrative within the country, in that Iranians will no longer look on America with suspicion and animosity?

In general, increased contacts can reduce the stereotypes of hostility that can develop among countries. I hope with time this will be the case between the US and Iran. Soft power can be a positive sum game from which both sides gain.

In a recent piece for National Interest, you wrote that the real challenge that the US is facing could be called “the rise of the rest”. Some authors such as Fareed Zakaria in his “Post-Americanism World”, are pointing to the same challenge. There are also philosophers who believe that America as “the” world superpower is coming to an end – For example American philosopher, Richard Rorty wrote in a piece for Decent magazine: “The American Century has ended (…) The spiritual life of secularist Westerners centered on hope for the realization of those ideals. As that hope diminishes, their life becomes smaller and meaner.” In view of such analysis, do you think the US can overcome those challenges stemming from its power and hegemony? Or is it the US has no clear awareness of such challenge?

Americans have worried about their decline since the early days of the founding fathers centuries ago. In the last half century there have been several cycles of declinism. This tells you more about American psychology than it does about relative power positions of countries. In my book, I explain why I do not think the American century is over. At the same time, the rise of transnational challenges like climate change, cyber terrorism, and international financial stability will require cooperation among countries. In that sense, the rise of the rest as well as the new transnational challenges will require the US to work with others. There will be no American imperialism or hegemony, but as the largest country, there will still be a need for leadership in organizing global collective goods.

In his September 16 address at a meeting with the IRGC commanders in Tehran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said: “cultural and political penetration is more dangerous than military and security threats.” You also referred to the ‘culture’ as one of the key elements of soft power – you mentioned both the US educational and popular cultures of America as powerful media – maybe here we could use the term Trojan horses. Iran’s leadership has repeatedly warned against such “cultural invasion”. Iranians have themselves naturally organized into movements to counteract Western cultural intrusion, thus manifesting a national trend. Do you see a situation where Iran would disappear to the US; or could it be that Iran will walk a different path than that of the Soviet Union?

Countries evolve over time, and I have no idea what future choices Iran will make, but I suspect that most of its future evolution will be determined from inside Iran.

To read the interview at Iran's View, click here.

EWI’s U.S.-China High-Level Security Dialogue took place in Beijing on November 16-19. The American team—EWI staff and invited experts—was welcomed at the highest levels in China, from the think tanks of the Foreign and Defense Ministries to the Academy of Military Science of the People’s Liberation Army, from headquarters of the Communist Party's International Department to the Foreign Ministry to Peking. Yes, there is concern about terrorism, especially as a challenge in China’s west, where experts told us development has blunted efforts by extremists (and where the police keep things in check). Yes, there is concern about the increase in tensions in the South China Sea. But most of all, even among foreign policy and military experts, there is a focus on national goals internal to the country: doubling the GDP between 2010 and 2020 and achieving a “modernized country” by 2050.  

The Chinese leaders are more comfortable addressing climate change or proliferation in the context of their understanding of a multi-polar world, expressing repeatedly their commitment to win-win solutions and the common good. When pressed by visitors about how China can use its growing power to join the fight against the Islamic State, or contribute to settling the crisis of legitimacy in the Middle East, or stabilize Afghanistan, the answers reflected the primacy of domestic policy:  the importance of the reforms undertaken by President Xi. Even the One Belt, One Road policy is seen as much as a domestic project as a foreign one.

Most significant, perhaps, was the importance that the Chinese place in continued contact, and the enthusiasm with which they greeted the American team. It was clearly a priority that Wang Jiarui, Vice Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Conference, emphasized in his meeting with the team. That there are ongoing challenges he readily admitted, both in domestic issues and with the outside world, including the United States. But he expressed very strong support for the ongoing programs of EWI with China, from the Sanya military-to-military initiative that will convene, also in Beijing, at the beginning of December, and the Party-to-Party talks that he personally hopes to attend in the U.S. late in 2016. Wang gave a frank appraisal as well of his own area of special competence, relations between China and North Korea. The Chinese are watchful, pragmatic, and very much engaged not only with their neighbors in the DPRK but also with the South Koreans and Japanese; Wang himself has made a strong effort to make sure that Beijing and Seoul understand one another well. He too, along with nearly every other foreign policy expert in the discussions, made clear that the future of the understanding built between groups of international experts relies, in the case of China, in close attention to the Chinese vision of their own internal developments. Without this, he noted, the basis on which relations are founded will be incomplete.

That said, it is clearly not enough to rely on bilateral links, successful as they may be in the efforts of EWI and the Chinese. The issues that America and China face are rarely issues limited to the two countries. In the South China Sea, let us not forget the role of Vietnam, the Philippines, or Malaysia, let alone the international conventions of the Law of the Sea.

In the course of the One Belt, One Road projects, the concerns of India, Pakistan and Afghanistan will be paramount. Indeed, there is clearly a need for more breadth of vision, breaking out of the straitjacket of bilateral meetings that sometimes repeat arguments that have been stated many times before. The Chinese and the American participants agreed that more partners and more issues will make that which EWI has built that much stronger. It will allow the other issues of the day—the terrorist threat in Europe, the challenges to stability in the Middle East—to enter the conversation between America and China in new ways as well.

In order to advocate for continued regional economic cooperation in the face of a deteriorating security situation, EWI's Regional Security Initiative convened an event in Dushanbe on October 12-14, 2015. EWI's Vice President for Regional Security, Ambassador Martin Fleischer, led a delegation of senior political and business practitioners from Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Turkey, who met with high-ranking Tajik government officials. 

The mission highlighted the cross-border economic progress currently being seen, while exploring opportunities for continued intra-regional success and drawing attention to potential hurdles to further growth. Also on the discussion table were the significant security challenges currently facing Afghanistan and the greater Central Asian neighborhood, and how the region can continue to foster economic growth and development in a seemingly daunting situation.

Click here to download the full report. 

Click here to view pictures from the event. 

The former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government Joseph Nye has been a central figure in American foreign policy for the last four decades. He has served in the United States government as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology.

He has written many influential books. Best known is Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. His most recent book Is the American Century Over? (Wiley, 2015) argues that the United States remains the critical power in the world and that current trends suggest it will maintain that position, although the nature of its power will shift.

Clearly, China is the rising power in the world. And yet I wonder whether the inevitable competition between the United States and China necessarily has to end in a bitter confrontation. I think that such an anticipation is culturally based with no real basis in reality. How do you think the fates of the United States and of China will be interlinked? Do you think that good relations are critical to the United States maintaining its global position?

China’s size and its high rate of economic growth will bring it closer to the United States in terms of the basic resources for influence over the next few decades. Such an evolution does not necessarily imply that China will surpass the U.S. as the most powerful country. Even if China were to suffer no major domestic political setbacks, many of the current projections for its future growth are simple linear extrapolations of current growth rates and those rates are likely to slow in the future. Moreover, looking only at economic projections can result in a one­dimensional understanding of power because one ignores the strengths of the U.S. military and American advantages in terms of soft power. Also, we should not overlook China’s geopolitical disadvantages within the context of the internal Asian balance of power. China’s position is less favorable by comparison than America’s relations with regards to the Americas, Europe, Japan, India and other countries. 

On the question of absolute decline, rather than relative American decline, the United States faces serious problems such as debt, general access of the population to adequate secondary education, growing income inequality and political gridlock at home. Although these issues are important, they are ultimately only part of the picture. On the positive side of the ledger we can find favorable trends for the United States in terms of demography (not the serious aging of the population that we find in East Asia), technology (lead in research and the creation of new fields), and energy. And there are abiding factors that favor the United States such as its geographical location and its enduring entrepreneurial culture. 

As an overall assessment, describing the 21st century as one of American decline is inaccurate and misleading. America has many problems, but it is not in absolute decline in the sense that the late Roman Empire was. The current trends suggest that the United States will remain more powerful than any single state in the coming several decades. 

I think that ultimately the greatest challenges for the United States will not be that it is overtaken by China, or overwhelmed by some other contender. Rather the United States may well be faced with a complex landscape of power resources made up of both states and nonstate actors that pose unprecedented challenges. The task for the United States increasingly will be to organize alliances and networks that can be mobilized to effectively address an increasing number of new transnational problems. And increasingly we will be challenged to organize such complex multilateral cooperation for their solution. 

Contrary to the claims of some who proclaim this century the “Chinese century,” we do not see any signs of a post­American world. That said, although American leadership will continue, it will take a different form than it did in the 20th century. As I wrote some time ago, the paradox of American power is that although the United States has tremendous assets, unmatched in the world, nevertheless the only superpower cannot go it alone. 

I do not think that China should make the mistakes that the United States made. For example, China should not be a free rider on global issues, benefiting from the global order but not actively contributing to it. The United States did so in the 1930s and it was a major error. 

The American share of the world economy will be less in this century than it was in the middle of the past century. But the greater challenge will be responding effectively to the simple complexity of new challenges. That means newly emerging countries and a panoply of nonstate actors. These new challenges will make it difficult for even the largest power to wield influence and organize action. In the end, I feel that rather than China, the greater challenge for the United States will be institutional entropy. 

Why did you feel there was a need to affirm America’s strengths at this particular moment? What are the reasons that some are led to underestimate America’s capabilities?

In the 1990s, I wrote that the rapid rise of China could cause a global conflict similar to that described by Thucydides in his monumental study of the disastrous Peloponnesian War in ancient Greece. Thucydides concluded that the rise of Athenian power instilled a fear in Sparta that set in motion an escalation of tensions and conflicts. 

Today, I think that such a scenario of overt conflict between China and the United States is unlikely in the current environment. There are, however, analysts who insist that China cannot rise peacefully. 

And then there are those who draw analogies to the geopolitical tensions that brought on World War I, specifically how Germany surpassing Britain in industrial power brought the order in Europe into question. In this respect Thucydides’ other warning is important to bear in mind: the belief in the inevitability of conflict can become one of its main causes. There is a possible scenario in which each side, believing it will end up at war with the other, makes reasonable military preparations in accordance with that assumption which then are read by the other side as confirmation of its worst fears. Such a vicious cycle can be set in motion. 

An accurate assessment of power relations is essential to prevent miscalculations in policy. There remains a concern that as China grows more nationalistic, it faces the dangers of hubris. Similarly, there is a risk that the United States will overreact to fears of dangers posed by the rise of China and exacerbate the situation. 

Fortunately, it is doubtful that China will have the military capability to pursue any overly ambitious dreams in the next several decades. Costs matter. It is easier to indulge one’s wish list for future expansion if you are looking at a menu with no prices attached. Thus, if Chinese leaders try to match the United States in any meaningful manner, they will have to contend with the reactions of other countries, as well as with the constraints created by their own objectives of continued economic growth and the pursuit of external markets and resources. 

Thus I continue to welcome a peaceful rise for China and I believe that with thoughtful statesmanship serious conflicts can be avoided.

When we try to assess the U.S.­China relationship, it is valuable to look back to the past, like the completion of Athens and Sparta, or the United States and Great Britain, or Great Britain and Germany. But it is also true that we are witnessing technological developments today that are simply unprecedented in human history. The advancement of computer processors at an exponential rate has transformed some aspects of international relations, and complicated the relationship of the United States with the world. This development cannot be found in history books because it has never happened before.

It appears that technology will not only determine wealth and power, but also transform the very nature of international relations.

The U.S. will likely maintain its technological lead for the next five to ten years, and probably beyond then. It is impossible to predict fifty years in the future. U.S. spending on research and development is currently about 2.9 percent of GDP, an amount exceeded only by the spending of South Korea, Japan and Germany. China and the European Union are closer to 2 percent of GDP. Equally significant is the strong entrepreneurial culture and the access to venture capital in the United States which pushes forward technological change. 

I am not as optimistic about the United States and its prospects for the future in science and technology without radical reform. I worry that the overall level of competence is slowly dropping in relative and in absolute terms. 

If one looks at the technologies that are often cited as most transformative for this century we find generally that the United States remains at the forefront of new developments. This statement holds true for biotechnology, nanotechnology, and remains true for the next generation of information technology. 

Some suggest that climate change is a game changer at multiple levels. First, the response to climate change will require a new level of engagement with the world as equals that the United States may find difficult. And secondly climate change means that the United States will suffer because the economy is too deeply invested in oil. Just as the United States was able to pull ahead of Britain because Britain was too deeply invested in coal in the last century, could it be that this time around that China will find it easier to move to solar and wind power because it is not as invested in oil? 

Also it may be that the U.S. military cannot make the shift as quickly to addressing the security challenge of climate change because it is so deeply invested in weapons of the past. 

I regard climate change as a very important issue. China is now the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide and it has become the world’s largest oil importer. By the 2020s, the shale revolution may mean that North America will no longer be an energy importer. Much of the shale gas will be able to displace coal and oil which produce more greenhouse gases. 

China also has massive shale resources, but it has been slower to exploit them. Overall the U.S. is better placed than China to respond to climate change. That said, the challenge of climate change is going to require the cooperation of the United States, China, India and other nations. No one country will be able to solve this problem on its own, or to escape its consequences. 

Although it may be true that U.S. power will continue longer than many had anticipated, the “death of distance” that rapid technological development has brought about, to quote Frances Cairncross, is increasingly making China a big part of the United States economy itself, and a part of American corporations.

Will not the future U.S. be deeply integrated with China, perhaps to a degree unprecedented? 

The U.S. and China are deeply entangled, and that state is largely a good thing. Deterrence of destructive military or cyber actions can rest on denial, punishment, or entanglement. China and the U.S. would each suffer if they launched a nuclear strike, or took down each other’s electric grid. That discourages such drastic acts. In the economic realm as well, China cannot afford to dump its dollars onto world markets because such an act would hurt them as much, or more than, it would hurt the U.S. As Robert Keohane and I wrote about power and interdependence forty years ago, where there is symmetrical interdependence, there is not much power. 

To read the interview at The Diplomat, click here.

To read the original version of the interview at Asia News, click here.